Full text of "India and Tibet; a history of the relations which have subsisted between the two countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910; with a particular account of the mission to Lhasa of 1904"

See other formats

Ofartiell Untoctattg SItbratg

CHARLES WILLIAM WASON
COLLECTION

CHINA AND THE CHINESE

THE GIFT OF

CHARLES WFLLIAM WASON

CLASS OF 1876

1918

i lu ■ ^ y :

The original of tiiis book is in
tine Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023235108

INDIA AND TIBET

Cornell University Library
DS 785.Y78

India and Tibet a lilstory of tlie reiatio

3 1924 023 235 108

THE DALAI LAMA.

Frontispiece.

INDIA AND TIBET

A HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS WHICH HAVE
SUBSISTED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
FROM THE TIME OF WARREN HASTINGS TO
1910 ; WITH A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE
MISSION TO LHASA OF 1904

BY SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND
K.C,LE.

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1910

]/\/o'^im

\ij m\

MY WI|FE,

ON WHOM FELL THE ANXIETY

AND SUSPENSE OF

DISTANTLY AWAITING THE RESULTS OF HIGH ADVENTURE,

I DEDICATE THIS BOOK,

IN THE HOPE THAT

FROM IT MAY COME SOME RECOMPENSE FOR

THE SUFFERING SHE ENDURED

PREFACE

An apology is needed for the length of this book. When
it was passing through the press, a Parliainentary Blue-
book appeared containing much important information as to
recent developments, and what 1 had intended as only the
account of our relatipns with Tibet up to the return of the
Mission of 1904 1 thought with advantage might be extended
to include our relations to the present time. The whole
forms one connected narrative of the attempt, protracted
over 137 years, to accomplish a single purpose — the estab-
lishment of ordinary neighbourly intercourse with Tibet.
The dramatic ending disclosed is that, when that purpose
had at last been achieved, we forthwith abandoned the
result.

The reasons for this abandonment have been — firstly,
the jealousy borne by two great Powers for one another ;
and, secondly, the love of isolation engrained in us islanders.
I have suggested that our aim should be to replace jealousy
by co-operation, and, instead of coiling up in frigid isolation,
we should expand ourselves to make and keep friendships.

The means I have recommended are living personalities
rather than dry treaties, and what Warren Hastings and
Lord Curzon wanted — an agent at Lhasa — is to me also
the one true means of achieving our purpose.

I am fully conscious of having made mistakes in that
part of the conduct of these affairs which fell to me to
discharge. The exactly true adjustment of diplomatic
with military requirements, and of the wishes of men in
England with the necessities of the situation in Tibet,
could only be made by a human being arrived at perfec-
tion. Not yet having arrived there, I doubtless made
many errors. I can only assume that, if 1 had never
made a mistake, I should never have made a success.

viii PREFACE

Likewise, in my recommendations for the future, I may
often be in error in detail, but in the main conclusion of
substituting intimacy for isolation and effecting the change
by personality, 1 would fain beheve I shall prove right.

What I say has no official inspiration or sanction,
for I have left the employment of Government, and
am seeking to serve my country in fields of greater
freedom though not less responsibility ; but, in compiling
the narrative of our relations with the Tibetans, I have
made the fullest use of the four Blue-books which have
been presented to Parliament. These contain information
of the highest value, though in the very undigested form
characteristic of Parhamentary Papers. Beyond personal
impressions I have added nothing to them, but merely
sought to deduce from them a connected account of events
and of the motives which impelled them. To Sir Clement
Markham's account of Bogle's Mission and Manning's
journey to Lhasa, to Captain Turner's account of his
Mission to Tibet, and to Perceval Landon's, Edmund
Candler's, and Colonel Waddell's accounts of the Mission
of 1904, I am also indebted, as well as to Mr. White,
Captain Bailey and Messrs. Johnston and Hoffman for
photographs.

I lastly desire to acknowledge the trouble which
Mr. John Murray has so kindly taken in correcting the
proofs.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

September 1, 1 910.

P.S. — Too late to make use of it, I have received the
just published reprint from the T'sung Pao of Mr. Rock-
hill's " The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations to
the Manchu Emperors of China." The conclusion of this
famous authority on Tibet, that the Tibetans have no desire
for total independence of China, but that their complaints
have always been directed against the manner in which
the local Chinese officials have performed their duties, is
particularly noteworthy.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

WAREEN HASTINGS' POLICY: BOGLE's MISSION — 1774

Bhutanese aggression on Bengal in 1772, p. 4. Warren Hastings repels
aggression, p. 4. Tashi Lama intercedes on behalf of Bhutanese, p. 5. Warren
Hastings replies, proposing treaty of amity and commerce, p. 7- His policy, p. 7.
He selects Bogle for Mission, p. 8. His instructions to Bogle, p. 9. Value of
discretionary powers to agents, p, 10. Bogle's reception by Tashi Lama, p. 13.
The Lama acknowledges-unjustifiability of Bhutanese action, p. 14. Conversation
regarding trade, p. 16. Bogle receives two Lhasa delegates, p. 17. Tibetan fear
of the Chinese, p. 18. Bogle suggests alliance with Tibetans against Gurkhas,
p. 19. Obstructiveness of Lhasa delegates, p. 20. The Nepalese instigate the
Tibetans against Bogle, p. 21. Conversations with Kashmiri and Tibetan
merchants, p. 22. Results of the Mission, p. 24.

CHAPTER H

wAiiREN Hastings' policy (contimied) : turner's mission — 1782

Warren Hastings' further efforts, p. 26. Captain Turner sent to Shigatse,
p. 27. Power of the Chinese, p. 28. Admission to traders granted, p. 29.
Nepalese invasion in 1792, p. 30. Closing of intercourse with Tibet, p. 31.

CHAPTER III

manning's visit to LHASA? — 1811

Manning's previous career, p. 33. He makes friends with the Chinese, p. 34.
Obtains permission from them to visit Lhasa, p. 37. He visits the Grand Lama,
p. 37. His stay in Lhasa, p. 38. Results of his journey, p. 39. Subsequent
exploration, p. 40.

CHAPTER IV

THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS — 1873-1886

Bengal Government urge improvement of intercourse with the Tibetans,
1873, p. 42. Press for admission of tea to Tibet, p. 44. Delay caused by refer-
ence of local questions to central Governments, p. 45. Cobnan Macaulay's
efforts in 1885, p. 46. The Tibetans cross our frontier in force, 1886, p. 47.
Neither Chinese nor Tibetan Government can or will withdraw them, -p. 48.
General Graham expels them, 1888, p. 49.

X CONTENTS

CHAPTER V

THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 1890

The Chinese ask that a treaty should be made^ p. 60. Convention signed
Marchj 1890, p. 51. Trade Regulations signed December, 1893, p. 52. Tibetans
fail to observe Regulations, p. 54. Bengal Government wish to protest, p. 65.
Government of India prefer to be patient, p. 56. Tibetans occupy land inside
Treaty boundary, p. 60. Efforts to demarcate boundary, p. 67- Tibetans
remove boundary pillars, p. 59. Sir Charles Elliott proposes occupation of
Chumbi, p. 61. Government of India adhere to policy of forbearance, p. 62.
Reasons for Tibetans^ seclusive policy, p. 63, Chinese fail to arrange matters,
p, 64. Report on result of five years' working of the Treaty, p. 65.

CHAPTER VI

SECUBING THE TREATY EIGHTS 1899-1903

Attempts by Lord Curzon to open direct communication with Dalai Lama,
p. 66. Dalai Lama's iVlission to Russia, p. 67. Russian Government disclaim its
having political nature, p. 68. Tibetans expelled b^ us from Giagong inside
Treaty boundary, p. 71. Rumours of Russo-Tibetan agreement, p. 72. Reasons
why Russian activity in Tibet should cause Indian Government anxiety, p. 73.
Indian Government propose sending Mission to Lhasa, p. 76.

CHAPTER VII

NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA 1903

Russian protests, p. 79. Lord t,ansdowne's rejoinder, p. 81. Russian
assurances of no intention to interfere in Tibet, p. 82. Such assurances did not
preclude possibility of Tibetans relying on Russian support, p. 83.

CHAPTER VIII

A MISSION SANCTIONED 1903

Views of His Majesty's Government on general question, p. 84. Corre-
spondence with Viceroy as to scope of Mission, p. 86. Viceroy's proposal to
have agent at Gyantse, p. 87. Decision to despatch a Mission to Khamba Jong,
p. 87. Correspondence with the Chinese, p. 88. Instructions to the British
Commissioner, p. 91. Justification for despatch of Mission, p. 92.

CHAPTER IX

SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 1903

I am summoned to Simla, May, 1903, p. 95. Receive Lord Curzon's instruc-
tions, p. 96. Mr. White's arrival, p. 97. Magnificent scenery on way to Dar-
jiling, p. 100. Views of Kinchinjunga, p. 101. Assistance given by Bengal
Government, p. 103. Tropical forests, p. 104. Character of Lepchas, p. 107.
Hard work of 32nd Pioneers, p. 108. Reach Upper Sikkim, p. 109. Tibetans
protest against our passing Giagong, p. 110. Lhasa delegates arrive on frontier,
p. 111. Mr. White, with escort, reach Khamba Jong, p. 112.

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER X

KHAMBA JONG 1903

I join Mr. White at Khamba Jong, p. 116. Interview with Mr. Ho, p. 117.
Speech to Tibetan delegates, p. 118. They refuse to report to Lhasa, p. 121.
Recreations at Khamba Jong, p. 122. Deputation from Tashi Lama, p. 123.
Arrival of Mr. Wilton, p. 124. Viceroy suggests to Resident he himself should
meet me, p. 124. Two Sikkimese seized by Tibetans, p. 126. Shigatse Abbot
arrives, p. 125. Situation grows threatening, p. 128. Departure of Mr. Ho,
p. 131. My suggestions to Government for meeting the situation, p. 132. Aid
given by Nepalese, p. 133. British representation to Chinese Government,
p. 138. Recommendations of Indian Government, p. 140. Secretary of State
sanctions advance to Gyantse, p. 140. Viceroy notifies Chinese Resident, p. 142.
Chinese Government protest, p. 143. Russian Government also protest, p. 144.
Justification for advance, p. 146.

CHAPTER XI

DAKJILING TO CHUMBI 1903

Question of advancing in winter or waiting till spring, p. 149. Risks in
crossing Himalayas in winter, p. 150. Transport preparations, p. 161. Departure
from Dai-jiling, p. 162. Crossing the Jelap-la (pass), p. 153. Protests from
Tibetans, p. 165. Arrive Yatung, p. 156. Macdonald occupies Phari, p. 167.
Obstruction of Lhasa monks, p. 169. Extreme cold, p. 160. Crossing the
Tang-la, p. 160.

CHAPTER XII

TUNA 1904

Lhasa officials come to Tuna, p. 162. I visit Tibetan camp, p. 163. Critical
situation, p. 166. Conclusions as to Tibetan disposition, p. 167- Lhasa General
visits me, p. 168. Severe cold, p. 169. Bhutanese Envoy arrives, p. 169. His
attempts to reason with Tibetans, p. 170. Our losses from cold, p. 172. Mac-
donald arrives, March 28, p. 173. We advance to Guru, p. 174. Troops advance
without firing, p. 176. Tibetans refuse to allow passage, p. 177. Sudden com-
mencement of action, p. 178. Chinese Resident urges delay, p. 179. Our arrival
at Gyantse, p. 180.

CHAPTER XIII

GYANTSE 1904

Friendly attitude of people, p. 182. But no signs of negotiators, p. 183. I
advocate preparations to advance to Lhasa, p. 184. Tibetan troops again assemble,
p. 185. Mission attacked, p. 187. Brander attacks Tibetans on Karo-la (pass),
p. 189. He returns to Gyantse, p. 191. Advance to Lhasa sanctioned by Home
Government, p. 191. Mission escort reinforced, p. 192. Captains Sheppard and
Ottley, p. 192. Brander attacks Palla village, p. 194. I am recalled to Chumbi,
p. 195. Attacked at Kangma, p. 196. I advocate preparing to stop at Lhasa for
winter, p. 197. Government discourage the idea, p. 199. Renewed pledges to
Russia, p. 201. How these fettered the Indian Government, p. 201. Meeting
with Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan, p. 203. More aid from Nepal, p. 206.

xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIV

THE STORMING OF GYANTSiE JONG — 1904

Macdonald, with reinforcements, leaves Chumbi, p. 208. Good feeling of
country people, p. 208. Reinforcements reach Gyantse, p. 209. Ta Lama
arrives to negotiate, p. 211. He is informed jong must be evacuated, p. 216.
Operations against jong commence, p. 217. Gurdon killed, p. 218. Grant leads
assault, p. 219. Jong captured, p. 220. Negotiators not to be found, p. 221.
Preparations for advance completed, p. 221. Tongsa Penlop informs Ta Lama
of my readiness to negotiate en route to Lhasa, and Dalai Lama of our terms,
p. 222.

CHAPTER XV

THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 1904

Dalai Lama asks Tongsa Penlop to effect a settlement, p. 223. Action at
Karo-la, p. 224. At NagartSe find deputation from Lhasa, p. 225. They ask us
to return to Gyantse, p. 226. They fear their religion will be spoilt, p. 230.
And that Russians might want to go to Lhasa, p. 231. Importance I attached to
good personal relations, p. 232. The beautiful Yam-dok Tso (lake), p. 233,
Arrival at Brahmaputra, p. 234. Letter from National Assembly, p. 235.
Question whether to negotiate here or go on to Lhasa, p. 236. Major Bretherton
drowned, p. 237. Dalai Lama's Chamherlain brings letter from his master,
p. 238. I reply that we must advance to Lhasa, p. 239. We discuss general
question of intercourse with India, p. 240. Further discussion with Ta Lama,
p. 243. We advance across Brahmaputra, p. 247. Final deputation attempts to
dissuade us from going to Lhasa, p. 249. Arrival at Lhasa, p. 250.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TERMS 1904

Disadvantage of being pressed for time, p. 251. Views of Indian Govern-
ment regarding terms, p. 252. Their desire to have Agent at Lhasa, p. 252.
And to occupy the Chumbi Valley, p. 256. The question of an indemnity, p. 257.
Of an Agent at Gyantse, p. 258. Of exclusive political influence in Tibet, p. 259.
Of facilities for trade, p. 269. His Majesty's Government consider proposals
excessive, and decide against Agent at Lhasa, p. 260. And against Gyantse Agent
proceeding to Lhasa, p. 262. Amount of indemnity to be such as can be paid in
three years, p. 262.

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEGOTIATIONS

Chinese Resident visits me day of our arrival at Lhasa, p. 263. Question of
entering Lhasa city, p. 264. Impressions of city, p. 265. Reception by Chinese
Resident, p. 266. Nepalese representative and Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan visit
me, p. 267. Flight of Dalai Lama, p. 269. Chinese Resident says ordinary
people anxious for intercourse, p. 270. The Ti Rimpoche (Regent) commences
negotiations, p. 273. Disagrees with obstructive policy of National Assembly,
p. 274. Two Sikkimese prisoners released, p. 276. Difficulties in regard to
indemnity, p. 279. Tongsa Penlop suggests that Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet

CONTENTS xiii

should look to Englandj p. 280. Chinese Resident denounces the Dalai Lama,
p. 282. Tibetans incline to agree to some of terms, p. 282. But continue to
protest against indemnity, p. 284.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE TEEATY CONCLUDED 1904

Pressure for time, p. 289. Military considerations demand very early with-
drawal, p. 290. Necessity for decisive action, p. 290. Tibetans presented with
iinal terms, p. 291. They propose extension of time for payment of indemnity,
p. 294. Reasons for accepting proposal, p. 294. Question of Chumbi Valley,
p. 296. Permission for Gyantse Agent to proceed to Lhasa, p. 299. I insist on
signing Treaty in Potala, p. 300. The ceremony of signature, p. 303.

CHAPTER XIX

IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA 1904

Release of prisoners, p. 307. Visits to monasteries, p. 309. Character or
Lamas, p. 310. The effects of Lamaism on Tibetans and Mongols, p. 314. Visit
to Jo Khang Temple, p. 316. The inner spirit of the people, p. 317. Socia
side of Tibetans, p. 318. Tibetan view of English, p. 319. Chinese attitude to
Tibetans, p. 321.

CHAPTER XX

THE RETUEN 1904

Farewell visits, p. 326. Sensations of good-will, p. 326. Good behaviour of
Indian troops, p. 327. Exploring parties, p. 328. Successful work of Rawling
and Ryder, p. 330. Return to Simla, p. 332. Meeting with Lord Curzon, p. 333.
Audience of His late Majesty, p. 333. Mission flag placed in Windsor Castle,
p. 334.

CHAPTER XXI

RESULTS OF THE MISSION

Good-will of Tibetans, p. 336. Friendship of Bhutan, p. 336. Scientific
results, p. 337. Indemnity reduced by His Majesty's Government, p. 338.
Period of occupation of Chumbi reduced, p. 338. Permission for Gyantse Agent
to proceed to Lhasa abandoned, p. 339. Reasons of His Majesty's Government
for above, p. 339.

CHAPTER XXII

NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA 1905-1910

Convention with China confirming Lhasa Convention, p. 342. Unfriendly
attitude of Chinese in Tibet, p. 343. Their attempts to prevent direct relations
with Tibetans, p. 344. Sir Edward Grey's remonstrances, p. 345. Indian Govern-
ment complains of breaches of Lhasa Convention, p. 347. Chinese device to
prevent direct relations between us and the Tibetans in regard to payment of
indemnity, p. 348. Question of evacuating Chumbi Valley, p. 364. Chumbi
evacuated, p. 369. Trade Regulations agreed to, p. 359. Chinese forward move-
ment commences, p. 362. Bhutan taken under our protection, p. 365.

xiv CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIII

A'lTITPDE OF THE TIBETANS SINCE 1904 1904-1910

Favourable Tibetan attitude following signature of Treaty, p. 367. Dis-
turbances in Eastern Tibet, 1905, p. 368. Batang annexed by Chinese, p. 372.
Dalai Lama's movements in Mongolia, p. 377. Anglo-Russian agreement in
regard to Tibet, p. 378. Dalai Lama arrives in Peking, p. 382. Leaves Peking,
p. 386. Arrives near Lhasa, November, 1909, and complains of Chinese encroach-
ments, p. 386. Arrives in Lhasa, p. 387. Chinese intention to. take away his
temporal power, p. 389. Chinese troops arrive in Lhasa, p. 389. Dalai Lama
flees, p. 391. Arrives in Darjiling, p. 392. Visits Viceroy in Calcutta, p. 394.
Tibetan Ministers ask for British officer with troops to be despatched to Lhasa,
and for alliance, p. 396. Dalai Lama's request for aid refused, p. 396. But
British Government makes protest to Chinese Government, p. 396. Chinese state
they merely wish to exercise effective control, p. 398. Dalai Lama deposed,
p. 399. Chinese view of situation, p. 400. Indian Government's views, p. 403.
Lord Morley's views, p. 404.

CHAPTER XXIV

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Tendency to centralization of control, p. 407. Reasons why British adminis-
trators in India lack confidence in centralization in London, p. 408. Remedies
for evil, p. 411. More intimate personal relationship, p. 412. More trust in
the " man on the spot," p. 416. Summary of situation in Tibet, p. 416. Morality
of intervention in Tibet, p. 416. Co-operation with Russia, p. 421. Chinese
generally good neighbours, p. 421. Necessity for securing removal of inimical
local Chinese officials, p. 423. And for preserving intimate touch with Tibetans,
p. 424. A forward policy recommended, p. 428.

CHAPTER XXV

A FINAL EEFLECTION

" A strange force " or " the designs of bureaucrats," p. 430. No deliberate
intention to conquer India, p. 432. Impelled to intervene in Tibet, p. 433.
Probability of some force impelling us on, p. 434. Reality of an inherent
impulse, p. 435. Its direction towards harmony, p. 436. Hence disorder invites
intervention, p. 436. Our intellects should be used to give impulse definite
effect, p. 438.

APPENDIX

Anglo-Chinese Convention, 1890 ; Trade Regulations, 1893; Anglo-Tibetan
Convention, 1904 ; Anglo-Chinese Convention, 1906 ; Anglo-Russian Con-
vention, 1907.

INDEX I (p. 447).

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TO FACE PAOE

THE DALAI LAMA ... Frontispiece
{Reproduced by permission of the "Sphere.")

MR. BOGLE ... 8

SIKKIM SCENERY - 105

MISSION CAMP, KHAMBA JONG - - 116

THE SHIGATSE ABBOT - - - 128

THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL - 134

COLUMN CROSSING THE TANG-LA, JANUARY, 1904 - - 160

CHUMALHARI - - 162

MOUNTED INFANTRY - 169

THE START FROM TUNA FOR GURU - - 173

SEPOYS " SHOULDERING " TIBETANS FROM POSITION : GURU, MARCH,

1904 - - - - 176

THE TONGSA PENLOP (nOW MAHARAJA OF BHUTAN) - 204

GYANTSE JONG - - - 216

CAMP NEAR KARO-LA - 224

BERTHON BOATS ON BRAHMAPUTRA 234

TA LAMA AND HIS SECRETARY - - 242

THE GATE OF LHASA ----- 260

THE DALAI LAMA - - - - 256
{Reproduced Jyy permission of the Proprietors of the "Daily Graphic.")

THE POTALA, LHASA - - - - 265

MISSION QUARTERS, LHASA - - - 267

THE COUNCIL - • - - 268

THE TI RIMPOCHE - - . - , 273

xvi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TO PACE PAGE

THE CHUMBI VALLEY - .... 297

SIGNING THE TEEATY --...- 304

SEALS AFFIXED TO TREATY - - - 306

THE SEEA MONASTERY - - - - 310

MAPS

1. THE CHINESE EMPIRE, SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITION OF

TIBET TO CHINA PROPER, INDIA, AND RUSSIA

'At end

2. PART OF TIBET, SHOWING THE ROUTE FOLLOWED BY THE

MISSION TO LHASA

INDIA AND TIBET

INTRODUCTION

This book is an account of our relations with Tibet, but
many still wonder why we need have any such relations at
all. The country lies on the far side of the Himalayas, the
greatest range of snowy mountains in the world. Why,
then, should we trouble ourselves about what goes on there?
Why do we want to interfere with the Tibetans ? Why not
leave them alone ? These are very reasonable and pertinent
questions, and such as naturally spring to the mind of even
the least intelligent of Englishmen. Obviously, therefore,
they must have sprung to the minds of responsible British
statesmen before they ever sanctioned intervention. The
sedate gentlemen who compose the Government of India
are not renowned for being carried away by bursts of
excitement or enthusiasm, nor are they remarkable for
impulsive, thoughtless action. They have spent their lives
in the dull routine of official grind, and by the time they
attain a seat in the Viceregal Council they are, if anything,
too free from emotional impulses. Certainly, the initiation
of anything forward and interfering was as little to be
expected from them as from the most rigorous anti-
Imperialist. The head of the Government of India at the
time of the Tibet Mission was, it is true, a man of less
mature official experience, but he happened to be a man
who had studied Asiatic policy in nearly every part of Asia,
besides having been Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs ;
and even supposing he had been the most impulsive and
irresponsible of Viceroys, he could take no action without
gaining the assent of the majority of his colleagues in India,

2 INTRODUCTION

and without convincing the Secretary of State in England.
India is not governed by the Viceroy alone, but by the
^''iceroy in Council. On such a question as the despatch of
a mission to Tibet, the Viceroy would not be able to act
without the concurrence of three out of his six councillors,
and without the approval of the Secretary of State, who,
in his turn, as expenditure is incurred, would have to gain
the support of his Council of tried and experienced Indian
administrators and soldiers, besides the approval of the
whole Cabinet.

It is, then, a very fair presumption at the outset that if
all these various authorities had satisfied themselves that
action in Tibet was necessary, there probably was some
reasonable ground for interference. What was it that
influenced these sedate authorities, alike in India and
in England, to depart from the natural course of leaving
the Tibetans alone, to behave or misbehave themselves
as they liked ? What was it that persuaded these gentle-
men that action, and not inaction, intervention, and
not laissez-faire, were required, and that we could no
longer leave this remote State on the far side of the mighty
Himalayas severely alone ? There must have been some
strong reason, for it was not merely a matter of permitting
an adventurous explorer to try and reach the "forbidden
city." After thirty years of correspondence what was
eventually sanctioned was the despatch of a mission with
an escort strong enough to break down all opposition.
What was the reason ?

The answer to this I will eventually give. But to make
that answer clear we must view the matter from a long
perspective, and trace its gradual evolution from the
original beginnings. And, at the start, I shall have
to emphasize the point that there has always been
intercourse of some kind between Tibet and India, for
Tibet is not an island in mid-ocean. It is in the heart
of a continent surrounded by other countries. That it is
a mysterious, secluded country in the remote hinterland of
the Himalayas most people are vaguely aware. But that
it is contiguous for nearly a thousand miles with the
British Empire, from Kashmir to Burma, few have

INTERCOURSE WITH TIBET 3

properly realized. Still less have they appreciated that
this contact between the countries means intercourse of
some kind t between the peoples inhabiting them, even
though it has to be over a snowy range. The Tibetans
drew their religion from India. From time immemorial
they have been accustomed to visit the sacred shrines of
India. Tibetan traders have come down to Bengal,
Kashmiri and Indian traders have gone to Tibet. Tibetan
shepherds have brought their flocks to the pastures on the
Indian side of the range in some parts. In other parts
the shepherds from the Indian side have taken their sheep
and goats to the plateaux of Tibet. Sometimes the
Tibetans or their vassals have raided to valleys and plains
of India, sometimes Indian feudatories have raided into
Tibet. At other times, again, the intercourse has been of
a more pacific kind, and intermarriages between the
bordering peoples and interchanges of presents have taken
place. In a multitude of ways there has ever been inter-
course between Tibet and India. Tibet has never been
really isolated. And, as I shall in due course show, the
Mission to Lhasa of 1904, was merely the culmination of a
long series of effbrts to regularize and humanize that inter-
course, and put the relationship which must necessarily
subsist between India and Tibet upon a business-like and
permanently satisfactory footing.

CHAPTER I

BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

It is an interesting reflection for those to make who
think that we must necessarily have been the aggressive
party, that the far-distant primary cause of all our attempts
at intercourse with the Tibetans was an act of aggression,
not on our part, not on the part of an ambitious Pro-
consul, or some headstrong frontier officer, but of the Bhu-
tanese, neighbours, and then vassals, of the Tibetans, who
nearly a century and a half ago committed the first act —
an act of aggression — which brought us into relationship
with the Tibetans. In the year 1772 they descended into
the plains of Bengal and overran Kuch Behar, carried off
the Raja as a prisoner, seized his country, and offered such
a menace to the British province of Bengal, now only
separated from them by a small stream, that when the
people of Kuch Behar asked the British Governor for help,
he granted their request, and resolved to drive the moun-
taineers back into their fastnesses. Success attended his
efforts, though, as usual, at much sacrifice. We learn
that our troops were decimated with disease, and that the
malaria proved fatal to Captain Jones, the commander,
and many other officers. " One can hardly breathe," says
Bogle, who passed through the country two years later —
"frogs, watery insects, and dank air." And those who
have been over that same country since, and seen, if only
from a railway train, those deadly swamps, who have
felt that suffocating, poisonous atmosphere arising from
them, and who have experienced that ghastly, depressing
enervation which saps all manhood and all life out of one,
can well imagine what those early pioneers must have
suffered.

BHUTANESE AGGRESSION 5

Fortunately there was at the head of affairs the greatest,
though the most maligned, of all the Governors- General
of India, who was able to turn to profit the advantages
accruing from the sacrifices which had been made.
Fortunately, too, in those days a Governor-General still
had some power and initiative left, and was able, without
interminable delays, debates, correspondence, and inter-
national considerings, to act decisively and strongly before
the psychological moment had passed.

Warren Hastings resisted the aggression of the Bhu-
tanese, and drove them back from the plains of Bengal into
their own mountains ; but when the Tashi Lama of Tibet
interceded on their behalf, he at once not only acceded,
but went further, and made a deliberate effort to come into
permanent relationship with both the Bhutanese and
Tibetans. Nor did he think he would gain lasting results
by any fitful effort. He knew well that to achieve any-
thing effort must be long, must be continuous, and must
be persistent, and that the results would be small at first,
but, accumulating in the long process of years, would
eventually amount to what was of value.

The Bhutanese, I have said, when they found them-
selves being sorely punished for their aggression, appealed
to the Tashi Lama of Tibet to intercede for them with
the Governor of Bengal ; and the Tashi Lama, who was
then acting as Regent of Tibet during the infancy of the
Dalai Lama, wrote to Warren Hastings a very remark-
able letter, which is quoted both by Turner and Markham,
and which is especially noteworthy as marking that the
intercourse between us and the Tibetans was started by
the Tibetans. The Tibetans have stated on many a
subsequent occasion to the Government of India, and on
innumerable occasions to myself, that they are not per-
mitted to have intercourse with us. But originally, and
when they wanted a favour from us, the intercourse was
started by themselves, and in a very reasonable, dignified,
and neighbourly manner.

The Tashi Lama wrote to Warren Hastings, after
various compliments: "Neither to molest nor to perse-
cute is my aim. . . . But in justice and humanity I

6 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

am informed you far surpass ... I have been repeatedly
informed that you have been engaged in hostiUties
against the Deb Judhur, to which, it is said, the Deb's
own criminal conduct in committing ravages and other
outrages on your frontier has given rise. As he is of a
rude and ignorant race (past times are not destitute of
instances of the like misconduct which his own avarice
tempted him to commit), it is not unlikely that he has
now renewed those instances, and the ravages and plunder
which he committed on the skirts of the Bengal and
Behar provinces have given you provocation to send your
avenging army against him. However, his party has been
defeated, many of his people have been killed, three forts
have been taken from him, he has met with the punish-
ment he deserved, and it is evident as the sun that your
army has been victorious, and that, if you had been
desirous of it, you might in the space of two days have
entirely extirpated him, for he had no power to resist your
efforts. But I now take upon me to be his mediator, and
to represent to you that, as the said Deb Raja is dependent
upon the Dalai Lama . . . should you persist in offering
further molestation to the Deb Raja's country, it will
irritate both the Lama and all his subjects against you.
Therefore, from a regard to our religion and customs, I
request you will cease all hostilities against him, and in
doing this you will confer the greatest favour and friend-
ship upon me. I have reprimanded the Deb for his past
conduct, and I have admonished him to desist from his
evil practices in future, and to be submissive to you in all
matters. I am persuaded that he will conform to the
advice which I have given him, and it will be necessary
that you treat him with compassion and clemency. As
for my part, I am but a Fakir, and it is the custom of my
Sect, with the rosary in our hands, to pray for the welfare
of mankind and for the peace and happiness of the inhabi-
tants of this country ; and I do now, with my head
uncovered, entreat that you may cease all hostilities against
the Deb in future."

On receipt of this letter, Warren Hastings laid it before
the Board at Calcutta, and informed them that, in reply, he

WARREN HASTINGS' POLICY 7

had written to the Tashi Lama, proposing a general treaty
of amity and commerce between Bengal and Tibet. The
letter of the Lama, he said, had invited us to friendship,
and the final arrangement of the disputes on the frontier
had rendered the country accessible, without danger either
to the persons or effects of travellers. He had, therefore,
written for and obtained a passport for a European to
proceed to Tibet for the negotiation of the treaty, and he
now purposed sending Mr. Bogle, a servant of the Com-
pany, well known for his intelligence, assiduity, and exact-
ness in affairs, as well as for the " coolness and moderation
of temper which he seems to possess in an eminent degree."
Warren Hastings, with great wisdom and knowledge of
Asiatic affairs, adds that he "is far from being sanguine
in his hopes of success, but the present occasion appears
too favourable for the attempt to be neglected."

This latter is precisely the point which we who have
dealt with Asiatics can appreciate so well — taking the
opportunity, striking while the iron is hot, not letting the
chance go by, knowing our mind, knowing what we want,
and acting decisively when the exact occasion arises. It
is hard to do nowadays, with the Provincial Govern-
ment so subordinate to the Government of India, with the
Government of India so governed by the Secretary of
State, with Cabinet Ministers telling us that the House of
Commons are their masters, and members of the House
of Commons saying they are the mouthpieces of their con-
stituents. Nevertheless, the advantages of such a method
of conducting affairs must not be forgotten. Decision and
rapidity of action are often important factors in the
conduct of Asiatic affairs, and may save more trouble
than is saved by caution and long deliberation.

Warren Hastings' policy was, then, not to sit still
within his borders, supremely indifferent to what occurred
on the other side, and intent upon respecting not merely
the independence but also the isolation of his neighbours.
It was a forward policy, and combined in a noteworthy
manner alertness and deliberation, rapidity and persist-
ency, assertiveness and receptivity. He sought to secure
his borders by at once striking when danger threatened,

8 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

but also by taking infinite pains over long periods
of time to promote ordinary neighbourly intercourse
with those on the other side. Both qualities are
necessary. Spasmodic action unaccompanied by steady,
continuous efforts at conciliation produces no less bad
results than does plodding conciliation never accompanied
by action. It was because Warren Hastings possessed
this capacity for instantly seizing an opportunity, because
he could and would without hesitation or fear use severity
where severity alone would secure enduring harmony,
but would yet persistently and with infinite tact, sagacity,
and real good-heartedness work for humane and neigh-
bourly relationship with adjoining peoples, that he must
be considered the greatest of all the great Governors-
General of India.

But to be successful a policy must be embodied in a
fitting personality. And to appreciate Warren Hastings'
Tibetan policy we must know something of the agent he
chose to carry it into effect. What was the character of
the man who was to lead the first Mission ever sent to
Tibet? We learn from Markham that he was born in
1746, and had at first been brought up in a business office;
but on proceeding to India had been given a post in the
Revenue Department. His letters to his father and sisters
show him to have been a man of the strongest home feel-
ings, and his conversations with the Tibetans indicate that
he was a man of high honour and strict rectitude. Warren
Hastings himself not only had a high opinion of his abilities
and official aptitude, but also entertained for him a warm
personal friendship.

The youth of Warren Hastings' agent is the first point
to note : he was only twenty-eight. Nowadays we use
men who are much too old. It is when men are young,
when they are still crammed full of energy, when their
faculties are alert, that they are most useful and effective.
I often doubt whether the experience of maturer age
possesses all the advantages which are commonly attri-
buted to it, and whether young men act more rashly

MR. BOGLE.

To jhce page S.

WARREN HASTINGS' INSTRUCTIONS 9

or irresponsibly than old men. The former have their
whole careers before them, and their reputations to make.
They are no more likely, therefore, to act rashly than " old
men in a hurry." Warren Hastings was therefore wise,
in my opinion, to choose a young man, and he was
equally wise to choose an agent of good breeding
and with great natural kindliness of disposition. Asiatics
do not mind quickness or hotness of temper, or severity
of manner, as long as they can feel that at bottom
the man they have to do with has a good, warm, generous
heart. He need not wear it on his sleeve, but they will
know right enough whether he possesses one or not. And
that Warren Hastings' agent had such a heart his home
correspondence, his friendship with Hastings himself, and
his eventual dealings with the Tibetans amply testify.

Having determined his policy and selected his agent,
Warren Hastings gave him the following instructions,*
dated May 13, 1774 : " I desire you will proceed to
Lhasa. . . . The design of your mission is to open a
mutual and equal communication of trade between the
inhabitants of Bhutan [Tibet] and Bengal, and you will be
guided by your own judgment in using such means of
negotiation as may be most likely to effect this purpose.
You will take with you samples, for a trial of such articles
of commerce as may be sent from this country. . . . And
you will diligently inform yourself of the manufactures,
productions, goods, introduced by the intercourse with
other countries, which are to be procured in Bhutan. . . .
The following will be also proper objects of your inquiry :
the nature of the roads between the borders of Bengal and
Lhasa, and of the country lying between ; the communica-
tions between Lhasa and the neighbouring countries, their
government, revenue, and manners. . . . The period of
your stay must be left to your discretion. I wish you to
remain a sufficient time to fulfil the purposes of your
deputation, and obtain a complete knowledge of the
country and the points referred to your inquiry. If you

* Markham, " Mission of Bogle," p. 6.

10 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

shall judge that a residence may be usefully established at
Lhasa without putting the Company to any expense, but
such as may be repaid by the advantages which may be
hereafter derived from it, you will take the earliest oppor-
tunity to advise me of it ; and if you should find it neces-
sary to come away before you receive my orders upon it,
you may leave such persons as you shall think fit to remain
as your agents till a proper resident can be appointed. . . .
You will draw on me for your charges, and your drafts
shall be regularly answered. To these I can fix no limita-
tion, but empower you to act according to your discretion,
knowing that I need not recommend to you a strict
frugahty and economy where the good of the service on
which you are commissioned shall not require a deviation
from these rules."

Did ever an agent despatched on an important mission
receive more satisfactory instructions ? The object clearly
defined, and the fullest discretion left to him as to the
manner of carrying it out. Hastings, having selected the
fittest agent to carry out his purpose, leaves everything to
his judgment. Whatever would most effectively carry
out the main purpose, that the agent was at perfect liberty
to do, and time and money were freely at his disposal. " I
want the thing done," says Warren Hastings in effect,
" and all you require to get it done you shall have."

The only equally good instructions I have personally seen
issued to an agent were given by Cecil Rhodes in Rhodesia.
I travelled up to Fort Salisbury with Major Forbes, whom
Rhodes had summoned from a place two months' journey
distant to receive instructions, for he did not believe in
letters, but only in personal communication. After dinner
Rhodes questioned Forbes most minutely as to his require-
ments, as to the condition of things, as to the difficulties
which were likely to be encountered, and as to his ideas on
how those difficulties should be overcome. He said he
wanted to know now what Forbes required in order to
accomplish the object in view, because he did not wish to
see him coming back later on, saying he could have carried
it out if only he had had this, that, or the other. Let him
therefore say now whatever he required to insure success.

DISCRETION LEFT TO AGENT 11

All that he asked, and more than he asked, Rhodes gave
him, and then despatched him, saying, " Now, I don't want
to hear of you again till I get a telegram saying your job
is done."

These are, of course, ideal methods of conveying
instructions to an agent, which it is not always possible for
a high official to give. Lord Curzon would, I know, have
liked to give similar instructions to me, and, as far as pro-
viding money, staff, military support, etc., he did. But,
with the closer interconnection of public affairs, public
business is now so complicated that it is not, I suppose,
possible to leave to an agent the same amount of discretion
that Warren Hastings did to Bogle. StiU, great results
in many fields, and, what is more, great men, have been
produced by the use of Warren Hastings' method of
selecting the fittest agent, and then leaving everything in
his hands. I do not see that any better results have
been obtained by utilizing human agents as mere
telephones. If the conduct of affairs has become com-
plicated, that does not appear to be any reason in itself
for abandoning the method. It appears only a reason for
principals and agents rising to the higher occasion while
still pursuing the old successful method. Ease of com-
munication has brought nations more closely together and
complicated affairs, but it has also made possible readier
personal communication between principal and agent.
And therefore there is need not so much for curtailing
the discretion of the agent whUe he is at work as for
utilizing the greater facility for personal intercourse now
possible. In conversation the agent will be able to
impress his principals with whatever local and personal
difficulties he has to contend with, and the means
required for carrying out their object, and they will be
able to impress him with the limits outside which it is
impossible to allow him to act. It is a clear certainty that
the present tendency to concentrate, not merely control,
but also direction, in London, cannot go on for ever. An
Empire like ours, immense in size and immensely com-
plicated, cannot be managed in detail from headquarters.
The time must come when the House of Commons and

12 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

the constituencies, overburdened with the great affairs
with which they have to deal, will, by the sheer force and
weight of circumstances, see the advantages of leaving
more to the men on the spot. They will probably insist
on agents being more carefully selected. They will require
them to keep in much closer personal contact with head-
quarters. They will expect, too, that politicians who
control should already be personally acquainted, or make
themselves personally acquainted, with the countries they
control. But with these conditions fulfilled they wUl, it
may be hoped, be able to leave more to the men on the
spot, removing them relentlessly if they act wrongly, but
while they are acting, leaving them to act in their own way.
Bogle, with these free instructions and this ample sup-
port, set out from Calcutta in the middle of May, 1774,
that is, less than two months from the date of the despatch
of the Tashi Lama's letter from Shigatse, so that Warren
Hastings, if he had left ample leisure to his agent to carry
out his purpose, had himself acted with the utmost
promptitude, even in so important a matter as sending a
mission to Lhasa with the possibility of establishing there
a permanent resident. Rapidity of communication has
not resulted in the rapidity of the transaction of public
affairs, and the consideration of despatching a mission
to Lhasa nowadays takes as many years as weeks were
occupied in the days of Warren Hastings.

During his passage through Bhutan, Bogle found
many obstacles placed in his way ; but he eventually left
the capital in the middle of October, and on the 23rd
of that month reached Phari, at the head of the Chumbi
Valley, up which we marched to Lhasa 130 years later.
Here he was received by two Lhasa officers, and farther
on, at Gyantse, where the Mission of 1904 was attacked
and besieged for nearly two months, he was entertained
by a priest, " an elderly man of polite and pleasant
manners," who sat with him most of the afternoon, and
drank "above twenty cups of tea." Crowds of people
appear to have assembled to look at him, but beyond

TASHI LAMA RECEIVES BOGLE 13

the irksomeness of these attentions he suffered no incon-
venience or opposition.

On November 8, 1774, he arrived at the place near
Shigatse where the Tashi Lama was at the time in
residence. The day following he had an interview with
the Lama, and delivered to him a letter and a necklace of
pearls from Warren Hastings. This was the first oflficial
interview which had ever taken place between a British
officer and a Tibetan, and as such is particularly worthy
of note.

The Tashi Lama received Bogle* " with a very
courteous and smiling countenance," seated him near him
on a high stool covered with a carpet, and spoke to him
in Hindustani, of which he had " a moderate knowledge."
After inquiring about Warren Hastings' health, and
Bogle's journey through Bhutan, he introduced the
subject of the war in Behar — that is, the Bhutanese invasion
of the plains of Bengal. " I always," said the Lama,
" disapproved of Deb Judhur (the Bhutanese Chief) seizing
the Behar Raja (the Raja of Kuch Behar) and going
to war with the Fringies (the English) ; but the Deb
considered himself as powerful in arms, and would not
listen to my advice. After he was defeated, I wrote to
the Governor, who, in ceasing hostilities against the
Bhutanese, in consequence of my application, and restoring
to them their country, has made me very happy, and has
done a very pious action. My servants who went to
Calcutta were only little men, and the kind reception they
had from the Governor I consider as another mark of
friendship."

Bogle explained that Kuch Behar was separated
from the British province of Bengal only by a rivulet ;
that the Bhutanese from time immemorial had confined
themselves to their mountains, and when they visited
the low countries it was in an amicable manner, and
in order to trade ; that when many thousand armed men
issued at once from their forests, carried off the Raja
of Kuch Behar as prisoner, and seized his country, the
Company very justly became alarmed, and concluded

* Markham, p. 135.

14 BOGLl^'S MISSION, 1774

that the Bhutanese, encouraged by their successes in
Kuch Behar to-day, and undeterred by so slight a
boundary as a small stream, might invade the British
provinces to-morrow. Bogle continued that Warren
Hastings, on the people of Kuch Behar applying to him
for assistance, immediately despatched a battalion of sepoys
to repel the invaders, but was extremely glad, on receipt
of the Tashi Lama's letter, to suspend hostilities and
subsequently to conclude a peace with the Bhutanese and
restore them their country. In conclusion, he said that
Warren Hastings, being happy to cultivate the friendship
of a man whose fame was so well known, and whose
character was held in veneration by so many nations, had
sent him to the Lama's presence with the letter and tokens
of friendship which he had laid before him.

The Lama said that the Deb Judhur did not manage
his country properly, and had been turned out. Bogle
replied that the English had no concern with his expulsion ;
it was brought about by his own people : the Company
only wished the Bhutanese to continue in their own
country, and not to encroach upon Bengal, or raise
disturbances upon its frontier. " The Governor," said the
Lama, " had reason for going to war, but, as I am averse
from bloodshed, and the Bhutanese are my vassals, I am
glad it is brought to a conclusion."

The point, then, that it was an act of aggression on the
part of a vassal of the Tibetans which was the initial
cause of our relationship with the Tibetans ; that that act
was considered unjustifiable by the then ruler of Tibet, and
that our own action was approved of and appreciated
by him, is established by this conversation. Except for
the unjustifiable aggression of the Bhutanese upon our
neighbours, we would never have been brought into
conflict with these vassals of Tibet ; and but for the
intervention of the Tibetan Regent on their behalf, we
should not then have thought of any relationship with the
Tibetans. The initiation of our intercourse did not rest
with us. We were not the interferers. It was the

THE TASHI LAMA 15

Tibetans themselves who made the first move. This
much is clear from the Tashi Lama's conversation.

We may well pause for a moment to consider the man
who had thus first communicated with us. It so happens
that he was the most remarkable man Tibet has produced
in the last century and a half, and one cannot help thinking
that if he had lived longer, and Warren Hastings had
remained longer in India, these two able and eminently
sensible and conciHatory men would have come to some
amicable and neighbourly agreement by which the inter-
relations of their respective countries might have been
peacefully conducted from that time till now.

Bogle says of him that he was about forty years of age,
that his disposition was open, candid, and generous, and
that the expression of his countenance was smiling and
good-humoured. He was extremely merry and entertain-
ing in conversation, and told a pleasant story with a great
deal of humour and action. " I endeavoured," says Bogle,
" to find' out, in his character, those defects which are
inseparable from humanity, but he is so universally
beloved that I had no success, and not a man could
find it in his heart to speak ill of him."

The Lama treated Bogle in the most intimate manner.
He would walk the room with the strange Englishman,
explain to him the pictures, and make remarks upon the
colour of his eyes. " For, although," says Bogle, " vene-
rated as God's vicegerent through all the eastern countries
of Asia, endowed with a portion of omniscience, and with
many other Divine attributes, he throws aside, in con-
versation, all the awful part of his character, accommodates
himself to the weakness of mortals, endeavours to make
himself loved rather than feared, and behaves with the
greatest affability to everybody, particularly to strangers."

Continuing his conversation on the subject of Behar,
the Lama, in subsequent interviews, said that many people
had advised him against receiving an EngUshman. " I

16 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

had heard also,"* he said, "much of the power of the
Fringies : that the Company was hke a great King, and
fond of war and conquest ; and as my business and
that of my people is to pray to God, I was afraid to admit
any Fringies into the country. But I have since learned
that the Fringies are a fair and a just people." To this
Bogle replied that the Governor was, above all things,
desirous of obtaining his friendship and favour, as the
character of the English and their good or bad name
depended greatly upon his judgment. In return the
Lama assured Bogle that his heart was open and well
disposed towards the English, and that he wished to have
a place on the banks of the Ganges to which he might
send his people to pray, and that he intended to write
to Warren Hastings about it. This he did, after Bogle's
return, and a piece of land was given him on the banks of
the Hooghly branch of the Ganges, opposite Calcutta, and
a house and temple were constructed on it by Bogle
for the Lama.

The conversation now turned to the question of trade.
The Tashi Lama said that, owing to the recent wars in
Nepal and Bhutan, trade between Bengal and Tibet was
not flourishing, but that, as for himself, he gave encourage-
ment to merchants, and in Tibet they were free and secure.
He enumerated the different articles which went from
Tibet to Bengal — " gold, musk, cow-tails (yak-tails), and
coarse woollen clothes " — but he said the Tibetans were
afraid to go to Bengal on account of the heat. In the
previous year he had sent four people to worship at
Benares, but three had died. In former times great
numbers used to resort to Hindustan. The Lamas had
temples in Benares, Gaya, and several other places ; their
priests used to travel thither to study the sacred books and
the religion of the Hindus, and after remaining there ten,
twenty, or thirty years, return to Tibet and communicate
their knowledge to their countrjntnen ; but since the Mo-
hammedan conquest of India the inhabitants of Tibet
had had little connection with Bengal or the southern
countries.

* Markham, p. 137.

OBSTRUCTION FROM LHASA 17

Bogle assured him that times were now altered, that
under the Company in Bengal — and it must be remembered
that when he was speaking our rule did not extend beyond
Bengal on that side of India — every person's property was
secure, and everyone was at liberty to follow his own
religion.

The Lama said he was informed that under the
Fringies the country was very quiet, and that he would
be ashamed if Bogle were to return with a fruitless errand.
He would therefore consult his officers and some men
from Lhasa, as well as some of the chief merchants, and
after informing them of the Governor's desire to encourage
trade, and of the encouragement and protection which the
Company affiarded to traders in Bengal, " discuss the most
proper method of carrying it on and extending it."

The following day the Lama told Bogle that he " had
written to Lhasa on the subject of opening a free com-
mercial communication between his country and Bengal."
"But," says Bogle, " although he spoke with all the zeal
in the world, I confess I did not much like the thoughts
of referring my business to Lhasa, where I was not present,
where I was unacquainted, and where I had reason to
think the Ministers had entertained no favourable idea of
me and my commission."

Later on, at the request of the Tashi Lama, two
deputies from Lhasa came to visit Bogle. They said the
English had shown great favour to the Lama and to them
by making peace with the Bhutanese and restoring their
country. Bogle replied that the English were far from
being of that quarrelsome nature which some evil-minded
persons represented them to be, and wished not for extent
of territories. They were entrusted with the management
of Bengal, and only wished it should remain in tran-
quillity. The war with the Bhutanese was of their own
seeking. The deputies might judge whether the Company
had not cause for alarm when eight or ten thousand Bhu-
tanese, who had formerly confined themselves to their
mountains, poured into the low country, seized the Raja

18 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

of Kuch Behar, took possession of his territories, and
carried their arms to the borders of Bengal. The deputies
could judge for themselves whether the Company were
not in the right in opposing them. In the course of the
war some of the Bhutan territory was taken from them,
but was immediately restored at the request of the Tashi
Lama, and so far from desiring conquest, the boundaries
of Bengal remained the same as formerly.

The Lhasa deputies said the Lama had written to
Lhasa about trading, but that the Tibetans were afraid of
the heat, and proceeded, therefore, only as far as Phari,
where the Bhutanese brought the commodities of Bengal
and exchanged them for those of Tibet. This was the
ancient custom, and would certainly be observed.

Bogle stated that besides this there was formerly a
very extensive trade carried on between Tibet and Bengal ;
Warren Hastings was desirous of removing existing
obstacles, and had sent him to Tibet to represent the
matter to the Tashi Lama, and he trusted that the Lhasa
authorities would agree to so reasonable a proposal. They
answered that Gesub Rimpoche (the Regent at Lhasa)
would do everything in his power, but that he and all the
country were subject to the Emperor of China.

" This," says Bogle, " is a stumbling-block which crosses
me in all my paths." And in the paths of how many
negotiators since has it not stood as a stumbling-block !
The Tibetans are ready to do anything, but they can do
nothing without the permission of the Chinese. The
Chinese would freely open the whole of Tibet, but the
Tibetans themselves are so terribly seclusive. So the
same old story goes on year after year, till centuries are
beginning to roll by, and the story is still unfinished. When
in the Audience Hall of the Dalai Lama's Palace at Lhasa
itself I had obtained the seals of the Dalai Lama, of the
Council, of the National Assembly, and of the three great
monasteries, to an agreement, and had done all this in the
presence of the Chinese Resident, I thought we had at
last laid that fiction low for ever. But it seems to be

FEAR OF THE CHINESE 19

springing up again in all its old exuberance, and showing
still perennial vitality.

Bogle, at the request of the Tashi Lama, related to him
the substance of his conversation with the Lhasa deputies.
The Lama assured him again of the reasonableness of his
proposals in regard to trade, but said that, in reply to the
letter he had written on the subject, he had received a
letter from the Lhasa Regent mentioning his apprehension
of giving umbrage to the Chinese. There were, too,
disturbances in Nepal and Sikkim which rendered this an
improper time to settle anything, but in a year or two he
hoped to bring it about. As to the English, the Lhasa
Regent had received such accounts as made him suspicious,
" and," added the Tashi Lama, " his heart is confined, and
he does not see things in the same view as I do."

Bogle then hinted at the advisability of the Tibetans
coming into some form of alliance with the English so that
the influence of the latter might be used to restrain the
Gurkhas of Nepal from attacking Tibet and its feudatories.
This argument evidently much struck the Lama, who
asked if he might write it to the Lhasa Regent. Bogle
told him he might, and that he had no doubt that Warren
Hastings would be ready to employ his mediation to make
the Gurkha Raja desist from his attempts on the territories
subject to Lhasa, and that he had reason to think that
from the Gurkha Raja's dread of the English it would be
effectual. The Lama said that the Regent's apprehensions
of the English arose not only from himself, but also from
his fear of giving offence to the Chinese, to whom Tibet
was subject. The Regent wished, therefore, to receive an
answer from the Court at Peking.

Bogle contended that Warren Hastings, in his proposals
to facilitate trade, was promoting the advantage of Tibet
as well as of Bengal ; that in former times merchants
used to come freely into Tibet ; that the Gurkha Raja's
wars and oppressions had prevented their coming for some
years past, and he only prayed the Lama to remove the
obstacles which these had occasioned. To this the Lama

20 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

replied that he had no doubt of carrying the point, but
that it might require a year or two to do it effectually.

So we see the well-intentioned Tashi Lama held back
by the obstructive Lhasa authorities ; and this was still
more evident at Bogle's next interview, which was with
the Lhasa deputies. They came to pay him a farewell
visit, and in the innocence of his heart he made the very
simple request that they would convey a letter from him
to the Lhasa Regent. Nothing could be more natural
than such a request ; but, till recently, one might just
as well have asked a Tibetan to touch a red-hot poker as
to carry a letter from an Englishman. The deputies said
that if it contained anything to do with business they
could not carry it. " I confess," says Bogle, " I was much
struck with this answer." Poor man, he might well be !
And I was equally struck, 130 years later, when 1 was
formally deputed on a mission to Tibet, with the full
consent of the Chinese suzerain, when Tibetans still refused
to take a letter from an Englishman. It was only when
we were in full march to Lhasa, and but a few miles distant,
that they at last consented to so simple a proceeding as
receiving a letter, though now they have changed so
completely round, that this year the Dalai Lama himself,
at Calcutta, appealed to the Viceroy of India " to secure the
observance of the right which the Tibetans had of dealing
direct with the British."

Bogle told the Lhasa deputies that he wished to know
the grounds of the Regent's suspicions, but they replied
" that much conversation was not the custom of their
country," and wished him a good journey back to Bengal.
Bogle endeavoured to get them to listen to him, as he
wished to introduce the subject of trade, but it was to no
purpose.

" This conversation gave me more concern," he records,
" than any I had in Tibet." He immediately asked to see
the Tashi Lama, and told him " with some warmth," as he

NEPALESE INTRUSION 21

was " a good deal aiFected," that he could not help being
concerned that the Regent should suspect him of coming
into his country to raise disturbances ; that God was his
witness that he wished the Regent well, and wished the
Lama well, and the country well, and that a suspicion of
treachery and falsehood he could not bear. The Tashi
Lami tried to calm him, and eventually dictated a letter
in Tibetan in Bogle's name to the Lhasa Regent. This
letter contained only one sentence of pure business. It
simply said : " I request, in the name of the Governor, my
master, that you will allow merchants to trade between
this country and Bengal." Not a very aggressive request
to make or a very great favour to ask, especially as the
Tibetans had begun their intercourse by asking a favour
from us. But it was not for a century and a quarter, and
not till we had carried our arms to Lhasa itself, that that
simple request was answered, although all the time the
people and traders of Tibet were only too willing to
trade with us.

Why Bogle did not himself go to Lhasa, as he was
empowered to do by his instructions, seems strange. • The
Tashi Lama said that he himself would have been quite
willing, but that the Lhasa Regent was very averse, and
he dissuaded Bogle, saying that the Regent's heart was
small and suspicious, and he could not promise that he
would be able to procure the Regent's consent.

And now the feeling of suspicion was to be increased
by an unfortunate occurrence. The Gurkha Raja of
Nepal wrote to both the Tashi Lama and the Lhasa
Regent, announcing that he had subdued certain districts.
He said he did not wish to quarrel with Tibet^ but if they
had a mind for war he let them know he was well prepared,
and he would desire them to remember he was a Rajput.
He wished to establish factories at places upon the
Tibetan border, where the merchants of Tibet might pur-
chase the commodities of his country and of Bengal, and
he desired the concurrence of the Tibetans. He also
further desired the Tibetans "to have no connection with

22 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

Fringies or Moghuls, and not to allow them into the
country, but to follow the ancient custom, which he was
resolved likewise to do." A Fringy had come to him
upon some business, and was now in his country, but he
intended to send him back as soon as possible, and desired
the Tibetans to do the same with Bogle.

Thus were Bogle's difficulties still further increased.
A-nd in one respect, at least, we have advanced since his
day ; for the Mission to Lhasa in 1904, instead of being
hampered, was warmly supported by the Nepalese. The
Dewan of Nepal wrote strongly to the Lhasa authorities,
urging them to reason, and his agent at Lhasa was of the
greatest assistance to me in my negotiations with the
Tibetans.

Besides China and Nepal thus entering into this
Tibetan question, there was also some mention of Russia
even so far back as that. The Tashi Lama had already
questioned Bogle about the Empress of Russia. He now
told Bogle that there was a quarrel between the Russians
and the Chinese over some Tartar tribe. The Russians
had not yet begun hostilities, but he imagined they would
soon go to war about it. Bogle told him that as the
Russians were engaged in a very heavy war with the Turks
— how far back that other story reaches ! — he supposed
they would hardly think of entering into another with
the Chinese. He said the Russians were a very hardy
and warlike people, capable of great efforts, and he
doubted whether the Chinese would be able to cope with
their troops.

Bogle then had conversations with the Kashmiri
traders, who had been sent to him by the Tashi Lama,
and who wanted to be allowed to trade with Bengal
through Bhutan. They stated the difficulties which the
Bhutanese placed in their way, and said that the Chief of
Bhutan would soon remove these if the Company would
threaten him with war, as after the last war he was in

TIBETAN MERCHANTS 23

great dread of the English. It is a point which should
be specially noted by those who believe that Warren
Hastings' policy was aggressive, that Bogle, in reply to this
hint, told the merchants* that he had no power to use
such language to the Bhutanese, and that ivkatever he did
with the Raja must be by peaceable and friendly means.
The Company had entered into a treaty of peace with
them, "which, according to the maxim of the English
Government, would . . . remain for ever inviolate."

Tibetan merchants also came, at the Tashi Lama's
request, to see Bogle. They dealt chiefly in tea, some of
them to the extent of two or three lakhs of rupees a year —
of the then value of £20,000 to £30,000. They said the
Lama had advised them to send agents to Bengal, but they
were afraid to go into the heat of the plains. They had a
tradition that about eight hundred years ago people of
Tibet used to go to Bengal, but that eight out of ten
died before their return. Bogle told them that if they
were afraid of sending their servants thither, the Kashmiri
would supply them with what they wanted. They said
that formerly wool, broadcloth, etc., used to come through
Nepal, but since the wars in Nepal the trade had diminished.
They added that people imagined from gold being produced
in Tibet that it was extremely rich, but that this was not
the case, and if extraordinary quantities of gold were sent
to Bengal, the Emperor of China, who was Sovereign of
the country, would be displeased.

At his farewell interview Bogle said that Warren
Hastings would send letters to the Lama by his own
servants, upon which the Lama said : " I wish the Governor
will not at present send an Englishman. You know what
difficulties I had about your coming into the country, and
how I had to struggle with the jealousy of the Gesub
Rimpoche (the Regent) and the people at Lhasa. Even
now they are uneasy at my having kept you so long. I
could wish, therefore, that the Governor would rather send
a Hindu. I am in hopes my letter to the Regent will
have a good effect in removing his jealousy, and I expect
in a year or two that the government of this country will

* Markham, p. l62.

24 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774

be in the Dalai Lama's hands, when I will inform the
Governor, and he may then send an Englishman to me and
to the Dalai Lama."

The Tashi Lama repeated his concern at Bogle's
departure and the satisfaction he had received in being
informed of the customs of Europe. He spoke all this,
in and with a look very different from the studied compU-
ments of Hindustan. " I never could reconcile myself,"
continues Bogle, " to taking a last leave of anybody ; and
what from the Lama's pleasant and amiable character, what
from the many favours and civilities he had shown me, I
could not help being particularly affected. He observed
it, and in order to cheer me mentioned his hopes of seeing
me again."

Of Bogle's own warm-hearted and affectionate feelings
to the people of Tibet there can be no question. On the
eve of his departure he wrote in a letter to his sister :
" Farewell, ye honest and simple people ! May ye long
enjoy the happiness which is denied to more polished
nations ; and while they are engaged in the endless
pursuits of avarice and ambition, defended by your barren
mountains, may ye continue to live in peace and content-
ment, and know no wants but those of nature."

At the close of Bogle's Mission we may review its
results. He was sent by Warren Hastings to establish
relationship and intercourse of trade with the Tibetans.
How far did he succeed in carrying out that object ?

It is sufficiently clear that, as regards personal relation-
ship, he was eminently successful, and that was about as
much as he could have expected to establish at the start.
As we have already seen, Warren Hastings never expected
any very striking result from the first communication. He
wished to lay the foundation for neighbourly intercourse,
and in this much he succeeded. He had had experience
enough of Asiatics in other quarters to be aware that they
are very naturally suspicious of a European Power, then by
some apparently irresistible process gradually expanding
over smaller Asiatic peoples. As the instance of the Gurkha

RESULTS OF MISSION 25

Raja's letter showed, there are few Asiatic rulers who, if
they have the power to subdue a weaker neighbour, will not
as a perfectly natural course proceed to bring that neighbour
under subjection. This is looked upon by most Asiatics
as a quite normal and inevitable proceeding. Naturally,
therefore, the Tibetans would assume that it would only
be a matter of time before the English Governor of Bengal
would attack Tibet. He had the power to subdue the
country ; he would therefore subdue it. In the first
instance he would, of course, send up an agent to spy out
the land, to see what it was worth, and to find out the best
way into it ; and such an agent doubtless Bogle was, in their
opinion. It was inevitable, therefore, that Bogle should
be viewed with suspicion, and that the Tibetans should not,
at the first jump off, throw their country freely open to
trade. How much wiser, in their opinion, would be the
views of some shrewd old counsellor who said : " Keep the
English at a distance; don't let one into our country; stay
behind our mountain barrier and have nothing whatever
to do with anyone beyond it. This is the ' ancient custom.'
Do not let us depart from it. Let us be civil to this Bogle
now he is here, lest we offend his powerful master, but
for God's sake let us get rid of him as soon as we can, and
put every polite difficulty we know of in the way of any
other Englishman coming amongst us."

We can imagine how sound such an opinion would
seem to the generality of the old greybeard "s hearers, and
how difficult it would be for anyone — even the Tashi
Lama — to contend against it. And with such a feeling in
existence Bogle could not do more than produce a
favourable personal impression, and put in an argument or
two, whenever he had the opportunity, to show that there
were also some advantages in having relationship with
the English, in the hopes that these arguments might
gradually sink into the Tibetan mind, and when the
opportunity should arise, bring forth fruit. And this much
he did most effectively in carrying out the Governor's
policy.

CHAPTER II

TURNER'S MISSION, 1782

Warren Hastings was not content with a single effort
to reopen the commercial and friendly intercourse which
in former times had subsisted between Tibet and India.
As he had expected little from the first move, so he had
always intended to work continuously with the same end
in view, hoping to eventually gain that end by repeated
efforts over long periods.

Bogle returned to Calcutta in June, 1775, and in
November of the same year Hastings deputed Dr. Hamil-
ton, who had accompanied him to Tibet, on a second
mission to Bhutan. Hamilton spent some months in
Bhutan, inquiring into and settling certain causes of dis-
pute ; and in July, 1777, he was sent on a third mission
to Bhutan to congratulate a new Deb Raja on his succes-
sion. Thus, as Markham points out, Warren Hastings,
by keeping up a regular intercourse with the Bhutan
rulers, by maintaining a correspondence with the Tashi
Lama, and by means of an annual fair at Rangpur,
prevented the opening made by Bogle from again being
closed.

Warren Hastings also intended to send another mis-
sion to Tibet itself, and in 1779 Bogle was appointed
Envoy for a second time. But in the meanwhile the
Tashi Lama had decided to undertake a journey to
Peking to visit the Chinese Emperor. Bogle, therefore,
was to have been sent to Peking to meet the Lama there,
but, most disastrously for all friendly intercourse between
Tibet and India, the Lama died in Peking in November
1780, and Bogle himself died at Calcutta in April, 1781.

The success of Asiatic affairs depends so much on the

PERSISTENCE OF WARREN HASTINGS 27

influence of personalities that the death of these two men,
who had conceived such a real respect and affection
for one another, was an almost fatal blow to Warren
Hastings' plans for the improvement of the relationship
between Tibet and India. Nevertheless, he kept steadily
on with his deliberate policy, and watched for some other
opportunity of carrying it to fruition. Persistency of aim
and watchfulness for opportunities, making the most of
the occasion offered, and decisiveness of action — these were
always Hastings' guiding principles. So when, in Feb-
ruary, 1782, news reached Calcutta that the Tashi Lama,
in accordance with the Tibetan ideas of reincarnation,
had reappeared in the person of an infant, he resolved
to send another mission to Tibet to congratulate the
Regent.

For this duty he selected Captain Samuel Turner, an
officer who had distinguished himself at the Siege of
Seringapatam and on a mission to Tippoo Sultan, and
who was then thirty-three years of age.

Turner himself was very favourably received at
Shigatse, and at his first interview informed the Regent
that Warren Hastings had an earnest solicitude to
preserve and cultivate the amicable intercourse that had
so happily commenced between them ; that this corre-
spondence, in its earliest stages, had been dictated by the
purest motives of humanity, and had hitherto pointed with
unexampled sincerity and steadiness towards one great
object, which constituted the grand business of the Tashi
Lama's life — peace and universal good ; that the Governor-
General, whose attention was always directed towards the
same pursuits, was overwhelmed with anxiety lest the
friendship which had been established between himself
and the Regent might undergo a change, and he had
therefore sent a trusted agent to convey his congratulations
on the joyful reappearance in the world of the late Tashi
I^ama, and to express the hope that everything that was
expected would at length be eflFectually accomplished.

To this the Regent replied that the present and the

28 TURNER'S MISSION, 1782 -

late Tashi Lama were one and the same, and that there
was no manner of difference between them, only that, as
he was yet merely an infant, and his spirit had but just
returned into the world, he was at present incapable of
action. The Regent assured Turner of the firm, un-
shaken attachment which the Tashi Lama had entertained
for Mr. Hastings to his latest breath, and he was also loud
in his encomiums on the occasion that gave birth to their
present friendship, which originated entirely in his granting
peace to the Bhutanese in compliance with the intercession
of the Tashi Lama.

In other interviews the Regent assured Turner that
during the interview of the late Tashi Lama with the
Emperor of China, the Lama had taken several opportuni-
ties to represent in the strongest terms the particular
amity which subsisted between the Governor-General and
himself. The Regent said that the Lama's conversation
had even influenced the Emperor to resolve upon com-
mencing a correspondence with his friend. Turner was
also assured that the Tashi Lama particularly sought from
the Emperor liberty to grant admission to Tibet to what-
ever person he chose, without control. And to this the
Emperor is said to have consented ; but, owing to the
death of the Tashi I^ama and the jealousy of the Chinese
officials, nothing resulted.

The power and influence of these Chinese officials
in Tibet was evidently very great, for in his intercourse
with the Tibetan officials Turner could plainly trace,
though they were averse to own any immediate de-
pendence upon the Chinese, the greatest awe of the
Emperor of China, and of his officers stationed at the
Court of Lhasa, who had usurped even from the hands of
the Dalai Lama the greatest portion of his temporal power.
When Turner offered to attend a certain ceremony, the
Regent excused himself from accepting the offer of his
company on account of the Chinese, whose jealousy
of strangers was weU known, and to whom he was par-
ticularly anxious to give no occasion for offence. On a

TRADERS ADMITTED 29

subsequent occasion the Regent told Turner that many-
letters had passed between himself and the Dalai Lama,
who was always favourably inclined towards the English ;
but he attributed the discouragement and obstruction
Turner had received to the Chinese officials at Lhasa.
" The influence of the Chinese," adds Turner, " overawes
the Tibetans in all their proceedings, and produces a
timidity and caution in their conduct more suited to the
character of subjects than allies." At the same time, they
were very jealous of interference by the Chinese, and
uneasy of their yoke, though it sat so lightly upon them.
And while they respected the Chinese Emperor, and had
this fear of Chinese officials, they "looked upon the
Chinese as a gross and impure racf of men."

And now again, as in Bogle's time, we see traces of
Russian influence. The Regent and the Ministers told
Turner that they were no strangers to the reputation of
the reigning Czarina, Catherine, her extent of dominion,
and the commerce carried on with China. Many over-
tures, they told him, had been made on the part of
Russia to extend her commerce to the internal part of
Tibet, but the disinclination of the Tibetans to enter into
any new foreign connection, and the watchful jealousy of
the Chinese, had hitherto defeated every attempt of
that nature.

Turner spent nearly a year in Tibet, and though he was
unable to visit Lhasa owing to the antipathy of the
Lamas, he was able to obtain some substantial concessions
from the Regent of the Tashi Lama at Shigatse. He
obtained* " his promise of encouragement to all merchants,
natives of India, that may be sent to traffic in Tibet, on
behalf of the Government of Bengal," and he reports to
Warren Hastings that his authority alone is requisite
to secure these merchants the protection of the Regent,
who had promised to grant free admission into Tibet

* Turner, p. 374.

30 TURNER'S MISSION, 1782

to all such merchants, natives of India, as shall come
recommended by the Governor of Bengal ; to yield them
every assistance requisite for the transport of their goods ;
and to assign them a place of residence for vending their
commodities, either within the monastery at Shigatse, or,
should it be considered as more eligible, in the town itself.
He did not consider it consistent with the spirit of
Warren Hastings' instructions, he reports, to be impor-
tunate for greater privileges than those to native traders.
Such as he had obtained he hoped would suffice to open
the much-wished-for communication. When merchants
had learnt the way, tasted the profit and established
intercourse, the traffic might bear a tax, which, if laid
upon it in its infancy, might suppress its growth.

Turner rejoined Warren Hastings at Patna in March,
1784, and I remember seeing, among some original letters
of Warren Hastings in the Indian Foreign Office, an
enthusiastic appreciation of Turner's work, and an ex-
pression of the great pleasure the meeting affiorded him ;
for Hastings was as warmly appreciative with some men
as he was coldly reserved with others.

As long as Hastings remained in India our intercourse
with Tibet prospered. But soon after his departure a
contretemps occurred, and all his work was undone. In
1792 the Nepalese invaded Tibet, sacked Shigatse, and
carried off all the plunder of the monasteries. The Lamas
had to flee across the Brahmaputra and apply for protection
to the Chinese. A Chinese army was despatched to their
assistance. The Nepalese were defeated and driven back
across their own frontier, and peace was only concluded
upon the conditions of an annual tribute to the Emperor
and the full restitution of all the spoils which they
carried off.

By an unfortunate circumstance, through the first
British Envoy having arrived in Nepal just about the time
of this invasion, the Chinese commander formed the
impression that we had instigated, or at least encouraged,
the Nepalese in their attack on Tibet ; and the representa-

TRADE AGAIN STOPPED 31

tions which he made to his Government, coupled, says
Turner, with our decUning to afford effectual assistance to
the Lamas' cause, had considerable weight. As a conse-
quence, all communication between Tibet and India was
stopped, and " the approach of strangers, even of Bengal
and Hindustan, was utterly prohibited." The Hindu holy
men were charged with treachery in acting as spies and
guides for the Nepalese, and were forbidden to remain
any longer in Shigatse ; and " from this period," con-
tinues Turner, " unhappily is to be dated the interrup-
tion which has taken place in the regular intercourse
between the Company's possessions and the territory of
the Lama."

It was a sad ending to what had begun so promisingly,
and one is tempted to reflect what Warren Hastings
would have done if he had still held the reins of govern-
ment in Bengal, and whether he would have been able to
restrain the Gurkhas, to assist the Lamas, and to reassure
the Chinese. Certainly it is a most unfortunate circum-
stance that we so often are unable to help our friends just
when they most need our help, and press our friendship
upon them just when they least want it.

Thus the results of Warren Hastings' forethought and
careful, steady endeavour were all lost. Yet it must be
conceded by the sturdiest advocate of non-interference
that those endeavours were not merely statesman-like, but
humane. There was never any attempt to aggress. No
threats were ever used ; no impatience was shown.
Warren Hastings, as the representative of a trading com-
pany, looked, firstly, to improve trade relations ; but as
the ruler of many millions of human beings, he knew
that trade or any other relationship must be based on
mutual good feeling, and he knew that good feeling with
a suspicious people can only be established by a very,
very slow process. He therefore took each step deliber-
ately, and he strove to secure permanently the advantages
of each small step taken ; and, having done this, he had
some right to expect that when he himself had shown

32 TURNER'S MISSION, 1782

so much restraint and moderation, those who followed
after would continue the same deliberate policy.

Unfortunately, as we have seen, the policy of drift and
inaction in regard to Tibet set in on Warren Hastings'
departure. The promotion of intercourse had proved a
difficult business ; and with so much on hand elsewhere
in the building up of the Indian Empire, it was perhaps
natural that the ordinary Governor-General should let the
matter drop.

CHAPTER III

MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA

Now when statesmen were most lukewarm about Tibet
the inevitable Enghsh adventurer came to the front. And
it is a curious circumstance that it was just when our
relations with the Tibetans were at their coldest that
the only Englishman who ever reached Lhasa before the
Mission of 1904 achieved this success. He was not an
accredited agent of Government sent to bring into effect
a deliberate policy such as that conceived by Warren
Hastings. He was a private adventurer, and he went up
in spite of, and against the wishes of, the Government of
the time.

His name was Manning. At Cambridge he was the
friend of Charles Lamb, and was of such ability that he
was expected to be at least Second Wrangler, but he was
of an eccentric nature, and "had a strong repugnance to
oaths," and left the University without a degree. He
conceived, however, a passionate desire to see the Chinese
Empire. He studied the Chinese language in France and
England, afterwards made his way to Canton, remained there
three years, and in 1810 procured a letter of introduction
from the Select Committee of Canton to Lord Minto, then
Governor-General of India, asking him to give him every
practicable assistance in the prosecution of his plans. But
he received little or no aid from the Government, and was
left to his own resources, without official recognition of
any description.

Manning, attended by a Chinese servant, proceeded to
Tibet through Bhutan, and on October 21, 1811, arrived
at Phari, at the head of the Chumbi Valley. His descrip-
tion of the Jong then precisely corresponds with our own

33 3

34 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA

experiences in Tibet on many an occasion since: "Dirt,
dirt, grease, smoke. Misery, but good mutton."

A Chinese Mandarin arrived there about the same time,
and Manning gave him two bottles of cherry-brandy and
a wineglass. This, and probably Manning's very original
manners, evidently unfroze his heart, for he asked him to
dinner, and promised to write immediately to the Lhasa
Mandarin for permission for him to proceed. Manning
also received applications to cure soldiers, and his medicines
" did wonderfully well, and the patients were very grateful."
They even petitioned for him to go with the Mandarin
towards Gyantse, and the Mandarin granted their
request.

Altogether, Manning made a very favourable impression
on the Chinese who, he remarked, lorded it in Tibet like the
English in India, and made the Tibetans stand before
them. And he considered then that there were advantages
in having the Chinese in this superior position. " Things
are much pleasanter now the Chinese are here," he says ;
" the magistrate hints about overtures respecting opening
a commercial intercourse between the Chinese and the
English through Bhutan. I cannot help exclaiming in my
mind (as I often do) what fools the Company are to give
me no commission, no authority, no instructions. What
use are their Embassies when their Ambassadors cannot
speak to a soul, and can only make ordinary phrases pass
through a stupid interpreter? No finesse, no tournure,
no compliments. Fools, fools, fools, to neglect an oppor-
tunity they may never have again ! "

Poor Manning experienced very severe cold, and
travelled to Gyantse in great discomfort, and felt these
discomforts acutely, so that the greater part of his diary
is filled with quaint denunciation of his Chinese clerk ;
of a vicious horse which kicked and bit him; of the
" common horse-furniture," which was " detestable " ; of
the saddle which was so high behind and before that he sat

INTERCOURSE WITH CHINESE 35

in pain unless he twisted himself unequally ; of another
pony "which sprang forward in a full runaway gallop, with
the most furious and awkward motion he ever experienced " ;
of yet another that was " so weak, so tottering, and so
stumbling, and which trembled so whenever he set his foot
on a stone, which was about every other step," that he
could " hardly keep up with the company " ; of his being
" so eaten up by little insects " that he had to sit down in
the sunshine and get rid of as many as he could, for he
" suffered a good deal from these little insects, whose
society he was not used to " ; of his at last finding " a
very pleasant-going horse with a handsome countenance,"
which he was tempted to buy, " but was checked by the
prudent consideration that he might encumber me at
Lhasa," and too much disencumber his lean purse. Strange
that the first Englishman ever to visit Lhasa should have
been incommoded for want of a five-pound note with
which to buy a rough hill pony.

At Gyantse the Chinese Mandarin and General, in
whose train Manning had come, appointed him a little
lodge in the courtyard of the principal house, and what-
ever he required was soon supplied by the Chinese soldiers
and others who wished medical treatment from him.
" One brought rice, one brought meat, another brought a
table, another brought a little paste and paper and mended
a hole in the window, another brought a present of a pen
and candles." Every Chinaman in the town came to see
him. The General was "vastly civil and polite," and
invited him to dinner. But though he was " very much
of a gentleman," Manning concluded that he was " really
no better than an old woman." The dinner was tolerably
good, and the wine excellent, but the cooking was
indifferent.

On the other hand, the Mandarin was impressed by
Manning's beard. He had known men with better
moustaches than Manning's, for he had, " for convenience
of eating, song, and drink," cut his short in India, and it
had not yet grown again. But the beard never failed to
excite the General's admiration, and he declared he had
never seen one nearly so handsome. The General, like-

36 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA

wise, approved of his " countenance and manner." He
pretended to skill in physiognomy and fortune-telling,
and foretold very great things of Manning.

Manning also visited the Tibet Mandarin, who lived
" in a sort of castle on the top of a hill," the Jong, which
General Macdonald attacked and captured in 1904, and
they discussed Calcutta and Tibet together for half an
hour, but what they said Manning does not record. The
Tibetan intimated that he would return the visit the
next day, and he sent " some rice and a useful piece of
cloth, but did not come himself."

With his medical practice Manning had a greater
success. To one Chinaman and his wife, who were
suffering from " an intermittent fever," he gave " opium.
Fowler's solution of arsenic, and afterwards left them a
few pages of bark. The mother-in-law, also, who had the
complaint of old age, he cheered up with a little comfort-
ing physic."

The General often came to see him, " for, like many
other Generals, he had nothing to do, and was glad of a
morning lounge." He managed, however, to foist a
Chinese servant on to Manning as cook. This man's
cooking was bad, but " in drying and folding up linen he
saved him infinite trouble," for, says Manning, " I never
could to this day fold up a shirt or other vestment. A
handkerchief or a sheet I can manage, but nothing
further."

Manning, hearing that the General was fond of music,
and " no bad performer," took the opportunity " one day,
while he was smoking his pipe in my courtyard, of intro-
ducing the subject, and paying my court to him by
requesting the favour of hearing music. This brought me
an invitation to take an evening repast and wine with him,
which was just what I liked. He gave us a very pretty
concert. . . . The Chinese music, though rather meagre
to a European, has its beauties. . . . The General
insisted upon my giving him a specimen of European
(Calcutta) music on the Chinese flute. I was not ac-
quainted with the fingering of that instrument, but I
managed to produce something, which he politely praised."

VISITS THE GRAND LAMA 37

The answer from the Lhasa magistrate to his request
to be permitted to proceed to Lhasa arrived a few days
after his arrival at Gyantse. A passport was given him,
transport and supplies furnished, and as he neared Lhasa
he was met by a " respectable person on horseback, who
dismounted and saluted," and who had been sent out by
the Tibetan authorities to welcome him and conduct him
to Lhasa.

The view of the Potala, " of the lofty, towering palace,
which forms a majestic mountain of a building," excited
his admiration, but if the palace had exceeded his expec-
tations, he says, the town as far fell short of them. There
was " nothing striking, nothing pleasing, in its appearance.
The habitations were begrimed with smut and dirt. . . .
In short, everjrthing seemed mean and gloomy, and
excited the idea of something unreal."

His first care was to provide himself with a proper
hat, and, having found one, he proceeded to pay his
respects to the Chinese Mandarin. Coming into his
presence, he for the first time in his life performed the
ceremony of ketese, or kneeling. The Mandarin received
him politely, and said he had provided him with quarters.
On the following day he visited two of the chief Tibetan
officials.

On December 17, 1811, he went to the Potala to salute
the Grand Lama. He took with him as an offering some
broadcloth, two pair of china ewers, and a pair of good
brass candlesticks, which he had "clean and furbished
up," and into which he put " two wax candles to make a
show." He also took " thirty new bright dollars, and as
many pieces of zinc," and, besides this, " some genuine
Smith's lavender-water . . . and a good store of Nankin
tea, which is a rarity and delicacy at Lhasa, and not to be
bought there."

Arrived in the great hall he made due obeisance,
touching the ground three times with his head to the
Grand Lama, and once to the Ti-mi-fu. While he was
bowing, " the awkward servants contrived to let fall and

38 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA

break the bottle of lavender-water." Having delivered
his present to the Grand Lama, he took oflf his hat, and
"humbly gave his clean-shaved head to lay his hands
upon."

This ceremony over, he sat on a cushion, not far from
the Lama's throne, and had such^ brought them. But "the
Lama's beautiful and interesting face and manner engrossed
almost aU his attention." His face was, he thought,
poetically and affectingly beautiful. He was at that time
about seven years old, and had the simple and unaffected
manners of a well-educated, princely child. Sometimes,
particularly when he looked at Manning, his smile almost
approached to a gentle laugh. " No doubt," naively re-
marks Manning, "my grim beard and spectacles somewhat
excited his risibility."

The little Grand Lama addressed a few remarks to
Manning, speaking in Tibetan to the Chinese interpreter,
the interpreter in Chinese to Manning's Chinese Munshi,
and the Munshi in Latin to Manning. " I was extremely
affected by this interview with the Lama," says Manning.
" I could have" wept through strangeness of sensation."

Here in Lhasa, as at Gyantse, Manning had many
applications made to him for medicine, and he treated
both Chinese and Tibetans. But spies also came, and
" certainly," says Manning, " my bile used to rise when
the hounds looked into my room." The Tartar General
detested Europeans. They were the cause, he said, of all
his misfortunes. Sometimes he said Mamiing was a
missionary, and at other times a spy. " These Europeans
are very formidable ; now one man has come to spy the
country he will inform others. Numbers will come, and
at last they will be for taking the country from us." So
argued the Mandarins, and, indeed, there were rumours
that the Chinese meant to execute Manning. He had
always fully expected this possibility, and writes: "I never
could, even in idea, make up my mind to submit to an
execution with firmness and manliness."

Yet, on the whole, he was not badly treated. He

RETURN TO INDIA 39

remained on at Lhasa for several months, paying many
visits to the Grand Lama, and eventually orders came
from Peking for him to return the way he came. He
left Lhasa on April 19, and reached Kuch Behar on
June 10, 1812.

Manning's own object was " A moral view of China, its
manners, the degree of happiness the people enjoy, their
sentiments and opinions so far as they influence life, their
literature, their history, the causes of their stability and
vast population, their minor arts and contrivances ; what
there might be in China to serve as a model for imitation,
and what to serve as a beacon to avoid." Having been
foiled in this his main object, he does not appear to
have regarded the subsidiary circumstance that he had
reached Lhasa as of particular interest. And he seems
to have been so disgusted with the Government's refusal
to support him, that when he returned to Calcutta he
would give no one any particulars of his journey. The
account which Markham published sixty years later was
only discovered long after his death.

It is a meagre record of so important a journey, yet
it exemplifies one or two points which are worthy of
note. It showed that an individual Enghshman, with
delicacy of touch and with a real sympathetic feeling
towards those among whom he was travelling, could find
his way even into the very presence of the Dalai Lama in
the Potala itself. It showed, too, that he could get on
perfectly well with the Chinese personally. But it showed
likewise that at the back of the minds of both the
Tibetans and Chinese was a strong dread of the British
power, which made them fear to allow a single English-
man to remain in Tibet or even pass through the country.

Yet Manning confirmed what Bogle and Turner had
also noticed — that, while the Tibetans dreaded the
Chinese, they disliked them intensely. He says that the
Chinese were very disrespectful to the Tibetans. Only
bad-charactered Chinamen were sent to Tibet, and he
could : not help thinking that the Tibetans " would view

40 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA

the Chinese influence in Tibet overthrown without many
emotions of regret, especially if the rulers under the new
influence were to treat the Grand Lama with respect ; for
this is a point in which those haughty Mandarins are some-
what deficient, to the no small dissatisfaction of the good
people of Lhasa." These words would be very fairly
applicable to the situation at the present day.

After Manning, no Englishman, in either a private or
official capacity, visited Lhasa till the Mission of 1904.
This seems to show want of enterprise on the part of
Enghshmen in India ; but some did make the attempt,
and many more would have if they could have obtained the
necessary leave from all the authorities concerned. British
officers in India are keen enough to go on such adven-
tures, but leave can very rarely be obtained. I had myself
planned out such a journey in 1889. I had interviewed
the Foreign Secretary, now Sir Mortimer Durand, and
not only obtained permission, but even some pecuniary
assistance, when, at the last moment, I was refused per-
mission by the Colonel of my regiment. Such restric-
tions must, I know, have prevented many another besides
myself. Still, efforts were made by individual officers,
unsupported by Government, to explore Tibet, and, if
possible, reach Lhasa. Moorcroft explored Western
Tibet, and, according to some reports, actually reached
Lhasa and died there ; Richard and Henry Strachey visited
the sources of the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej ; Carey,
Littledale, Bower, Wellby, Deasy, and Rawling explored
in Northern Tibet ; and native surveyors mapped even
Lhasa itself, to which point Sarat Chandra Das also pene-
trated at great risk and brought back most valuable
information.

These and other efforts to explore the country by the
Russian, travellers Prjevalsky, Pievtsoff'and Kozoloff"; by
the Frenchmen Hue and Gabet, Bonvalot, Prince Henri
d'Orl^ans, Dutreuil de Rhins and Grenard ; and by that
indefatigable and courageous Swedish traveller, Sven
Hedin, have all been brought together by Sir Thomas

SUBSEQUENT EXPLORATION 41

Holdich in his recent work on exploration in Tibet. It
is not necessary here to do more than refer to the fact
that efforts to gain a knowledge of the country were
almost continuously being made through the second half
of last century ; my object is rather to describe the effort,
not so much to explore the country, as to regularize and
foster the intercourse which already existed with its
, people.

CHAPTER IV

THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS, 1873-1886

It was not till a century had elapsed since Warren
Hastings had begun his attempts to form a friendship
with the Tibetans that the Government in India again
made any real effort to come into proper relationship with
their neighbours. For a century they were content to let
things take their course, in spite of their informality, and
in spite of the fact that Indian subjects were having all
the worst of the intercourse, for while Tibetans were
allowed to come to India when and where and how they
liked, to trade there without duty and without hindrance,
to travel and to reside wherever they wished, on the
other side, obstructions of every kind were placed in the
way of Indians, and still more of British, trading, travel-
ling, or residing in Tibet. But in the year 1873 the Indian
Government began to stir, and take stock of the position,
and to reflect whether this one-sided condition of affairs
might not be changed to the advantage of Indians and
Europeans without hurting the Tibetans.

In that year the Bengal Government addressed the
Government of India a letter, a copy of which was sent to
the Royal Geographical Society, in which they urged that
the Chinese should be pressed "for an order of admittance
to Tibet," and that " the authorities at Peking should
allow a renewal of the friendly intercourse between India
and Tibet which existed in the days of Bogle and
Turner." The Bengal Government said that the Govern-
ment of India and the Secretary of State had repeatedly
expressed the great interest which they took in this
subject, and the wish that no favourable opportunity
should be neglected of promoting the development of

NEED OF INTERCOURSE 43

commercial intercourse between British India and those
trans-Himalayan countries which were then practically
closed to us. If only the Chinese and Tibetans would
remove the embargo at present imposed upon the entry of
our trade, there were, by routes under our own control,
no serious difficulties or dangers of any kind to overcome,
and none of the risks of collision which existed else-
where.

Tibet, the Bengal Government said, was a well-
regulated country with which our Hillmen were in constant
communication. When Europeans went to the frontier
and tried to cross it, there was no display of violence or
disturbance. They were civilly turned back, with an
intimation that there were orders not to admit them. All
the inquiries of the Lieutenant-Governor led to the
belief that the Tibetans themselves had no objections to
intercourse with us. The experiences of the great botanist,
Sir Joseph Hooker, who in 1849 had travelled to the
Tibetan border, and Blanford among the recent travellers,
and of Bogle and Turner in the past, were singularly at one
upon this point. The Commandant of Khamba Jong, who
had met Mr, Blanford on the frontier in 1870, assured him
that the Tibetans had no ill-will to foreigners, and would, if
allowed, gladly receive Europeans. The fact appeared to
be, the Lieutenant-Governor said, that " the prohibition to
intercourse with Tibet is part of the Chinese policy of
exclusion imposed on the Tibetans by Chinese officials and
enforced by Chinese troops stationed in Tibet." He fully
sympathized with the Chinese desire to keep out foreigners
in China. " But," he said, " in Tibet there is not wealth
enough to attract many adventurers ; there is room only
for a moderate and legitimate commerce ; " and among a
people so good and well regulated as the Tibetans there
would be no such difficulties as existed in China. If the
road were opened, it would be used only by fair traders and
by responsible Government servants or travellers under
the control of Government.

In seeking to press the Chinese for admittance to
Tibet, he said, the most emphatic declaration might be
made that, having our natural and best boundary in the

44 THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS

Himalayas, we could not, and would not in any circum-
stances, encroach on Tibet, and we might offer to arrange
that none save Hillmen or classes domiciled in Tibet
should be allowed to go in without a pass, which would be
given under such restrictions that Government would be
responsible for the conduct of the holders.

The Lieutenant-Governor adduced as a further reason
for entering into formal relationship with the Tibetans that,
if we had an understanding between us, we should together
be able to keep in order the wild tribes inhabiting the
hiUy country between British territory and Tibet. And
he instanced the case of the Mezhow Mishnies, who for
murdering two French missionaries in 1854 were punished
both by us and by the Tibetans, and who, in consequence,
ever after had " a most salutary dread of using violence."

The Bengal Government also contended then in 1873,
as they are still contending now, for the admission of our
tea. Indian tea is grown in large quantities on the hills in
British territory bordering Tibet. But, said the Lieu-
tenant-Governor, nearly forty years ago : " The Tibetans,
or rather their Chinese Governors, will not, on protectionist
principles, admit our tea across the passes. An absolute
embargo is laid on anything in the shape of tea." The
removal of this, he thought, might well be made a sub-
ject of special negotiation. And besides tea, the Bengal
Government thought that Manchester and Birmingham
goods and Indian indigo would find a market in Tibet,
and that we should receive in return much wool, sheep,
cattle, walnuts, Tibetan cloths, and other commodities.

Thus, thirty years before the Tibet Mission started the
local Government had made a real effort to have the
Chinese pressed to abandon their policy of exclusion so
far as Tibet was concerned. The lineal official descendant
of Warren Hastings in the Governorship of Bengal neither
attempted nor advocated any high-handed local measures.
He stated his case calmly and reasonably, and advocated
the most correct course — the attempt to settle the matter
direct with the Chinese.

DELAYS OF CENTRALIZATION 45

Local officers are often told that they are too im-
patient, and that they too frequently want to settle a
matter by local action, when it might be so much better
disposed of by correspondence from headquarters ; by
negotiations, for instance, between London and Peking, or
London and St. Petersburg. They are urged to take a
widet view, and to display a calmer spirit, and greater con-
fidence in the wisdom and sagacity of their London rulers.
But when thirty years after this very moderate and perfectly
reasonable request was made by the local authority, the
matter was stiU no nearer settlement than it was when
the request was made ; and when the House of Commons,
which controls the destinies of the Empire, was still asking
why we did not apply to the Chinese, the local officer's
faith in the superior efficacy of headquarters treatment
is somewhat shaken. And he often questions whether
matters which, after forming the subject of voluminous
correspondence between the provincial Government and
the Government of India, between the latter and the
India Office, between the India Office and the Foreign
Office, between the Foreign Office and the Ambassador
abroad, between him and the Foreign Government, which
are discussed in the Cabinet, and form a subject for debate
in the House of Commons and the House of Lords,
and for platform speeches and newspaper articles in-
numerable, do not in this lengthy process assume a
magnitude which they never originally possessed ; whether,
having assumed such magnitude, they ever really do get
settled or only compromised ; and whether, after all, they
might not have been settled expeditiously and decisively on
the spot before they had been allowed to grow to these
alarming proportions.

There are, one knows, many cases which can only
be settled by the Central Government, and which are so
settled very satisfactorily, but I am doubtful if Tibet
is one of these, and whether we have been wise in the
instance of Tibet, and in many others connected with
China, to make so much of, and expect so much from, the
Chinese Central Government, which has so little real
control over the local Governments. Perhaps if the

46 THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS

Government of Bengal, with the countenance and support
of the Imperial Government, had long ago dealt directly
with the Lhasa authorities, Chinese and Tibetan matters
might have been arranged more expeditiously and satis-
factorily. At any rate, it cannot be safely assumed that
the Central Government method is necessarily the best.

In this case, for instance, all that resulted was that
the Chinese Government, in the Chefu Convention con-
cluded three years later, undertook to protect any mission
which should be sent to Tibet — an undertaking which was
literally valueless, for when a mission was actually sent to
Tibet they were unable to afford it the shghtest protec-
tion, and the Chinese representative in Lhasa confessed to
me in writing that he could not even get the Tibetans
to give him transport to enable him to meet me.

The Government of Bengal had therefore to content
themselves with improving the road inside our frontier,
and with doing what they could on our side to entice and
further trade.

But in 1885 a renewed effort was made to come to an
understanding with the Tibetans. The brilliant Secretary
of the Bengal Government, Colman Macaulay, visited the
frontier to see if any useful relationship could be established
with the Shigatse people by the route up the head of the
Sikkim Valley. The Tashi Lama, who resides at Shigatse,
had always been more friendly than the Lhasa people, and
this seemed more promising. Macaulay saw a local Tibetan
official from the other side, entered into friendly inter-
course, and found, as Bogle and Turner had found, that
apart from Chinese obstruction there was no objection on
the part of the .Tihetan people themselves to enter into
friendly relationship. Macaulay was filled with en-
thusiasm. He threw his whole soul and energy into the
matter. He secured the support of the Government of
India. And, more important still, he fired the Secretary of
State for India with ardour. Never before had such enthu-
siasm for improving our relations with Tibet been shown.
And as it happened that this Secretary of State was the best

TIBETAN AGGRESSION 47

the India Office have ever had — the man who without any
faltering hesitation annexed Burma, to the lasting benefit
of the Burmese, of ourselves, and of humanity — there
seemed now a real prospect of success. Lord Randolph
Churchill and Colman Macaulay were something of kindred
spirits, and Macaulay was sent to Peking with every
support and encouragement to get the necessary permit
for a mission to Lhasa. The Chinese assented. Per-
mission was granted. Macaulay organized his mission,
bought rich presents, collected his transport, and was on
the eve of starting from Darjiling when " international
considerations " came in and Government countermanded
the whole affair.

" Everything had gone so fairly," wrote Macaulay to
Sir Clements Markham from Darjiling in October, 1886,
" that it was difficult for us here to believe that we should
be shipwrecked within sight of the promised land." Yet
so it was, and he took his disappointment so deeply to
heart that he completely broke down in health, and died
a few years later.

Immediately following on the abandonment of the
mission came the most unprovoked aggression on the
part of the Tibetans. They crossed the Jelap-la, the pass
from Chumbi into Sikkim and the frontier between Tibet
and our feudatory State, and they occupied Lengtu,
eighteen miles on our side of the frontier, building a
guard-house there, and turning out one of our road over-
seers, placed there to superintend the road which Sir
Richard Temple had made when Lieutenant-Governor of
Bengal. And on hearing that the mission had been
countermanded, they became so elated that they boasted
that they would occupy Darjiling, only seventy-eight
miles off, and something like a panic ensued in this
almost unprotected summer resort. At the same time,
on the opposite side of Tibet they were still more actively
aggressive, expelling the Roman Catholic tnissionaries
from their long-established homes at Batang, massacring
many of their converts, and burning the mission-house.

48 THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS

This is a very essential fact to bear in mind in the
consideration of the Tibetan question — that after both
Tibetan and Chinese susceptibilities had been given way
to on every occasion, it was the Tibetans who invaded us.
It was a Bhutanese invasion of the plains of Bengal,
followed by a letter from the Tashi I^ama, that had
initiated our relations with Tibet in the time of Warren
Hastings. And it was this invasion of Sikkim that forced
upon us the regularization of our relations with the
Tibetans.

When the Tibetans thus invaded the territory of our
feudatory, we should have been well within our right in
forthwith expelling them by force ; but, in accordance
with the policy of forbearance we had so consistently
pursued, we referred the matter to the Chinese, and
requested them to procure the withdrawal of the Tibetans.
We also allowed the Chinese ample time, a year, within
which to bring their influence to bear. Then, at the end
of 1887, we wrote to the Tibetan cominander that unless
he evacuted his position before JNlarch 15, 1888, he would
be expelled by force. This letter was returned unopened.
In February we wrote to the Dalai Lama himself to the
same effect, but again we received no reply. It was only
on March 20, 1888, that a British force assumed the
offensive, and advanced upon the Tibetans in the position
they had occupied within our frontier at Lengtu.

The Tibetans, for the time being, offered no resistance,
and retired to Chumbi, on their own side of the frontier,
and our troops occupied a position at Gnatong, on our
side. Two months later, however, the Tibetans again
showed truculence, and with 3,000 men attacked our
camp at Gnatong. They were repulsed, and once more
withdrew. But in September they, for the third time,
advanced across our border, and in a single night, with
that skill in building for which they are so remarkable,
threw up a wall three miles long and from 3 to 4 feet high
in a position just above Gnatong, and some miles within
our border.

TIBETANS EXPELLED 49

This position General Graham attacked on the follow-
ing day, and drove the Tibetans from it over the Jelap-la
Pass, and in the ensuing days pursued them into the
Chumbi Valley. But here again, in accordance with our
principle of respecting Chinese susceptibilities, our troops
did not remain in Chumbi a single day, but returned at
once to Gnatong. For two years now the Tibetans had
been encroaching on our side of the frontier, but not for
one day would we permit our troops to remain on the
Tibetan side. Forbearance could scarcely go further than
this, but yet it was to be still more strained on many a
subsequent occasion.

CHAPTER V

THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

The Chinese Amban, or Resident, at Lhasa now appeared
upon the scene to effect a settlement, and during 1889 we
endeavoured to have the frontier line properly fixed and
our exclusive supremacy in Sikkim, which was recorded in
well-known treaties, definitely recognized. We also wished,
if possible, to have trade regulated. Considering that we
had abandoned the proposed mission to Lhasa out of
deference to Chinese and Tibetan susceptibilities, that the
Tibetans had assumed the offensive, and that the Chinese
had shown themselves utterly unable to control them, this
was not an unreasonable expectation to hold. We made
no demand for indemnity or for any accession of territory.
We merely asked that the boundary and trade should be
regulated. Yet a year of negotiation passed and no result
was obtained, and the Government of India told the
Chinese negotiators that they had decided "to close the
Sikkim incident, so far as China is concerned, without
insisting upon a specific agreement."

But now that the Indian Government, knowing that they
could perfectly well hold their own up to their frontier, and
finding that the Chinese were of little use in controlling
events beyond it, were quite prepared to drop negotia-
tions, the Chinese themselves came forward and pressed
for their conclusion. This is an important point. It was
now the Chinese who were pressing for an agreement.
Further, and this is still more important, they stated that
" China will be quite able to enforce in Tibet the terms of •
the treaty," and they asked the Government of India to
depute officers to meet the Chinese Resident at Gnatong.
For the agreement which was subsequently reached the

CHINESE DESIRE A TREATY 51

Chinese are therefore in the fullest sense responsible.
They had themselves sought it, and they had themselves
undertaken to control the affairs of the Tibetans.

Agreement was eventually reached in 1890, and a Con-
vention vi'as signed by Lord Lansdowne and the Chinese
Resident in Calcutta on March 17. It laid down that " the
boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the
mountain range separating the waters flowing into the
Sikkim Teesta, and the affluents from the waters flowing
into the Tibetan Mochu, and northwards into other rivers
of Tibet." It admitted the British protectorate over the
Sikkim State. By it both the Chinese and British
Governments engaged "reciprocally to respect the
boundary as defined in Article I., and to prevent acts of
aggression from their respective sides of the frontier."
The three questions of providing increased facilities for
trade, of pasturage, and of the method in which official
communications between the British authorities in India
and the authorities in Tibet should be conducted were
reserved for discussion by joint Commissioners from either
side, who should meet within six months of the ratifica-
tion of the Convention.

This Convention proved in practice to be of not the
slightest use, for the Tibetans never recognized it, and the
Chinese were totally unable to impress them. But it was
at least a start towards effecting our ultimate object of
regularizing our intercourse with Tibet, and for another
three years we solemnly occupied ourselves in discussing
the three reserved points ; the Chinese Resident, Sheng,
being himself the joint Commissioner on the side of the
Chinese, and Mr. A. W. Paul representing the British
Government.

Our principal aim was to get some mart recognized, to
which our merchants could resort and there meet Tibetan
merchants. We did not attempt to gain permission for
our traders to travel all over Tibet, as Tibetan traders can
travel all over India. We merely sought to have one
single place recognized where Indian and Tibetan traders
could meet to do business with each other. And the
place we sought to get so recognized was not in the centre

52 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

of Tibet, or even in Tibet proper at all. It did not lie on
the far side of the Himalayan watershed. It was Phari,
at the head of the Chumbi Valley, on the southern side of
the main Himalayan range. Yet to even this the Chinese
and Tibetans would not agree, and eventually Yatung, at
the extreme southern end of the Chumbi Valley and
immediately on our border, was agreed upon.

Having made this concession, and having refrained
from pressing for permission to allow British subjects to
travel beyond this or to buy land and build houses there,
we had hoped that the Chinese would meet our wishes in
regard to the admission of tea. Speakers in Parliament
scoffed at the idea of pressing tea upon the Chinese, but
for the Bengal Government it is an important point. All
along the low hills bordering Tibet there are numerous
tea-plantations, aflfbrding both an outlet for British and
Indian capital and employment for many thousands of
Indian labourers. To a responsible local Government it
is of importance to encourage and foster this industry.
Now, just across the frontier are three milhons of tea-
drinkers. Tea is just the kind of light, portable com-
modity most suited for transit across mountains, and it
was perfectly natural, reasonable, and right that the
Bengal Government should press for its admission to
Tibet, that the Tibetans might at least have the chance of
bujdng it or not, as they pleased. But the Chinese, in
spite of concessions in other matters by the Government
of India, remained obstinate, and still remain obstinate,
in regard to the admission of tea, and eventually only
agreed to admit Indian tea into Tibet "at a rate of duty
not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into
England," which, as the latter ra.te of duty is 6d. per pound,
and the tea drunk in Tibet is very inferior, was in reality
the imposition of an ad valorem duty of from 150 to 200
per cent., and was therefore a concession of not the
slightest value.

On December 5, 1893, the Trade Regulations were
signed at Darjiling. The trade-mart at Yatung was to

TRADE REGULATIONS SIGNED 53

"be open for all British subjects for purposes of trade
from the first day of May, 1894," and the Government were
to be "free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch
the conditions of British trade." British subjects were
not at liberty to buy land and build houses for themselves,
but were to be free " to rent houses and godowns (stores)
for their own accommodation and for the storage of their
goods," and " to sell their goods to whomsoever they
please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in
money, to hire transport of any kind, and, in general, to
conduct their business without any vexatious restrictions."
Goods other than arms, liquors, and others specified, were
to be " exempt from duty for a period of five years "; but
after that, if found desirable, a tariff might be " mutually
agreed upon and enforced." The Political Officer in
Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer in conference
were to settle any trade disputes arising.

No arrangements for communication between British
and Tibetan officials were made, but it was laid down that
despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese
Resident should be handed over by the Political Officer in
Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer.

And as to grazing, it was agreed that at the end of
one year such Tibetans as continued to graze their cattle
in Sikkim should be subject to such regulations as the
British Government might lay down.

May 1, 1894, had been fixed as the date upon which
the trade-mart at Yatung was to be opened, and at the
appointed time Mr. Claude White, the Political Officer
in Sikkim, was sent to visit Yatung, to attend the opening
of the mart, and to report on the general situation as
regards trade. He was instructed not to raise the
question of demarcating the frontier, but to undertake,
if the subject was mooted by the Chinese officials, that
their views and suggestions should be laid before the
Government of India.

Mr. White, writing on June 9 from Yatung, reported
that, in the first place, the site of the mart had been

54 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

" exceedingly badly chosen." It will be remembered that it
was chosen by the Tibetans, and simply accepted by us
out of deference to their feelings. It was at the bottom
of a narrow valley, shut in by steep hUls, with no room
for expansion. He further reported that the godowns
(stores), or shops, built for the trade would answer the
purpose of native shops, but were quite inadequate for the
storage of goods or for the use of European merchants,
and that the rent proposed was exorbitant, being Rs. 25 a
month, when a fair rent would be from Rs. 4 to Rs. 5. He
found the Tibetans most discourteous and obstructive,
and he believed that the Lhasa authorities had issued
orders that the free-trade clauses of the treaty were not
to be carried out. The local official at Phari, at the head
of the Chumbi Valley, charged 10 per cent, on all goods
passing through Phari, both imports and exports ; and
this action, in Mr. White's opinion, certainly did away
with any freedom of trade, as provided for in the treaty,
for it was obviously useless to have provided by treaty
that Indian goods should be allowed to enter Tibet free
of duty if a few miles inside the frontier, and on the only
road into Tibet, a heavy duty was to be imposed upon
them.

Mr. White also reported that the Chinese, though
friendly to him, and apparently willing to help, had " no
authority whatever." They admitted that the treaty was
not being carried out in a proper spirit, and Mr. White
gathered that the Tibetans actually repudiated it, and
asserted that it was signed by the British Government and
the Chinese, and therefore they had nothing to do with it.
In any case, they maintained that they had a right to
impose what taxes they chose at Phari so long as goods
were allowed to pass Yatung free. The Chinese con-
fessed that they were not able to manage the Tibetans.
The Tibetans would not obey them, and the Chinese
were afraid to give any orders. China was suzerain over
Tibet only in name, was Mr. White's conclusion. Nego-
tiation was, therefore, he said, most difficult, for though the
Chinese agreed to any proposal, they were quite unable to
answer for the Tibetans, and the Tibetans, when spoken to,

TIBETANS BREAK THE CONVENTION 55

either sheltered themselves behind the Chinese or said that
they had no orders to give any answer for Lhasa, and
could only report.

Mr. White's immediate superior, the Commissioner
of the Rajshahi Division, agreed with him that the
levying of a duty of 10 per cent, ad valorem at Phari
was a clear breach of the main article of the Trade
Convention. He contended that by Article IV. of the
Regulations it is provided that goods entering Tibet for
British India across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa,
shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years, and
that this meant a general exemption from all duties,
wherever imposed, the place of realization being altogether
irrelevant. He recommended, therefore, that this breach
of the main article of the treaty, to which all the other
provisions were ancillary, should be made the subject of a
representation to the Chinese Government.

The Government of Bengal took the same view. They
thought the levy of the duty at Phari undoubtedly
seemed to be inconsistent with the terms of the treaty,
which provided for free trade for a period of five
years. And the Lieutenant-Governor felt that no time
should be lost in making this matter the subject of a
representation to the Government of China.

And in this view our Minister at Peking, Mr.
(afterwards Sir Nicholas) O'Conor, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg and Constantinople, thoroughly concurred, and
suggested to the Viceroy that the imposition of a 10 per
cent, ad valorem duty at Phari should be very strongly
protested against as contrary to treaty stipulations.

The Government of India, however, " recognizing the
necessity for extreme patience in dealing with the Tibetans,
decided that it would be premature to make any formal
complaint of their obstructiveness."* They wrote to the
Government of Bengal that " The information in regard to
the levy of duty at Phari and to the obstructiveness of the
Tibetans was certainly unsatisfactory, but the Regulations

* Blue-book, p. 24.

56 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

only laid down that goods entering Tibet from British
India across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, shall
be exempt, etc. Phari is a considerable distance from the
frontier, and unless it could be shown that the duty to
which Mr. White referred was a special one newly imposed
it appeared doubtful whether the Government of India
could enter a valid objection." " It has always been
recognized," continues the despatch, " that the utmost
patience is necessary in dealing with the Tibetans, and
having regard to the short time which has elapsed since the
date fixed for the opening of the Yatung mart, the
Governor- General in Council would prefer to make nothing
in the nature of a complaint to the Chinese Government
at the present stage."*

The Viceroy, accordingly, merely wrote to the Amban
that he had been sorry to learn from Mr. White's reports
that he was disappointed at the existing conditions of
trade between Tibet and Sikkim ; that it would seem
that Mr. White was of opinion that trade was unduly
hampered by the action of the Tibetan officials at Phari ;
that His Excellency (the Amban) would be interested to
hear the views which Mr. White had formed ; and that
he, the Viceroy, was confident that traders will, under the
Amban's directions, be allowed all the freedom and privi-
leges permissible under the Regulations, and he hoped that
before long they might be able to congratulate each other
on successful trade development at Yatung. Certainly
nothing could have been milder, more patient, and more
forbearing — and also, as it proved, less effectual.

It was not only in trade matters that the Tibetans
had shown a disregard of the treaty. In the matter of
the frontier also they proved troublesome, and during his
stay at Yatung Mr. White was informed that certain
places in the north-east of Sikkim, and within the
boundary laid down in the Convention of 1890, had
recently been occupied by Tibetan soldiers. The Viceroy
wrote to the Amban in August, 1899, pointing out that

* Blue-book, p. 31.

TIBETANS CROSS TREATY-BOUNDARY 57

such incidents were not unlikely to occur as long as the
frontier officials had no practical acquaintance with the
actual border-line, and suggesting that it would probably
be convenient to arrange that Frontier Officers should
meet before long on the border and travel together along
the boundary fixed by the Convention.

To this the Amban replied, in October, that the
Tibetan Council raised objections to our officers " travel-
hng along " the frontier, and were unable to agree that
British officers should travel on the Tibetan side of the
frontier, but that they considered the proposal to send
officers to define the frontier was one with which it was
proper to comply. The Amban had, accordingly, deputed
a Chinese Major commanding the fi-ontier troops, and the
Tibetan Council had deputed a General and a Chief
Steward, to proceed to the frontier to meet the officer
appointed by the Viceroy, " there to inspect the border
between Sikkim and Tibet as defined by the Convention,
and to make a careful examination in order that boundary
pillars might be erected, which shall be for ever respected
by either side." In conclusion, the Amban asked to be
informed what officer had been deputed by the Viceroy
for this duty, and the date on which he would arrive on
the frontier, in order that he might instruct the Chinese
and Tibetan deputies " to proceed at the appointed time
for the work of demarcation."

This seemed clear and business-like enough. Mr. White
pointed out to Government that, with winter coming on,
it would be impossible to commence demarcation before
May the 1st in the following year, so there was plenty of
time in which to make aU preliminary arrangements. He
also said that the Chinese deputy was an official whom he
had met at Yatung, and who had been most courteous to
him. And the Commissioner and Bengal Government
agreed that the Tibetan objection to British officers travel-
ling within the Tibetan borders might be respected, and
that it would be sufficient to erect pillars at the passes,
which could be approached from the Sikkim side. So the
Viceroy replied, in December, that he thought a start
should be made any time between May 1 and July 1 ; that

58 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

Mr. White had been deputed for the purpose, and would
meet the other deputies at whatever point on the frontier
might be convenient; and would be strictly enjoined
not to travel on the Tibetan side of the boundary, as it
would be sufficient if boundary pillars were erected at
the passes which can be approached from the Sikkim
side.

The Amban replied on January 13, 1895, that he had
sent orders to the deputies " to hold themselves in readi-
ness to commence work at the time suggested by the
Viceroy," and he suggested that the respective officers
should " come together at Yatung, where they can decide
upon the best place for beginning operations, and where
the three parties (Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan) can
agree upon a date for starting together on the work of
demarcation."

Everything was then carefully and deliberately
arranged, and there seemed good prospect of a settle-
ment of the frontier ; but when, in the following May,
Mr. White approached the frontier to meet the Chinese
deputy, in accordance with an arrangement they had made
between them, he was met by a letter, written by
direction of the deputy, and stating that the Lamas were
obstinate in their refusal to supply transport, and that he
was much disturbed at his failure to keep his appointment,
but had laid his difficulties before the Amban. On
May 19 Mr. White and the Chinese Major met — a
different one from the deputy originally appointed, for the
latter had since died. He asked for more delay, but
Mr. White refused, as he had already been kept waiting
with his escort at inclement altitudes, and Mr. White
and he fixed the site of the pillar on the Jelap-la (pass),
which is a spot where the site of the watershed forming
the boundary, according to treaty, is quite unmistakable,
as it runs along a very sharply-defined ridge. Mr. White
erected a pillar here, and arranged with the Chinese
deputy to meet him at another pass, the Dokala, on
June 1, while Mr. White should in the interval erect a

TIBETANS REMOVE BOUNDARY PILLARS 59

pillar at the Donchukla, to be afterwards inspected by the
Chinese.

At this time Mr. White also received a letter from the
Amban, saying that a day for the beginning of the work
having been decided upon, it was, of course, proper that a
commencement should be made on that day, and he had
already received the consent of the Tibetan State Council
to that end. But the Lamas of the three great monas-
teries, the Amban proceeded to explain, were still full of
suspicion, and were pressing certain matters upon him,
which made it necessary for him to enlighten them further.

He therefore requested Mr. White kindly to postpone
commencing work for a time, in order to avoid trouble on
this point. But Mr. White replied that his letter had
arrived too late, as the work of demarcation had already
commenced before its receipt, and he urged Government
to grant no further delay, for the Chinese had had five years
since the treaty was signed within which to settle with
the Tibetans.

The Government of India, however, thought that no
serious inconvenience had apparently arisen through the
frontier being undemarcated, and that if the Chinese
delegate failed to meet him at the Dokala on or about
June 1, he should write to the Chinese Resident, explain-
ing that he had proceeded so far under arrangements with
the Chinese deputies at the Jelap-la ; but as they had not
joined him, he would return to Gantok. He was further
to ask the Resident whether work could be jointly pro-
ceeded with that season, and giving latest dates for
recommencement.

A few days later came the news that the pillar which
Mr. White had erected on the Jelap-la had been de-
molished by the Tibetans, and the stoneware slab on
which the number of the pillar had been inscribed had
been removed by them. And on June 11 Mr. White
telegraphed that the pillar he had erected on the
Donchuk-la had been wilfully damaged, and as this was
an unfrequented pass he considered the outrage must be

60 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

deliberate. He subsequently stated that the numbered
slab here also had been taken away, and that the destruc-
tion of the pillar was most probably the work of three
Lamas sent from Lhasa to watch the proceedings of the
Tibetan Commissioners at Yatung.

This was brought to the notice of the Chinese Resident
by the Viceroy, and a reply was received that the Council
of State had sent no orders for the destruction of the
pillar, and that he had given orders that a strict examina-
tion should be made into the affair, and the people
who stole the slab from the pillar be severely punished.
At the same time, the Amban suggested that the work of
delimiting the frontier should be postponed " until after
the expiry of the free period when the treaty was to be
revised."

When informed of this proposal, our Minister at Peking
stated his opinion that it would be best to be firm in the
refusal of a postponement, and he solicited the Viceroy's
authority to repeat to the Chinese Government what he
had previously informed them, that, if obliged, the British
Commissioner would proceed alone.

The Bengal Government also urged that Mr. White
" should be authorized to proceed with his own men alone
to lay down the boundary and set up pillars on the passes
along the eastern frontier where no dispute was known to
exist." But the Lieutenant-Governor was informed that
the Government of India were not prepared to insist upon
the early demarcation of the frontier, and directed that
Mr. White should return to Gantok forthwith, or, at any,
rate withdraw at once from the immediate neighbourhood
of the border.

The Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Charles Elliott, acknow-
ledged that it was difficult for Mr. White to remain
indefinitely in his camp on the frontier, but declared that
it was impossible to disguise the fact that a return to
Gantok practically meant the abandonment of the demar-
cation. He believed that the authorities in Peking were
anxious that the delimitation should continue without

SUGGESTED OCCUPATION OF CHUMBI 61

delay, but it was plain that the Amban at Lhasa was
unable to give effect to the wishes of his Government in
consequence of the opposition manifested by the Lamas,
who exercised the real authority in Tibet. The contem-
plated withdrawal of Mr. White to Gantok would un-
doubtedly, he thought — and events proved him to be
absolutely right — cause a loss of prestige, would be looked
upon by the Tibetans as a rebuff to British authority, and
would encourage them in high-handed acts and demands,
and possibly outrages. He had no doubt that if the
British Government had only to deal Avith Tibet, the
wisest policy would be to give them warning that unless
they at once made arrangements to co-operate in the work
of delimitation it would be done without them, and that
unless they appointed a ruler on their side who could
protect the pillars set up, the British Government would
march in and hold the Chumbi Valley in pawn, either
temporarily or permanently. Such a brusque and high-
handed line of conduct, added the Lieutenant-Governor,
was the only one that frontier tribes who have reached the
stage of civilization of the Tibetans could understand. But
the affair, he allowed, was complicated by the relations of
Government with China, and our desire to uphold the
weak and tottering authority of the Chinese in Lhasa, the
result of which was that the people who were in real
power were not those we dealt with, and that the people
we dealt with had no power to carry out their engage-
ments with us. In the circumstances. Sir Charles Elliott
advocated such negotiations with the Chinese Govern-
ment as would leave the British Government free to
march in and hold the Chumbi VaUey, with their consent,
and without any detriment to the Chinese suzerainty,
but with the object of assisting them to establish their
authority more firmly at Lhasa. At any rate, we ought,
he considered, to intimate in a firm and friendly way to
the Peking Government that either they must get their
orders carried out or we must. He reminded the
Government of India that nothing had been exacted as
the result of the British victories at Lengtu and on the
Jelap-la — not even compensation for the cost of the cam-

62 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

paign — and he urged that we should now insist that we
would protect our own interests if China could not carry
out her engagements.*

These, in the light of future events, appear reasonable
and sensible proposals ; but the Government of India, in
pursuance of their pohcy of forbearance and moderation,
would not accept them. They ordered Mr. White
definitely to return to Gantok. They noticed that the
returns of trade between British territory and Tibet
showed a marked increase, and they hoped that the
continued exercise of moderation and patience would
gradually remove Tibetan suspicions as to our aims and
policy.

A few months after this was written, in November of
1895, Mr. Nolan, the Commissioner of Darjiling, an officer
who had for many years been conversant with the
Tibetan question, and who held civil charge of that
division of Bengal which adjoins Sikkim and Bhutan, and
who supervised our relations with those two States as well
as our trade with Tibet, visited Yatung, and had conver-
sations with Chinese and Tibetan local officials. His
report of the state of affairs there is one of the most inter-
esting published, t He found that the imposition of the
10 per cent, duty at Phari was no new exaction, but had
existed for a long time. He found, also, that the reason
the Tibetans did not meet Mr. White in the previous
summer to delimit the boundary was that they wished
the general line of the frontier should be agreed upon, in
the first instance, with reference to maps, and the ground
visited only after this was done. But he found, too,
that the Tibetans repudiated the treaty. The " Chief
Steward," the sole Commissioner on the part of the
Tibetan Government for reporting on the frontier matter,
" made the important statement that the I'ibetans did
not consider themselves bound by the Convention with
China, as they were not a party to it." He reported further,
that the Tibetans had prevented the formation of a mart

* Blue-book, p. 44. t Ibid., p. 54.

FEEBLE CHINESE INFLUENCE 63

by building a wall across the valley on the farther side of
Yatung, by efficiently guarding this and by prohibiting
their traders from passing through. Mr. Korb, a wool
merchant from Bengal, had come to Yatung to purchase
wool from some of his correspondents on the Tibetan side,
who had invited him thither ; but the Tibetans prevented
his correspondents from coming to do business with him.
Tibetan merchants were similarly prevented from seeing
Mr. Nolan.

Mr. Nolan's conclusion was that, even though the duty
which was collected at Phari was neither special nor newly
imposed, yet exaction was inconsistent with the treaty
provision that trade with India should be exempt from
taxation ; and also that the first clause in the Trade
Regulations, providing that " a trade-mart shall be
established at Yatung," which " shall be open to all
British subjects for the purposes of trade," had not been
carried into effect.

The failure to carry out the treaty he attributed
entirely to the Tibetans. He was quite satisfied that the
Chinese officials in Tibet, whatever might have been their
prepossessions in favour of the policy of seclusion, then
sincerely desired to see the Convention carried out, being
afraid that they would be disgraced by their own Govern-
ment if it were not. The Tibetans were the real as well
as the ostensible opponents. And Mr. Nolan believed
their true motives in opposing the treaty were correctly
expressed by a monk, who said that if the English entered
Tibet, his bowl would be broken, meaning that the
influence of his Order would be destroyed, and its wealth,
typified by the collection of food made from door to door
in bowls, would be lost. And this opposition on the part
of the Lamas the Chinese had not the means of overcoming.
They certainly had an acknowledged social superiority, and
they were feared to a certain extent on account of their
power to send an army through the Himalayas, as they
had done on several occasions with surprising success. On
the other hand, their present forces in Tibet were ridicu-
lously small, and from Yatung to Gyantse they only had
140 soldiers, and at Lhasa only a few hundreds, while

64 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA

the monks at Lhasa numbered 19,100, of whom 16,500
were concentrated in three great monasteries, and they
were vigorous and formidable in a riot, having attacked
the Chinese in 1810 and 1844 and the Nepalese in 1883.

Mr. Nolan, with his long experience on this frontier,
had, as events have shown, most accurately gauged the
situation. The Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Charles Elliott,
considered that his report showed that the improvement
hoped for from conciliation and forbearance had not taken
place in the two seasons during which the mart had
nominally been opened, and by the systematic obstruction
of the Tibetans the object of the treaty with China had
been frustrated. He therefore renewed his recommendation
that a diplomatic reference should be made to China,
pointing out how completely the Tibetans had violated the
spirit of the treaty and Trade Regulations, and had
refused to be bound by their terms.

But the Government of India again replied that they
wished to pursue a policy of conciliation, and did not
wish to make any serious representations to the Chinese
Government. They repeated that trade had increased,
and as regards demarcation of the frontier, they understood
from a further report of Mr. Nolan's that the Tibetans
claimed a strip of territory near Giagong, in the north of
Sikkim, and these claims the Government of India con-
sidered it would not only be impolitic but inequitable to
ignore. The Viceroy therefore wrote to the Chinese
Resident, suggesting that Chinese and Tibetan delegates
should be sent to Gantok, the capital of Sikkim, to meet
Mr. White there, and proceed with him to Giagong to
make a local inquiry, but that no actual demarcation
should take place until the reports of the results of the
inquiry had taken place.

And so the game rolled on, and nothing whatever
resulted. The Chinese Resident was superseded, and the
Chinese asked that action should be deferred till the new
one arrived. The new Resident came, and wrote that
the Tibetans are " naturally doltish, and prone to doubts

RESULT OF FIVE YEARS' EXPERIENCE 65

and misgivings," and it would be best therefore that they
should " personally inspect the line of demarcation men-
tioned in the treaty," though a Tibetan representative had
been with the Chinese Amban when the Convention was
made, and had ample opportunity during the years that
agreement took in negotiating to inspect and to give the
views of his Government upon it. And so it resulted
that when, at the conclusion of five years from the signing
of the Trade Regulations, the Secretary of State asked the
Government of India for " a full report, both on the
progress made since the date of that agreement towards
the settlement of the frontier, and on the extent to which
the trade stipulations of the treaty and Convention had
been operative," the Bengal Government had to reply*
that the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, as laid
down in Article I. of the Convention, had not yet been
demarcated, owing to the refusal of the Tibetans to abide
by the terms of the Convention, and to their claiming a
tract of land to the north of Donkya-la, Giagong, and the
Lonakh Valley ; and that the trade stipulations contained
in the Regulations, had been inoperative. The Tibetans
had prevented Yatung becoming a real trade-mart ; abso-
lutely no business was transacted there, and it was merely
a registering post for goods passing between Tibet and
India, and the proclamation of the place as a mart had in
no way influenced the trade between the two countries,
for what small increase there was appeared to be mainly
due to, and might have been expected from, the restora-
tion of peace between the British Government and Tibet.
This was the net result of the policy of conciliation
and forbearance towards the Tibetans and of reliance on
the Chinese Central Government, which had been pursued
from 1873.

* Blue-book, p. 92.

CHAPTER VI

SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

Now that five years had elapsed since the Trade Regula-
tions were concluded, and they were, according to their
provisions, subject to revision, the Government of India
began to consider any practical measures for securing
fuller facilities for trade. The Convention of 1890 and
the Trade Regulations of 1893 were intended to provide
these facilities, but so far none had been obtained ; and
the Indian Government thought that, as the Tibetans
attached great importance to retaining the Giagong piece
of territory in Northern Sikkim, and as we had no real
desire to hold it, there might be advantage in conceding
that point if the Tibetans would, on their side, make some
equivalent concession. They might, it was thought, con-
cede to us the point for which we had contended when
negotiating the Trade Regulations, and recognize Phari as
the trade-mart in place of the quite useless Yatung. Lord
Salisbury* agreed that some action was necessary, but it
seemed to him that, as during recent years Chinese
advisory authority in Tibet had been little more than
nominal, and the correspondence of the Government of
India even seemed to show that it was practically non-
existent, it would be preferable to open direct communica-
tion between the Government of India and the Tibetan
authorities.

Lord Curzon therefore commenced, in the autumn of
1899, a series of attempts to open up direct communica-
tion with them. Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutanese Agent in
Darjiling, who was accustomed to visit Tibet for trade

* Blue-book, p. 101.
66

VICEROY'S LETTERS DECLINED 67

purposes, was first employed to write a letter on his own
behalf to the Dalai Lama, suggesting, in general terms,
that a high Tibetan official should be sent to discuss the
frontier and trade questions. This letter met with an
unfavourable response. Captain Kennion, the Assistant
to the Resident in Kashmir, who annually visits Leh and
the Western Tibet frontier, was then charged with a letter
from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama, which he was to
give to the Tibetan officials in Gartok ; but six months
after this was returned to Captain Kennion, with the
intimation that the officials had not dared, in the face of
the regulations against the intrusion of foreigners into
Tibet, to send it to Lhasa. These two methods having
failed, Ugyen Kazi was entrusted with another letter from
the Viceroy to the Dalai I^ama, which he was himself to
present at Lhasa. In August, 1901, he returned from
Lhasa, reporting that the Dalai Lama declined to reply
to it, stating as his reason that the matter was not one for
him to settle, but must be discussed fully in Council with
the Amban, the Ministers, and the Lamas, and the letter
was brought back with the seal intact.

A factor of determining importance now suddenly thrust
itself into the situation. At the very time when the Vice-
roy was making these fruitless efforts to enter into direct
communication with the Dalai Lama came the information
that this exclusive personage had been sending an Envoy
to the Czar. Our Ambassador at St. Petersburg forwarded
to the Foreign Office an announcement in the official
column of the Journal de Saint Petersbourg of October 2
(15), 1900, announcing the reception by His Majesty the
Emperor of a certain Dorjieff, who was described as first
Tsanit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. And, some
months later, our Consul-General at Odessa forwarded
to the Foreign Office an extract from the Odessa Novosti
of June 12 (25), 1901, stating that Odessa would welcome
that day an Extraordinary Mission from the Dalai Lama
of Tibet, which was proceeding to St. Petersburg with
diplomatic instructions of importance. At the head of

68 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

the mission was the Lama, Dorzhievy (Dorjieff), and its
chief object was a rapprochement and the strengthening
of good relations with Russia. It was said to have been
equipped by the Dalai Lama, and despatched with auto-
graph letters and presents from him to His Imperial
Majesty. And, among other things, it was to raise the
question of the establishment in St. Petersburg of a per-
manent Tibetan Mission for the maintenance of good
relations with Russia.

This Dorjieff, it appeared from an article in the Novoe
Vremya of June 18 (July 1), 1901, was a Russian subject,
who had grown up and received his education on Russian
soil. He was by birth a Buriat of Chovinskaia (in the
province of Verchnyudinsk, in Trans-Baikalia, Eastern
Siberia), and was brought up in the province of Azochozki.
He had settled in Tibet twenty years before his present
visit to Russia. " This reappearance of the Tibet Mission
in Russia proved," said the Novoe Vremya, "that the
favourable impressions carried back by Dorjieff to his
home from his previous mission have confirmed the Dalai
Lama in his intention of contracting the friendliest rela-
tions with Russia. ... A rapprochement with Russia
must seem to him [the Dalai Lama] the most natural
step, as Russia is the only Power able to frustrate the
intrigues of Great Britain."

Count Lamsdorff, however, in conversation with the
British Ambassador* on July 3, 1901, characterized "as
ridiculous and utterly unfounded the conclusion drawn in
certain organs of the Russian press, that these Tibetan
visitors were charged with any diplomatic mission." He
said Dorjieff was a Mongolian Buriat of Russian origin,
who came occasionally to Russia with the object, he
believed, of making money collections for his Order from
the numerous Buddhists in the Russian Empire. Count
Lamsdorff added that on the occasion of Dorjieff's visit in
the previous autumn to Yalta, the Emperor had received
him, and he himself had had an opportunity of learning
some interesting details from him of life in Tibet ; the
Russian Geographical Society also took an interest in his

* Blue-book, p. l66.

DALAI LAMA'S MISSION TO RUSSIA 69

visit, which had, however, no official character whatever,
although he was accompanied on this visit by other
Tibetans.

But, in spite of this declaimer, DorjiefF was still styled
an Envoy Extraordinary, and the Messager Officiel of
June 25 (July 8, 1901) had the announcement that his
Majesty the Emperor had received on June 23, in the
Grand Palace at Peterhof, the Envoy Extraordinary from
the Dalai Lama of Tibet. And as the Russian press
announced that the Envoys had paid visits to Count
LamsdorfF and M. Witte, Sir Charles Scott, the British
Ambassador, took an opportunity at an interview with
Count LamsdorfF of ascertaining some further particulars.*
The latter said that, although the Tibetan visitors had
been described as Envoys Extraordinary of the Dalai
Lama, their mission could not be regarded as having any
political or diplomatic character. The mission was of the
same character as those sent by the Pope to the faithful
in foreign lands. DorjiefF had some post of confidence in
the Dalai Lama's service, but Count LamsdorfF believed
that he stiU maintained his original Russian nationality.
He had brought the Count an autograph letter from the
Dalai Lama, but this letter merely expressed a hope that
Count LamsdorfF was in the enjoyment of good health
and was prosperous, and informed him that the Dalai
was able to say that he himself enjoyed excellent health.

These proceedings naturally enough attracted the
attention of the Secretary of State for India, who on
July 25 pointed out to the Foreign Office t that the Dalai
Lama had recently refused to receive the communications
addressed to him by the Viceroy, and that while the
Viceroy was thus treated with discourtesy a mission was
publicly sent to Russia, and the publicity given to the
Tibetan Mission which had recently arrived in St. Peters-
burg could not fail to engender some disquietude in the
minds of the Indian Government as to the object and
result of any negotiations which might ensue. The
Secretary of State for India suggested, therefore, that
our Ambassador should be instructed to inform Count

* Blue-book, p. 117. t Ibid., p. 123.

70 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

LamsdorfF we had received liis assurance with satisfaction,
as any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or
disturb the existing status of Tibet, would be a movement
in which His Majesty's Government could not acquiesce.
This suggestion was adopted, and on September 2, 1901,
our Ambassador informed Count LamsdorfF that His
Majesty's Government would naturally not regard with
indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency
to alter or disturb the existing status in Tibet. The
Russian Minister repeated his assertion that " the mission
was chiefly concerned with matters of religion, and had
no political or diplomatic object or character."

For the time being the Government of India itselt
took no action in regard to this new factor, though in
concluding a despatch to the Secretary of State on
February 13 of the following year (1902) they declared
that it was desirable that the unsatisfactory situation
in Tibet should be brought to an end with as little delay
and commotion as possible, since there were factors in the
case which, at a later date, might invest the breakdown
of the unnatural barriers of Tibetan isolation with a wider
and more serious significance.

They continued to plod steadily along at the settle-
ment of the frontier, and corresponded with the Secretary
of State and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce about the
introduction of tea to Tibet now that the five years, during
which it was to be excluded had expired. But they
acted with much more decision than previously, and
instead of waiting year after year for the arrival of
Chinese or Tibetan deputies to meet our representatives,
they sent Mr. White, in the summer of 1902, to Giagong,
to reassert British rights to the tract of country which the
Tibetans had been occupying in contravention of the
treaty of 1890, and, if necessary, to expel them from the
British side of the frontier. Mr. White had suggested
that an effective and simple way would be to occupy the
Chumbi Valley, but the Government of India, though
they considered grounds for strong action were far from

TIBETANS EXPELLED ACROSS BORDER 71

lacking, were not for the time in favour of such a proposal.
And another alternative of stopping all Tibetan trade they
thought would be hard on our own traders, and might
drive trade permanently away to Nepal and Bhutan. They
accordingly adopted the above-mentioned course.

Mr. White went to Giagong on June 26, 1902, with
200 men, and camped half a mile from the Tibetan wall,
where the Khamba Jongpen and 40 men were stationed.
He gave them twenty-four hours' notice in which to move
to the other side of the boundary. On the following
morning, after some protests, the Tibetans removed across
the boundary. On July 4 a number of Tibetan officials
visited him, and said they had come under instructions
from the Tashi Lama to show him the Giagong boundary.
Mr. White told them that his orders were to lay down
the boundary as shown in the Convention of 1890, which
had been signed by the Chinese Amban on behalf of
the Tibetans. I'o which they replied that they had
heard of the treaty, but that it was invalid, as it had not
been signed by any Tibetan. The Tibetans, however,
asked for a copy of the treaty and for the names of the
passes, and Mr. White told them they could see for
themselves if the water ran into the Sikkim Valley or into
Tibet, and where the water parted into Sikkim and Tibet
was the boundary. He found on the tract 6,270 sheep,
737 yaks, out of which only 1,143 sheep and 80 yaks
belonged to the Sikkimese, and the remainder were
Tibetan. Near the top of the Naku La he found a
Tibetan wall running across the valley, with a blockhouse
on the east.

The immediate consequence of this action was, that at
the end of July the Viceroy received a letter from the
Chinese Resident at Lhasa, asking for an explanation
of the object and reasons of Mr. White's proceedings, and
saying that he had appointed Mr. Ho Kuang-Hsi to
proceed to Giagong, and had further arranged with the
Dalai Lama for the despatch of a Tibetan official to act
conjointly with Mr. Ho in any discussion with Mr. White
which should arise.

The Viceroy, in reply, wrote to say that the object

72 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

of the journey from which Mr. White had recently
returned was to inspect the boundary as laid down in the
Convention of 1890, and to compel the withdrawal from
Sikkim territory of any troops which the Tibetans might
have established in violation of that Convention. He
reminded the Chinese Resident that he had offered to
make concessions with respect to these frontier lands, on
the understanding that matters as to trade would be put
on a proper footing. But Lord Curzon pointed out that
the negotiations for the improvement of trade relations
between India and Tibet had made no real progress
during the past twelve years. In these circumstances, he
had no alternative but to compel the observance of the
boundary as prescribed by the Convention ; and until
matters as to trade had been placed on a satisfactory
footing, he must continue to insist on the boundary being
observed, though any proposals which the Chinese
Resident would make for the improvement of trade
relations would receive careful consideration, and Mr.
White had been instructed to discuss with the Com-
missioners appointed by the Amban any suggestions which
they might put forward.

As a fact, the Commissioner never did meet Mr.
White. Mr. Ho was prevented by " iU-health " from pro-
ceeding to Gantok. Then he was recalled to Lhasa.
Then the Chinese Resident himself was to be replaced,
and the new one would not reach Lhasa till the following
summer. And so on, with the usual and unfailing
excellent reasons for doing nothing.

But, in the meanwhile, the new factor in the situation
was assuming significant proportions and causing the
Government of India anxiety. I have already related
how the Dalai Lama was sending missions to the Czar,
with autograph letters to the Russian Chancellor, at the
very moment when he was declining all communications
from the Viceroy of India. And now, from a totally
different quarter, came rumours that China was making a
secret agreement with Russia in regard to Tibet.

RUMOURED RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 73

Our Minister at Peking, on August 2, 1902, tele-
graphed* to Lord Lansdowne that there had been going
the rounds of the press an agreement in regard to Tibet,
alleged to have been secretly made between Russia and
China. In return for a promise to uphold the integrity of
China, the entire interest of China in Tibet was to be
relinquished to Russia. This rumour, said our Minister,
seemed to have originated in a Chinese paper published in
Satow. Fuller information was sent by letter. According
to this, among other things, Russia would establish
Government officers in Tibet to control Tibetan affairs.

On Sir Ernest Satow making, in accordance with
Lord Lansdowne's instructions, a representation to the
Chinese Foreign Board about this, the President of the
Board strongly denied that there was any such agree-
ment, and declared that no such arrangement had ever
formed a subject of discussion between the Chinese and
Russian Governments. But the rumour seems to have
had a wide prevalence and to have been regarded
seriously, for our Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported
in October that the Chinese Minister there had told him
that several of his colleagues had been making inquiries
from him respecting this pretended agreement, which had
appeared in several Continental as well as Russian news-
papers, and which he, the Chinese Minister, had first seen
in the Chinese newspapers. The Government of India,
also, reported to the Secretary of State that circum-
stantial evidence, derived from a variety of quarters, all
pointed in the same direction, and tended to show the
existence of an arrangement of some sort between Russia
and Tibet.

It may be asked — and, indeed, it was asked — why the
Government of India should have been so nervous about
Russian action in Tibet. The Russian Government had
said that the mission which the Dalai Lama had sent to
St. Petersburg was of a " religious " nature, and the
Chinese Foreign Board had said there was no agreement

* Blue-book, p. 140.

74 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

with Russia about Tibet. Why not, then, have disre-
garded these idle rumours ? Such lofty disregard is easy
for irresponsible persons at a comfortable distance in
England to display. But the responsible Government
in India cannot dismiss such rumours with so light a
heart. Russia might not have had any agreement
about Tibet, and the Tibetan Mission might have been
purely religious ; but that she was extremely interested
in Tibet was unquestionable. She had for years been
sending semi-official, semi-scientific expeditions into the
country. These had always reported on the richness
of Tibet in regard to gold, and the desirability of getting
concessions there. There was at the very moment one
of these expeditions with an armed escort in Tibet.
Apart from this, the interest of Russiain Tibet was
thoroughly natural. The Dalai Lama was regarded with
superstitious reverence by many thousands of Russian
Asiatic subjects. Moreover, at that time it was generally
looked upon as inevitable that Russia would shortly
absorb Mongolia, and all Mongols look upon the
Dalai Lama as a god. It was, indeed, because of his
immense influence over the Mongols that the Chinese had
for centuries, and at great cost to themselves, secured and
maintained a dominant influence in Lhasa. It is easy to
understand, therefore, that the Russians would be glad
enough of any opportunity of gaining an influence with
the Dalai Lama. The mission of the latter to the Czar
might, as the Russian Chancellor said, be mainly religious,
and similar to missions which the Pope sends out. But
even in Europe it is often difficult to distinguish between
religion and politics, and in Asia the two are almost indis-
tinguishable. A religious understanding between the
Dalai Lama and the Czar might by the former be
regarded as a political agreement. And whatever might
have been the intentions of the Russian Government at
the time, they might on some subsequent occasion have
sent a mission to Lhasa, as they had sent a mission to
Kabul in 1879 and caused an Afghan War.

Even so, why should we trouble ? What possible
harm could a few Russians do in Lhasa ? Russia might

RUSSIAN DANGER TO INDIA 75

invade India through Afghanistan, but she could never
invade India across Tibet and over the Himalayas. Why,
then, should we be so touchy about her action there ?
Why not let her send as many missions and officers as she
liked ? This also seems a broad-minded attitude, such as
a platform orator in the heart of England might safely
take up. But, again, it was not so easy for those away on
the frontier of the Empire, with immediate responsibilities
on their shoulders, to feel so complacent. If Russia had
been the friend she is now, and if our influence in Lhasa
had been unmistakable, it would have been easier to take
such a view, and it is, indeed, in my opinion, the right
view now to take. But in 1902 she was still on the crest
of a great advancing wave of expansion. She had not yet
been checked by Japan. She had spread over Manchuria
with startling rapidity. Where, at the time of my journey
there with Sir Evan James, no Russian had ever been
seen, there were now Russian railways and Russian can-
tonments. She had expanded in Western Turkestan and
annexed the Pamirs, and it was generally looked upon
only as a matter of time before she would absorb Chinese
Turkestan and Mongolia. If, then, we complacently, and
without a protest, allowed her to establish herself in Tibet,
we could hardly expect those States dependent on us and
bordering Tibet to think otherwise than that this was the
real Power in Asia, and this, therefore, the Power to look
up to.

A full-dress Russian invasion of India, through Tibet,
no responsible person ever dreamed possible. But, without
a real invasion, Russia established in Lhasa, while we were
unrepresented there, could cause Government a great deal
of anxiety. In practical detail it would mean the increase
of our army on the North-East frontier by several
thousand men.

It was obviously prudent, therefore, to prevent her
acquiring a more predominant influence than our own in
Tibet. While it was quite natural that she should be glad
to have an influence at Lhasa, it was still more natural
that we should be jealous of her having more influence
than we had. For, while our border was contiguous with

76 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

Tibet for 1,000 miles, from Kashmir nearly to Burma, the
Russian border nowhere touched or even approached
Tibet. The whole breadth of Chinese Turkestan lay-
in between the Russian frontier and the nearest frontier of
Tibet, and Lhasa itself was 1,000 miles distant from the
nearest point on the Russian frontier. To appreciate the
position, let the reader draw out the map at the end of this
volume.

The Government of India, accordingly, recommended
prompt action. The attempts to negotiate an under-
standing with the Tibetans through the Chinese had
proved a failure. It had been found impossible to open
up direct communications with the Tibetans. The result
of the exclusion of the Tibetans from the pasture lands at
Giagong, though it had materially improved our position
on the border, was not in effect more than a timely
assertion of British authority upon the spot. These
different rumours from such varied sources tending, in the
opinion of the Government of India, to indicate the
existence of some kind of an arrangement between Russia
and Tibet, necessitated dealing with the situation far more
drastically and decisively than it had ever been dealt with
before. Continuously since 1873 the Government of
India had been trying by every correct and reasonable
method to regularize their intercourse with Tibet. Their
patience was now exhausted, and, instead of trifling about
on the frontier with petty Chinese or Tibetan officials,
they proposed, in the very important despatch of January 8,
1903,* to send a mission, with an armed escort, to Lhasa
itself, there to settle our future relations with Tibet, and
to permanently establish a British representative.

This proposal, when it reached England, seems to have
caused considerable surprise. But Warren Hastings, a
century before, had meant to do this very thing ; and
the Russians had a Consular representative in Chinese
Turkestan alongside their frontier, so there seemed no
particular reason why we should not have had a similar
representative in Tibet alongside our frontier. The
risk had to be considered, it is true, but why the case of

* Blue-book, p. 152.

PROPOSED MISSION TO LHASA 77

Cavagnari's murder at Kabul should be everlastingly
brought up as an argument against sending an officer
outside our frontier it is difficult to understand. It is
ignoble to the last degree to be scared for all time by
what happened then. Cavagnari was murdered. What
then ? I agree with my old chief and first master in
Central Asian politics. Sir Charles Macgregor, that if
our agent A was murdered we should have sent up B,
and if B was murdered we should have sent up C.
Our whole Afghan policy for thirty years past has been
frightfully ignominious, and the day will come when we
shall bitterly regret not having had an agent at the capital
of a country for whose foreign policy we are responsible.
At any rate, the fact of barbarian Afghans murdering our
representative at Kabul in 1879 was no adequate reason
for not sending a representative to Lhasa in 1903.

These, however, are merely my own views. The
contention of the Government of India was that, in
suggesting a mission to Lhasa, they were merely reviving
a proposal which had been supported as far back as 1874
by Sir T. Wade, then British Minister at Peking, and
which was almost taking definite shape in 1885-86, when
the importance of a Burmese settlement appears to have
so impressed itself upon aU parties that the Lhasa Mission
was sacrificed in order that the signature of the Chinese
Government to the Burmese Convention might be
obtained. The Government of India considered it a grave
misfortune that they should have been diverted from a
project of unquestionable importance by the exigencies of
political considerations that had not the remotest con-
nection with Tibet. They recommended, therefore, the
revival of this precedent, and the firm pursuance of the
policy which was then abandoned.

The Government of India regarded the so-called
suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction.
China was always ready to break down the barriers of
ignorance and obstruction and to open Tibet to the
civilizing influence of trade, but her pious wishes were
defeated by the short-sighted stupidity of the Lamas. In
the same way Tibet was only too anxious to meet our

78 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS

advances, but she was prevented from doing so by the
despotic veto of the suzerain. The Government of India
wished to put an end to this " solemn farce," and would
have preferred to deal with Tibet alone. But they
recognized that China could not be entirely disregarded,
and only asked that, if the Home Government trusted to
the interposition of China, this might be accompanied
by a resolute refusal to be defeated by the time-honoured
procedure, and that if and when a new treaty was
concluded, it should not be signed by the British and
Chinese alone, but by a direct representative of the
Tibetan Government also.

At the same time, said the Government of India, the
most emphatic assurances might be given to the Chinese
and Tibetan Governments that the mission was of an
exclusively commercial character, that we repudiated all
designs of a political nature upon Tibet, that we had
no desire either to declare a protectorate or permanently
to occupy any portion of the country, but that our
intentions were confined to removing the embargo that
then rested upon aU trade between Tibet and India, and
to estabhshing those amicable relations and means of
communication that ought to subsist between adjacent and
friendly Powers.

These proposals the Government of India commended
to the favourable consideration of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, in the firm conviction that if some such step were
not taken, "a serious danger would grow up in Tibet,
which might one day, and perhaps at no very distant date,
attain to menacing dimensions." They regarded the
situation, as it seriously affected the frontiers which they
were called upon to defend with Indian resources, as one
in which their opinion was entitled to carry weight with
His Majesty's Government ; and they entertained a
sincere alarm that, if nothing was done and matters were
allowed to slide, they might before long have occasion
gravely to regret that action was not taken while it was
still relatively free from difficulty.

CHAPTER Vll

NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

I WOULD again recall the fact that when the Government
of India wrote the above-quoted despatch, Russia was not
yet at war with Japan, and was very much in the
ascendant and active in Asia. She had recently occupied
Port Arthur, and run a railway through Manchuria ; and
she was in a dominant, almost domineering, position at
Peking. And as showing the interest she took in Tibet,
there came, just after the receipt by the India Office of
Lord Curzon's despatch, a representation from the Russian
Chargd d'AfFaires in London, founded apparently upon
our very humble efforts of the previous summer within
our own frontier. In this representation, which was made
in the form of a memorandum* communicated to the
Foreign Office, it was stated that, according to the infor-
mation which the Russian Government had received from
an authoritative source, a British military expedition had
reached Komba-Ovaleko, on its way north by the Chumbi
Valley, and that the Russian Government would consider
such an expedition to Tibet as likely to produce a situation
of considerable gravity, which might oblige them to take
measures to protect their interests in those regions.

It was impossible to trace what place was intended
by Komba-Ovaleko. Mr. White and his little escort of
150 men had never gone outside the limits of Sikkim,
and had long since returned to their headquarters. There
was no difficulty, then, in giving the Russian Ambassador
the assurance that this " authoritative " information was
without the smallest foundation. And Lord Lansdowne
went further than merely refuting the false information.

* Blue-book, p. 178.
79

80 NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

He told the Ambassador* that the language of the com-
munication had seemed to him unusual, and, indeed, almost
minatory in tone. He referred especially to the state-
ment that the Imperial Government might, in consequence
of our action in a country which immediately adjoined
the frontiers of India, find it necessary to take measures
to protect Russian interests in those regions. Lord Lans-
downe said he could not conceive why it was necessary
for Russia to evince her interest in this manner.

Count Benckendorff expressed his opinion that these
exaggerated rumours had been spread designedly in order
to foster ill-feeling between Great Britain and Russia, and
thought we should spare no pains in order to dissipate
them. There was, he said, no reason whatever why the
two Governments should have trouble over Tibet. Russia
had no political designs upon the country, and he presumed
we had not.

Lord Lansdowne replied that if he was invited to say
that we had no desire to annex Tibetan territory, he
would unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative, but he
was bound to be careful how he gave general assurances,
the import of which might hereafter be called in question,
as to our future relations with Tibet. It was natural that
the Indian Government should desire to promote Indian
trade in that country, and they would no doubt take
whatever measures seemed to them necessary for that
purpose. The Ambassador admitted that this was only
natural.

A few days later, on February 18, Lord Lansdowne,
in a further conversation with the Russian Ambassador,
recurred to the same subject. f He said that the Indian
Government had been seriously perturbed by the com-
munication made to the Foreign Office. The interest of
India in Tibet was. Lord Lansdowne said, of a very
special character. With a map of Central Asia before
him, he pointed out to the Ambassador that Lhasa was
within a comparatively short distance of the Indian
frontier, while, on the other hand, it was considerably over
1,000 miles from the Asiatic possessions of Russia, and

* Blue-book, p. 180. + Ibid., p. 181.

RUSSIAN PROTESTS 81

any sudden display of Russian interest or activity in the
regions immediately adjoining the possessions of Great
Britain could scarcely fail to have a disturbing effect upon
the population, or to create the impression that British
influence was receding, and that of Russia making rapid
advances into regions which had hitherto been regarded as
altogether outside her sphere of influence.

Lord Lansdowne added that he had received from
apparently trustworthy sources reports to the effect that
Russia had lately concluded agreements for the establish-
ment of a Russian protectorate over Tibet, and also that,
if she had not already done so, she intended to establish
Russian agents or Consular officers at Lhasa, and he
thought it of the utmost importance that as the Ambas-
sador had disclaimed on the part of Russia poUtical designs
upon Tibet, he should be in a position to state whether
these rumours were or were not without foundation.

Count BenckendorfF replied that he did not believe
that there was any foundation in them, but he expressed
his readiness to make special inquiries of the Russian
Government as to the truth of the statements referred to.

Lord Lansdowne then went on to say that as we were
much more closely interested than Russia in Tibet, it
followed that, should there be any display of Russian
activity in that country, we should be obUged to reply by
a display of activity, not only equivalent to, but exceeding
that made by Russia. If they sent a mission or an
expeditioh, we should have to do the same, but in greater
strength. As to our dealings with Tibet at the moment.
Lord Lansdowne stated that we were endeavouring to
obtain from the Tibetan authorities the fulfilment of
pledges which»had been given to us in 1890 in regard to
the location of the frontier, and in regard to trade facilities
on the borders of Sikkim. We had found that it was of
no use to deal with Tibet through China, owing to the
dilatory methods of the Chinese Government and the
slenderness of their influence over Tibet. It was abso-
lutely necessary that these local questions should be
disposed of to our satisfaction, and we should continue to
take the necessary steps for that purpose.

82 NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Some delay occurred in getting a reply from the
Russian Government, but on April 8, 1903, the Russian
Ambassador informed Lord Lansdowne* that he could
" assure him officially that there was no convention about
Tibet, either with Tibet itself, or with China, or with any-
one else ; nor had the Russian Government any agents in
that country, or any intention of sending any agents or
missions there. But, although the Russian Government
had no designs whatever about Tibet, they could not
remain indifferent to any serious disturbance of the status
quo in that country. Such a disturbance might render it
necessary for them to safeguard their interests in Asia ;
not that even in that case they would desire to interfere
in the affairs of Tibet, as their pohcy 'ne viserait le
Tibet en aucun cas,' but they might be obliged to take
measures elsewhere. They regarded Tibet as forming
part of the Chinese Empire, in the integrity of which they
took an interest."

Count Benckendorff went on to say that he hoped that
there was no question of any action on our part in regard
to Tibet which might have the effect of raising questions
of this kind, and Lord Lansdowne told him that we had
no idea of annexing the country, but he was well aware
that it immediately adjoined our frontier, that we had
treaties with the Tibetans, and a right to trade facilities.
If these were denied us, and if the Tibetans did not fulfil
their treaty obligations, it would be absolutely necessary
that we should insist upon our rights. In cases of this
kind, where an unciviUzed country adjoined the posses-
sions of a civilized Power, it was inevitable that the
latter should exercise a certain amount of local pre-
dominance. Such a predominance belonged to us in
Tibet. But it did not follow from this that we had any
designs upon the independence of the country.

With these very definite assurances from Russia, it
might well be asked why we should still have desired to
take pronounced measures in Tibet. Anxiety in regard
to Russian action in Tibet was the main reason why the
Government of India, sought to take action in Tibet.

* Blue-book, p. 187.

TIBETAN RELIANCE ON RUSSIA 83

Now that we were reasonably assured that Russia had no
intention of interfering in Tibet, why should we still have
thought it necessary to send a mission into the country ?
The answer is that we had not yet settled those questions
of trade and intercourse which had existed years before
the Russian factor intruded itself into the situation ;
besides which we had always the consideration that,
although it might be true enough that the Russians had
no mind to have any dealings with the Tibetans, yet the
Tibetans might still think they could rely on the Russians
in flouting us. The Germans had officially no intention
of interfering with the Boers, yet it was because Kruger
thought he could rely upon German support that he
went to war with England. He was much too astute an
old gentleman to have fought us if he had thought he
would have had to fight us by himself. So it was with
the Tibetans. The Russian Government might not have
the remotest intention of helping them in any possible
way, yet the Tibetans might, and did, think they could
count upon Russian support. The Dalai Lama's Envoy
Extraordinary had been very well received by the Czar
and by the Russian Chancellor and others. Doubtless,
he had collected some very handsome subscriptions and
received valuable presents. A little Oriental imagination
would soon expand these ordinary amenities into a promise
of thick-and-thin support against the English. We had
still this erroneous impression to reckon with.

CHAPTER VIII

A MISSION SANCTIONED

While the negotiations with Russia were proceeding the
Home Government would come to no final decision as to
the action to be taken. The question at issue, they in-
formed the Indian Government* in February, was no
longer one of details as to trade and boundaries — though
on these it was necessary that an agreement should be
arrived at — but the whole question of the future political
relations of India and Tibet. They agreed with the Indian
Government that, having regard to the geographical posi-
tion of Tibet on the frontiers of India, and its relations
with Nepal, it was " indispensable that British influence
should be recognized at Lhasa in such a manner as to
render it impossible for any other Power to exercise a
pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with
the interests of British India." They admitted, also, the
force of the contention that the interest shown by the
Russian Government in the action of the Government of
India on the Tibetan frontier demonstrated the urgency
of placing our relations with Tibet on a secure basis.
They recognized that Nepal might be rightly sensitive as
to any alteration in the political position of Tibet which
would be likely to disturb the relations at present existing
between the two countries, and that the establishment of
a powerful foreign influence in Tibet would disturb those
relations, and might even, by exposing Nepal to a pressure
which it would be difficult to resist, affect those which
then existed on so cordial a basis between India and
Nepal. They regretted the necessity for abandoning the
passive attitude that had hitherto sufficed in the regulation

* Blue-book, p. 184.
84

VIEWS ON H.M.'S GOVERNMENT 85

of affairs on the frontier, and were compelled to recognize
that circumstances had recently occurred which threw on
them the obligation of placing our relations with the
Government of Lhasa upon a more satisfactory footing.
And they acknowledged that the proposal to send an
armed mission to enter Lhasa, by force if necessary, and
establish there a Resident, might, if the issue were simply
one between India and Tibet, be justified as a legitimate
reply to the action of the Tibetan Government in returning
the letters which on three occasions the Viceroy had
addressed to them, and in disregarding the Convention
with China of 1890. But they stated that they could not
regard the question as one concerning India and Tibe£
alone. The position of China in its relations to the
Powers of Europe had been so modified in recent years
that it was necessary to take into account those altered
conditions in deciding on action affecting what stiU had
to be regarded as a province of China. It was true that
we had no desire either to declare a protectorate or
permanently to occupy any portion of the country. But
measures of that kind might become inevitable if we were
once to find ourselves committed to armed intervention.

For the above reasons, the Home Government thought
it necessary, before sanctioning a course which might be
regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese
Empire, to be sure that such action could be justified by
the previous action of Tibet, and they had, accordingly,
come to the conclusion that it would be premature to
adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the
affairs of Tibet as those proposed by the Government of
India. They would await, therefore, the result of their
reference to the Russian Government, and after those
explanations had been received they would be in a better
position to decide on the scope to be given to the negotia-
tions with China, and on the steps to be taken to protect
India against any danger from the establishment of foreign
influence in Tibet.

When the Russian assurances were at length received,
the purport of the conversation Lord Lansdowne had held
with the Russian Ambassador was at once communicated

86 A MISSION SANCTIONED

by telegram to the Viceroy, and on April 14 the Secretary
of State, presuming that it would be necessary to include
in the scope of the negotiations with China and Tibet the
entire question of our future relations with Tibet, com-
mercial and otherwise, asked the Viceroy for his views as
to the form which these negotiations should now take,
with special reference to the means to be adopted to
insure that the conditions that might be arrived at would
be observed by Tibet.

The Viceroy on April 16 replied that he had recently
received from the delegate deputed by the Chinese Resi-
dent an intimation that if Yatung was not considered a
suitable locality, they were wUling to negotiate at any
place acceptable to us. And he proposed, accordingly, to
invite the Chinese Resident to depute delegates to meet
our representative at Khamba Jong, which was the
nearest inhabited place on the Tibetan side to the frontier
in dispute near Giagong. The Viceroy proposed that our
representative, with an escort of 200 men, should proceed
to that place, while reinforcements were held in reserve in
Sikkim, and that, should the Chinese and Tibetan repre-
sentatives fail to appear, or should the former come with-
out the latter, our representative should move forward to
Shigatse or Gyantse, in order that the arrival of the
deputations from Lhasa might be accelerated.

The Secretary of State telegraphed on April 29 that
there was no objection to the Chinese, Tibetan, and
Indian representatives meeting at Khamba Jong or to the
military arrangements recommended ; but His Majesty's
Government considered that without previous reference to
them the Mission should not advance beyond that place,
as in existing conditions, even in the event of the failure
of the Chinese and Tibetan parties, any sudden advance to
Lhasa was not, in their opinion, justified.

In regard to the subject-matter of the forthcoming
negotiations, the Viceroy telegraphed on May 7 that,
having regard to the stultification of existing treaty
provisions, and to the unsuitability of either Yatung,
Phari, or any other place in the Chumbi Valley, for a
trade-mart, in which business could be transacted directly

OBJECTS OF THE MISSION 87

between British and Tibetan merchants, without incurring
the monopoly of local traders, it was necessary to insist
upon opening a new trade-mart and upon having a British
agent at Gyantse. The Viceroy thought that having
a British representative at Lhasa, which would be the best
possible security for the future observance of the con-
ditions, would be far preferable ; but assuming the un-
willingness of His Majesty's Government to press this
claim, the proposal for an agent at Gyantse was a suitable
alternative. In any case, the fullest facilities should be
given to the British representative for direct communica-
tion with the Tibetan Government, and if he met vdth
obstruction, it would be necessary to resort to the
alternative of moving him forward to Lhasa. Further-
more, it would be necessary to secure for British Indian
subjects the same freedom for trade and travel in Tibet as
was enjoyed by Kashmiris and Nepalese, and to insist that
all British subjects duly authorized by the Government of
India should be allowed to proceed by recognized routes to
Gyantse, beyond which a pass from the Tibetan Govern-
ment would be required.

As Commissioner, the Viceroy proposed to appoint
Major Younghusband, Resident at Indore. He could
confidently rely on his judgment and discretion, and he
had great Asiatic experience. With him he would
associate as Joint Commissioner Mr. White, Political
Officer in Sikkim.

The Secretary of State hesitated to accept at once
the proposal regarding Gyantse, and wished before coming
to any decision to be informed whether the Viceroy could
propose any alternative in place of the extreme course
of advancing by force into Tibet ; and the Viceroy said the
only alternatives were (a) the costly and ineflFectual
measure of blocking aU trade - routes and excluding
Tibetans from British India, and (6) an occupation of the
Chumbi Valley.

The final decision of the Home Government on the
whole matter was telegraphed to the Viceroy on May 28.
They approved a procedure by which both the Chinese
and Tibetan Governments would be bound by the action

88 A MISSION SANCTIONED

of their representatives, but they wished that the negotia-
tions should be confined to questions concerning trade
relations, the frontier, and grazing rights, and that no
proposal should be made for the establishment of a
Political Agent at Gyantse or Lhasa, as such a political
outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incom-
mensurate with any benefits which would be gained by it.
They had recently received assurances that Russia had
no intention of developing political interests in Tibet,
and they were unwilling to be committed by threats to
any definite course of compulsion to be undertaken in
future.

While the Home Government and the Indian Govern-
ment were thus deliberating as to the final action which
should be taken, communications with the Chinese were
being exchanged. The Chinese Government had, in
December, informed our Minister at Peking that "the
Throne, attaching deep importance to international re-
lations, and regarding the Tibetan question of great
importance, had specially appointed Yu Tai to be Imperial
Resident in Tibet, with orders to proceed with all speed,
and negotiate with Mr. White in an amicable spirit."
This newly-appointed Resident called on the British
Minister on January 5, and informed him that he had
hoped to be able to travel to his new post by way of
India, but that, in order to avoid arousing the suspicion
of the Tibetans, it had been decided that he should travel
by the Yangtse River and Szechuan, and would not be
able to reach Lhasa much before July. He did not, in fact,
reach it till six months later still, till thirteen critical
months had elapsed since the Chinese Government had
told us that he was to proceed to Lhasa with all possible
speed.

Mr. Townley, the British Charg^ dAffaires at Peking,
on May 12, informed the Chinese Government that
the Government of India would invite the Resident
at Lhasa to send Chinese delegates to meet the repre-
sentatives of the British Government at Khamba Jong,

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE CHINESE 89

for the settlement of pending questions, and would inform
the Resident that the Chinese delegates should be accom-
panied by a duly accredited Tibetan representative. The
Chinese Government were told that we attached great
importance to this latter point, for the Tibetans had more
than once intimated to the British authorities that they
did not consider themselves bound to observe the pro-
visions of the treaties previously made between the British
and Chinese representatives, because no representative
of the Dalai Lama had taken part in the negotiations.

The Chinese Government, on receipt of this, tele-
graphed to the Resident at Lhasa, asking him again to
admonish the Dalai Lama, and to persuade him not to fail to
send, with speed, a Tibetan official to be associated with the
deputy Ho in his discussion with Mr. White. In reply,
the Chinese Government received, on July 18, a telegram
from the Resident, saying that he had at once com-
municated these instructions to the Dalai Lama,
"directing him to send a Tibetan [lit., barbarian] official of
fairly high standing and despatch him to the frontier,
provided with credentials as a negotiator, in order to
concert with the Prefect Ho and his colleagues, to await
British officials, and effect a harmonious and sincere
settlement."

The Resident at Lhasa had also at this time submitted
to the Throne a memorial, which furnishes exceedingly
instructive reading. He said he had summoned the
Tibetan Councillors to his office, and admonished them in
person to the effect that the English intended to bring
troops to Tibet, and that it was difficult to fathom their
objects. All this, he said, was the result of their obstructing
last year a deputy with his retinue, so that a favourable
opportunity was lost. If the English did make this long
march, it would, of course, be the duty of him, the
Imperial Resident, to proceed in person to the frontier and
find some way of persuading them to stop. But the
Tibetans, on their side, must not show their previous
obstinacy ; and if the English did not stop, and insisted on
entering Tibet, they must on no account repel them with
arms, but must discuss matters with them on the basis of

90 A MISSION SANCTIONED

reason. Thus he hoped a rupture might be avoided, and
things brought back to a satisfactory conclusion. But if,
as before, the Councillors allowed themselves to be guided
by the three great monasteries, and hostilities once began,
then the horrors of war would be more than he could bear
to think of, and even the mediation of him, the Imperial
Resident, would be of no avail.

Such, said the Resident, were the admonitions which he
addressed to the Tibetan Councillors, and as he did so he
watched their demeanour. It was submissive certainly, but
obstinacy was engrained in the character of the Tibetan
barbarians, and whether, when matters should become
pressing, they would consent to obey and discuss questions
in a friendly spirit, it was difficult for him to tell in advance.

The laconic observation by the Emperor on this curious
document, which correctly described the Tibetans, and
which incidentally depicted both the contempt of the
Chinese for these "barbarians" and the ineffectiveness of
their control over them, was — " Seen."

But the Resident had also written to the Viceroy, on
April 6, saying that he had deputed Mr. Ho and Captain
Parr for the discussion of affairs, and they were waiting at
Yatung. The deputy appointed by the Viceroy might,
he said, either come to Yatung, or the Chinese deputies
would proceed to Sikkim, or such other place as might be
decided on by the Viceroy.

To this the Viceroy replied, on June 3, 1903, that, as
the Resident had already clearly recognized, it would be
useless to negotiate upon matters affecting Tibet without
insuring the full and adequate representation of the
Dalai Lama's Government throughout the proceedings.
He was nominating as his Commissioner Colonel Young-
husband, who, accompanied by Mr. White, Political
Officer in Sikkim, as Joint Commissioner, would proceed
to meet the Commissioners appointed by the Resident,
who should, of course, be of equivalent rank, and must be
attended by a Tibetan officer of the highest rank, whose
authority to bind the Tibetan Government was absolute
and unquestioned. On this understanding, that the Lhasa
authorities would be duly and fully represented, the

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONER 91

Viceroy was prepared to accept the Resident's invitation
that the Commissioners should meet at a very early date,
and discuss, not only the exact position of the frontier
under the Convention of 1890 and the mutual rights of
grazing to be allowed on either side of that frontier to the
people of Tibet and British territory, but also the method
in which our trade relations could be improved and
placed upon a basis more consonant with the usage of
civilized nations and our direct and predominating interests
in Tibet. And as the Resident was prepared to let his
deputies meet the British representative at any place
which the Viceroy might select, and as Khamba Jong,
being the nearest inhabited place to the frontier in
question, seemed to be the most suitable place for the
meeting, he had directed Colonel Younghusband to
proceed thither as soon as he conveniently could, and he
trusted that the Resident would secure the attendance of
the Chinese and Tibetan representatives at Khamba Jong
on, or as soon as possible after, July 7.

On the same date as this letter was written I also
received my own formal instructions.* I was informed
that a strict insistence on the boundary-line as laid down
in the Convention of 1890 was, perhaps, not essential either
to the Government of India or to the Sikkim Durbar, and
I was directed to give my opinion on this point after
inspecting the tract in question. The matter of grazing
rights was not one of great importance, and after discus-
sion with the Chinese and Tibetan delegates I was to
submit my proposals as to the agreement which might be
come to in this matter. The revision of the Trade Regu-
lations and the recognition of Gyantse as a trade-mart in
place of Yatung were to form the subject of discussion
with the Chinese and Tibetan delegates, and the provision
of guarantees for the observance of such agreements as
might be concluded were to be considered a matter of the
first importance. It was further considered very desirable
that arrangements for free communication between the
Government of India and the authorities at Lhasa should
be made, and possibly also annual meetings between

* Blue-book, p. 198.

92 A MISSION SANCTIONED

British and Tibetan officials for the due settlement of the
trade and frontier difficulties which might occur.

In conclusion, I was warned to be very careful to
abstain from using any language or taking any action
which would bind the Government to any definite course
hereafter without first obtaining the sanction of the
Government of India.

All was now prepared for the start of a mission. In
this extraordinarily complex and intricate matter the many
different fines had at last been made to converge on one
point. The manifold communications which had taken
place for thirty years between the Bengal Government and
the Government of India, between local Indian officers and
local Chinese and Tibetans ; the correspondence between
Simla or Calcutta and London, between the India Office
and the Foreign Office, between the Foreign Office and
the Russian and Chinese Governments, and between the
Viceroy and our Minister at Peking and the Chinese
Resident at Lhasa, had all been boiled down into the
definite act of the despatch of a mission to a place a bare
dozen miles inside Tibet to discuss trade-relations, frontier
and grazing rights.

This was not, after all, any remarkably bold or out-
rageously aggressive act. Such as it was, was it justified ?
The narrative of the causes which led to the move has
been long, but, even so, it has been hard to put their true
significance so that it may be appreciated by people un-
acquainted with Orientals. Still, there are some fairly
plain facts and considerations which emerge from the
long narrative, and which all who are accustomed to the
conduct of affairs may be expected to understand.

The first fact is this — that it was aggression on the
part of the Tibetans or their vassals which led to action
on our part, and that before ever a single soldier of the
British Government had crossed the frontier into Tibet
Tibetan troops had crossed it to the Indian side. It was
the irruption of the Bhutanese into the plains of Bengal
which caused Warren Hastings to send Bogle to Tibet in

JUSTIFICATION OF THE MISSION 93

1774. It was the invasion of Sikkim by the Tibetans
which made the necessity for the treaty of 1890. And it
was because the Tibetans repudiated that treaty, and
occupied territory inside the boundary therein laid down,
that we had to take measures to see it observed.

But even supposing they were aggressive, it may be
said that we ought to have treated the Tibetans with
leniency, gentleness, and consideration, because of their
ignorance. So we ought, and so we did. Warren
Hastings conceded the request of the Tashi Lama. And
though the Tibetans for a century have been free to come
down to India, with no restrictions on their trade or on
their travel, we for years never pressed for any ordinary
rights of trade and travel for our own subjects, whether
British or Indian. We allowed the Tibetans to come
down where, and when, and how they liked. For a
century we let the principle of heads they win, tails we
lose, continue. Even when we at last stirred, and thought
of sending Macaulay to Lhasa to make some less, one-
sided arrangement, we gave up the idea when we saw that
the Tibetans raised objection. And even, again, when
the Chinese asked us to make a definite treaty with them
on laehalf of the Tibetans, and guaranteed its observance
by them, and when the Tibetans broke it, and repudiated
it, and refused to meet our officers, we continued for ten
years showing them forbearance and patience. It was
only at last when the Tibetans, having broken the treaty,
having dechned to have any communication with us, yet
sent Envoys to the Russians, that we took high action,
and despatched a mission with an escort into Tibet. If
we had shown no inclination to hold the Tibetans and
Chinese to their engagements, others might well think
that they also would not be held to theirs, and our
authority and influence would slacken in proportion as
this impression got abroad. No Government can conduct
the affairs of contiguous States if it allows a treaty to be
broken with impunity.

My personal view is that the local question would have
been better settled, and much subsequent international
complications would have been saved if, at an earlier stage

94 A MISSION SANCTIONED

in the proceedings, when it first became amply clear that
our treaty was valueless ; that the Tibetans repudiated and
ignored it, and that the Chinese were unable to have it
observed, we had at once resumed the proceedings where
we had left them when we drove the Tibetans across
our border, and had again advanced into the Chumbi
VaUey, and stopped there till we had effected a properly
recognized and lasting settlement. This was the course
recommended by Sir Charles Elliott, the then Lieutenant-
Governor of Bengal, and whether that would have been a
wise course or not, I do not see how anyone who has care-
fully considered the whole course of transactions which at
last led up to the despatch of a mission to the first
inhabited place across the border can deny that such a
course was justified.

Whether the mission was conducted with due con-
sideration or with unnecessary harshness, and whether
any good came of it, either to ourselves or to the
Tibetans or to anyone else, are matters for separate
review, and to that purpose I will now address myself in
the following narrative of the course of the mission.

CHAPTER IX

SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

The previous chapters have been necessarily, though
perhaps somewhat tediously, fiUed up with a narrative of
the many intricate considerations which went towards
the final determination to send a mission to Tibet.
But of all that had been going on — of the voluminous
correspondence in the great offices, of the meetings
and attempts at meetings on the frontier — I was wholly
ignorant. Anglo-Indian papers seldom contain informa-
tion on such happenings. And for some years past,
in accordance with the weU-intentioned, but, as it has
since turned out, thoroughly unsound, advice of a previous
Viceroy, that it would be to my advantage in the Political
Department not to remain for ever on the frontier, but
to acquire experience of internal affairs as well, I had
been serving in the interior in political agencies in
Rajputana and Central India, and had heard nothing of
any intention to send a mission to Tibet. Nor had I ever
had any connection with Tibet, though as long ago as
1888 the then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal had, 1 dis-
covered many years after, asked the Government of India
for my services, as I had then just returned from a journey
around Manchuria and across Central Asia, from Peking to
Kashmir, and it was thought that, knowing Chinese
customs, I might be of use, in addition to the Chinese
interpreter. This request was twice made, it appears ;
but I was then a young subaltern, still in military employ,
and in the throes of examination, and the Government of
India replied that I was not available, as I was about to
go up for examination, and, if sent away then, would fail
to qualify for promotion. So I went up for one of those

96 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

examinations of which such a fetish is made, and never
till now had been near the Tibet frontier. I made, indeed,
an abortive effort in 1889 to go to Lhasa, disguised as a
Turki from Central Asia ; but this, too, was nipped in the
bud by the refusal of my Colonel to give me leave from
the regiment. What spirit of adventure I possessed
never received much encouragement from Government,
and, as I have said, I had left the frontier for some years,
and was superintending the affairs of a native State in
the very heart of India, when, on a sweltering day in
May, I suddenly receiA^ed a summons to proceed at once
to Simla to receive instructions regarding a mission I was
to lead to Tibet.

Here, indeed, I felt was the chance of my life. I was
once more aUve. The thrill of adventure again ran through
my veins. And I wasted little time in rounding up my
business, packing my things, and starting off for Simla.

There I was handed over all the papers in the
Foreign Office to digest while the final instructions of the
Secretary of State were stUl awaited. And one afternoon
I was asked to lunch with Lord Curzon and Lord
Kitchener, at a gymkhana down at Annandale, where,
after lunch, sitting under the shade of the glorious pine-
trees, Lord Curzon explained to me all his intentions,
ideas, and difficulties. Men and ladies performed every
feat of equestrian skill and equestrian nonsense, and the
place was crowded with all the beauty and gaiety of Simla
in the height of the season. But the Viceroy and I sat
apart, and talked over the various difficulties I should meet
with in Tibet, and the best means by which they could be
overcome.

One thing he made perfectly clear to me from the
start — that he meant to see the thing through ; that he
intended the mission to be a success, and would provide
me with every means within his power to make it so.
Fortunately, we knew each other well — ever since his first
appointment as Under-Secretary of State for India. We
had travelled together nine years previously round Chitral
and Gilgit ; we had corresponded for years ; and when he
came to India he, with a kindness of heart for which he is

COMPOSITION OF STAFF 97

ordinarily given very little credit, had asked me to regard
him, not as Viceroy, but as an old friend and fellow-
traveller. No better initiator and supporter of such an
enterprise as a mission to Tibet could be imagined. He
had his whole heart and soul in the undertaking, and I do
not think it took long for me to put my whole heart into
it, too.

I had in previous years been despatched from Simla
on two political missions — in 1889 to explore the un-
known passes on the northern frontier of Kashmir, and
to put down the raids from Hunza, and in 1890 to the
Pamirs and Chinese Turkestan — so I had some general
idea of what to expect on the present occasion ; and as I
had also spent three months in the Legation at Peking,
besides travelling from one end to the other of the Chinese
Empire, I knew enough about the Chinese to know that
I should never be able to deal successfully with them
without the assistance of someone who had had a life-
training in the work. I therefore, in the first place, asked
for an officer of the China Consular Service to act as
adviser and interpreter. Next, as regards dealing with
the Tibetans, it was most necessary to have an officer who
could speak the Tibetan language, and it was fortunate
for the success of the mission that Government were able
to send with it, first as Intelligence Officer and afterwards
as Secretary, Captain O'Connor, an artillery officer, who,
when stationed with his mountain battery at Darjiling,
had learned the Tibetan language and studied the history
and customs of the Tibetans, and who, I afterwards found,
was never so happy as when he was surrounded by
begrimed Tibetans, with whom he would spend hour after
hour in apparently futile conversation.

The services of some of the Gurkhas and of the
Pathan, Shahz^d Mir, who had been with me on my
mission in 1889, I also tried to secure ; but the Gurkhas
had all left their regiment, and Shahzad Mir, who had
been employed on many a mission and reconnaissance
since, was then absent in Abyssinia.

Mr. White reached Simla a day or two after my
arrival, and we at once set to work to discuss arrange-

98 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

ments. He had had experience on that frontier for
fourteen years, and was naturally well up in all the local
aspects of the question, and knew — what I did not —
M^hat dealing with Tibetans really meant. His accounts
of their obstinacy and obstructiveness appeared to me
exaggerated, and, with the optimism of inexperience, I
thought that we should, together with Captain O'Connor's
assistance, be able to soon break through it. But Mr.
White turned out in the end to be right, and I think
from the first he knew that we should not be able to do
anything elsewhere than in Lhasa.

Mr. White's long local experience on that frontier
made his recommendation in regard to arrangements
specially valuable. We were to have an escort of 200
men from the 32nd Pioneers, who had been for some
months in Sikkim improving the road towards the frontier,
and we wished arrangements made for them to precede
us to the vicinity of the frontier, so that we, travelling
lightly, might reach Khamba Jong as quickly as possible,
for we were now getting well on into the summer, and
had not much time to spare for negotiation before the
winter came on.

Indian troops and officers have, fortunately, plenty of
experience in rough work of this and every other descrip-
tion. The 32nd Pioneers I had known in the Relief of
Chitral in 1895, and they had come almost straight to
Sikkim from another frontier expedition, so they could be
relied on to be thoroughly up to the duty now expected
of them. All I asked Government for, on Mr. White's
recommendation, was that, as they would be moving up
from the hot, steamy valleys of Lower Sikkim to a plateau
15,000 feet above sea-level, they should be provided with
clothing on the winter scale, with poshtins (sheepskin
coats) for sentries, and that special rations should be
issued to the men. And for ceremonial effect, which is
an item never to be lightly passed over in dealings with
Asiatics, I asked that they should take with them their
full-dress uniforms, and that twenty-five of them should
be mounted on ponies, which could be procured locally.

The Government of India always equips and organizes

DEPARTURE FROM SIMLA 99

its expeditions well, and such little arrangements were
soon and readily made. And by a piece of foresight on
its part, there was on the spot in Sikkim the best practical
rough-and-ready supply and transport officer in their
service, Major Bretherton, D.S.O., a very old friend of
mine in Chitral days, a man of unbounded energy, of
infinite resource, and of quite unconquerable optimism,
who was drowned in the Brahmaputra within a few days'
march of Lhasa, when we were just about to reap the
reward which he, more than any other single man, had put
within our reach.

All headquarter arrangements having been made, and
my formal instructions received, Mr. White and I left
Simla early in June to proceed by Darjiling to the
Sikkim frontier. In India such enterprises as we were
now embarking on are always started off very quietly, and
few outside a limited official circle, and possibly the
Russian Government, knew anything at all about our
mission. The Government of India is over-sensitive to
questions and criticisms in Parliament, and, dependent as
it is upon the support of public opinion in England,
would be better advised, in my opinion, to take the public
in England more into its confidence. But this sensitive-
ness is intelligible. It must by the necessity of the case be
especially difficult to govern India from England, but that
task is rendered vastly more difficult by careless questions
and criticisms of Members of Parliament. My mission
suffered much through the want of support by the British
public, and they could hardly have been expected to give
it support when it was eventually sprung so suddenly on
them, and when they had not had the opportunity of
watching affairs gradually growing to a crisis. On the
other hand, the Indian Government cannot be expected
to expose delicate affairs to the risk of rough, crude
handling from men who, though they ultimately control
these affairs, are so very little versed in their conduct,

I departed, then, from Simla in the most matter-of-fact
manner possible, telUng my friends, what was perfectly

100 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

true, that I was going to see Darjiling. I had therefore
no "enthusiastic send-ofF." But I had what was better,
the heartfelt good wishes of the Viceroy, who has known
the conditions under which frontier officers work, and has
been more interested in the problems which confront them
than any other Viceroy for many a year past. I was also
greatly cheered, and subsequently most warmly and con-
tinuously supported, by Sir Louis Dane, the Foreign
Secretary, whose hospitality I had enjoyed during my stay
in Simla.

The journey from Simla to Darjiling by Calcutta was
a curious beginning for an expedition to the cold of the
Himalayas. The monsoon had not yet broken. The heat
of the railway journey was frightful. At Calcutta the
temperature was almost the highest on record. And we
hurried on, for I was impatient, not only to be out of
the heat, but to be getting to work.

At the very outset I looked forward to one experience
of, to me, peculiar interest. My life through, mountains
have excited in me a special fascination. I was born
in the Himalayas, within sight of the Kashmir Moun-
tains ; and some inexplicable attraction has drawn me
back to them time after time. Now that I was called
upon to pierce through the Himalayas to the far country
on the hither side, I was to make my start from that
spot, from which of all others the most perfect view is
to be obtained. DarjUing is now known throughout the
world for the magnificence of its mountain scenery, and
fortunate it is that such a spot should be now so easily
accessible.

As in the earliest dawn I looked out of the train
window, to catch the first glimpse of those mighty
mountains I had to penetrate, I saw far up in the sky a
rose-tinged stretch of seeming cloud. All around was
level plain. The air was stifling with the heat of a
tropical midsummer. But I knew that pinky streak across
the sky could be nothing else than the line of the
Himalayas, tinted by the yet unrisen sun. It gave me

FIRST VIEW OF HIMALAYAS 101

the first thrill of my new adventure, and I forthwith
drank in greedily every new impression.

All around in the plains there was rank, dank,
depressing vegetation. tJnwholesomeness exuded from
the soil. Putrefying pools of water lay about on every
side. The whole air was thick with fever. But those
high heavenly mountains carried hope. As the train
progressed, the lower " hills " — themselves 7,000 or 8,000
feet in height — came into sight. Eventually we reached
their base, and left the ordinary train for the little mountain
railway which ascends to Darjiling. And now, indeed,
were charms on every hand. The little railway winds
its way upward through a tropical forest of superb
magnificence. The orchids could almost be plucked from
the miniature carriages. The luxuriant vegetation nearly
met over the train. Immense tree-ferns and wild bananas
shot up beneath the overhanging arches of the dripping
forest trees. Wreaths and festoons of vine, convol-
vulus, and begonia stretched from bough to bough.
Climbing bauhinias and robinias entwined the trunks and
hung like great cables from tree to tree. Bamboos shot
up in dense tufts to a height of 100 feet. Refreshing
streams dashed foaming down the mountain- side. Glorious
waterfalls here and there thundered over steep cliffs.
And through all the diminutive train panted its way
upward — by zigzags, by spirals, through tunnels, across
dizzy bridges, along the sides of cliiFs — but only too slowly,
for, glorious as was the tropical forest, I thirsted for the
sight of Kinchinjunga, which we should get when we at
last topped the ridge and reached Darjiling.

Alas ! when we at last reached the summit, all was hid
in cloud. Fresh from the steamy plains, we shivered in the
damp mists, and when we reached Darjiling itself rain was
descending in cataracts. It was depressing, but it had the
advantage that it enabled me to recuperate a little from
the hot, trying railway journey through the plains of
India, and be all the more fit therefore to thoroughly
enjoy and appreciate the great view when at last it should
be revealed.

Many times afterwards I saw it, and each time with a

102 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

new and more wonderful impression. Sometimes in the
eddying cloudy billows a break would come, giving a
glimpse into heaven itself; and through the little inlet would
be seen a piece of sky of the intensest blue, and against it
a peak of purest white, so lofty and so much a partner of
the sky and clouds it seemed impossible it could ever be of
earth. This was Kinchinjunga in one of its aspects. At
another time, when all was clear of cloud, I would look
steeply down from the tropical forests of Darjiling for
6,000 feet to the bottom of the narrow valley beneath,
and then up and up through tier after tier of ever-heighten-
ing ridges, till, far up in the skies, suffused in the blue
and dreamy haze, my eyes would rest on the culminating
range of all, spotless and ethereal, and reaching its climax
in one noble peak nearly 28,000 feet above the valley
depths from which it rose. And at yet another time, when
the houses were all lit in the bazaar, and the lamps
lighted along the roads, and night had almost settled
down upon Darjiling, high up in the skies would be
seen a rosy flush : Kinchinjunga was still receiving the
rays of the sun, long since set to us below. In these
and many other aspects Kinchinjunga had never-ending
charms.

Darjiling itself, with such scenery and vegetation, was,
it need hardly be said, an exquisitely beautiful place.
And it had about it none of the busy air of Simla. It
was at this season nearly always shrouded in mist, and
seemed wrapped in cotton- wool. No one was in a hurry,
and the whole tone of the place was placid and serene.

Sir James Bourdillon, the acting Lieutenant-Governor;
Mr. Macpherson, the Chief Secretary ; Mr. Marindin, the
Commissioner ; Mr. Walsh, the Deputy-Commissioner,
were all most helpful to me, and I appreciated their assist-
ance all the more because I could not help feeling somewhat
of an interloper and poacher upon other people's preserves.
Since 1873 the Bengal Government had been working for
the settlement of their frontier affairs with Tibet, and now
at the crucial moment a stranger dropped down from the
Olympian heights of Simla to carry out the culminating
act. I could naturally expect ordinary official civility

OVER-CENTRAtlZATION 103

from them. But they, every one of them, went out of
their way to put their whole information and experience
at my disposal. More than that, both they and their
wives were more thoughtful and kind to my wife than
I could possibly record during all that time of anxiety
and depression when we subsequently advanced to Lhasa,
and we have ever felt most deeply grateful to them.

The Bengal Government, I have often thought, has
experienced a hard fate over Tibet affairs. It was a
Governor of Bengal — Warren Hastings — who initiated
the idea of sending a mission to Tibet. It was another
Lieutenant-Governor who revived the idea of intercourse
in 1873. It was a Bengal officer, Colman Macaulay, who
originated and pushed through the idea of a mission to
Lhasa in 1885. It was a Bengal officer, Mr. Paul, who
negotiated the Trade Regulations of 1893 ; and it was a
Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Charles Elliott, who, in 1895,
made what seems to me to have been the most suitable
recommendation for the settlement of the question, an
occupation of the Chumbi Valley.

But gradually, in the course of years, the conduct of
frontier matters has been taken out of their hands by the
Government of India and out of the hands of the latter
by the Imperial Government. There has been a greater
and greater centralization of the conduct of frontier rela-
tions, which may be necessary from some points of view,
but one of the effiscts of which is apparent locally. The
local Government loses its sense of responsibility for
frontier matters. Local officers feel little inducement to
fit themselves for the conduct of such affairs. And, con-
sequently, when good frontier officers really are wanted
in future, they will not be found, and the next mission
to Lhasa will in all probability be led by a clerk from
the Foreign Office in London.

I left Darjiling on June 19, in drenching rain. To
reahze it the English reader must picture to himself the
heaviest thunderstorm he has ever seen, and imagine that
pouring down continuously night and day. I was, of
course, provided with a heavy waterproof cloak, with a
riding apron and an umbrella; but the moisture seemed to

104 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

soak through everything, for there was not only the rain
beating down from above, but the penetrating mists
creeping in all round. But I could not be depressed by
mere rain, however much. The road passed through a
forest of unsurpassable beauty. Chestnuts, walnuts, oaks,
laurels, rhododendrons, and magnolias grew in great mag-
nificence, and among them Himalayan kinds of birch,
alder, maple, holly, apple, and cherry. Orchids of the
most brilliant varieties I could have gathered in basketfuls.
The perpetual moisture and the still atmosphere nourished
the most delicate ferns ; while the mosses were almost as
beautiful, and hung from the trees in graceful pendants,
blending with the festoons of the chmbing plants.

After riding for some miles along the ridge, we de-
scended towards the Teesta River, and again met with the
magnificent tree-ferns, palms, bamboos, and wild bananas.
We passed by several flourishing tea plantations, each
with its cosy, but lonely, bungalow, surrounded by a
beautiful garden. By the roadway caladiums of every
variegated colour brightened the prospect. But as we
descended the atmosphere grew more oppressive and
stifling, till when we reached the Teesta itself, which here
lies at an altitude of only 700 feet above sea-level, the
atmosphere was precisely that of a hothouse. The
thermometer did not rise above 95°, but the heat was well-
nigh unbearable. Perspiration poured from every pore.
Energy oozed away with every drop, and the thought of a
winter amid the snows of Tibet became positively cheering.
It was a curious beginning for such an expedition as was
to follow, but the Indian officer has to be prepared to
undergo at a moment's notice every degree of heat or
cold, of storm and sunshine, of drought or deluge, and
take everything he meets cheerily as in the day's work.

We were now in Sikkim proper, the thin wedge of a
valley which runs from the plains to the watershed of
the Himalayas, and separates Nepal from Bhutan. For
luxuriance and for variety of vegetation, and of animal,
bird, and insect life, it must, I should say, be unequalled
by any other country in the world, for it lies in the
tropics, and rises from an elevation of only a few hundred

SIKKIM SCENERY.

To face page 105.

TROPICAL SCENERY 105

feet above sea-level to a snowy range, culminating in a
peak 28,178 feet in height.

The valley bottom was narrow, and the Teesta
River, 100 yards or so broad, dashed down over great
boulders and beside precipitous cliffs with immense
velocity. Both the main and the side valleys were very
deep, the slopes steep, and the whole packed with a dense
forest of rich and graceful and variegated foliage. Tropical
oaks of gigantic size, a tree with a buttressed trunk grow-
ing to a height of 200 feet, " sal," sago-palms, bamboos,
bananas, bauhinias, "took," screw-pine, and on the ridges
Pinus eoccelsus. An immense climber, with pendulous
blossoms, and which bears a fruit like a melon, was very
prevalent, and aristolochias, with their pitcher-like flowers,
orchids, and ferns. Tropical profusion of vegetable
growth was nowhere better exemplified. But almost
more remarkable were the number and the variety of the
butterflies. I counted seventeen different species in a
couple of hundred yards, some of the most exquisitely
beautiful colouring, flashing out every brilliant and
metallic hue ; others mimicking the foliage, and when at
rest shutting their wings together, and exactly resembling
the leaves of a tree. Less beautiful, but equally abundant,
was the wealth of insect life. And here with a vengeance
was the thorn which every rose possesses. Midges,
mosquitoes, gnats, every conceivable horror and annoy-
ance in this particular line, was present here ; also beetles
in myriads ; some spiders, too, of enormous size ; cock-
chafers and cockroaches, winged ants, and, in addition to
all these insect pests, the countless leeches on every leaf
and every blade of grass. It is indeed a paradise for a
naturalist, but only for such a naturalist as has his flesh
under due subjection to the spirit. And such a naturalist
was the great Sir Joseph Hooker, the friend of Darwin,
who first explored this country in 1848 and 1849, and who
is even now living amongst us.

The stillness of these parts I have already referred to.
There is seldom a breath of air stirring, and one feels in a
gigantic hothouse. But it is not noiseless, for, apart from
the roar of the main river as it dashes impetuously

106 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

through the languid forest, and, apart from the thundering
of the voluminous waterfalls, which, fringed with rich
masses of maidenhair and many other delicate and grace-
ful ferns, form yet another striking feature in the land-
scape, one hears also in the forest depths the incessant
chorus of the insects. Bird-life there is scarcely any, and
therefore very little song of the birds ; but there is an
incessant rhythmic rise and fall of insect whirring, broken
at intervals by the deafening, dissonant screechings of
invisible crickets.

All this was very beautiful and very interesting as an
experience, but I felt no temptation to linger in the
stifling valley, and was glad when the road began to rise
to Gantok and the temperature to lower. Then the
more distinctly tropical vegetation began to disappear,
and at between 4,000 and 5,000 feet a kind of birch,
willows, alders, rhododendrons, and walnuts grew side
by side with the plantains, palms, and bamboos. Among
the plants grew balsam, climbing vines, brambles, speed-
wells, forget-me-nots, strawberries, geraniums, orchids,
tree-ferns, and lycopodiums.

Embedded amidst all the luxuriance of forest and
plant life, and facing the snowy range with a view of
Kinchinjunga itself, is the Gantok Residency, a charming
English house, clustered over with roses, and surrounded
by a garden in which rhododendrons, magnohas, canna
of every rich variety, tree-ferns, lilies, and orchids, and
all that could excite the envy of the horticulturist, grow
almost without the trouble of putting them into the
ground.

Here T enjoyed the hospitality of Mr. White, who had
preceded me to make preparations. He and Mrs. White
had lived there for fourteen years. They were devoted to
their garden, in which they found a never-ending interest
with all the English flowers — narcissus, daffodils, pansies,
iris^n the spring, and the beautiful tropical plants in the
summer.

They were also devoted to the people amongst whom
they lived. These Lepchas are, says Mr. White, in his
recent book, " Sikkim and Bhutan," " quite an exceptional

CHARACTER OF LEPCHAS 107

people, amongst whom it is a pleasure to live." And
he says they make excellent and trustworthy servants.
Certainly these people were devoted to Mr. White, who,
in a kindly patriarchal way, did many a kindness for them
as he toured through their valley. And I was particularly
interested in observing them, and hearing Mr. White's
opinion of them, because they have been the subject of so
many encomiums on the part of Herbert Spencer. On
account of their truthfulness and gentleness they had been
held up by him as an example to civilized people, and
I was anxious to see whether at close quarters they were
as estimable as they had appeared at a distance to the
philosopher.

They are of the Mongolian type of feature, yet they
have very distinctive features of their own, and would
never be mistaken for either the Tibetans, the Nepalese,
or the Bhutanese, who touch them on either side, and they
seem to have come along the foothills from Assam and
Burma. Their chief characteristic is undoubtedly their
gentleness. Timidity is the word which might better
describe it. They live in a still, soft, humid climate, and
their character is soft like the climate ; but their disposition
is also attractive, like their country. They are great lovers
of Nature, and unequalled as collectors. In their own
country and unspoiled they are frank and open, good-
natured and smiling, and when they are at their ease,
amiable, obliging, and polite. They are indolent and
improvident, but they seldom have private or political
feuds. They never aggress upon their neighbours. And
by nature they are scrupulously honest. Their women
are chaste, and neither men nor women drink in excess.

These 6,000 Lepchas certainly have every estimable
quality, and many for which we Europeans are not
strikingly remarkable. Yet mere gentleness, without
strength and passion at the back, can hardly count much
in the world, and it is not possible seriously to regard the
Lepchas as an ensample for our hving. Even the naughty
little Gurkhas, who would, except for our protection of the
Lepchas, have long since swallowed them up, we really
prefer.

108 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

We remained only a few days in Gantok, and then
pushed on toward the Tibetan frontier, for we were well
on in the summer now, and we wanted, if possible, to get
the matter settled before winter. The rain never ceased :
bucketfuls and bucketfuls came drenching down. The
ordinary waterproofing in which we wrapped our luggage
was soaked through as if it had been paper. In the valley
bottom we passed the camp of the 32nd Pioneers engaged
in improving the road, and anything more depressing and
miserable I have never seen. Tents, clothes, furniture —
everything was soaking. The heat was stifling, the insect
pests unbearable. Fever sapped the life out of the men,
and one shuddered at the misery of life under such condi-
tions : day after day, week after week, month after month,
digging and blasting away at a road which as soon as it
was made was washed into the river again ; wet through
with rain and with perspiration while at work, and finding
everything equally moist on returning to camp ; tormented
with insect pests at work and in camp by night and by
day. Yet it was only by mastering such conditions as
these that the eventual settlement with Tibet was ever
rendered possible.

Fortunately for them, some 200 were now to leave
these dismal surroundings and accompany me to the
Tibetan frontier as escort. We marched on up the valley
by a road carried in many places along the side of preci-
pices overhanging the roaring river, and with neither wall
nor railing intervening between one and destruction.
Only in Hunza, beyond Kashmir, have I seen a more pre-
carious roadway. The same luxuriant vegetation extended
everjrwhere. But what impressed me most in this middle
region of Sikkim were the glorious waterfalls. Never
anywhere have I seen their equal. We were in the midst
of the rains. The torrents were full to the limit, and they
would come, boiling, foaming, thundering down the moun-
tain-sides in long series of cascades, gleaming white through
the ever-green forest, and festooned over and framed with
every graceful form of palm and fern and foliage.

And now, as we reached the higher regions, the loath-
some leeches, the mosquitoes, gnats, and midges, were left

UPPER SIKKIM 109

behind, and we came into a region of Alpine vegetation —
spruce-firs, ash, birch, maple, crab-apple, and nut, with
jasmine, ivy, spiraea, wood-sorrel, and here and there, rising
lightly through the shade of the forest, a gigantic white
lily, most exquisitely lovely.

On June 26 we reached Tangu, at a height of 12,000
feet above the sea, and here in a comfortable wooden rest-
house, in a cool and refreshing climate, we were able to
forget all the depressions of the steamy valleys. The
spireea, maple, cherry, and larch, which we had met
lower down, had now disappeared, and in their place
were willow, juniper, stunted birch, silver fir, white
rose, berberry, currant, and many rhododendrons. The
mountain-sides were covered with grass and carpeted with
flowers, and especially with many beautiful varieties of
primulas, as well as with gentians, potentillas, geraniums,
campanulas, ground orchids, delphiniums, and many other
plants, while near by we found a fine dark blue poppy ;
and, most remarkable plant of all, growing here and
there on the mountain-side in isolated grandeur, a gigantic
rhubarb {Rheum nobile), described by Hooker as the hand-
somest herbaceous plant in Sikkim, with great leaves
spread out on the ground at the base, while the main
plant rose erect to a height of 3 feet in the form of a
pyramid, but with the clusters of flowers protected from
the wind and rain, by reflexed bracts.

Here, at Tangu, only a march below the district
round Giagong, which the Tibetans claimed, the real
business of the mission commenced. By July 1 the
whole of both the escort and the support — the former
200 men and the latter 300 — were assembled, under the
command of Colonel Brander. Both the men and the
transport animals had suffered greatly in marching through
the drenching rain and the steamy, fever-laden lower
valleys ; but now, in the cooler air of Tangu, they re-
covered their strength, and all were eager for the advance
into Tibet. I was myself equally keen, but as I could
hear no news of either Chinese or Tibetan officials of rank

no SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

or authority having arrived at Khamba Jong to meet me,
I decided to let Mr. White, with Captain O'Connor and
the whole escort, go on in advance to arrange pre-
liminaries.

On July 4 they left Tangu, and encamped some nine
miles distant, on the near side of the wall at Giagong,
which the Tibetans claimed as their boundary, and from
which they had been removed by Mr. White in the pre-
vious year. Before reaching camp — that is to say, well
on the Sikkim side of even the wall — Mr. White was met
by the Jongpen, or Commandant, of Khamba Jong —
" Jong " being the Tibetan for fort. He informed
Mr. White that there were encamped at Giagong, on the
other side of what the Tibetans claimed as their frontier,
two officials — a General and a Chief Secretary of the
Dalai Lama — who had been deputed to discuss frontier
matters, and who were anxious to confer with Mr. White
on the following day.

Mr. White informed the Jongpen that he would be
prepared to greet the officials on the road, and to receive
them in a friendly manner in his camp on the next evening,
but that he was not prepared to halt or hold any discussion
at Giagong.

On the following day Captain O'Connor rode forward,
and was met by the Jongpen of Khamba Jong at the wall
at Giagong, which the Tibetans claimed as their frontier,
but which was on a river flowing into the Teesta River,
and therefore clearly on our side of the frontier laid down
by the Convention of 1890, concluded by the Chinese
Resident, who had with him a Tibetan representative.
The Jongpen importuned Captain O'Connor to dismount
and to persuade Mr. White to do the same. But Captain
O'Connor said that no discussion was possible, and on
Mr. White's arrival with the escort they all passed
through the wall, and just beyond saw the two Lhasa
officers arrayed in yellow silks, and accompanied by a
crowd of unarmed retainers riding towards them from
their camp. Captain O'Connor advanced to meet them,
and they dismounted and spoke to him very civilly. They
asked him to persuade Mr. White to dismount, to proceed

TIBETAN REMONSTRANCES 111

to their tent close by, to partake of some refreshments,
and to " discuss matters." Captain O'Connor repUed
that Mr. White was not prepared to break his journey or
to discuss matters at Giagong, but would be glad to see
them in his camp that evening, though any discussion
must be deferred until after the arrival of myself and the
Chinese Commissioner at Khamba Jong.

They pressed forward on foot, and, catching hold of
Mr. White's bridle, importuned him to dismount and
repair to their tents. At the same time their servants
pressed round the horses of the British officers, and,
seizing their reins, endeavoured to lead them away.
After speaking very civilly to the two Lhasa officials,
Mr. White was obliged to call two or three sepoys to clear
the way, and the British officers then rode on, while the
two Lhasa officers mounted and rode back to camp. The
Jongpen afterwards followed the British officers, and made
repeated efforts to induce them to halt for a day at the
next camp in order to confer with the two Lhasa officials.
He was in a very excited state, and hinted more than once
at possible hostilities, and said : " You may flick a dog
once or twice without his biting, but if you tread on his
tail, even if he has no teeth, he will turn and try and
bite you."

I suppose it is always difficult for one party to see the
other party's point of view ; but, of course, his contention
regarding us precisely applied to what we thought of
the Tibetans. It was simply because the Tibetans had
encroached on us, and were even now addressing us inside
the frontier fixed by treaty, that we were at last turning
and insisting on our treaty rights.

That evening Mr. Ho, the Chinese delegate, sent word
that he had arrived at Giri, just on the other side of the
frontier, and asking that Mr. White would remain at
Giagong.

The next day Mr. White and his escort rode quietly
across the frontier, without meeting anyone except the
Chinese Commandant of the small post of Giri, who
passed by without speaking. Mr. White encamped near
Giri, and received a visit from Mr. Ho, who communicated

112 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

to him the contents of the Resident's reply to the Viceroy,
and made a request, which was pohtely decUned, that the
British Commissioner should remain at Giri in preference
to proceeding to Khamba Jong. In this despatch the
Chinese Resident informed the Viceroy that he had again
deputed Mr. Ho, in conjunction with Captain Parr, the
Customs Commissioner at Yatung, who, he said, were
truly of equal rank to the Commissioner deputed by the
Viceroy, to discuss all matters in a friendly manner. He
further said that the Dalai Lama had deputed his Chief
Secretary and a Depon (General) of Lhasa to negotiate
in conjunction with the Chinese Commissioners. But the
Resident understood, he said, that Khamba Jong was in
Tibetan territory, and therefore the meeting could only
be at the boundary near the grazing-grounds fixed by the
Convention of 1890. The Resident contended, that is to
say, that though the Tibetans had for thirteen years with
armed men occupied territory on our side of the frontier
laid down by the Convention, we were not even to meet
temporarily for discussion on the Tibetan side of the same
frontier.

On July 7 Mr. White, with his escort, marched to
Khamba Jong, and encamped on a small stream not far
from the Jong, or fort, which was an imposing building
on the summit of a lofty crag some hundreds of feet above
the plain. Mr. Ho wrote to Mr. White saying that he
had instructed the Khamba Jongpen to provide him with
supplies, and that he himself, accompanied by the two
Lhasa officials, would arrive there on the following day.
A letter of thanks was sent, and on the strength of
Mr. Ho's letter Mr. White wrote to the Tibetan Jongpen
asking him to supply some grass ; but the letter was
returned unopened, with a somewhat unceremonious
verbal message.

Major Bretherton, the energetic supply and transport
officer, who had come up from Sikkim to arrange supply
matters, on the following day found a rich and fertile
valley some three or four miles from Khamba Jong, where
grazing was abundant, and where barley crops were raised
and sheep and cattle reared.

THE LHASA DELEGATES 113

In the evening the Khamba Jongpen, with two
junior officers bearing presents from the Lhasa delegates,
arrived in camp. Mr. White received them, and sent
polite messages in return, and Captain O'Connor after-
wards interviewed the messenger in his own tent, and
conversed very amicably for some time, the messenger
being evidently very pleased with his reception, and alto-
gether refusing to accept money, which was aU Mr. White
had at the moment, in return for their presents. The
Jongpen also behaved with great civility, and repeatedly
apologized in regard to his refusal to accept the letter,
and promised to supply grass on the following day.

The two Lhasa officials, who were those referred to in
the Chinese Resident's letter to the Viceroy, visited Mr.
White on July 11. They were well-mannered, but made
protests regarding what they called our transgression of
the frontier. After the interview with Mr. White they
visited the Sikkim heir-apparent, who had arrived in
Mr. White's camp on the previous day ; and here
Captain O'Connor, in a less formal way, had a long con-
versation with them, endeavouring to find out under what
amount of authority they had come. But they evaded
all queries, and merely reiterated that if they had not had
proper orders they would not, of course, be there. On
the same day Mr. White visited Mr. Ho.

Captain O'Cormor had a two-hours conversation with
the Lhasa delegates on the 12th. He elicited that the
Chief Secretary had been to Peking and back by Calcutta
and Shanghai. The position they took up was that the
place appointed by their Government for the discussion of
affairs was the Giagong frontier, and on arrival there they
would produce their credentials. As regards official corre-
spondence, they said that by the terms of some treaty
between the Chinese and the Tibetans all official corre-
spondence between the Tibetans and foreigners had to be
conducted through the Ambans, and, under these circum-
stances, they could neither receive nor reply to our letters.
But they affirmed, nevertheless, that they were fully
empowered to treat with our Commissioners at the proper
place — the Giagong frontier.

114 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG

Their dislike of the Chinese they plainly expressed.
They said the Chinese despised the Tibetans, and were
often instrumental in letting foreigners into the country —
the poor Chinese who are accused by us of keeping
foreigners out! The relations of Tibetans and Chinese
were indeed extraordinarily anomalous. Whilst the
Tibetans deferred to Mr. Ho in almost every matter,
going so far as to forward to him official letters received
from our camp for fear that they might get into trouble if
they retained them, Mr. Ho himself admitted that in
many matters he was powerless. The Tibetan officials
appeared to be childishly impotent and terrified of their
own Government, whilst at the same time they were
deliberately obstructive in every matter, great or small, in
which the British were concerned, and were quite ready
to use the Chinese as a very convenient scapegoat when-
ever it suited them.

Mr. White made a formal visit to them on July 13,
and at the close of the interview gave them presents,
including two packets of tea each. They tried to raise
some objections to receiving the tea, but no attention
was paid, and the presents were accepted.

While all these proceedings were taking place, 1
confess that I at Tangu was in some anxiety. To
march across the frontier in face of all protest, as
Mr. White did, appears, when set down like this, as
a very high-handed action. But it was also very risky.
I had purposely, though not very wisely, but at any
rate to avoid a direct collision at the very start, decided
not to attack, and remove the Tibetans from Giagong,
as they had been removed on the previous year. Mr.
White was simply to march through to the place appointed
by our Government in communication with the Chinese
Government for the place of negotiation. But in so doing
we left Tibetan troops in a good position on our line of
communications, and as the Tibetans were evidently in an
irritable state, this was no mean risk to take, and Colonel
Brander and I at Tangu used to look out with con-
siderable anxiety for the arrival of the daily dak from
Mr. White.

FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS 115

On the face of it there seems some force in the
Tibetan argument that discussion should take place at
Giagong ; and when officials from Lhasa had at last arrived,
and with a Chinese deputy as weU, and even provided with
credentials, and were ready to negotiate, it would seem more
reasonable on our part to have met there and negotiated.
But such negotiations would not in fact have led to
any result. The powers they had would simply have been
not to let us inside the wall. They would have had none
to negotiate in the real sense of the word, and they would
have been afraid to make any kind of concession for fear
their property or even their lives would be forfeited. Even
when we arrived close to Lhasa, and men of much higher
rank came to meet us, they had absolutely no power.
Even the Regent had none, nor the whole Council. The
Tibetans had no machinery for the conduct of foreign
relations. They were under some arrangement to let the
Chinese conduct their foreign relations, and yet, as we
had experienced, they refused to abide by what the
Chinese did for them.

CHAPTER X

KHAMBA JONG

Now that Chinese and Tibetan representatives of some
kind had appeared, even though they were not of much
rank or accredited with much power, I thought it well to
proceed to Khamba Jong to get into touch with them,
and form my own impression of how matters stood. I
therefore rode straight through from Tangu to Khamba
Jong on the ISth, accompanied by Mr. Dover, the
Sikkim engineer, who had made such excellent rough
roads and bridges, and escorted by a few mounted men.

After Tangu the mountain-sides became more and
more barren ; trees were replaced by low shrubs and
dwarf rhododendrons, and higher up they, too, disappeared,
till, when we crossed the Kangra-la (pass), there was
nothing but rough coarse scrub. The pass itself was easy
enough, though it was just over 17,000 feet in height.
As we descended from it we were at length really in
Tibet, and the change was most marked. In place of
narrow valleys were great wide plains, intersected indeed
by distant ranges of mountains, and absolutely devoid of
trees, but open and traversable in every direction. The
sky, too, was clear. The great monsoon clouds were left
behind, and the sun shone with a power which brought
the temperature up to 82° in the shade, and made it
quite uncomfortably hot at midday, though at night there
were 4° of frost.

As we rode on into Tibet and got out into the open,
and well away from the Himalayan range, we obtained
a glorious view of that stupendous range from Chumal-
hari, 24,000 feet, on the extreme east, to Kinchinjunga,

116

OBJECTIONS TO KHAMBA JONG 117

28,275 feet, in the centre, and Everest itself, 29,002 feet,
and ninety miles distant in the far west.

On July 20 I made a formal call upon Mr. Ho and
the Tibetan delegates. Mr. Ho was not a very polished
official, and did not favourably impress me. The Tibetan
Chief Secretary, however, did, and I reported at the time
that he had an " exceedingly genial, kind, accomplished
style of face." But appearance belied him, and right up
to the conclusion of the treaty, nearly fourteen months
later, he was the most inimical to us of all the Tibetans.

As this was a first interview, I did not proceed with
any business discussion, but I told the delegates that,
though I must await the orders of the Viceroy on the
letter which the Resident had addressed him, and could not,
therefore, yet commence formal negotiations, yet I would
at our next meeting state plainly in detail the view which
the Viceroy took of the situation, so that they might
know our views, and be ready when the formal negotiations
commenced to make proposals for their settlement.

Two days later they aU came to return my visit, and
after the usual polite conversation I said I would now
redeem my promise, and 1 told the interpreter to com-
mence reading a speech which I had prepared beforehand,
and which Captain O'Connor had carefully translated into
Tibetan. But before he could commence the Tibetans
raised objections to holding negotiations at Khamba
Jong at all. The proper place, they said, was Giagong.
I told them that the place of meeting was a matter
to be decided upon, not by the negotiators, but by
the Viceroy and Amban. The Viceroy had selected
Khamba Jong because of its proximity to the portion of
frontier in dispute, and he had chosen a place on the
Tibetan rather than the Indian side of the frontier because
the last negotiations were conducted in India ; and when,
after much trouble a treaty had been concluded between
the Chinese and British Governments, the Tibetans had
repudiated it, saying they knew nothing about it. On the
present occasion, therefore, the Viceroy decided that
negotiations should take place in Tibet, and had asked
that a Tibetan official of the highest rank should take

118 KHAMBA JONG

part in them, in order that, when the new settlement was
completed, the Tibetans should not be able to say they
knew nothing of it.

The Tibetans then raised objections to the size of my
escort. I explained that it was merely the escort which
was becoming to my rank, and was even smaller than the
escort which the Chinese Resident took to Darjiling and
Calcutta at the former negotiations. They said they had
understood that the negotiations were to be friendly, and so
they themselves had brought no armed escort. I replied
that the negotiations certainly were to be friendly, and
that if I had had any hostile intentions I should have
brought many more than 200 men, a number which was
only just sufficient to guard me against such attacks of
bad characters as had very recently been made upon the
British Ambassador at the capital of the Chinese Empire.

My speech was then read by the interpreter. It
recounted how, seventeen years before, the Viceroy
proposed a peaceful mission to Lhasa to arrange the
conditions of trade with Tibet. British subjects had the
right to trade in other parts and provinces of the Chinese
Empire, just as all subjects of the Chinese Emperor were
allowed to trade in every part of the British Empire. But
in this one single dependency of the Chinese Empire, in
Tibet, obstacles were always raised in the way of trade.
It was to discuss this matter with the Tibetan authorities
at Lhasa, and to see if these obstacles could not be removed,
that the then Viceroy of India proposed, with the consent
of the Chinese Government, to send a mission to Lhasa
in 1886. But when the mission was about to start, the
Chinese Government at the last moment informed the
Viceroy that the Tibetans were so opposed to the idea of
admitting a British mission to their country that they (the
Chinese Government) begged that the mission might be
postponed ; and out of good feeling to the Chinese
Government, and on the distinct understanding that the
Chinese would exhort the Tibetans to promote and develop
trade, the Viceroy counterordered the mission.

Seventeen years had now passed away since the
Chinese made the promise, and the British Government

SPEECH TO LHASA DELEGATES 119

had just cause to complain that in all these years, owing
to the persistent obstruction of the Tibetans, the Chinese
had been unable to perform their pledge.

And the forbearance which the Viceroy had shown in
countermanding the mission had met with a bad return on
the part of the Tibetans, for they had proceeded, without
any cause or justification, to invade a State under British
protection. Even this the Viceroy bore with patience for
nearly two years, trusting they would be obedient to the
authority of the Chinese Government and withdraw. But
when they still remained in Sikkim, and even attacked
the British troops there, he was compelled to punish them
and drive /them back from Sikkim and pursue them into
Chumbi. And in Chumbi the British troops would have
remained as a punishment for the unprovoked attack
upon them if it had not been for the friendship which
existed between the Emperor of China and the Queen of
England.

Out of regard, however, for that friendship, the Viceroy
agreed to enter into negotiation with the Chinese Resident
acting, on behalf of the Tibetans, and after some years an
agreement was made, by which the boundary between
Tibet and Sikkim was laid down, and arrangements were
made for traders to come to Yatung to sell the goods to
whomsoever they pleased, to purchase native commodities,
to hire transport, and to conduct their business without
any vexatious restrictions. It was also agreed that if,
after five years, either side should wish to make any
alterations, both parties should meet again and make a
new agreement.

At the end of five years the Queen's Secretary of State
wrote to the Viceroy and inquired how the treaty was
l^eing observed, and the reply went back that the Tibetans
had destroyed the boundary pillars which British and
Chinese officials had erected on the frontier laid down by
the treaty ; that they had occupied land at Giagong inside
that boundary ; that they had built a wall on the other
side of Yatung, and allowed no one to pass through to
trade with the traders who came there from India ; and,
lastly, that they had repudiated the treaty which had been

120 KHAMBA JONG

signed by the Resident and the Viceroy on the ground
that it had not been signed by one of themselves.

When the Queen's Great Secretary heard of the way
they had set at naught the treaty which the Amban and
the Viceroy had signed, he was exceedingly angry, and
ordered Mr. White to go to Giagong to remove the
Tibetans who had presumed to cross the frontier which
the Amban and Viceroy had fixed. Mr. White had gone
there and removed the Tibetans, and thrown down their
guard-house, and reported to the Viceroy what he had
done.

Now the Amban, when he heard what Mr. White had
done, wrote to the Viceroy that, if there was any matter
which needed discussion, he would send a Chinese officer
and a representative of the Dalai Lama to settle it with a
British officer. And the Viceroy had written in reply
that he had sent a high officer with Mr. White to
Khamba Jong to settle everything about the frontier and
about trade ; but as the Tibetans had broken the old treaty
because they said they had known nothing about it, His
Excellency had written to the Amban that there must be
at the negotiations a Tibetan official of the highest rank,
whose authority to bind his Government must be un-
questioned. Mr. White and I had accordingly come, and
as soon as I heard from the Viceroy that he was satisfied
on this last point I was ready to commence negotiations.

The Viceroy, I could assure them, had no intention
whatever of annexing their country, and it was possible,
indeed, that he might make concessions in regard to the
lands near Giagong, if in the coming negotiations they
showed themselves reasonable in regard to trade. But I
warned them that, after the way in which they had broken
and repudiated the old treaty, concluded in their interests
by the Amban at the close of a war in which they were
defeated, they must expect that he would demand from
them some assurance that they would faithfuUy observe
any new settlement which might be made.

" You come and travel and trade in India just as you
please," I said. " You go where you like, and stay there
as long as you Uke. But if any one from India wishes to

TIBETANS REFUSE TO REPORT SPEECH 121

trade in Tibet he is stopped on the frontier, and no one is
allowed to go near him. He can trade in Russia, in
Germany, in France, and in all other great countries, and
in all other dependencies of the Chinese Empire, in
Manchuria, in Mongolia, and in Turkestan ; but in Tibet
alone of all countries he cannot trade. This is a one-sided
arrangement, unworthy of so fair-minded and cultured a
people as you are ; and though His Excellency has no
intention of annexing your country, and may, indeed, if
you prove reasonable in regard to the admission of trade,
make concessions to you in respect to the frontier lands
near Giagong, yet he will insist that the obstacles which
you have for so many years put in the way of trade
between India and Tibet shall be once and for ever
removed."

This speech was, of course, made for the benefit of the
Lhasa Government. The Tibetan officials would receive
no written communications, but I thought it barely
possible that they might pass on a verbal communication,
especially when it was made before a responsible Chinese
official, and after I had given due notice of my intention.

The Tibetan delegates listened attentively while it was
being delivered, but at its conclusion said that they could
not enter into any discussion upon it. I replied that
neither could I discuss it with them, for I had not yet
heard from the Viceroy that he was satisfied that they
were of sufficiently high rank to carry on negotiations. I
had, however, as a matter of courtesy, taken the trouble
to acquaint them informally with the Viceroy's views,
which I trusted they would report to their Government.
They replied that they could not even do that much, that
they could make no report at all unless we went back to
Giagong.

Mr. Ho here interposed, and said that the Tibetans
were very ignorant and difficult to deal vsdth, and he asked
me if I could not meet them by agreeing to go to the
frontier. I said I would with pleasure, and when repre-
sentatives whom the Viceroy would permit me to
negotiate with were present I would gladly ride with them
to the frontier and discuss the question on the spot ; but

122 KHAMBA JONG

the frontier was not at Giagong, as the Tibetans supposed,
but at the Kangra-la (pass), only ten miles from where
we where. Mr. Ho said the actual position of the frontier
was not known yet, but that it was where the waters
flowed down to India. I said five minutes' investigation
would make clear where that was, and Mr. Ho said that
then the matter could be very easily settled.

Mr. Ho's Chinese secretary then suggested that 1
should give the Tibetans the copy of my speech which the
interpreter had read from. I assented with readiness, and,
with Mr. Ho's approval, presented it to them. But they
could not have got rid of a viper with greater haste than
they got rid of that paper. They said that they could on
no account receive it, and handed it on to Mr. Ho's secre-
tary, to whom, as he spoke Enghsh, I had also given an
EngUsh version.

These so-called delegates never came near us again at
Khamba Jong, but shut themselves up in the fort and
sulked. And in reporting the result of this interview to
Government, I said that both Mr. White and I were of
opinion that Government must be prepared for very pro-
tracted negotiations, and also for the possibility of coercion.
The attitude of the Tibetans was fully as obstructive, 1
said, as Mr. White and every other person acquainted
with them had predicted it would be, and I saw at present
little prospect of coming to a settlement without coercion,
though I would use every possible means of argument and
persuasion.

And if the delegates did not choose to give me any
work, I was quite content to do none, for I was thoroughly
happy in camp there at Khamba Jong. All my staff were
delightful companions, and we were very happy together.
Mr. White was the best possible hand at making a camp
comfortable and feeding arrangements good ; and we
had neither the stifling heat of the Indian plains nor the
discomforts of the rainy season in the hills. We were
beyond the reach of the monsoon. We had occasional
refreshing showers, but for July, August, and September,
the rainfall was only 4'9 inches, and, for the most part,
the weather was bright and fine and clear. We could see

DEPUTATION FROM TASHI LAMA 123

immense distances over the rolling plains. We would watch
the mighty monsoon clouds sweeping along the Himalayas ;
we would catch glimpses of some noble peak rising superbly
above them, and Kinchinjunga close by and Everest in
the farthest distance were a perpetual joy.

Some of us went out shooting antelopes and Ovis
ammon ; while others went botanizing or geologizing ; and
when, later on, our scientific staff was complete, I could
accompany Mr. Hayden to hunt for fossils, Captain
Walton to collect birds, and Colonel Prain, now Director
of the Botanical Gardens at Kew, to coUect plants, and
thus hear from each of these specialists in turn all the
interests of their sciences, so I did not care a pin how
long these obstinate Tibetans kept us up there.

But while the Lhasa delegates would have no more to
say to us, a deputation came to see me on behalf of the
Tashi Lama, who is of equal spiritual importance with the
Dalai Lama, though of less political authority. They
said that they had been sent to represent to us that the
Tashi Lama was put to great trouble with the Lhasa
authorities by our presence at Khamba Jong ; that the
Lhasa authorities held him responsible for permitting us
to cross the frontier, and he begged me to be so kind as
to save him from the trouble by withdrawing across the
frontier or to Yatung, which was the place fixed for meet-
ings of this kind. I repeated to them all the arguments I
had used with the Lhasa delegates. They were much
more courteous, and talked over the matter in a perfectly
friendly, and even cheery, way. They said, though, that
they knew nothing about the treaty, as it was concluded
by the Amban, and not by themselves, and they could not
be responsible for observing it. I said that that was pre-
cisely the reason why we had now come to Tibet. We
wished now to make a new treaty there, where Tibetans
could take part in the negotiations, so that they would
not in future be able to say they knew nothing about it.
They laughed, and said this was a very reasonable argu-
ment, but that it was the Lhasa people, and not them-
selves, who had broken the treaty, and we ought to go to
Yatung and make the new treaty there.

124 KHAMBA JONG

I told them that, in the first place, they also had
broken the treaty by crossing the boundary fixed in it and
occupying Giagong ; and, in the second place, we must
regard Tibetans as all one people, and hold all responsible
for the actions of each.

The impression left upon m6 by this interview, I
reported at the time, was that the Tibetans, though exces-
sively childish, were very pleasant, cheery people, and,
individually, probably quite well disposed towards us.

Mr. Wilton, of the China Consular Service, joined us
on August 7. He had been acting as Consul at Chengtu,
in Szechuan, and I had not spoken to him for more than
five minutes before I realized what a help he would be to
us. He at once said that neither the Chinese nor the
Tibetan delegates were of at all sufficient rank or authority
to conduct negotiations with us, and no one else than one
of the Ambans and one of the Tibetan Councillors would
be of any use. The new Chinese Resident, who had been
deputed in the previous December specially for the pur-
pose of conducting these negotiations he had himself seen
at Chengtu, and it is significant of the dilatoriness of the
Chinese that, while Mr. AVilton reached me early in
August, the Resident did not reach Lhasa till the next
February, thirteen months after he had set out from
Peking.

Having received Mr. Wilton's advice regarding the
status of the delegates, the Viceroy, on August 25, v^rrote
to the Chinese Resident, suggesting that either he himself
or his Associate Resident should meet me, and that, as the
present Tibetan delegates had shown themselves entirely
unsuited for diplomatic intercourse, and would not even
accept the copy of the speech explanatory of the relations
between India and Tibet which I had made, he proposed
that the Tibetan Government should be invited to depute
a Councillor of the Dalai Lama, accompanied by a high
member of the National Assembly.

As regards the objection which the Resident had made
to the selection of Khamba Jong as the meeting-place,
Lord Curzon said that it was the nearest point in Tibet
to the disputed boundary ; and it was necessary that the

FEAR OF TIBETAN ATTACK 125

present negotiations should be conducted in Tibet, as the
former Convention which the Tibetans had repudiated was
concluded in India, and His Majesty's Government were
not prepared to allow a similar repudiation of any new
agreement. But, as winter was approaching, if the
negotiations were not completed, I might have to select
some other place in Tibet for passing the winter. In con-
clusion, the Viceroy emphasized the importance of my
position and duties, and stated that I was entitled to
expect that he should reply to my communications, and
look to him for co-operation.

At Khamba Jong itself no progress was being made.
There was, indeed, fear at one time that we should be
attacked, and I have not much doubt that we should have
been if we had shown any slackness or unguardedness.
But Captain Bethune was an officer of much experience,
and his men were all accustomed to frontier warfare, and
every precaution was taken. Our camp was well fortified
and the country round regularly patrolled.

Two Sikkim men who had gone to Shigatse, as was
customary, were seized, however, and, we heard, had either
been tortured or killed. In spite of our representations,
the Tibetans refused to give them up, and, in retaliation,
we had to seize Tibetan herds and to remove all the
Tibetans I had so far, though at considerable risk, allowed
to remain at Giagong.

Some slight chance of a settlement appeared when, on
August 21, the head Abbot of the Tashi Lumpo monas-
tery, near Shigatse, came to make another representation
on behalf of the Tashi Lama. He was a courteous, kindly
man, and was accompanied by two monks and a lay
representative, besides the former deputy from the Tashi,
Lama. The Abbot said that a Council had been held by
the Tashi Lama, and it had been decided to make another
representation to me. This representation did not, how-
ever, differ from the first, and I repeated the same argu-
ments in reply. He was especially insistent about
Giagong, and I asked him when one man had a certain
thing which another man wished to get from him, which
was the wiser course to pursue — to make friends with him,

126 KHAMBA JONG

or to do everjrthing to make him annoyed. The Tibetans
all burst out laughing at this argument, and I then went
on to say that the Lhasa authorities, instead of doing
everything they could to dispose us favourably towards
them, and incline us to make concessions in regard to
Giagong, had adopted a steadily unfriendly attitude ; they
had sent only small officials to meet Mr. White and
myself, and these small officials did nothing but say they
would negotiate nowhere else but at Giagong. This was
not the way to predispose us in their favour.

The Abbot said the delegates were not small officials,
but were next in rank to the Councillors. I said I had
concluded they were men of little power, because when I
had made a speech to them on my first arrival, and had
asked them to report the substance of it to the Lhasa
Government, they had refused. If they could not even
report a speech, I supposed they would not be fit to
negotiate an important treaty.

I asked the Abbot to give this advice to His Holiness
— that if he wished us to withdraw from Khamba Jong, he
should use his influence with the Lhasa authorities to
induce them to send proper delegates, and instruct such
delegates to discuss matters with us in a reasonable and
friendly spirit. Then matters would be very soon settled,
and we would return to India.

I then made some personal observations to the Abbot,
and he told me that from a boy he had been brought up
in a monastery in a religious way, and was not accus-
tomed to deal with political matters. I told him I envied
him his life of devotion. It was my business to wrangle
about these small political matters, but I always admired
those who spent their lives in the worship of God. He
asked me if he might come and see me again, and I said
he might come and see me every day and all day long ;
and Captain O'Connor, who could speak Tibetan, would
often pay him visits.

On August 24 the Abbot again came to see me, and
said that after his previous visit he had gone to the Lhasa
delegates and urged them to negotiate at Khamba Jong,
instead of at Giagong. But they had replied that, just as

INTERVIEW WITH SHIGATSE ABBOT 127

my orders were to negotiate at the former place, so their
orders were to negotiate at the latter, and they could not
agree to anything different. The Abbot, therefore, now
came to say that there were several hundred Tibetan
troops near by, but he would get those withdrawn if I
would send away my escort. He thought that then the
Lhasa Government would probably consent to negotiations
at Khamba Jong. I told him that I had not the slightest
objection to the presence of the Tibetan troops, but it
surprised me that, when they had so many hundreds near,
they should have any objection to the small number
which I myself had.

The innocent-minded Abbot then asked if I would send
away half, and he would himself remain with us as a
hostage. He explained that the Tibetans thought we had
come with no friendly intent, as we had forced our way
into the country, and a reduction of our escort would
appease them. I told the Abbot I could not acknowledge
that we had forced our way into Tibet, as I had up to
now ignored the presence of Tibetan soldiers inside the
treaty frontier, who had no business to be where they
were ; and I repeated my old arguments in regard to the
strength of my escort.

The Abbot very politely apologized for all the trouble
he was giving me by making so many requests. I told
him he might make requests to me all day long, and he
would always find me ready to listen to him and give him
what I, at any rate, considered reasonable answers. I
much regretted the inconvenience which was being caused
to the Tashi Lama, and I felt sure that if the conduct of
these negotiations rested with His Holiness and the
poUte and reasonable advisers of his whom he had sent to
me, we should very soon come to a settlement.

I advised the Abbot to get the Tashi Lama to repre-
sent matters directly to Lhasa. He replied they were not
allowed to make representations against the orders of the
Lhasa Government. Nevertheless, he would again, that
very day, go to the Lhasa delegates, tell them how he had
once more tried to induce me to go back to Giagong, and
would ask them to make a request to Lhasa to open

128 KHAMBA JONG

negotiations at Khamba Jong, and he said he would even
go so far as to undertake to receive in their stead any
punishment which the Lhasa Government might order
upon the delegates for daring to make this request.

He then asked me what we wanted in the coming
negotiations. I told him that I had set our requirements
forth fully in a speech I had made on my first arrival, a copy
of which I would very gladly give him. But he was well
acquainted with it, and asked me what was meant exactly
by opening a trade-mart. I explained that we wanted a
proper trade-mart, which would not be closed with a wall
behind it, as Yatung had been — a mart where Indian
traders could come and meet Tibetan traders ; a mart such
as we had in other parts of the Chinese Empire, and had
formerly had in Shigatse itself.

The Abbot himself was a charming old gentleman.
Whatever intellectual capacity he may have had was not
very apparent to the casual observer, and he corrected me
when I inadvertently let slip some observation implying
that the earth was round, and assured me that when I had
lived longer in Tibet, and had time to study, I should find
that it was not round, but flat, and not circular, but
triangular, like the bone of a shoulder of mutton. On
the other hand, he was very sociable and genial. He
would come and have lunch and tea Avith us, and would
spend hours with Captain O'Connor and Mr. Bailey,
playing with gi'amophones, typewriters, pictures, photo-
graphs, and all the various novelties of our camp.

But the situation now began to grow worse. On
August 31 I was informed by a trustworthy person, who
had exceptional sources of information, that he was
convinced that the Tibetans would do nothing till they
were made to and a situation had arisen. They were
said to be quite sure in their own minds that they were
fully equal to us, and, far from our getting anything out
of them, they thought they would be able to force some-
thing out of us. Some 2,600 Tibetan soldiers were occu-
pying the heights and passes on a line between Phari and
Shigatse. My informant did not think, however, that they
would attack us for the present, though they might in the

TIBETANS ASSEMBLE TROOPS 129

winter, when our communications would be cut off. Their
immediate policy was one of passive obstruction. They
had made up their minds to have no negotiations with us-
inside Tibet, and they would simply leave us at Khamba
Jong, while if we tried to advance farther, they would
oppose us by force. They were afraid that if they gave
us an inch we would take an ell, and if they allowed us at
Khamba Jong one year we should go to Shigatse the next,
and Lhasa the year after. So they were determined to
stop us at the start.

The Shigatse Abbot had, I heard, done his best to
make the Lhasa officials take a more reasonable view, but
without success. The Lhasa officials were entirely ruled
by the National Assembly at Lhasa, and this Assembly
was composed chiefly of Lhasa monks.

It was difficult to understand why there was all this
trouble about negotiating at Khamba Jong, for the
Chinese Government had informed our Minister at
Peking on July 19 that "the Imperial Resident had
now arranged with the Dalai Lama to appoint two
Tibetan officials of fairly high standing to proceed with
the Prefect Ho to Khamba to meet Major Younghusband
and Mr. White, and discuss vdth them what steps are to
be taken." The Chinese Government added that they
trusted it would be possible to effect a speedy and
friendly settlement of this long-standing dispute, and
requested Mr. Townley to acquaint his Government by
telegraph with the contents of this communication, so
that Major Younghusband and Mr. White might be
instructed to open negotiations in a friendly spirit with
the Tibetan and other delegates appointed, and it was
hoped that the pending questions would then be speedily
and finally settled.

The Chinese Government did, indeed, ask the British
Government to withdraw the troops we had with us at
Khamba Jong, but this was on the strength of a report
they had received that when I was to foUow Mr. White
to Khamba Jong, I was to bring with me the 300 raen who
formed the support left at Tangu.

That the Dalai Lama himself had agreed to Khamba

130 KHAMBA JONG

Jong being the meeting-place seems evident from the
copy of the telegram from the Chinese Resident at
Lhasa, which the Chinese Government forwarded to
Mr. Townley with the above-mentioned communication.
The Resident's words were : " The Dalai Lama's answer
is to the effect that, since the British Government has
appointed Major Younghusband as Boundary Commis-
sioner and Mr. White as his fellow-Commissioner, and
fixed the 7th instant for the meeting of the delegates at
the frontier station of Khamba, and as the Prefect Ho
Kuang Hsieh is to proceed there in a few days from
Chingshi, it is his duty, the matter being a very important
one, also to appoint interpreter officials above the usual
rank to proceed to Khamba, and, in company with the
Prefect Shou [? Ho], to meet the British delegates and
discuss the frontier question with them."

Nothing would seem clearer than this. Both the
Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama accepted
Khamba — that is, Khamba Jong — as the place of meeting,
and directed their delegates to proceed to meet Mr. White
and inyself there. Yet, when we met at the appointed
place, they refused to have anything to do with us !

I think a solution of this extraordinary proceeding
may be found in the last paragraph of the telegram of the
Resident to his Government. In this very same telegram
in which he announces that the Dalai Lama is sending
delegates with Mr. Ho to meet me at Khamba Jong,
the Resident asks that we should " be careful not to cross
the frontier, and thus again excite the suspicion and alarm
of the Tibetans."

My impression is that neither the Chinese Govern-
ment, the Resident, nor the Dalai Lama knew that
Khamba Jong was on the Tibetan side of the frontier.
And this appalling ignorance of the frontier by men who,
nevertheless, kept the control of frontier affairs absolutely
in their hands was one of the main difficulties with which
we had to deal, and was what made it an absolute
necessity to negotiate with them face to face at Lhasa
itself.

In any case, whether they really were ignorant or not

REPRESENTATION TO CHINESE 131

of the position of Khamba Jong, they had all formally
agreed to send delegates to meet Mr. White and myself
there, and the continued refusal of these delegates even to
receive communications was utterly indefensible.

On September 1 Mr. Ho came to me to say he had
been recalled to Lhasa owing to ill-health. I took the
opportunity to recount the difficulties the Chinese Govern-
ment had placed us in by undertaking responsibilities in
regard to the Tibetans, and then not being able to fulfil
them. The British Government had time after time
shown consideration to the Chinese Government, but the
net result was that the Tibetans had broken the old
treaty, and now placed every obstacle in the way of
negotiating a new one. I trusted he would represent to
the Resident the seriousness of the position, and impress
upon him the importance of using his influence with the
Tibetan Government to induce them to change their
present intolerable attitude. The Tibetans did not seem
to understand that for years they had been offending the
British Government, and that it iU became them, therefore,
to object to the mere place where negotiations were to be
held. We had given them the opportunity for negotiat-
ing, and if the Lhasa Government still persisted in
refusing to hold negotiations at Khamba Jong, and the
Chinese still showed their incapacity to make them
negotiate there, then the Resident must understand that
the position would become very grave indeed, and the
Chinese and Tibetans would only have themselves to
thank if, under these circumstances, the British Govern-
ment took matters into their own hands and adopted their
own measures for effecting a settlement.

Mr, Ho said he would explain aU this to the Amban,
and he also then and there explained it to the Tibetans —
the Shigatse Abbot and others, though not including the
Lhasa delegates — who were present, and these seemed
impressed, though they said we were acting in a very
oppressive manner.

On September 2 the Government of India asked me to
submit proposals for dealing with the situation if the
Tibetans continued to be so impracticable. I replied on

132 KHAMBA JONG

the 9th, that I thought that the Viceroy's reply to the
Resident might have some effect upon the Chinese at least.
Both Chinese and Tibetans had so far been under the
impression that the present mission was only one more of
the futile little missions which had come and gone on the
Sikkim frontier for years past. They thought that if they
could be obstructive enough during the summer and
autumn, we should no doubt return before the winter. On
this point the Viceroy's letter would leave them in no
doubt. It was clear from that that we intended to stay
for the winter. Besides this I had, I said, in conversation
with Mr. Ho and the Shigatse people, tried to bring both
the Chinese and the Tashi Lama round to putting
pressure on the obstinate Lhasa monks. But there was
little hope, I thought, that mere verbal persuasion would
be sufficient. Direct action would be required. The
despatch of a second Pioneer regiment to put the road
to the Jelap-la (pass) in order, had, I understood, been
ordered. I recommended, therefore, that about the same
time my escort should be strengthened by 100 men from
the support.

What I thought, however, would have a greater effect
than anything else upon the Tibetans would be the
demonstrating to them that the Nepalese were on our
side, and not theirs. The Nepalese Minister had offered
8,000 yaks. I would have 500 of these march across to us
by the Tinki Jong route, and would recommend that
a suitable representative of the Nepalese Durbar should
accompany them for the purpose of formally handing
them over to us. This would be a sign which the Tibetans
could not mistake that the Nepalese were on our side.

The strengthening of my escort and the appearance of
the Nepalese yaks might be made to coincide with the
concentration of the 23rd Pioneers in the neighbourhood
of the Jelap-la (pass) in about a month's time. This I
thought was all that could be done to bring the Tibetans
to a more suitable frame of mind. If these measures
failed, an advance into the Chumbi Valley was the most
obvious course to take, for the Jelap-la could be crossed at
any time during the winter, and along the Chumbi Valley

PLANS FOR COERCION 133

lay the best trade-route and military road to Lhasa.
When the Chumbi Valley had been occupied, the mission
might, transported by Nepalese yaks, march across to
Gyantse. The 32nd Pioneers and all transport would
then be transferred to the Chumbi Valley line, and that
line be made our chief line of communication.

These were my recommendations to Government
when two months' experience had shown me the difficulty
of even entering into communication with the Tibetans.
Neither Mr. White nor I, nor any of us, had any real hope
of effecting a final settlement anywhere short of Lhasa
itself; for it was quite evident to us on the spot that
to carry the negotiations through we should have to come
to close grips with the priestly autocrats who kept all
power in their own hands, and to whom the officials
on the frontier were frightened to represent the real
state of affairs. But at that time it was high tireason
for me to whisper the word Lhasa to my nearest friend,
such agitation did the sound of it cause in England. So I
racked my brains and everyone else's brains to think of
alternative measures to an advance to Lhasa, which might
be exhausted before this alarming proposal could be made.
And I subsequently strove honestly to get the utmost out
of each of those measures before I suggested the next, for
I quite realized the difficulty which any Government at
home has in securing support from the House of Commons
in a matter of this kind. Such methods are very costly,
very risky, and very ineffective ; but as long as what an
officer in the heart of Asia may do is contingent on the
" will " of " men in the street " of grimy manufacturing
towns in the heart of England, so long must our action be
slow, clumsy, and hesitating, when it ought to be sharp
and decisive.

1 have referred to the offer of the Nepalese Govern-
ment to help us with yaks, a species of buffalo peculiar to
Tibet, which are of value as transport animals at high
altitudes. This offer was not only of great practical use,
but of still greater political significance. And it is time

134 KHAMBA JONG

now to consider this yet other important factor in the
situation — the attitude of the Nepalese Government ; for
Nepal was in rather a peculiar position in this matter.
On the one hand, it sends a mission to Peking every three
years, and also has a treaty with the Tibetans, under
which it is bound to come to their assistance if they are
attacked ; on the other hand, it has political relations
with ourselves. The attitude which the Nepalese Govern-
ipent would take under the circumstances was a matter of
considerable importance to us, and no doubt of much
questioning among themselves.

Recognizing this, the Government of India at the
start laid down in their despatch to the Secretary of State
of .January 8, 1903, that they contemplated acting in com-
plete unison with the Nepalese Durbar throughout their
proceedings, and would invite them, if thought advisable,
to take part in our mission. The Indian Government
believed that the policy of frank discussion and co-
operation with the Nepalese Durbar would find the latter
prepared most cordially to assist our plans. An interview
at Delhi at the time of the Durbar between Lord Curzon
and the Prime Minister of Nepal, Maharaja Chandra
Shamsher Jang — the same who came to England in 1908
— confirmed the impression. The Nepalese Government
regarded this rumour of intrigue in Tibet with the most
lively apprehension, and considered the future of the
Nepalese State to be directly involved. Further, the
Maharaja (the Prime Minister) was prepared to co-
operate with the Government of India in whatever way
might be. thought most desirable, either within or beyond
the frontier, for the frustration of designs which he
deemed to be utterly inconsistent with the interests of his
own countiy.

This intention the Maharaja afterwards most amply
fulfilled right up to the close of the mission. The
welcome offer of 500 yaks, now accompanied as it was by
a further offer of 8,000 yaks within a month, was the first
practical sign of the intention. A second was to follow.
And early in September I received from Colonel Raven-
shaw, our Resident in Nepal, who had so much con-

THE PEIME MINISTER OF NEPAL.

Toface page 134.

AID FROM NEPAL 135

tributed to this good understanding between us and the
Nepal Prime Minister, the translation of a letter which the
latter had just addressed to the Council of Lhasa.

In this letter the Nepal Minister said that he had
heard from his frontier officers and from newspaper
reports that, in the absence of fuUy-empowered Com-
missioners from Tibet to deal with the British Commis-
sioners at Khamba Jong, no settlement could be arrived
at, and the latter were being unnecessarily detained.
This omission to depute Commissioners vested with full
authority, and the neglect or failure of the Tibetan
Council to bring about a reasonable settlement for so
long, compelled him to say that " such unjustifiable
conduct " might lead to grave consequences. It was laid
down, the Minister said, in the treaty between Nepal and
Tibet that Nepal would assist Tibet in the case of the
invasion of its territory by any foreign Rajas. Conse-
quently, when a difference of opinion arose between the
Tibetans and anyone else, it was incumbent on him to
help them to the best of his power with his advice and
guidance, in order to prevent any trouble befalling them
from such difference of opinion. And the manner in
which the Tibetans had managed the present business not
appearing commendable, the assistance he would give at
this crisis " of their own creation " would consist in giving
such advice as would conduce to the welfare of their
country. Should they fail to follow his advice and trouble
befall them, there would be no other way open to him of
assisting them in the troublous solution brought about by
■following a wayward course of their own. This should be
understood well, for the British Government did not
appear to him to have acted in an improper or high-
handed way in this matter, but was simply striving to
have the conditions of the treaty fulfilled, and it was
against the treaty and against all morality or policy to
allow matters to drift, and to regard as enemies the
officers of such a powerful Government who had come to
enforce such rights. Besides, when the Emperor of
China had, for their good, posted Ambans of high rank, it
was a serious mistake on their part to disregard even their

136 KHAMBA JONG

advice and neglect to carry on business with the British
Commissioners.

The advice the Nepal Minister gave to the Tibetan
Council was this : If the report was correct that they had
refused to be bound by the treaty of 1 890, on the ground
that it was concluded by the Chinese and not by them-
selves, then they had acted very improperly. The
Tibetans and the Nepalese had for a long time held the
Emperor of China in high respect. It was improper,
then, to declare that the treaty, having been made by the
Chinese, was not binding upon the Tibetans, since what-
ever was done was done on their behalf. The Minister
pointed out that, since the conclusion of the treaty
between the British and Nepal Governments representa-
tives of each of the Governments had resided in the
other's country, and the due observance of the terms of
the treaty had been continually advantageous to the
Government of Nepal, and their religion had not suffered
in any way. The advantages derived from such an
arrangement were too many to enumerate. Since the
treaty was made, the British Government had on different
occasions restored to them territories lost by Nepal in
war, and producing a revenue of many lakhs of rupees.
The Tibetans must bear in mind that the Government that
they had to deal with was not a despotic, but a constitu-
tional, one, and this would be corroborated by the fact
that the British had helped the Nepalese to maintain the
autonomy of their country for so long a time, whereas
they might easily have deprived them of it if they had had
a mind to behave in a despotic and unjust manner. The
most notable feature in the relations of the Nepalese with
the British, continued the Minister, was that they
sacredly observed Nepalese religious and social prejudices.
Hence if the Tibetans would even now take time by the
forelock, settle the pending questions, and behave with the
British as true friends, he was sure Tibet would derive
the same benefit from such an alliance as Nepal had
hitherto done. That the British Government had any
evil designs upon Tibet did not appear from any source.
It was well known that the sun never sets upon the

ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE 137

British dominions, and that the Sovereign of such a vast
Empire should entertain designs of unjustly and im-
properly taking the Tibetan mountainous country should
never cross their minds. So wrote the Nepalese Minister
to the Lhasa Council.

Another month passed, and there was still no improve-
ment in the situation. On the contrary, continued
rumours arrived that the Tibetans were massing troops,
and that at Lhasa they were quite prepared to go to war.
The old Shigatse Abbot was very friendly, but quite
ineffectual in bringing about negotiations. One day he
lunched with us, and assured us that he had made a
divination that Yatung was the place where negotiations
would be carried on quickest. I said that what we
wanted to find was a place where the negotiations could
be carried on, not quickest, but best ; and I asked him to
consult his beads again, and see if Shigatse would not be
suitable in that respect. He laughed, and replied that the
divination had to be made in front of an altar, to the
accompaniment of music. Captain O'Connor had suc-
ceeded in making the Abbot and his people so friendly
that Mr, WUton heard from Chinese sources that the
Chinese believed that we had either bought over the
Abbot or promised him some considerable concession —
neither of which was, of course, the case. Still, all this
friendliness of the Shigatse men amounted to very little
practical use as long as the Lhasa people were still
obstinate. So on October 7 I telegraphed to Government
that I was strengthening my escort by 100 men from the
support, and on the following day telegraphed them a
r^sumd of the whole situation.

1 said that the Viceroy's despatch had reached the
Resident one month previously, and no reply had yet been
received, though letters from Lhasa could reach Khamba
Jong in four days. The Mission had been there for three
months without being able to even commence negotiations.
The Chinese showed indifference and incompetence, and
the Tibetans pure obstruction. The present Resident was

138 KHAMBA JONG

acknowledged by even the Chinese to be weak and incom-
petent, and his Associate Resident had been allowed to
resign some months back. The new Amban, though
appointed in December, was only just leaving Chengtu,
and could not reach the frontier tiU January. The new
Associate Resident had been given sick-leave before even
joining his post. Mr. Ho, though I had given him the
above-mentioned very serious warning, made no haste to
proceed to Lhasa, but had loitered at Phari. Even if the
Chinese showed less indifference, they could do little with
the Tibetans. Mr. Ho was refused transport, and Colonel
Chao (his successor) had informed me that the new Resi-
dent could not bring large numbers of troops into Tibet,
as Tibetans would refuse to furnish transport and sup-
plies. As regards the attitude of the Tibetans, th€ people
in the vicinity and the Shigatse deputies were perfectly
friendly, but the Lhasa authorities were as obstructive as
ever. The delegates, since the fii-st formal visits, had
refused all communication, social or official, with me.
The two Sikkim men made prisoners remained in custody,
and Tibetan troops lined all the heights between our camp
and Gyantse or Shigatse ; and there was much probability
that Siberian Buriat' Lamas were present in Lhasa. The
result of all our moderation in the present and previous
years was nil, and I could, I said, no longer hold out any
hope to Government of a peaceful solution of the question.

On October 11 I left Khamba Jong to proceed to
Simla to confer with the Government of India on future
action, and thus ended this futile effort to settle the ques-
tion on the frontier.

The unsatisfactory nature of the situation had in the
meanwhile been taken notice of by the Government in
England, and, under their instructions, Sir Ernest Satow,
our Minister at Peking, on September 25 presented a note
to the Chinese Government, stating that, in spite of the
Dalai Lama having agreed that negotiations should take
place at Khamba Jong, the Tibetan representatives had
refused to negotiate there ; they had imprisoned two British
subjects at Shigatse, and refused to release them ; and
they were collecting troops, and making hostile prepara-

SUMMONED TO SIMLA 139

tions. Sir Ernest Satow further verbally informed the
Foreign Board, in accordance with his instructions, that
His Majesty's Government expected them to bring imme-
diate pressure to bear upon the Dalai Lama, with a view
to the release of the two British subjects who had been
imprisoned, and to the commencement without delay of
negotiations between the Tibetan delegates and the British
Commissioners. Should the Dalai Lama not give imme-
diate satisfaction to these demands, His Majesty's Govern-
ment would feel themselves compelled to take such
measures as they might consider necessary for the safety
of their Mission and for the release of the two British
subjects.

Prince Ching promised Sir Ernest Satow to despatch
a telegram at once to Lhasa by Batang, and said he hoped
an improvement would manifest itself as soon as the new
Resident arrived ; but he described the Tibetans as
intensely ignorant and obstinate, and very difficult to
influence.

At first the Imperial Government was not prepared
to sanction anything further than the occupation of the
Chumbi Valley ; but on October 1 Lord George Hamilton
telegraphed to the Government of India that Govern-
ment had again considered the position, and were now
prepared, if complete rupture of negotiations proved
inevitable, to authorize, not only the occupation of the
Chumbi Valley, but also the advance of the Mission to
Gyantse, if it could be made with safety ; and he asked
the Viceroy to inform him of his plans, and particularly
how he proposed to secure the safety of the Mission at
Gyantse.

It was upon this that I was summoned to Simla to
advise the Government of India, and after consultation
with me at a meeting of the Council, which I was invited
to attend, they telegraphed, on October 26, to Mr. Brodrick,
who had now succeeded as Secretary of State, that, for
the following reasons, an advance into Tibet seemed indis-
pensable : (1) Though the Dalai Lama had agreed to the
Commissioners meeting at Khamba Jong, the Tibetan
delegates had refused to hold any communication with the

140 KHAMBA JONG

British Commissioner ; (2) no Chinese delegates of suitable
rank had as yet been sent ; (3) the procrastination of the
Chinese Government ; (4) the warhke preparations of the
Tibetans ; (5) the arrest and imprisonment of two British
subjects ; (6) the complete failure of the policy pursued
for twenty-five years, the only result of which was that
the Tibetans mistook our patience for weakness, and
despised our strength. They recommended, therefore, the
advance should extend to Gyantse, and should not be con-
fined to the Chumbi Valley, for these reasons: (1) That
the Chumbi VaUey is on the Indian side of the watershed,
and is not regarded as part of Tibet, and a move from
Khamba Jong only to there would be regarded as a retro-
grade movement by the Tibetans ; (2) that if we moved
only into the Chumbi Valley, we should find the existing
situation at Khamba Jong repeated at Phari ; (3) that
Colonel Younghusband considered it extremely important
that we should come into contact with the Tibetan people,
for they were quite prepared to enter into relations with
us, and were friendly, it being only the hierarchy of
Lhasa Lamas who were opposed ; (4) that, as we were
pressing to have a mart at Gyantse, that object could be
secured in no better way than by advancing thither at
once. On arrival at Gyantse the force would not attack
the place, but, as had been done at Khamba Jong, would
establish a fortified port, and invite Tibetans and Chinese
to resume negotiations.

It was estimated, in a subsequent telegram, that the
total force to be employed would be one battalion of
Gurkhas, two companies of Sappers and Miners, two
battalions of Pioneers, two guns, British Mountain Battery,
two Maxims, and two seven-pounder guns. The com-
mand of the whole was to be entrusted to Brigadier-
General Macdonald.

The Secretary of State,* in a telegram dated Novem-
ber 6, at last gave his sanction to an advance. In view of
the recent conduct of the Tibetans, His Majesty's Govern-
ment felt that it would be impossible not to take action,
and they accordingly sanctioned the advance of the

* Blue-book, I., p. 294.

MOVE TO GYANTSE SANCTIONED 141

Mission to Gyantse. They were, however, clearly of
opinion that " this step should not be allowed to lead to
occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs
in any form. The advance should be made for the sole
purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and as soon as reparation
was obtained a withdrawal should be effected. While
His Majesty's Government considered the proposed action
to be necessary, they were not prepared to establish a
permanent Mission in Tibet, and the question of enforcing
trade facilities in that country should be considered in the
light of this telegram."

It was a curious telegram, which I never quite under-
stood. It said that the advance was to be made for the
sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction. But it was always
understood, and it was most emphatically laid down, that
this was not a punitive expedition to obtain satisfaction
and get reparation. It was a Mission despatched to put
our relations with the Tibetans on a regular footing, to
establish ordinary neighbourly intercourse with them.
Lord Lansdowne himself said in the House of Lords * :
" We desire that a new Convention should be entered
into between the Government of India, on the one hand,
and the Tibetans and Chinese, as the suzerain Power, on
the other. That is the object of the Mission." It is
remarkable that a document which was so often quoted to
the Russian Government, to the Indian Government, to
the Chinese Government, and which the Indian Govern-
ment on one occasion quoted to me in terms of admoni-
tion, should have described with so little precision the real
purpose of the advance — and this at the culminating point
of thirty years' effort on the part of the Government of
India. It was not till after the Mission had been attacked
at Gyantse, and on account of that attack, that we
demanded satisfaction — in the shape of an indemnity.
The obvious purpose of the advance was to do what
Warren Hastings had attempted, what the Government of
Bengal since 1873 had been advocating — to put our inter-
course with the Tibetans on proper terms. We had
found it impossible to effect this object on the frontier or

* February 26, 1904.

142 KHAMBA JONG

by negotiation with the Chinese Government. We were
going to advance into Tibet, to Gyantse, to see if we
could not effect it there, to get the frontier defined and
recognized, to have the conditions under which trade
could be carried on determined, and to have the method
of communication between our officials and Tibetan
officials clearly laid down. This, and not the obtaining of
satisfaction, which is the business of a military commander
in charge of a punitive expedition, was obviously the
purpose of our advance into Tibet, and it is odd that this
was not recognized in what was so often afterwards quoted
as the fundamental statement of our policy.

The telegram was not very purposeful or instructive,
but such as it was we were glad enough to get it. It at
least allowed us to go to Gyantse, and though at the time
when my advice was asked 1 said I did not think we
should get the business really settled till we reached Lhasa,
we certainly stood a better chance at Gyantse than at
Khamba Jong. In all civilized countries envoys who
have to negotiate a treaty go straight to the capital, and
how it could ever have been expected that in Tibet, where
all power was concentrated in a supposed god, who relied
upon the support of Russia in any difficulties, we should
have been able to negotiate a treaty at anywhere short of
Lhasa, it is hard now to realize.

However, as I told I^ord Curzon at his camp in
Patiala, where I took leave of him on my return to Tibet,
I meant to do my very best to get the thing through.
He once more gave me the same warm encouragement
he always extended to those in India whom he believed
to be working well, and I left again for Darjiling.

While we were making preparations at Darjiling for
the next move, correspondence was also taking place
from headquarters. The Viceroy, in reply to a letter of
the Lhasa Resident's of October 17, stating that he had
nominated a Colonel Chao in place of Mr. Ho, that he
had asked the Dalai Lama to send a Councillor of State
to accompany him (the Resident) to Khamba Jong, but

CHINESE PROTESTS 143

that all this required time to settle, and asserting that the
Tibetan passes were guarded by soldiers, and requesting
the Viceroy, therefore, to instruct the British Commissioner
not to move from the present camp, told the Resident
that he understood that Colonel Chao was of lower, not
higher, rank than Mr. Ho, and that, as the Resident's
departure was contingent on the Dalai Lama's nomination
of a Councillor, and as the Dalai Lama had for four
months past failed to send, as desired, an officer of the
highest rank, he saw no prospect of the Resident arriving
at Khamba Jong within any reasonable time. The
Viceroy then recapitulated our various grounds of com-
plaint, and concluded by saying that, in these circumstances,
he had no alternative but to transfer the place of negotia-
tions to some more suitable spot, where he hoped they
might be resumed. And as the Resident had stated that
the Tibetan passes were guarded by soldiers, he had been
compelled to take measures to insure the safety of the
Commissioners in moving from Khamba Jong, and to
prevent any possible interruption of communication vdth
them.

The Chinese Government made on November 16 a
protest to Lord Lansdowne against an advance, and
hoped that I would be instructed to await the arrival of
the new Resident, who, it will be remembered, had been
instructed nearly a year previously to proceed as rapidly
as possible to Lhasa ; but Lord Lansdowne informed
them that His Majesty's Government had learnt by
experience that the Tibetans systematically disregarded
the injunctions of the Emperor and the Chinese Govern-
ment, who had no real influence in restraining them from
acts such as those we complained of We had treated
the Tibetans with the utmost forbearance, but these
recent proceedings compelled us to exact satisfaction, and
we could not remain inactive until the arrival of the new
Resident, who had unnecessarily protracted his journey.

The Chinese Minister said that his Government
recognized the forbearance shown by the British authori-
ties towards the Tibetans, and also the friendly spirit
brought by the British Commissioners to the discussion of

144 KHAMBA JONG

frontier questions, and they hoped that we would recog-
nize the difficult position in which China had been placed
by her obstinate and ignorant vassal, and enjoin our Com-
missioners to exercise patience and forbearance, and thus
assist the Resident, who had been instructed to proceed
in person to the frontier to bring the Tibetans to a
juster sense of their duties and responsibilities as good
neighbours.

To this Lord Lansdowne replied that the Chinese
had hitherto signally failed in such attempts, and the
attitude of the Tibetan authorities had of late been of
increased hostility. It was impossible, therefore, for us to
desist from the measures already sanctioned.

In the event, it turned out that the Resident never
did meet me on the frontier, and that even his successor,
when at last he arrived at Lhasa, did not care to meet
me even at Gyantse, for the Tibetans, so he informed me,
would not provide him with transport. Lord Lans-
downe's refusal to desist from action and pursue still
further the policy of patience and forbearance was, there-
fore, amply justified by events.

But it was not only the Chinese Government who
were now beginning to protest against our action. The
Russian Government also began to move in the matter.
Lord Lansdowne had on November 7, the day on
which the forward move was sanctioned by Government,
informed the Russian Ambassador* that, owing to the
outrageous conduct of the Tibetans, it had been decided to
send our Mission, with a suitable escort, farther into the
Tibetan territory, but that this step should not be taken
" as indicating any intention of annexing, or even of
permanently occupying, Tibetan territory." And on
November 17 Count Benckendorff called on Lord
Lansdowne, I and spoke in the most earnest tones of the
effect which had been created in Russia by the announce-
ment that we were about to advance into Tibet. He was
instructed to remind Lord Lansdowne of the former

* Blue-book, I., p. 294. t Ibid,, p. 298.

RUSSIAN PROTESTS 145

statement he (Count Benckendorft) had made to him as
to the manner in which the Russian Government regarded
the Tibetan question. They could not help feeling that
the invasion of Tibetan territory by a British force was
calculated to involve a grave disturbance of the Central
Asian situation, and it was most unfortunate that at that
moment, when the Russian Government were disposed
to enter into an amicable discussion of our relations at
the various points where British and Russian interests were
in contact — an aUusion to the preliminary negotiations
for the Anglo-Russian Agreement and entente cordiale —
an event of this kind, so calculated to create mistrust on
the part of Russia, should have occurred.

Lord Lansdowne expressed his great surprise at the
excitement which the announcement of the advance
seemed to have enacted. He had, he said, already pointed
out to the Ambassador that Tibet was, on the one hand,
in close geographical connection with India, and, on the
other, far remote from any of Russia's Asiatic possessions.
Our interest in Tibetan affairs was therefore wholly
diflferent from any which Russia could have in them.
He reminded Count Benckendorff that he had already
explained to him that we had received the greatest
provocation at the hands of the Tibetans, who had not
only failed to fulfil their treaty obligations, but had virtually
refused to negotiate with us. We had always been
reluctant to entangle ourselves in quarrels with the
Tibetans, but our forbearance had led them to believe
that we could be ill-treated with impunity. Lord
Lansdowne said he was firmly convinced that the Russian
Government would not have shown as much patience as
we had, and that they would have been at Lhasa by that
time. He felt bound to add that it seemed to him beyond
measure strange that these protests should be made by
the Government of a Power which had, all over the world,
never hesitated to encroach upon its neighbours when the
circumstances seemed to require it. If the Russians had
a right to complain of us for taking steps to obtain
reparation from the Tibetans by advancing into Tibetan
territory, what kind of language should we not be entitled

146 KHAMBA JONG

to use in regard to Russian encroachments in Manchuria,
Turkestan, and Persia.

Count Benckendorff asked him whether he had any
objection to his saying that Government had approved of
the advance into Tibetan territory with reluctance, and
only because circumstances had made it inevitable, and
that our sole object was to obtain satisfaction for the
affronts we had received from the Tibetans ; and Lord
Lansdowne said that he had no objection to his making
such a statement.

Despite Russian and Chinese protests, the advance to
Gyantse was now irrevocably decided on, and once again we
have now to ask. Was the Mission justified in advancing
into Tibet ? I have given all the reasons for thinking that
the despatch of the Mission to Khamba Jong was justified.
Was this further advance into the Chumbi Valley and to
Gyantse equally necessary ? Perhaps, if we had shown
yet more patience and yet more forbearance, we might
have effected our object without advancing by force into
the country. Was this so ?

What eventually occurred showed that there were no
possible grounds for such a behef. Even when the
Chinese Central Government were aroused, and had
ordered the Resident to proceed to the frontier to settle
matters, he was unable to get there. The Tibetans refused
him transport, and when we reached Lhasa, in August
of the following year, we found him to be practically
a prisoner, and almost without enough to eat, as the
Tibetans had prevented supplies of money from reaching
him, and he had actually to borrow money from us. But
it was with the Tibetans that we really wished to
negotiate. Perhaps they would have come to terms with
us if we had been a little less impatient and remained on
the frontier ? Perhaps they would have sent a Councillor,
as we had asked, and negotiated a treaty ? On this point,
too^ our later experience showed that we could not have
relied. When we at length reached Lhasa I had to
negotiate, not with one Councillor only, but with the whole

REPLY TO RUSSIAN PROTESTS 147

Council; and not with the Council, but the Regent himself,
to whom the Dalai Lama had entrusted his own seal and
whom he had appointed in his place ; and not with the
Council and the Regent only, but with the National As-
sembly and three great monasteries in addition ; and with
all in the presence of the Chinese Resident himself. No
one man would ever have been entrusted by them with
power, and no one man would take responsibility. It was
only with the whole together that it was possible to nego-
tiate ; and we could negotiate with the whole together no
where but in Lhasa itself.

Granted all this, some may say, but even then was it
worth incurring Russian resentment in order to settle a
trumpery affair of boundary pillars and petty trade
interests in a remote corner of our Empire? Now, I most
fully sympathize with the Russian view. Our advancing
into Tibet would — and, in fact, did — "involve a grave
disturbance of the Central Asian situation." The news
of our signing a treaty in the Potala at Lhasa, and of
the Dalai Lama having to flee, did produce a profound
impression. But if the subject-matter of our dispute was
small, there was small reason why the Russians should
trouble us about it. The matter grew in dimension
because the Tibetans, whom the Chinese suzerains them-
selves had characterized as obstinate and difficult to
influence, had grown stiU more obstinate and still more
difficult to influence, through their having led themselves
to believe that they could count on Russian support. In
view of Russian disclaimers, we can assume that the
Russian Government gave them no intentional grounds
for that belief. Nevertheless, they had it, and for practical
purposes that was all that concerned us then. The
reception of the Dalai Lama's religious missions by
the Czar, the Czarina, the Chancellor and Minister,
and the subscriptions they had collected, together with
the extraordinary belief they had that Russia was nearer
to Lhasa than India was, had led the ignorant Dalai
Lama to believe that he could count on Russian support
against the British. One can quite realize that the
Russians, with their thousands of Buddhist Asiatic sub-

148 KHAMBA JONG

jects, and with the prospect that then seemed near of
their absorbing Mongolia, and so possessing still more
Buddhist subjects, would be sensitive of our acquiring a
predominant influence with the Dalai Lama. But that is
scarcely a reason why we should not take measures to
counteract an influence which was already, and in hard
fact proving, detrimental to our own interests by en-
couraging the Tibetans in the belief that they could with
impunity ignore their treaty obligations. The Russian
Government had no intention of sending an agent to
Lhasa. Nevertheless, there was in Lhasa all the time a
Russian subject who had more influence over the Dalai
Lama than the Chinese Resident. When such was the
condition of affairs, we could hardly defer to Russia in a
matter concerning a country adjoining our frontier, but
nowhere adjoining hers.

Just as the move to Khamba Jong a dozen miles
inside the Tibetan frontier was most amply justified, so
also was the move to Gyantse, halfway to the capital.

CHAPTER XI

DARJILING TO CHUMBI

During our stay at Khamba Jong Mr. White, Captain
O'Connor, and I had often talked over the question of
advancing into Tibet in winter. It had always so far
been assumed that with the approach of winter all opera-
tions on this frontier must cease, missions must withdraw,
and troops go into winter-quarters. But on the Gilgit
frontier we had taken troops across snow-passes in winter,
and Colonel Kelly took troops and guns across the
Shandur Pass to the relief of Chitral in April, which, from
the softness of the snow, is the very worst time. I asked
Mr. White, who knew the Sikkim frontier so well,
whether there was really any insuperable obstacle to our
crossing these passes in winter, and as he said there was
not, and as he was heartily in favour of such a move, I
urged Government not to delay till the spring, but to let
us advance even in winter. We do not hesitate when
there is real necessity to send troops and missions into
unhealthy and hot places in the hottest season of the year.
Why, then, should we be put off by cold ? Against cold
we could take plenty of precautions by clothing troops
and followers with furs and sheepskins, and we should
doubtless lose some, but not more than we lose from
malaria and heat-strokes in hot places. And as for passes
being closed, I had had as much experience as most people
of Himalayan passes, and I knew that passes which are
closed for single men or small parties, are not necessarily
closed for large parties, which can organize regular shelters
and trample down paths in the snow. It was a risk to
take, and Lord Curzon and the Government of India
were courageous in taking it. But, like many other risks

149

150 DARJILING TO CHUMBI

we took on this enterprise, it was justified by the result.
By April the casualties from sickness and frost-bite were
only thirty-five deaths among combatants and forty-five
among followers, which, considering the circumstances,
was wonderfully low, and we had proved for aU time to
the Tibetans, to ourselves, and to the world, that Indian
troops could march across the Himalayas in the very
depth of winter.

As we settled down to our preparations at DarjUing,
it did indeed seem a bold task that we were under-
taking. The weather now, in November, was clear and
bright. Day after day from our headquarters at the
Rockville Hotel we could look out on that stupendous
range of snowy mountains, to view which hundreds of
people come at this season from all over the world. And
to think that we had to pierce through that mighty
barrier at the coldest season of the year in face of the
certain opposition of the Tibetans, and to establish our-
selves far beyond in a spot to which for half a century
no European had approached, did indeed at times appal
one. But the very risk and romance and novelty of the
task soon again inspired one with enthusiasm. It was no
ignoble little raid, as ignoble Little Englanders were
saying, that we were embarking on. It was an under-
taking with every moral justification behind it. And it
was a feat which, if successfully performed, would add
one more to the triumphs of man over Nature, and
bring added glory to the Indian army by whom it was
accomplished.

It had been originally intended that I should return to
Khamba Jong to the Mission which I had left there, and
with them march across to Kalatso, on the Gyantse line,
while General Macdonald marched up through Chumbi.
But on talking the matter over with him at Darjiling, he
thought that such a move would involve unnecessary risk,
and would be difficult to arrange for with the transport
and supplies, as the Tibetans had forcibly dispersed the
yaks which the Nepalese had sent across the frontier.
It was arranged, therefore, that the Mission, now under
the charge of Mr. Wilton, should be withdrawn from

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADVANCE 151

Khamba Jong ; but both Mr. White and I were anxious
that no retirement should take place from one direction
till we were actually advancing in another, for any
symptom of withdrawal before such people as the Tibetans
is apt to be misconstrued into fear, and to encourage
them into hostile action. So it was arranged that until
we advanced into Chumbi the Mission would remain at
Khamba Jong, and then retire into Sikkim and join
General Macdonald and myself in Chumbi.

General Macdonald, his Chief Staff Officer, Major
Iggulden, who was well acquainted with the frontier,
having served in the little Sikkim campaign of 1888,
Major Bretherton, and Captain O'Connor now had their
hands fuU with the arrangements for the advance, and, as
always happens, every additional unnecessary difficulty
arose. For advance into Tibet in mid -winter, animals like
yaks, which hate being below 12,000 feet, and are stifled
with the heat if the thermometer rises above the freezing-
point, were, of all others, the most suitable, and the
Nepalese Government, with great trouble had collected
several thousand and despatched them to Sikkim. But
just as they arrived some kind of disease broke out among
them, and all, except a very few, which had to be secluded,
died. It was a terrible blow, but Major Bretherton, with his
unfailing cheery resourcefulness, set about getting the
transport he knew and had worked so well on the
Kashmir frontier — Kashmir ponies, Balti and Poonch
coolies. Sir Edmond EUes, the Military Member of
Council, was near by in Calcutta at the time, and with
his unrivalled experience in organizing such expeditions,
was able to direct the whole scheme of arrangement to its
greatest possible advantage. He would not, indeed, at
this stage spare those magnificently organized mule corps
which he treasured up in the event of greater need else-
where, and which he only eventually sent when operations
in Tibet assumed a greater importance. But in every
other way he gave General Macdonald support in these
most difficult transport and supply arrangements, and
with great rapidity bullocks, ponies, and coolies, arrived in
the Teesta Valley. And sheepskins, blankets, woollen

152 DARJILING TO CHUMBI

comforters, thick jerseys, and warm socks, were pro^dded
for both fighting men and followers. If the Government
of India does a thing at all, it does it well, and nothing
was spared — except the mules — to make the movement a
success.

The local authorities were also extremely helpful.
Mr. Walsh, the Deputy Commissioner of DarjUing, on
account of his knowledge of the frontier, and because he
spoke Tibetan, was to accompany me as an Assistant
Commissioner ; and Mr. Garrett, who took his place at
Darjiling, put his whole energies to collecting coolies,
ponies, and supplies. The local engineers got the road
along the Teesta Valley — which with unfailing regularity
falls into the river in the rainy season — into proper work-
ing order again. Mr. White, in Sikkim, set to work to
raise a coolie corps for work on the passes. And in a
month from the date of receiving the sanction of tlie
Secretary of State, General Macdonald was able, in spite
of the blow which had befallen him in the loss of the
yaks, to make the start towards Tibet.

It was a sad day when I said good-bye to my wife and
little girl to plunge into the unknown beyond the mighty
snowy range which lay before us. To me there was
nothing but the stir and thrill of an entei-prise which
would ever live in history ; before her there lay only long
and dreary months of sickening anxiety and suspense, for
which my eventual success might or might not be a
sufficient recompense. A little knot of visitors assembled
at the Rockville Hotel on the morning of December 5 to
bid us good-bye and good luck, and Mrs. Wakefield, the
manageress, patriotically waved a Union Jack. Then we
were off — as it turned out, to the mysterious Lhasa itself.

The first night I passed with Mr. James, a nephew of
my old travelling companion in Manchuria, at a most
charming little bungalow in a tea-plantation, and on the
way met other tea-planters, all very anxious that my
Mission would have the result of opening up Tibet for
their produce. I once more rode through all that glorious
tropical vegetation in the Teesta Valley. I passed the
camp of the 28rd Pioneers, and first made the acquaintance

CROSSING THE FIRST PASS 153

of Colonel Hogge and his officers, with whom I was to
be so closely associated in future, and in whom I always
found such firm supporters. And by December 10
General Macdonald and his staff, the bulk of the troops
for the advance, Mr. White, Mr. Walsh, Captain O'Connor,
and myself had all rendezvoused at Gnatong, ready to move
into Tibet.

The force then assembled consisted of two guns. No. 7
Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery ; a Maxim gun de-
tachment of the Norfolk Regiment ; two guns, 7-pounders,
8th Gurkhas ; half-company 2nd Sappers ; eight companies
23rd Sikh Pioneers ; six companies 8th Gurkhas ; with
field hospitals, engineer field park, ammunition column,
telegraph, postal, and survey department detachments.
In spite of foot-and-mouth disease among the pack-
bullocks, of sickness and desertion amongst the Nepalese
Coolie Corps, and of rinderpest. Major Bretherton had
succeeded in accumulating a month's supply for the troops
and ten days' fodder for the animals, and General Mac-
donald was able to make a short march on the 11th to
the foot of the Jelap-la (pass) with the first column,
consisting of 1,150 fighting men, four guns, and four
Maxims.

On December 12 we crossed the pass itself. It is
14,390 feet in height, and leads, not across the main
watershed of the Himalayas, but across the range dividing
Sikkim from Chumbi, a sharp, bare, rocky ridge. The
ascent to it was very steep, and, as the ridge formed the
boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, it was possible we
might be opposed at the summit.

But on the question of opposition I had had some
communication with the Tibetans. News of the assembly
of troops and of the preparations we were making had
naturally reached the Tibetans, and on November 28
Captain Parr, who was in Chinese employ, associated with
the Chinese delegate, informed me that the Tibetans were
expecting that, before any advance was made into their
country, the British Government would make a formal
declaration of their intention ; that if they intended to
make war they would make a formal declaration of war.

154 DARJILING TO CHUMBI

I replied that no more formal declaration would be made
than that conveyed in the letter from the Viceroy to the
Chinese Resident. If the progress of the Mission were
obstructed, General Macdonald would use force to clear a
way for the passage of the Mission. If no opposition were
offered, he would not attack the Tibetans. We were pre-
pared to fight if fighting were forced upon us ; we were
equally ready to negotiate if the Chinese and Tibetans
would send proper delegates to negotiate with us.

All accounts seemed to show at that time that the
Tibetans intended to fight, and from several independent
sources came information that they were relying on
Russian support. And these latter reports were con-
firmed later by Colonel Chao, the Chinese delegate,
who said that DorjiefF was then in Lhasa, and that the
arrogance of the Tibetans was due to their reliance on the
support of the Russians, since many discussions had been
held in Russia between DorjiefF and Russian officials, with
the result that of late the Tibetans had been taunting the
Chinese openly, and saying that they had now a stronger
and greater Power than China upon which to rely for
assistance.

Still, I meant to do my best to secure our passage to
Gyantse without fighting, and to the General commanding
the Tibetan troops at Yatung I gave the pledge that we
were conducting the Mission, under adequate protection,
to a place better fitted for negotiation, but that we were
not at war with Tibet, and unless we were ourselves
attacked, we should not attack the Tibetans. I repeated
these assurances to some Tibetan messengers at Gnatong,
and told them to tell the Tibetan Generals that if they did
not attack us we would not attack them.

On reaching the summit of the Jelap-la, on a bright,
clear sunny day, with glorious views all round, we found
no one to oppose us. We looked down into the Chumbi
Valley into a sort of labyrinth of deep forest-clad valleys,
and beyond these to the high main range, which still
separated us from Tibet proper, for Chumbi is not
geographically part of Tibet, nor are its inhabitants true
Tibetans.

ARRIVAL AT YATUNG 155

The march was very trying for the troops and trans-
port, for the " road " was simply a mountain-path of the
roughest description. One coolie corps struck work, and
a number of the local drivers of a pony corps and many
Nepalese coolies had deserted, for a curious feeling was
prevalent on the frontier that we were advancing to our
doom. But the troops and the bulk of the transport got
over all right, though very exhausted, and we encamped
in three bodies near Langram, well below the pass, in a
deep, narrow, forest-clad gorge.

Here I was met by the ubiquitous Captain Parr, who
in many ways was extremely helpful at this time, by the
local Chinese official, and by the Tibetan General. They
asked me to go back to Gnatong, where the Chinese
Resident and Tibetan Councillors would come and discuss
matters with me. On my declining, they asked me to
remain where I was for two or three months. I told them
1 had waited for months without result at Khamba Jong ;
now I had to go on into Tibet. If my passage were
opposed. General Macdonald would break down opposi-
tion ; if they did not oppose us, we would not attack
them. They asked me what we should do if on the
morrow we found the gate in the Yatung wall closed. I
said we would blow it open.

What would happen on the morrow was now the
interesting question. We would reach Yatung, which
for the last ten years we had been trying to make into a
trade-mart, according to the treaty, and we would approach
that wall which the Tibetans had thrown up to prevent
anyone coming to trade. The dramatic moment had
arrived ; and as General Macdonald and I on the following
morning rode down the wooded gorge with all military
precautions, it was impossible to say what our reception
would be.

Suddenly, as we turned a sharp corner, we saw a sohd
wall, stretching right across the valley from the river up
the mountain-side. General Macdonald sent a flanking
party up the hills, and a skirmishing party to advance
straight at the wall. As we approached we were met by
the same officials who had visited us on the previous night.

156 DAKJILING TO CHUMBI

They asked us not to advance, but we noticed that they
had left the gate open, so the advance-guard passed through.
Then General Macdonald and I followed, and exactly as I
passed under the gateway the local official seized my bridle
and made one last ineffectual protest.

On the other side I called together all the officials, and
sitting on a stone, with a large crowd gathered round, I
explained to them the reason for our advance. I let them
repeat their protests, for it evidently appeased the Tibetan
General to say it in public ; but it did not strike me that
he personally particularly minded our coming, and the
meeting broke up in great good -humour. Then we
adjourned to Captain Parr's house, where we had to eat
not only his lunch, but lunches sent us by the Chinese and
Tibetan officials as well, these latter themselves joining in
the meal.

This was an excellent beginning, which filled me with
great hopes of effecting a settlement peacefully ; and as
we advanced up the valley in the next few days we found
the villagers ready to bring in supplies for purchase, and
to hire out their mules and ponies, while the women and
children who had run away to the hills returned to the
villages in perfect confidence.

After we had struck off from the subsidiary Yatung
Valley into the main Chumbi Valley, through which runs
the Amo-chu (river), the vaUey opened to a width of
two or three hundred yards, the road was good, there was
a considerable amount of cultivation, and grass was
plentiful ; the houses were better built, and the villages
had a more prosperous look than is generally seen in
Himalayan valleys ; and with a road right down the
Amo-chu to the plains of Bengal, which would save
crossing the Jelap-la, this seemed the obvious route by
which to approach Tibet.

General Macdonald had to halt for some daj^s, com-
pleting his arrangements for supplies and transport, and
while we were halted we were joined by Mr. Wilton,
Captain Ryder, R.E., the Survey Officer, and Mr. Hayden,
the geologist, who had aU come in from Khamba Jong.
They had had a very cold and very trying time after I

MACDONALD OCCUPIES PHARI 157

left, and their retirement was an extremely delicate opera-
tion. The Tibetan troops hovered about, and with a
17,000 feet pass to cross in December, Captain Bethune
had about as difficult a manoeuvre to perform as often falls
to the lot of a soldier. The Tibetans occupied our camp
in triumph, but never actually attacked, and the retire-
ment was safely effected.

Both Captain Ryder and Mr. Hayden had done excel-
lent work. The former had surveyed all the neighbour-
hood, fixing many new peaks far into Tibet ; and Mr.
Hayden, roaming over the hills, had made interesting
discoveries of fossil-bearing beds, which enabled him to
determine the age of the strata in those parts.

General Macdonald, with a flying column of 795 fight-
ing men, started on the 18th for Phari, through a piece
of country which had never before been traversed by a
European. It was reported that there was a Tibetan
force there ready to oppose us. The first march beyond
the permanent camp at the meeting of the Amo-chu and
the Rilo-chu was easy ; but the second march was over a
very bad road, ascending steeply through a narrow wooded
gorge, where a few determined men could have greatly
delayed the advance of the column. The hardships of the
march were increased by the almost total absence of fuel
at Kamparab camping-ground, which was two miles beyond
the wood limit. A certain amount of fuel had been taken
on spare mules, and this, with yak-dung in small quantities,
had to suffice. On the 20th General Macdonald reached
Phari, marching over open country, where the only obstacle
to rapid marching was the great altitude and numerous
frozen streams. The Jong (fort) he found unoccupied.
It was a strong, lofty, masonry-castellated structure, at
the junctioil of the road to the Tang-la (pass), with a road
to Bhutan, up which Bogle, Turner, and Manning had
proceeded to Tibet so many years before.

In this Jong General Macdonald stationed two
<;ompanies of the 8th Gurkhas and one 7-pounder gun,
while the remainder of the column camped on the plain
outside. To the Tibetan and Chinese officials General
Macdonald explained that he was only safeguarding, the

158 DARJILING TO CHUMBI

road for the advance of the Mission, and guarding against
the regrettable display of force with which the Tibetans
had endeavoured to intimidate the Mission at Khamba
Jong. He stayed there a couple of nights, during which
the cold was intense, the thermometer registering about
40° of frost at night. The ground was frozen so
hard that a working party of twelve men only succeeded,
after two hours' hard work, in excavating some 33 cubic
feet of earth, and as neither turf nor stones were avail-
able, it was impossible to construct any entrench-
ments.

Leaving Major Row in command of the two companies
in the Jong, General Macdonald returned with the
remainder of the force to Chumbi, which he reached on
the 23rd. And on Christmas Day we received a mostly
kindly and encouraging telegram from Lord Curzon. The
inhabitants of the Chumbi Valley were now selling us grass,
buck-wheat, turnips and potatoes, and Major Bretherton
had arranged for 400 mules to ply on a contract system
between here and the Teesta Valley. This, though very
helpful, did not amount to very much, and we were
dependent for most of our supplies and transport from
the rear. In addition to this, the loss of the yaks was
now severely felt. So our progress was necessarily slow.
But I was very anxious, as soon as we could, to be
over the main range, in Tibet proper, in some position
equivalent to Khamba Jong. Just over the Tang-la (pass)
we knew there was a small place called Tuna, and there I
wished the Mission established with a good escort and
plenty of ammunition and supplies, while all arrangements
were being completed for the further advance to Gyantse.
There was a certain amount of risk in this ; but to be
among the Tibetans proper, and to compensate for the with-
drawal from Khamba Jong, I thought it was necessary to
run it. Our prestige at this time on the Sikkim frontier
was quite astonishingly low. 1 had never seen it so
low elsewhere. In other places there was always that
indefinable something behind which gave one something
to work with, but on this frontier the people stood in
much greater awe of the Lhasa Lamas than they did qf

OBSTRUCTION OF LHASA MONKS 159

us, and we had to do everything we could, short of
fighting, to estabUsh some prestige.

On January 4 the Mission and a flying column, under
General Macdonald's personal command, left Chumbi, and
on the 6th reached Phari. The cold was now terrible.
Piercing winds swept down the valley, and discomfort was
extreme. Near our camp was a big waterfall frozen solid.

At Phari we found that representatives of the three
great monasteries at Lhasa and a General from Lhasa
had arrived, and Major Row reported many cases in
which the inhabitants had expressed their willingness to
deal with us, but feared to do so on account of the threats
of these Lhasa functionaries. Captain O'Connor saw
these monks, whom he found to be exceedingly surly,
saying they would discuss nothing whatever until we went
back to Yatung.

A Major Li, who had been deputed by the Resident to
take Colonel Chao's place, visited me, and told me it was
impossible to get the Tibetans to do anything. He said
they were a most obstinate people, and at present would
pay no respect to the Chinese, as they were so fully
relying on Russian support.

Captain O'Connor reported that the whole demeanour
of these Lhasa monks, who were the men who really
guided the destinies of Tibet, was impracticable in the
extreme. They made no advance in civility, though I
instructed Captain O'Connor to be studiously polite in his
behaviour, and they adopted the high tone of demanding
our withdrawal. All I asked them was an assurance that
they would not prevent willing people from selling
supplies to us, and even this little they refused both the
Chinese and myself.

But the worst feature of the situation, as I reported at
the time, was that the local people, and even the Chinese,
thought that in advancing into Tibet we were advancing to
our destruction. They were not impressed by our troops ;
they knew how few there were ; they knew of thousands
of Tibetan troops on the far side of the pass ; and they
believed that the new Lhasa-made rifles and the new
drill would prevent the loss they had incurred in their

160 DARJILING TO CHUMBI

last campaign against us. Many of our camp-followers
deserted, and local men in our employ brought in sto 5
of the numbers and prowess of the Tibetans, and how
they would attack us in the night and swamp us.

These were the circumstances in which we set out,
now in the extreme depth of winter, to cross over the
main range of the Himalayas into Tibet.

On January 7 we encamped at the foot of the pass,
the thermometer that night falling to 18° below zero. As
1 looked out of my tent at the first streak of dawn the
next morning there was a clear cutting feel in the atmo-
sphere, such as is only experienced at great altitudes.
The stars were darting out their rays with almost super-
natural brilliance. The sky was of a steely clearness, into
which one could look unfathomable depths. Behind the
great sentinel peak of Chumalhari, which guards the
entrance to Tibet, the first streaks of dawn were just
appearing. Not a breath of air stirred, but all was gripped
tight in the frost which turned buckets of water left out
overnight into solid ice, and made the remains of last
night's stew as hard as a rock. Under such conditions
we prepared for our advance over the pass, and as the
troops were formed on parade, preparatory to starting, it
was found that many of the rifles and one of the Maxims
would not work, on account of the oU having frozen.

The rise to the pass was very gradual, and the pass
itself, 15,200 feet above sea-level, was so wide and level that
we could have advanced across it in line. But soon now
the wind got up, and swept along the pass with terrific
force. At this altitude, and clad in such heavy clothing,
we could advance but slowly, and the march seemed in-
terminable. The clearness of the atmosphere made the
little hamlet of Tuna appear quite near ; but hour after
hour we plodded wearily over the plateau, and it was late
in the afternoon before we reached it, and even then, for
the sake of water, we had to go a mile or more beyond,
and encamp in the open.

A Tibetan force was near at hand, and as they were
credited with a habit of attacking at night, General Mac-
donald took special precautions against such an even-

'23I1'

CROSSING THE TANG-LA 161

tuality ; but as darkness set in and the cold increased in
intensity, we felt we should be pretty helpless in an open
camp, and there were some thoughts of retiring again across
the pass, for the military risks were very great. But, on
the whole, we thought it would be better to face it now
we were there ; and as, next morning, we examined the
hamlet of Tuna, and found it could be turned into a good
defensible post, and had a well within the walls, we
decided that the Mission should remain there, with an
escort of four companies of the 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant
Hadow's Maxim-gun detachment, and a 7-pounder —
the whole under Colonel Hogge ; while General Mac-
donald, with the flying column, returned to Chumbi to
complete his arrangements.

The immediate surroundings in which we now found
ourselves were miserable in the extreme. Tuna was nearly
15,000 feet above the sea, and was the filthiest place I
have ever seen. We tried to live in the houses, but after
a few days preferred our tents, in spite of the cold, which
was intense, and against which we could not have the
comfort and cheer of a fire, for only sufficient fuel for
cooking could be obtained, most of it being yak-dung, and
much having to be brought from Chumbi. The saving
feature was the grand natural scenery, which was a joy
of which I never tired. Immediately before us was an
almost level and perfectly smooth gravel plain ten or
twelve miles in width, and on the far side of this rose
the great snowy range, which forms the main axis of
the Himalayas, and here separates Tibet from Bhutan.
Snow seldom fell. The sky was generally clear, and
the sunshine brilliant, and well wrapped up, away from
the dirty hamlet and sheltered from the terrific wind,
there was pleasure to be had out of even Tuna. And the
sight of the serene and mighty Chumalhari, rising proudly
above all the storms below and spotless in its purity, was
a never-ending solace in our sordid winter post.

CHAPTER XII

TUNA

The first event of importance after our arrival at Tuna
was the receipt, on January 12, of a message from the
Lhasa officials, saying that they wished for an interview.
At noon, the time I had appointed, several hundreds
of men appeared on the plain below the village. They
halted there, and asked that I should come out and meet
them halfway. Perhaps unnecessarily, I refused this
request. It was bitingly cold in the open plain, and I
thought the Tibetan leaders might have come into my
camp, where I had said I would receive them, and where
a guard of honour was ready. However, I sent out the
indispensable and ever-ready Captain O'Connor to hear
what they had to say, and on his return he replied that
they once more urged us to return to Yatung, but after-
wards stated that they were prepared to discuss matters
there, at Tuna.

This constituted a distinct improvement on the
attitude adopted by them at Phari, and their general
demeanour was much more cordial, according to Captain
O'Connor. But they told him that if we advanced and
they were defeated, they would fall back upon another
Power, and that things would then be bad" for us. In
conversation with the Munshi they said that they would
prevent us from advancing beyond our present position,
and they repudiated our treaty with the Chinese, saying
they were tired of the Chinese, and could conclude a
treaty by themselves.

Encouraged by the fact that they showed some little
signs of a desire to discuss matters, I determined now to
make a bold move to get to close quarters with them.

162

VISIT TO TIBETAN CAMP 163

I was heartily tired of this fencing about at a dis-
tance ; I wanted to get in under their reserve. And I
thought that if we could meet and could tell them in an
uncontentious and unceremonious manner what all the
pother was about, we might at any rate get a start — get
what the Americans call a "move on." It was worth
while, it seemed to me, to make a supreme effort to get
this intrinsically small matter settled by peaceful means,
even if a very considerable risk was incurred in the
process ; and I wished particularly to see them, and to
judge of them, in their own natural surroundings. I was
constantly being called upon by Government to give my
opinion upon the probable action of the Tibetans, but so
far I had only seen them in our own camps, and they had
steadily refused to admit me into theirs. I therefore
determined on the following morning, without any for-
mality, without any previous announcement, and without
any escort, to ride over to their camp, about ten miles
distant, at Guru, and talk over the general situation —
not as British Commissioner, with a list of grievances for
which he had to demand redress, but as one who wished
to understand them, and by friendly means to effect
a settlement. I was only too well aware that such an
attempt was likely to be taken by the Tibetans as a sign
of weakness ; still, when I saw these people so steeped in
ignorance of what opposing the might of the British
Empire really meant, I felt it my duty to reason with
them up to the latest moment, to save them from the
results of their ignorance.

Captain O'Connor and Captain Sawyer, of the 23rd
Pioneers, who was learning Tibetan, accompanied me, but
we did not take with us even a single sepoy as escort.
On our way we were met by messengers, who had come
to say that the Tibetan chiefs would not come to see me
at Tuna, and I was all tlie more pleased that I had left
Tuna before the message arrived.

On reaching Guru, a small village under a hill, we
found numbers of Tibetan soldiers out collecting yak-
dung in the surrounding plain ; but there was no military
precaution whatever taken, and we rode straight into the

164 TUNA

village. About 600 soldiers were huddled up in the
eattle-yards of the houses. They were only armed with
spears and matchlocks, and had no breech-loaders. As
we rode through the village they all crowded out to look
at us, and not with any scowls, but laughing to each other,
as if we were an excellent entertainment. They were not
very different in appearance from the ordinary Bhutia
dandy-bearers of Darjiling or the yak-drivers we had with
us in camp.

We asked for the General, and on reaching the
principal house I was received at the head of the stairs by
a polite, well-dressed, and well-mannered man, who was
the Tibetan leader, and who was ftiost cordial in his greet-
ing. Other Generals stood behind him, and smiled and
shook hands also. I was then conducted into a room in
which the three Lhasa monks were seated, and here the
difference was at once observable. They made no attempt
to rise, and only made a barely civil salutation from their
cushions. One object of my visit had already been
attained : I could from this in itself see how the land lay,
and where the real obstruction came from.

The Lhasa General and the Shigatse Generals — we
had become accustomed to calling them Generals, though
the English reader must hot imagine they at all resembled
Napoleon — took their seats on cushions at the head of the
room and opposite to the monks. We were given three
cushions on the right, and two Shigatse Generals and
another Shigatse representative had seats on the left.
Tea was served, and the Lhasa General, as the spokes-
man of the assembly, asked after my health.

After I had made the usual polite replies and inquiries
after their own welfare, I said I had not come to them
now on a formal visit as British Commissioner, or with
any idea of officially discussing the various points of differ-
ence between us ; but I was anxious to see them and
know them, and to have an opportunity of freely discuss-
ing the general situation in a friendly, informal manner.
So I had ridden over, without ceremony and without
escort, to talk matters over, and see if there was no means
of arriving at a settlement by peaceful means. I said that

DISCUSSION WITH TIBETAN LEADERS 165

I had been appointed British Commissioner on account of
my general experience in many different countries, that I
had no preconceived ideas upon this question and no
animus against them ; from what I had seen of them, I
was convinced there was no people with whom we were
more likely to get on, and I hoped now we had really met
each other face to face we should find a means of settling
our differences and forming a lasting friendship.

The Lhasa General replied that all the people ol
Tibet had a covenant that no Europeans were ever to be
allowed to enter their country, and the reason was that
they wished to preserve their religion. The monks here
chimed in, saying that their religion must be preserved, and
that no European, on any account, must be admitted. The
General then went on to say that, if I really wanted to
make a friendly settlement, I should go back to Yatung.

I told him that for a century and a half we had re-
mained quietly in India, and made no attempt to force
ourselves upon them. Even though we had a treaty right
to station an officer at Yatung, we had not exercised that
right. But of recent years we had heard from many
different sources that they were entering into friendly
relations with the Russians, while they were still keeping
us at arm's length. One Dorjieff, for instance, had been
the bearer of autograph letters from the Dalai l^ama to
the Czar and Russian officials at the very time when the
Lama was refusing letters from the Viceroy of India. We
could understand their being friendly with both the
Russians and ourselves, or their wishing to have nothing
to do with either ; but when they were friendly with the
Russians and unfriendly with us, they must not be sur-
prised at our now paying closer attention to our treaty
rights.

The General assured me that it was untrue that they
had any dealings with the Russians, and the monks
brusquely intimated that they disliked the Russians just as
much as they disliked us ; they protested that they had
nothing to do with the Russians, that there was no
Russian near Lhasa at that time, and that Dorjieff was a
Mongolian, and the custom of Mongolians was to make

166 TUNA

large presents to the monasteries. They asked me, there-
fore, not to be so suspicious.

I said it was difficult not to be suspicious when they
persistently kept us at such a distance. I then addressed
them in regard to religion, and asked them if they had ever
heard that we interfered with the religions of the people
of India. They admitted that we did not interfere, but
they maintained, nevertheless, that it was to preserve their
religion that they adhered to their determination to keep
us out.

As the Buddhist religion nowhere preaches this
seclusion, it was evident that what the monks wished
to preserve was not their religion, but their priestly
influence. This was the crux of the whole situation.
And it entirely bore out what Mr. Nolan, the Com-
missioner of Darjiling, had observed many years before* —
that it was " the breaking of the beggars' bowl " that was
in question, the loss of these presents from Mongolians and
others.

So far the conversation, in spite of occasional bursts
from the monks, had been maintained with perfect good-
humour ; but when I made a sign of moving, and said that
I must be returning to Tuna, the monks, looking as black
as devils, shouted out : " No, you won't ; you'll stop here."
One of the Generals said, quite politely, that we had
broken the rule of the road in coming into their country,
and we were nothing but thieves and brigands in occupy-
ing Phari Fort. The monks, using forms of speech which
Captain O'Connor told me were only used in addressing
inferiors, loudly clamoured for us to name a date when we
would retire from Tuna before they would let me leave
the room. The atmosphere became electric. The faces
of all were set. One of the Generals left the room ;
trumpets outside were sounded, and attendants closed
round behind us.

A real crisis was on us, when any false step might
be fatal. I told Captain O'Connor, though there was really
no necessity to give such a warning to anyone so im-
perturbable, to keep his voice studiously calm, and to

♦ See p. 63.

CRITICAL SITUATION 167

smile as much as he possibly could, and I then said that I
had to obey the orders of my Government, just as much as
they had to obey the orders of theirs ; that I would ask
them to report to their Government what I had said, and
I would report to my Government what they had told
me. That was all that could be done at present ; but if
the Viceroy, in reply to my reports, ordered me back tc
India I should personally be only too thankful, as theirs
was a cold, barren, and inhospitable country, and I had a
wife and child at Darjiling, whom I was anxious to see
again as soon as I could.

This eased matters a little. But the monks continued
to clamour for me to name a date for withdrawal, and the
situation was only relieved when a General suggested that
a messenger should return with me to Tuna to receive
there the answer from the Viceroy. The other Generals
eagerly accepted the suggestion, and the tension was at
once removed. Their faces became smiling again, and they
conducted me to the outer door with the same geniality
and politeness with which they had received us, though
the monks remained seated and as surly and evil-looking
as men well could look.

We preserved our equanimity of demeanour and the
smiles on our faces till we had mounted our ponies and
were well outside the camp, and then we galloped off as
hard as we could, lest the monks should get the upper
hand again and send men after us. It had been a close
shave, but it was worth it.

I had sized up the situation, and felt now I knew how
I stood. I knew from that moment that nowhere else
than in Lhasa, and not until the monkish power had been
broken, should we ever make a settlement. But it was
still treason to mention the word " Lhasa " in any com-
munication to Government, and I had to keep these con-
clusions to myself for many months yet, for fear I might
frighten people in England who had not yet got accus-
tomed to the idea of our going even as far as Gyantse.

While I perceived that the monks were implacably
hostile, that they had the preponderating influence in the
State, and were entirely convinced of their power to

168 TUNA

dictate to us, I perceived also that the lay officials were
much less unfriendly, less ignorant of our strength, and
more amenable to reason, and that the ordinary people
and soldiers, though perhaps liable to be worked on by the
monks, had no innate bad feeling against us. Hereon I
based my hopes for the security of the eventual settlement.

A few days later the Lhasa General, known as -the
Lhi-ding Depon, in company with a high Shigatse official
and the General who had met me at Yatung, paid me a
visit at Tuna. The Lhasa General announced that, like
me, he was most anxious to come to a friendly settlement,
and therefore he would ask me to withdraw to Yatung,
where discussions could then take place in the most
amicable manner. I told him I did not wish to say any-
thing disagreeable to himself personally, as he had always
been polite to me, but I would ask him to let his Govern-
ment know that the time was past for talk of this kind,
and to warn them that they must take a more serious
view of the situation ; they must realize that the British
Government were exceedingly angry at the treatment
that I, their representative, had received, and were in no
mood to be trifled with. Far from going back, or even
staying here, we were going to advance still farther into
Tibet, and I expected to be met both by the Amban and
by a Tibetan official of the highest rank, who would have
sufficient authority to negotiate a proper treaty with me
in the place of the one concluded by the Amban, which
the Tibetans repudiated. I had waited for six months for
a proper representative to be sent to meet me, but even
now none had arrived.

I heard from him later that he had communicated to
the Lhasa monks the substance of this interview, but they
had stated they could make no report of my views to the
Lhasa Government until we had retired to Yatung.

Two Captains were sent to me on February 7 with a
message that I must retire to Yatung, and 1 sent the
usual reply verbally by them and in writing by the hands
of my Tibetan Munshi. This latter commimication was
returned, with the customary intimation that letters were
not received.

TRIALS FROM COLD 169

Two more messengers arrived on the 10th, asking me
to fix a date for withdrawal, and threatening trouble if I
remained. These threats and rumours of attacks, and
reports of the monks having set apart five days to curse
us solemnly, continued for the following weeks, and caused
us to keep well on the lookout : double sentries were
posted at night, and, on account of the cold, relieved every
hour. It was wearisome and anxious work, but we felt
quite confident of ourselves, and in the end no attack was
made.

General Macdonald and the main body were also
having a perhaps equally trying time. Communications
had to be kept up across two high passes right through
the winter ; a flying column had to be ready to proceed at
any moment to our assistance at Tuna ; and supplies and
transport had to be collected for our advance as soon as
possible to Gyantse. On the Tang-la there was never any
great depth of snow, and what snow fell soon cleared away ;
but there were terrible winds, and the convoys sometimes
crossed in blinding, icy blizzards. In February General
Macdonald himself came over with one of these convoys
for a short inspection. On the passes into Sikkim there
was much more snow, and they were occasionally closed
after an unusually heavy storm. Still, fairly continuously
the transport corps plied across them, and supplies accumu-
lated in Chumbi.

All this time we had been in considerable anxiety in
regard to Bhutan. During our advance through Chumbi
we had Bhutan on our right flank. The Bhutanese were
of the same religion as the Tibetans, and closely connected
with them. It was possible, therefore, that they might
take the Tibetan side, and it was of the highest importance
that we should secure at least their neutrality. Mr.
Marindin, the Commissioner of Darjiling, had written to
ask them to send someone to discuss matters with him ;
but the answer, which was received as we were passing
through Chumbi, was not wholly satisfactory, so I sent
another message, with the result that an official of some
standing, the Trimpuk Jongpen, arrived at Phari, and was
brought on by Mr. Walsh to see me at Tuna.

170 TUNA

He was a rough, jovial person, and when I said that I
merely wished to know on which side the Bhutanese
intended to place themselves, that, as they were of the
same religion and race as the Tibetans, we could quite
understand their siding with them, but only wished to
know plainly, so that we could make our arrangements
accordingly, he replied most emphatically that the Bhu-
tanese would be on our side. I said that these were mere
words, and he said ftiat he would put them on paper and
seal it, which he did. I said that that was, after all, only
a piece of paper. Would he show his friendship by
deeds ? Would he help us with supplies ? And he
readily promised, and gave us permission, on payment, to
make a road up the Amo-chu. Like the Nepalese on our
left flank, these Bhutanese on our right were most whole-
souled in their support, and it greatly strengthened my
position subsequently to be able to advance into Tibet
arm-in-arm with Nepal and Bhutan.

This Trimpuk Jongpen at once became a useful ally.
I explained to him the whole of our case with the Tibetans,
pretty much as I had explained it to the Tibetans in my
speech at Khamba Jong. He asked me whether he might
see the Lhasa delegates, explain our views to them, and
try and induce them to come to a settlement, for he said
his Government were most anxious that a peaceful settle-
ment should be arrived at. I had no hope that he would
be able to effisct anything, but I thought that the fact of
his attempting to mediate might be the means of bringing
the Bhutanese Government into closer relation with us.
I therefore consented to his seeing the Lhasa delegates,
and asked when he proposed to go to Guru. His answer
surprised me. He said he found there was no one there
of sufficient rank for him to visit them, so he would send
over and invite them to come and see him. The Lhasa
General, another General, and one of the Lama 1-epre-
sentatives did come and see him, and this incident
furnished sufficient proof of what we had all along con-
tended— that the men whom the Lhasa Government had
sent to negotiate with me were of an altogether too insig-
nificant position for me to meet in serious negotiation.

INTERVIEW WITH BHUTANESE ENVOY 171

After the first interview the Bhutan Envoy came to
me to report the result. He said he had repeated to them
what I told him, and the Lhasa delegates had replied that
Yatung was the place appointed for discussions, and we
ought to have discussed matters there ; but, instead of
that, we came with an armed force to Khamba Jong, and
then had come into Chumbi, so they did not believe that
we honestly intended to make a peaceful settlement, but
they asked what were the terms of the settlement we
wished to make.

I told the Envoy that I would vdlhngly go back to
Yatung if I thought that by doing so there was the
slightest prospect of making a durable settlement with
the Tibetans. But, as a matter of fact, we had tried for
years to make a settlement at Yatung. Our political
officers, Mr. White and Captain Le Mesurier, had met
Tibetan officials, and also the Amban, there, but without
result. As to what terms we would ask in the settlement,
that was, of course, a matter which I should have to discuss
with the high official possessed of full powers to negotiate,
as soon as one was appointed ; but I might say, in general
terms, that there were three main points we should want
to settle with the Tibetans : Firstly, the boundary with
Sikkim ; secondly, the regulation of trade and the selec-
tion of a more suitable trade-mart than Yatung ; and
thirdly, the means of communication between ourselves
and the Tibetans. The Envoy then returned to the
Lhasa delegates, who had been awaiting my reply. On
the following day they had a full meeting at Guru to
consider it, and the Lhasa General paid another visit to
the Bhutan Envoy. The Tibetans said that, as we were
in the wrong, having advanced into Tibet, we should
retire to Yatung, and then negotiations could take place ;
but as regards our wish to regulate communications with
them, they could only say that no communications would
ever be allowed, as it was against the rule of the country.

These negotiations had led to nothing ; but one more
stone had been turned in our attempt to effect a settle-
ment peacefully, and incidentally the attempt had been
instrumental in putting us on good terms with the Bhu-

172 TUNA

tanese. I wrote at the time that I was hopeful that
from this beginning we might establish more intimate
relations with Bhutan, for the Envoy was the first sensible
man I had met on that frontier, and there might be
advantage in closer intimacy between us. Everything
turned out well afterwards. Mr. White twice visited the
country and estabhshed the best possible relations with
the people, and Bhutan is now definitely under our
protection.

This was the last attempt to negotiate before we
advanced. The old Resident at Lhasa spoke much of
coming to meet me, but never came. The new Resident,
who had been appointed specially for this work in De-
cember, 1902, did not reach Lhasa till February the 11th,
1904, and neither he nor any proper Tibetan negotiator
appeared. And we remained patiently at Tuna through
all February and March.

The military officers had a poor time, for they had to
be so rigorously on the watch, and Colonel Hogge had
such a bout of sleeplessness from the effect of the high
altitudes that he had to go for a fortnight's change to
Chumbi, which is only 9,000 feet above sea-level, to give
himself the chance of sleeping again, after which he was
all right. We had, too, twelve cases of pneumonia among
the sepoys, eleven of which, from, the altitude, proved
fatal. And one poor young fellow in the postal depart-
ment, Mr. Lewis, had to have both his feet amputated
for frost-bite, and eventually died of the effects.

But we had much to employ us, too. Captain Ryder
would go off surveying ; Mr. Hayden would make
geologizing expeditions ; Captain Walton would collect
every living animal of any size and description he could
detect ; Captain O'Connor would always be surrounded
with Tibetans, of every degree of dirt ; and I would
spend my days on the mountain-sides, sheltered as much
as I could be from the wind, getting as much as I could
of the bright warm sunshine of these southern latitudes,
and on the whole thoroughly enjoying myself, for the
natural scenery was an unfailing pleasure.

Generally the days were clear and bright, but almost

1.^1

, ;

*' •■' .

,;*1

*' , '■

■ ^ \'

e-t
P3

.' < . 1

«<

>•;.

.. ^ 1'

,1 ■■■>»(

TERRIFIC BLIZZARDS 173

invariably at ten or eleven a terrific wind would arise, and
blow with fury for the rest of the day. And sometimes
mighty masses of cloud would come sweeping up from
the direction of India. Snow would fall, and then for two
or three days together we would be the sport of a terrific
blizzard. The mountains would be hidden, and nothing
would be visible but dull masses of fiercely-driven snow,
as fine and dry as dust, and penetrating everywhere. For
days together the thermometer would not rise above 15°
even in the middle of the day. Our camp would be the
very picture of desolation. It seemed impossible that the
poor sentries at night would ever be able to stand against
the howling storm and the penetrating snow, or that our
soldiers would ever be able to resist an attack from the
Tibetans in such terrific circumstances.

By the middle of March General Macdonald's
arrangements were nearing completion, and I wrote to the
new Resident, who had recently announced his arrival,
saying that I was about to move to Gyantse to commence
negotiations, that I hoped to meet him there, and trusted
he would secure the attendance of fully-empowered
Tibetan representatives of suitable rank. I asked him to
warn the Tibetans that the consequences of resistance to
the passage of my Mission would be very serious.

On March 24 General Macdonald left Chumbi, and
arrived at Tuna on the 28th, with two 10-pounder guns, one
7-pounder, four companies 32nd Pioneers, three and a half
companies 8th Gurkhas, field-hospital, and engineer park.

Colonel Hogge's patrols had been watching the
Tibetans carefully lately. Reinforcements had arrived
since I visited Guru, and the Tibetans had built a wall
across the road about six miles from Tuna. There was
also a considerable force on the other side of the Bam-tso
(lake).

On March 31, after we had given fair warning to the
Tibetans, the advance was made. Light snow lay on the
ground. The cold was even now intense. News that the
Tibetans weris still in position had reached us, and the
crucial moment which was to decide upon peace or war
was now approaching.

174 TUNA

We moved along as rapidly as is possible at those high
altitudes and encumbered with heavy clothing. A short
way out we were met by a messenger from the Tibetan
General, urging us to go back to India. I told the
messenger to gallop back at once and tell the Lhasa
General that we were on our way to Gyantse, and were
going as far as Guru, ten miles distant, that day. I said
that we did not want to fight, and would not unless we
were opposed, but that the road must be left clear for us,
and the Tibetans must withdraw from their positions
across it. Farther on, as we advanced across an almost
level gravelly plain, we came in sight of the Tibetan
position in a series of sangars on a ridge. At 1,000 yards'
distance we halted, and awaited the arrival of the Tibetans
for our last palaver. They rode up briskly with a little
cavalcade, and we all dismounted, set out rugs and coats
on the ground, and sat down for the final discussion. I
reiterated the same old statement — that we had no wish or
intention of fighting if we were not opposed, but that we
must advance to Gyantse. If they did not obstruct otu*
progress or did not attack us, we would not attack them.
But advance we must, for we had found it impossible to
negotiate anywhere else. They replied with the request —
or, indeed, almost order — that we must go back to Yatung,
and they would negotiate there. They said these were
their instructions from Lhasa. They also did not wish to
fight, but they had orders to send us back to Yatung.

There was no possible reasoning with such people.
They had such overweening confidence in their Lama's
powers. How could anyone dare to resist the orders of
the Great Lama ? Surely lightning would descend from
heaven or the earth open up and destroy anyone who had
such temerity ! I pointed to our troops, now ready
deployed for action. I said that we had tried for fourteen
years inside our frontier to settle matters. I urged that
for eight months now I had patiently tried to negotiate,
but no one with authority came to see me, my letters
were returned, and even messages were refused. I had
therefore received the commands of the Errlperor to
advance to Gyantse, in the hope that perhaps there re-

ADVANCE TO GURU 175

sponsible negotiators would meet us. Anyhow, the time
for further parleying here was gone. The moment for
advance had arrived. I would give them a quarter of an
hour after their return to their lines within which to make
up their minds. After that interval General Macdonald
would advance, and if the Tibetans had not already left
their positions blocking our line of advance, he would
expel them by force.

All this was interpreted to them by Captain O'Connor
with his inimitable suavity and composure. But we might
just as well have spoken to a stone wall. Not the very
slightest effect was produced. After all, our numbers were
not very overwhelming. The Tibetans had charms against
our bullets, and the supernatural powers of the Great
Lama in the background. Whether they had any lurking
suspicions that perhaps, after all, these might not be
efficacious I know not. But, anyhow, all had to obey the
orders from Lhasa. Those orders were not to let us
proceed farther, so stop us they must, and that was all
they were concerned with. They had formed no plan of
what they should do if we did advance contrary to the
Great Lama's orders. But for that there was no need ;
the Lama would provide. Such were their ideas. It was,
of course, an impossible situation.

The Generals and their following returned to their
camp. The quarter of an hour of grace elapsed. And
now the great moment had arrived. But I wished still
to give them just one last chance, in the hope that at
the eleventh hour, and at the fifty-ninth minute of
the eleventh hour, they might change their minds. I
therefore asked General Macdonald to order his men not
to fire upon the Tibetans until the Tibetans first fired on
them. In making this request I well knew the responsi-
bility I was incurring. We were but a liandful of men —
about 100 Englishmen and 1,200 Indians — in the face of
superior numbers of Tibetans, in the heart of their country,
15,000 feet above the sea, and separated from India by
two high passes ; and the advantage pur troops possessed
from arms of precision and long-ra:nge fire I took from
them.

176 TUNA

It was the last and final effort to carry out our object
without the shedding of blood. The troops responded
with admirable discipline to the call. They steadily ad-
vanced across the plain and up the hillside to the Tibetan
lines, expecting at any moment that from behind the
sangars a destructive volley might be opened upon them
before they could fire a shot. Some of them afterwards,
and very naturally, told me that they hoped they would
never again be put in so awkward a position. But I trust
their discipline will at any rate show to those in England
who so decried this day's action, and spoke about our
" massacring unarmed Tibetans " — that men on the re-
motest confines of the Empire can and do exercise
moderation and restraint in the discharge of their duty,
and do not always act with that wantonness and reckless
cruelty with which they are so often credited at home.

If General Macdonald had had a perfectly free hand,
and had been allowed to think only of military considera-
tions, he would have attacked the Tibetans by surprise in
their camp, without giving them any warning at all ; and
even after I had given the Tibetans warning, if he had still
been free to act on only military lines, he would have
shelled their position with his guns, and with long-range rifle-
fire have broken down the defence before advancing to the
attack. As it was, in order to give them a chance up
to the very last moment, he abdicated both the advantage
of surprise and of long-range fire, and his troops advanced
up the mountain-side on less than even terms to the
fortified position of the Tibetans.

The Tibetans on their side showed great indecision.
They also had apparently received orders not to fire first ;
and the whole affair seemed likely to end in comedy rather
than in the tragedy which actually followed. The Tibetans
first ran into their sangars and then ran out again.
Gradually our troops crept up and round the flanks. They
arrived eventually face to face with the Tibetans, as will
be seen in the accompanying photograph by Lieutenant
Bailey, and things were almost at an impasse till the
Tibetans slowly yielded to the admonitions of our troops,
and allowed themselves to be shouldered out of their

IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION 177

position and be " moved on," as London policemen would
disperse a crowd from Trafalgar Square.

At this point the two Lhasa Majors who had met me
previously in the day rode out again, and told me that
the Tibetans had been ordered not to fire, and begged
me to stop the troops from advancing. I replied that
we must continue the advance, and could not allow
any troops to remain on the road. There was a post
actually on the road, with a wall newly and deliberately
built across it, and it was obvious that if we were ever
to get to Gyantse the Tibetans behind that wall must be
removed. Yet I thought the affair was practically over.
The Tibetans were streaming away from their position
along the ridge, and had even begun to leave their post on
the road. Then a change came. The Lhasa General, or
possibly the monks, recalled the men to their post, and
an officer reported to General Macdonald that, though
surrounded by our troops, they refused to retreat : they
were not fighting, but they would not leave the wall they
had built across the road.

General Macdonald and I had a consultation together,
and agreed that in these circumstances the only thing to
do was to disarm them and let them go. We rode
together to the spot, and found the Tibetans huddled
together like a flock of sheep behind the wall. Our
infentry were in position on the hillside only 20 yards
above them on the one side ; on the other our Maxims
and guns were trained upon them at not 200 yards' dis-
tance. Our mounted infantry were in readiness in the
plain only a quarter of a mile away. Our sepoys were
actually standing up to the wall, with their rifles pointing
over at the Tibetans within a few feet of them. And the
Lhasa General himself with his staff was on our side of
the wall, in among our sepoys.

He had, of course, completely lost his head. Though
in command of some thousands of armed men, and though
I had given him ample warning of our intention to
advance, he was totally unprepared for action when our
advance was made. He had brought his men back into an
absurd position ; his action when he had got them back

178 TUNA

was simply childish. I sent Captain O'Connor to announce
to him that General Macdonald and I had decided that
his men must be disarmed, but he remained sullen and
did nothing ; and when, after a pause, the disarmament
was actually commenced, he threw himself upon a sepoy,
drew a revolver, and shot the sepoy in the jaw.

Not, as I think, with any deliberate intention, but from
sheer inanity, the signal had now been given. Other
Tibetan shots immediately followed. Simultaneously
volleys from our own troops rang out ; the guns and
Maxims commenced to fire. Tibetan swordsmen made a
rush upon any within reach, and the plucky and enter-
prising Edmund Candler, the very able correspondent of
the Daily Mail, received more than a dozen wounds, while
Major Wallace Dunlop, one of the best officers in the
force, was severely handled. For just one single instant
the Tibetans, by a concerted and concentrated rush, might
have broken our thin line, and have carried the Mission
and the military staff. But that instant passed in a flash.
Before a few seconds were over, rifles and guns were dealing
the deadliest destruction on them in their huddled masses.
The Lhasa General himself was killed at the start, and
in a few minutes the whole affair was over. The plain
was strewn with dead Tibetans, and our troops instinc-
tively and without direct orders ceased flring — though, in
fact, they had only fired thirteen rounds per man.

It was a terrible and ghastly business ; but it was not
fair for an English statesman to call it a massacre of
" unarmed men," for photographs testify that the Tibetans
were all armed ; and, looking back now, I do not see how
it could possibly have been avoided. The Tibetans after-
wards at Lhasa told me in all seriousness that I might
have known their General did not mean to fight, for if he
did he would not have been in the front as he was. This,
no doubt, was true, and, left to himself, he would, we
may be sure, have arranged matters with me in a per-
fectly amicable manner, for at Guru in January, and when
he came to see me at Tuna, he had always shown himself
courteous and reasonable ; and his men had no antipathy
towards us. But he had at his side, ruling and over-

THE GURU DISASTER 179

awing him, a fanatical Lama from Lhasa. Ignorant and
arrogant, this priest herded the superstitious peasantry to
destruction. It is only fair to assume that, somewhere in
the depths of his nature, he felt that the people's religion
was in danger, and that he was called upon to preserve it.
But blind fear of the danger which he believed threatened
was so combined with overweening confidence, and there
was such a lack of effort to avert the supposed danger by
reasonable means, as might so easily have been done, that
he simply brought disaster on his country, and, poor man,
paid the penalty of his unreasonableness with his life.
What to me is so sad is that now, when the Lamas have
discovered their errors and are imploring our aid, we can
do so little to befriend them.

After the action, General Macdonald ordered the whole
of the medical staff to attend the wounded Tibetans.
Everything that with our limited means we could do
for them was done. Captains Davies, Walton, Baird,
Franklin and Kelly, devoted themselves to their care. A
rough hospital was made at Tuna. And the Tibetans
showed great gratitude for what we did, though they failed
to understand why we should try to take their lives one day
and try to save them the next. We had been in some
anxiety regarding a second body of Tibetans, 2,000 strong,
on the opposite side of the lake, but these, on hearing of
the disaster near Guru, retreated ; and on April 5 we
resumed our march in the direction of Gyantse, the ther-
mometer, even thus in April, showing 23 degrees of frost
on the morning we started.

I now received a letter, dated March the 27th, from
the Resident, who said he was most artxious to hasten to
meet me, and had seen the Dalai Lama, but " difficulties
arose over transport, which he was unwilUng to grant."
After considering all this, he had come to the conclusion
that Tibetan politics were those of drift ; that Chinese
officials were too engrossed in self-seeking, and hence the
Tibetans shirked action. But a quarrel on his part with
the Dalai Lama would only mar matters, so he would
" go on " and perform his share of the duties allotted to
him, and he had decided to write "a succinct report to

180 TUNA

Peking," and then again ask for transport. He hoped I
would recognize his perplexities. I had excellent reason
for an advance to Gyantse with my escort, he said. But,
" notwithstanding the craft and deceit of the Tibetans and
their violation of principle," he had compelled them
" somewhat to understand the meaning of principle," and
if I suddenly penetrated into their country he feared they
would lapse into their former temper, and thus imperil
the conclusion of trade relations. The Dalai Lama had
told him that if I would retire to Yatung he would select
Tibetan delegates and request him (the Resident) to
proceed there and discuss matters. The Resident added
that " this frontier matter had been hanging fire for over
ten years because it had been perfunctorily drawn up in
the beginning, and because subsequently it was shirked by
the different delegates, who did not strive honestly to
adjust the difficulties." He was ashamed to mention the
question of my retirement to Yatung, but, stiU, he thought
it would be better for me to retire there and " insure the
smooth working of a settlement."

This is all we got after waiting for him for fifteen
months. I replied, informing him of the circumstances of
the Guru fight, and telling him that I was advancing on
Gyantse, which I expected to reach in about a week, and
I hoped that I should then have the pleasure of meeting
him and a high Tibetan official with the power to make a
settlement which would prevent any further useless blood-
shed.

On the way to Gyantse, at the Tsamdang Gorge, the
Tibetans again opposed our progress by building a wall
across the narrow passage. But General Macdonald dis-
lodged them and inflicted heavy loss, and on April 1 1 we
arrived at Gyantse.

We found the valley covered with well-built hamlets
and numerous trees and plenty of cultivation. Most of
the inhabitants had fled, but the jong, or fort, which
stands on an eminence in the middle of the valley, was
still partially occupied. The Commandant was informed
that General Macdonald proposed to occupy the jong on
the following morning, and would expect to find it vacated

ARRIVAL AT GYANTSE 181

by 9 a.m. On the morning of the 12th we found that
the troops had been withdrawn, and the jong was occupied
without opposition.

So ended another phase of the enterprise, and on
April 14 the Viceroy telegraphed, offering to myself,
Gene'ral Macdonald, and to all the officers and men of the
Mission escort, both civil and military, his warmest con-
gratulations upon the success of the first part of our
undertaking, and his grateful recognition of the cheerful-
ness, self-restraint, and endurance exhibited by all ranks
in circumstances unexampled in warfare, and calling for
no ordinary patience and fortitude.

CHAPTER XIII

GYANTSE

Gyantse, which had been our goal for so many months,
and with which we were to be but too well acquainted
before we had finished, has two principal features — the
jong and the monastery, called Palkhor Choide. The
jong is a really imposing structure built of strong, solid
masonry, and rising in tiers of walls up a rocky eminence
springing abruptly out of the plain to a height of 400 or
500 feet. It has a most commanding and dominant look.
And the monastery immediately adjoining it at a part of
the base of the hill is also impressive from the height and
solidity of the walls with which it is surrounded, and by
the massiveness of the buildings within the walls.*

The town itself was not of much importance, nor so
promising as a trading-mart as I had hoped. It lay at
the foot of the jong, and the bazaar did not possess shops
of any size. The real population, indeed, seemed to be
scattered in the numerous hamlets dotted all over the
valley, through which ran a considerable river.

The demeanour of the inhabitants was respectful.
They brought in supplies for sale, and in a few days a
regular bazaar was established by the Tibetans immediately
outside our camp, the bartering being carried on, as usual,
mostly by women. The people said they had not the
slightest wish to fight us, and only desired to escape
being commandeered by the Lhasa authorities. The
valley proved to be very fertile, with cultivation all down
it, and supplies were plentiful.

* An excellent description of the jong and monastery will be found
in Chapter VII. of Landon's "Lhasa."

182

QUIET AT GYANTSE 183

Gyantse was indeed a delightful change from Tuna.
It was, in the first place, nearly 2,000 feet lower, so
naturally warmer. In addition, spring was coming on.
Leaf-buds were beginning to sprout on the wiUows. The
little irises in plenty were appearing. And birds of several
rare varieties came to rejoice Captain Walton's heart and
fill his collection.

Captain O'Connor, Captain Ryder, and Mr. Hayden
rode down the Shigatse road to Dongtse and visited its
monastery, besides other houses and estates of note in
the valley. They found the people everywhere friendly
and very different from what they would have been on
the north-west frontier, for instance, under similar circum-
stances. The peasants were ploughing and sowing their
fields, and the whole country appeared perfectly contented
and quiet.

From the rear, too, came encouraging tidings. I
received a letter from the Dharm Raja, of Bhutan, saying
that when he heard that his friends had won a victory he
was greatly rejoiced, for nowadays England and Bhutan
had established a firm friendship, and he hoped that there
would always be firm faith and friendship between the
English and Bhutanese.

Yet, with all this ease and quiet, there was not the
slightest real sign of the business of negotiation being
commenced. I had naturally expected that, when the
Resident had been specially deputed by the Chinese
Government for these negotiations sixteen months pre-
viously, I should have found him at Gyantse, or at any
rate on his way there, and that, after the Chinese Govern-
ment had been urging the Tibetans since the previous
summer to send a properly empowered delegate, the
Resident would have been accompanied by a Tibetan
Commissioner capable of negotiating with me. But on
April 22 I received a despatch from the Resident, stating,
indeed, his intention of arriving at Gyantse before May 12,
but giving no news that a proper Tibetan Commissioner had
been appointed. He stated that the Lhasa General had
been the aggressor in the fight at Guru, that the fault was
on the side of the Tibetans, who had disregarded his

184 GYANTSE

advice, and he recognized our compassion in having mag-
nanimously released the foolish and ignorant prisoners,
cared for the wounded, and shown humane motives of
sternness and mercy. He added that the Dalai Lama
was now aroused to a sense of our power. But still there
was no mention that the transport which the Resident
was "insisting on" hacj been provided, and the appoint-
ment of a proper Tibetan Commissioner was still not
made. In fact, the Councillors had >all been imprisoned
by the Dalai Lama, and there were " but few capable
Tibetan officials to settle the frontier and other important
questions," which could not, added the Resident, " be
disposed of in a peremptory manner." A few days' delay
would not, therefore, he considered, be out of place.

Three days later he wrote that in this matter of
proceeding to meet me he had exhausted himself in talking
with the Tibetans, and trusted I would perceive something
of the difficult nature of the circumstances. And on
April 29 he wrote that he had received a reply from the
Dalai Lama about some representations I had made
against monks taking part in the fighting, but in this reply
not a word was mentioned about his transport or any other
matters.

In these circumstances I telegraphed to Government
on April 22 that the best way to meet these dilatory
tactics was, at the earliest moment by which military pre-
parations could be completed, to move the Mission straight
to Lhasa, and carry on the negotiations at the capital,
instead of halfway. This, I said, would be the most
effective and only permanent way of clinching matters,
besides being the cheapest and quickest. Our prestige, I
urged, was then at its height, Nepal and Bhutan were
with us, the people were not against us, the Tibetan
soldiers did not care to fight, the Lamas were stunned.
By a decisive move then a permanent settlement could
be procured. I added that, in recommending this pro-
posal at so early a stage for the consideration of Govern-
ment, my object was that the favourable season might be
utilized to the full, an(J that we might not allow the
psychological moment to pass without taking advantage

TIBETANS AGAIN ASSEMBLE 185

of it. Meanwhile, I said, I would receive the Amban,
and would ascertain what power to effect a settlement he
and the Tibetan representative really possessed.

In making this recommendation I was counting on a
collapse of the Lhasa authorities, which seemed to be
indicated by the Resident's statement, by the statement
of a Chinese official from Lhasa that Tibetan officers were
begging the Resident to intercede, by the fact that the
common people even, it was said, at Lhasa did not resent
our presence, that there were few troops between Gyantse
and Lhasa, and that the Lhasa authorities had been able
to produce only 5,000 men to oppose our advance as far as
Gyantse.

Whether this collapse would have taken place if we
had then set about advancing to Lhasa it is impossible to
say. Certainly it did not take place. But this may have
been due to the retirement of General Macdonald with
the greater part of the force which now took place, in
accordance with the plan prearranged between us of
leaving the Mission with a good strong escort to conduct
negotiations while the bulk of the force remained in sup-
port in Chumbi, where supplies were more readily avail-^
able. This, from a supply point of view, was desirable,
and it was in accordance with the policy of Government,
but it may have had the effect of re-arousing the Tibetans.

Anyhow, rumours soon began to reach me that
Tibetan forces were collecting again. On the 24th came
news that they were building walls across the road at the
Karo-la (pass) on the way to Lhasa, that camps holding
700 or 800 Tibetans had been established there, that the
Dalai Lama was endeavouring to gain time to enlist
Tibetans from far and wide to resist a British advance to
Lhasa, and that the local soldiers round Gyantse were,
under his orders, quietly leaving and proceeding towards
Lhasa.

To ascertain the truth of these rumours. Colonel
Brander, who was now in command of the Mission escort
of 500 men, two guns and two Maxims, and some mounted
infantry, on April 28 sent out a reconnaissance party of
one company of mounted infantry to the Karo-la ; and on

186 GYANTSE

May 1 we received news from Captain Hodgson, com-
manding the party, that he had advanced with his mounted
infantry across the pass, and three miles beyond had found
the Tibetans in occupation of a wall, some 600 yards long,
built across the valley. The Tibetans, estimated at from
1,000 to 1,500 in number, opened a heavy fire on the
mounted infantry at about 300 yards' distance. Our men
then retired steadily, firing only a few shots and returned
towards Gyantse.

Besides the definite information thus acquired, reports
also reached me that other troops were assembling in the
Rong Valley, ready to support those on the Lhasa road,
and that there was a large gathering, estimated at 4,000,
assembled at Shigatse itself, a portion of which was to
move up to Dongtse, twelve miles from Gyantse.

Colonel Brander now came to me and asked for leave
to go out and attack the Tibetans before these gatherings
could come to a head. He had much frontier experience,
and I also had some, and we both of us knew that when
such gatherings take place it is a pretty sound general
principle to take the initiative, and hit hard at them
before they have time to accumulate overwhelming
strength. It was a bold move, he contemplated, for the
Karo-la (pass) was forty-five miles distant, and was over
16,000 feet high ; and while he was away with two- thirds
of the escort, the Mission, with only one-third of its full
escort, might be itself attacked. I said that if he, on his
side, did not mind taking this risk, I, on iny side, did not
mind it, arid, as far as my military opinion was worth
anything, was quite in favour of the operation.

But it was on political grounds that I had to give the
decision, and on those grounds I had no objection. I had
come to negotiate, but there was no symptom of nego-
tiators appearing. On the other hand, the Tibetans were
still further massing their troops ; their position at the
Karo-la and between there and Kangma was threatening
our line of communication ; and they had fired on our
reconnoitring party. For these reasons I informed
Government by telegram on May 2 that I had raised no
objection on political grounds to Colonel Brander's pro-

ATTACK ON THE MISSION 187

posal to go out and attack the Tibetans on the pass before
they could attack our line of communication. I had stated,
verbally and in writing, to the Chinese and to the Tibetans
that we came to Gyantse to negotiate. Since our arrival
we had evacuated the jong, and General Macdonald, with
the greater part of the force, had returned to Chumbi.
There could be no question, then, that we meant to
negotiate and not to fight. Yet they still neither sent a
negotiator, nor said they had any intention to negotiate ;
instead they massed troops to attack us ; and I felt at
perfect liberty to let the commander of the Mission escort
take whatever means he liked to secure its safety.

On the same day, in view of the rumours of the hostile
attitude of the Tibetans towards Shigatse and of their
reinforcement by local levies, I placed the Gyantse Jong-
pen in custody in the British camp.

Colonel Brander set out on May 3, with three com-
panies of the 32nd Pioneers, one company 8th Gurkhas,
two 7-pounder guns and two Maxims, accompanied by
Mr. Wilton and Captain O'Connor, to assist him in case
Chinese or Tibetan officials were met with.

On May 4 Captain Walton's patients warned him that
some kind of attack on us at Gyantse was likely, and
Major Murray, 8th Gurkhas, who was in command during
Colonel Brander 's absence, sent out a mounted patrolsome
miles down the Shigatse road ; but they returned, report-
ing everything quiet.

At dawn the next morning the storm burst. I was
suddenly awaked by shots and loud booing close by my
tent. I dashed out, and there were Tibetans firing through
our own loopholes only a few yards off. From the Shigatse
direction a force of 800 men had marched all night, and
many, under cover of the darkness, had crept up under
the walls of our post. Then at dawn these suddenly
jumped up, and, supported by the remainder, made an
attempt to rush our post, a substantial house with a
garden at one side, the wall of which we had loopholed.
In the first critical moment they almost succeeded. They
as nearly as possible forced an entrance, but were stoutly
held at bay by two gallant little Gurkha sentries till our

188 GYANTSE

men turned out. Then, as at Guru, once the single
favourable moment had flashed by, nothing but disaster
lay before them. The attack began at about 4.30, and
did not cease till nearly 6.30, but in that time they had
left about 250 dead and wounded round our post.

Personally, 1 did not deserve to get through the
attack unscathed, for directly I was out of my tent I
made straight for the Mission rendezvous. I was in my
pyjamas, and only half awake, and the first thought that
struck me was to go to the rendezvous, agreed upon before-
hand, in what we called the citadel. But I ought, as I
did on other occasions — and as I think always should be
done in cases of any sudden attack — to have made straight
for the wall with whatever weapon came to hand, and
joined in repelling the attack during the few crucial
moments.

Major Murray, as soon as he had repelled the attack,
pursued the enemy for about two miles down the Shigatse
road. But it now became evident that this attacking
party was not the only force of Tibetans in the neighbour-
hood, and that another of similar strength had occupied
the jong, for these latter began firing into our post, and
we gradually came to realize that we were now besieged.

It turned out from information received from prisoners
that these troops had been collected by a General recently
appointed by the Lhasa Government, and that it was
accompanied by a representative of the great Gaden
monastery at Lhasa, by two clerks of the Dalai Lama,
and by other Lhasa officials. It was, therefore, no mere
local rising, but an attack deliberately planned by the
Central Tibetan Government.

For a few days, till Colonel Brander returned, we were
in a critical position, and we were also anxious about
Colonel Brander himself. The worst that, in making our
calculations at Darjiling in November, we had deemed
likely to happen had happened, and we were now at the
straining-point. Major Murray, assisted especially by
Captain Ryder with his engineering experience, strength-
ened the post as far as possible during the day, and at
night we looked out watchfully for a further attack. For

BRANDER'S FIGHT AT KARO-LA 189

it was at night, when our long-range rifles lost their
special advantage, that the Tibetans would have their
best chance. We only had 170 men, and the vastly
superior numbers which the Tibetans were now collect-
ing ought to have had a fair chance of overwhelming us
if they had pressed home a well-planned night attack.
They fired a good deal during this and the following
nights, but we kept a good watch, and we heard after-
wards that the Lamas tried to organize a second attack
on us, but the men refused to turn out.

It was an intense relief to me to hear on the 7th that
Colonel Brander had been successful in clearing the gather-
ing at the Karo-la, which consisted of 2,500 men, armed
with numerous Lhasa-made and foreign rifles, and headed
by many influential Lamas and officials from Lhasa. In
a short note to me he told me of the anxious moments he
had passed when, on the early morning before he made his
attack, he received a letter from me saying that the
Mission had been attacked at Gyantse. The Tibetans
were in a very strong position behind a loopholed wall of
great solidity, and 800 yards long, which they had built
right across the pass ; and to attack such a position at a
height of over 16,000 feet above sea-level, surrounded with
glaciers, with only a sixth of the numbers opposed to him,
and with his communications not over safe behind, Colonel
Brander had in truth to set his teeth and steel his
nerves. His frontal attack failed. Poor Bethune, a
typically steady, reliable and lion-hearted officer was killed.
The guns proved absolutely inefffective. Ammunition was
none too plentiful. And Colonel Brander said in his letter
to me that he was on the point of despairing when, just
at the critical moment, the turning movement of the
Gurkhas, under Major Row, who had slowly scrambled
up to a height of 18,000 feet, proved successful. Panic
took the Tibetans. They first began dribbling away from
the wall, then poured away in torrents. Colonel Brander
hurled his mounted infantry at them, and Captain Ottley
pursued them halfway to Lhasa.

It was a plucky and daring little action, and unique of
its kind in the annals of any nation ; for never before had

190 GYANTSE

fighting taken place at altitudes well over the summit of
Mont Blanc. I was indeed relieved to hear of its brilliant
success, and late at night on the 7th — that is, the very day
after the fight — to welcome back Captain O'Connor, Mr.
Perceval Landon, and the indefatigable Captain Ottley,
with his dashing mounted infantry, already the terror of
the Tibetans. They had made a bold dash back ahead of
Colonel Brander, and on the very next morning Captain
Ottley was to show the Tibetans who were investing us
the difference which his presence made.

A party of Tibetan horsemen were seen from our post
sauntering unsuspectingly along the valley, out of reach
of our rifles, but not out of reach of our mounted infantry,
twenty of whom, under Captain Ottley, now dashed out
of our post in pursuit. The Tibetans galloped up a side
valley ; Captain Ottley galloped after them ; and now we
saw a great body of Tibetan horsemen issue from the jong
to cut him off. I held my breath in suspense, fearing he
would not see the party behind in his eager pursuit of
the party in front. But Captain Ottley was not to be
so easily caught. He suddenly wheeled on to some rising
ground, dismounted his men as quick as lightning, and
was blazing away at both parties before they could realize
what had happened. In a moment several Tibetans
dropped, and the remainder scuttled away as fast as they
could.

All this put fresh spirit into our men, for we had had
three days and nights of considerable strain ; and on the
day following Colonel Brander himself with his column
returned safely to camp, and arrangements were at once
made to harry the garrison of the jong with rifle and
Maxim fire.

We now heard full details of the Karo-la fight. It
appears that the Tibetans engaged were mostly drawn
from the districts of South-Eastern Tibet. They were
commanded by a layman and a monk official, and had
been organized by a monk State Councillor and another
high ecclesiastical official who had been stationed for some
time at Nagartse. Representatives of the three great
Lhasa monasteries were at the fight, and each monk had

DEATH OF BETHUNE 191

bqpn provided by the Lhasa Government with a matchlock
and a knife before starting to join the army.

On the morning of the 1 0th we buried the remains of
poor Bethune, and it was my melancholy duty to read the
Burial Service over one whom I had known since the
Relief of Chitral, whose genial, manly nature attached him
to every one of us, and for whose soldierly qualities all had
the highest admiration. He was a grand type of British
officer, strict and thorough in his duties, yet beloved by
his men, and his loss was severely felt in the days that
were upon us.

Colonel Brander now reconnoitred the jong to see if
it was possible to capture it. He came to the conclusion
that an attack was too much to undertake. Our two
7-pounder guns were useless, though they had been
brought up specially for this purpose, and our force was
too small to carry the place by assault. It will naturally
be asked why, when the jong was evacuated on our first
arrival, we were not now occupying it instead of a house
in the plain. General Macdonald had several excellent
reasons for not establishing the Mission with escort in the
jong. It was too far from a water-supply ; and it was too
big to hold. The post he chose was compact and on the
river. Here he placed us, with ample supplies to last us
till relief could arrive if we were attacked. As I have
said, the worst that could happen did happen, and we held
out till reinforcements came.

But Colonel Brander, though he could not attack the
jong, did not allow himself to be simply invested in his
post. He constantly sallied out to clear villages, and
demolish any within the vicinity of our post ; he main-
tained a mounted dak service to the rear, and in every
way endeavoured to keep as much in the ascendant as
was possible in the circumstances.

An important stage had now been reached. The
Government of India on May 14 telegraphed to me that
His Majesty's Government agreed with them that recent
events made it inevitable that the Mission should advance
to Lhasa, unless the Tibetans consented to open negotia-
tions at Gyantse. I was, therefore, to give notice to the

192 GYANTSE

Amban that we should insist on negotiating at Lhasa
itself if no competent negotiator appeared in conjunction
with him at Gyantse within a month.

This was satisfactory to a certain degree, but 1 was
disappointed to have to be still further talking about
negotiations when we had been wantonly attacked, when
we were now actually invested, and when the Lamas
were gathering yet more forces around us. Any mention
of negotiating in such circumstances would only lead them
to believe we feared them, and it was with much re-
luctance that 1 eventually gave this message. But the
Government had to contend with many difficulties. They
were in the face of a strong opposition in the House of
Commons. There was no enthusiasm for the enterprise in
the country. We had only recently emerged from the
South African War. The Russo-Japanese War was
causing anxiety. And we had not yet concluded the
agreement and formed the Entente Cordiale with France.

General Macdonald was meanwhile making every
preparation in Chumbi for supporting the Mission escort
and eventually advancing to Lhasa ; and he had many
difficulties of his own to contend with, through an out-
break of cholera, and through the heavy rains causing
many breaches in the road in Sikkim. Supplies, munitions,
and transport, had to be laboriously coUected, and progress
was necessarily slow. But on May 24 strong reinforce-
ments reached Gyantse, and were a most welcome addition
to our strength, enabling Colonel Brander to assume a
more active attitude. They consisted of two 10-pounder
guns of the British mountain battery, under Lieutenant
Easton, a company of native sappers and miners, 50 Sikhs,
and 20 mounted infantry.

Our little garrison was strengthened, too, by the
arrival of Captain Sheppard, Royal Engineers, who, of all
the officers I saw during the Mission, struck me as being
the most likely to rise to the very highest position in the
service. His energy, his never-failing cheerfulness, his
daring, and his general ability, were altogether exceptional.
He was the champion racquet-player in the army, and
he was already known on north-western frontier cam-

SHEPPARD AND OTTLEY 193

paigns for his bravery. Here he added daily to his
reputation, and he and Captain Ottley were the two
whom I, as an onlooker — seeing a good deal, if not always
most, of the game — singled out to myself as haviag.in them
the surest signs of military genius. In a military career
so much depends on chance that these two may very
possibly sink down to the usual humdrum respectable
commander or staff officer. But I will stake my reputa-
tion as a prophet that, if the chance ever does come to
either of them before routine and examinations have
quenched their burning vitality, they will make a mark
like Lord Roberts or like the daring Hodson of Hodson's
Horse.

Here I must in a brief parenthesis criticize some re-
marks I heard Mr. Roosevelt, for whom otherwise I have
the greatest admiration, make to the Cambridge University
Union Society. He said that in public life and in the
army geniuses were not wanted, but that what was required
were average men with the ordinary qualities developed
by the men themselves to an extraordinary degree. In
this I most profoundly disagree. It is not the ordinary
average man, however much he may develop his mediocrity,
that is most wanted. It is the exceptional man. It is the
man with just that touch which we cannot possibly define,
but which we all instinctively recognize as genius. There
is a superabundance of ordinary men, and it must be
admitted that they do ordinary work very much better
than geniuses. But it is the genius alone who, when the
occasion arises, will flash a ray through these masses of
ordinary men, and make them do what they would never
do with any amount of development of their ordinary
plodding qualities. And it is of the highest importance to
find out these exceptional men. But the way to do this
is not by examinations — unless those who are least capable
of passing them are chosen. It is by letting the best
select the best, by letting the proved best select whom
they think promise best.

All this, however, is by way of interlude, and is merely
one of the many reflections I made while I was myself
under enforced inactivity, and had nothing much else to

194 GYANTSE

do but watch the action of those others upon whom the
responsibihty for the time being rested.

With his reinforcements Colonel Brander now took the
offensive in earnest, and on May 26 attacked the strongly-
built village of Palla, which was only 1,100 yards from our
post, and which the Tibetans were holding in strength,
and connecting with the jong by a wall. In the dead of
night, in utter darkness, the attacking party assembled.
All of us who were to remain behind went up to the roof
to watch the result. The column moved noiselessly out
from our post. A long silence followed. Then a few
sharp rifle cracks rang out, and soon from the jong and
from the Palla village there was a continuous crackle, with
sharp spurts of flame hghting the darkness. Soon after a
great explosion was heard, followed by a deadly silence.
What had happened we heard afterwards. Captain
Sheppard, accompanied by Captain O'Connor, had dashed
up to the wall of one of the principal houses in the village,
and after shooting two Tibetans with his revolver, placed
a charge of gun-cotton, lighted a fuse, and dashed back
again to cover. The explosion was the result, and a big
breach had been made. Captain O'Connor had then, with
his cake of gun-cotton, rushed into another house and
successfully fired it. Lieutenant Garstin and Lieutenant
Walker in another place tried to make a similar breach,
but the fuse did not act, and in making a second attempt
the former was killed, while Captain O'Connor also was
severely wounded.

This blowing up of houses crammed full of armed men
is indeed a desperate undertaking, but except by this
method of dehberately rushing up and placing a charge
under manned walls, and firing the charge, there was no
means of getting in, and Sheppard, Garstin, Walker, and
O'Connor deserve all the honour that is due to the bravest
of military actions.

Breaches had been made, but the village had yet to be
stormed, and Major Peterson, with his Sikh Pioneers, as
soon as it was light, gallantly stormed house after house,
while Colonel Brander supported him with the guns on
the hillside a few hundred yards off. The Tibetans

FIGHT AT PALLA 195

fought stubbornly, as they always did in these villages, but
Major Peterson pressed steadily on, and by 1.30 the
viUage was in Colonel Brander's hands.

Our losses were, besides Lieutenant Garstin, Royal
Engineers killed. Captain O'Connor, Lieutenant MitcheU,
32nd Pioneers, Lieutenant Walker, Royal Engineers, and
nine men wounded. It was a heavy casualty list for our
little garrison to sustain, but the capture of the village
was a great shock to the Tibetans, who till then, accord-
ing to a Chinaman whom Mr. Wilton met when accom-
panying one of our sorties, had become very truculent,
and talked of first attacking us and cutting all our
throats, and then murdering all Chinese.

The Palla village was occupied by our troops, and at
1.30 on the morning of May 30 the Tibetans, who had for
long been trying to screw themselves up for an attack
upon us, attacked both this and a Gurkha outpost we had
established. It was a beautiful sight to Avatch, with the
jong keeping up a heavy fire on us, and the houses at the
foot of the jong firing away hard on the village. But the
Tibetans were easily repulsed, for Colonel Brander had
been careful to fortify the place well, and the Tibetans
after this never ventured to take the offensive against
us, and the tide now definitely began to turn.

I therefore now with less reluctance wrote letters to the
Resident and Dalai Lama, saying that we were ready to
negotiate at Gyantse up to June 25, but that unless by
that date the Resident and competent negotiators had
arrived, we would insist upon negotiations being carried
on at Lhasa. The letters, together with a covering letter
to the Tibetan commander in the jong, were sent by the
hands of prisoners. Before undertaking their delivery,
however, the bearers stipulated that they should be
allowed to return to us as prisoners, which was a signifi-
cant commentary on the method of enlistment of the
Tibetan forces opposing us. The next morning the letters
were returned by the Tibetan General, who said that it
was not their custom to receive communications from the
English.

On the afternoon of June 5 I received instructions

196 GYANTSE

from the Government of India to proceed to Chumbi,
to confer with General Macdonald as to future plans.
We had to a certain degree kept open our communications.
Still, there were Tibetans all about, and it was a some-
what unusual, and certainly risky, proceeding for the chief
of the Mission to have to ride 150 miles down the lines
to consult the military commander. However, I was
glad enough of the change from the monotony of our
investment at Gyantse, and at four the next morning,
while it was still dark, I rode out with an escort of forty
mounted infantry, under Major Murray, and accompanied
by that gallant doctor of the 8th Gurkhas, Dr. Franklin.
We gave a wide berth to the Niani monastery, and arrived
safely at Kangma, our first fortified post, forty miles
distant, where Captain Pearson, of the 23rd Pioneers, was
in command with about 100 men.

All was quiet here, and the post had never so far
been attacked, owing probably to the effect of Colonel
Brander's action on the Karo-la, from which a route led
direct to this place. I had risen at 4.30 the next morning
to make an early start, and was just dressed when I heard
that peculiar jackal-like yell which the Tibetans had used
when they made their attacks at Gyantse. I instantly
dashed on to the roof, and there, sure enough, was a mob
of about 300 of them weighing down upon the post, and
before our men were out they were right up to the walls,
hurling stones and firing at me up on the roof, which was
flat, and from which I could not for the moment find a
way down. We all, dressed or undressed, dashed up to
the walls, seizing the first rifles we could find, and firing
away as hard as we could. And here again the Tibetans
just lost their opportunity. As before, in a moment it was
gone, and they suffered terribly for their want of military
acumen. Sixty or seventy were killed, and the rest drew
off" up the mountains.

But this was not the only body of Tibetans about.
While these were making the direct attack, two other
bodies of 400 men each had appeared, all of them Kham
men, the best fighters in Tibet. One party went up the
valley and the other down, to cut off" our retreat on either

TIBETANS ATTACK KANGMA 197

hand. This was a great strategical effort on the part
of the Tibetan commander, but it failed, because as soon
as the attack on our post was repulsed Major Murray
sallied forth, and in turn attacked the other Tibetan
parties, climbing the hillside and sending them helter-
skelter over the mountains.

Then we had some breakfast, and I proceeded on my
way to Chumbi. It was twenty-eight miles to the next
stage, at Kala Tso, and there was considerable risk of
encountering Tibetans on the way ; but I argued that
there was less risk immediately after a repulse than there
might be a day or two later. So I set out with twenty
mounted infantry, Major Murray and his men having
to return to Gyantse. At Kala Tso I was welcomed by
my old friends the 23rd Pioneers, under Colonel Hogge,
who had been our escort at Tuna during all that terrible
winter.

I now replied to a telegram I had received in the
morning from Government, asking me to communicate
my views on the general situation by telegram, as they
wished to have them as soon as possible. I said, with
reference to the contention which had been made by
the military authorities that it would be impossible to
keep troops at Lhasa after the autumn, that in my
opinion " an effort should be made to quarter troops at
Lhasa for the winter, for if we retired to Chumbi in
November, we risked the loss of all the results of our
present efforts, and the Tibetans would be still more
obstructive." I computed that the Lhasa and Gyantse
valleys would support 1,000 men each. I hoped that
while the ample forces now being sent would break
down opposition during the summer months, it would
be possible to keep in Lhasa a garrison, like that then
at Gyantse, capable of holding its own for a whole winter.
I added that if it was the case, as the military said, that
troops could not be maintained in Lhasa during the
winter, I had better not go to Lhasa at all, for there was
little use in my commencing negotiations with two such
obstructive people as the Tibetans and Chinese in any
place where I could not stay a full year, if necessary. I

198 GYANTSE

had been eleven months trying even to begin negotiations.
I should be quite unable to complete them in two or three
months, especially if the Chinese and Tibetans knew
we intended to leave before the winter.

The substance of this telegram I still think was per-
fectly sound, but its tone I do not now in cold blood
seek to defend. I must confess that during all this
Gyantse period I was not so steady and imperturbable as
an agent should be. Perhaps the prolonged stay at very
high altitudes was beginning to tell, for even Gyantse was
over 13,000 feet. Perhaps it was the greater realization
that nothing ever would be effected short of Lhasa, and
that this playing about at Khamba Jong, at Tuna, and at
Gyantse was merely for the benefit of the distant British
elector. Or it may have been the difficulty of reconciling
military with political considerations. Or possibly it was
reading in the newspapers now arriving from England
the accusations of cruelty, injustice, and oppression which
were being publicly brought against the Mission, and the
prophecies of disaster, such as befell Cavagnari, which
were to come on us also. Whatever it was, I certainly
became very restive, and now earned a rebuff from the
Government of India, which only made me worse, and
determined me to give up the whole business. It seemed
so easy to carry through if we only went straight at it, so
utterly impossible when in England they were only half-
hearted. I see now that I ought to have gone stolidly
and cheerily on, for Governments, too, have innumerable
difficulties of their own. Still, this was not easy at the
time.

It was tolerably certain a fortnight after my arrival at
Gyantse that the Tibetans did not seriously mean to
negotiate, and if we had to go to Lhasa, it was urgently
necessary to make early preparations for an advance,
so that another whole summer might not pass away
without result. Yet I was undoubtedly premature in
breathing the word Lhasa so early as the end of April.
It was clear to me that if we wished to make a well-
thought-out, complete, and lasting settlement with the
Tibetans and the Chinese combined, and if we wished —

NEED FOR REMAINING AT LHASA 199

what I always regarded as much more important than
any paper settlement, and as our real object in going to
Tibet — the establishment of a good feeling between our-
selves and the Tibetans, we must not only go to Lhasa,
but be able to stay there for an ample period. Yet when
I stated this opinion to Government, I should, I acknow-
ledge, have given it in a less brusque way than I did in
the telegram I have quoted.

I had this much in excuse. I had, as I have related,
at dawn on the day I sent that telegram, and before having
had my breakfast, been attacked by the Tibetans, and had
myself to fight with a rifle in my hand. I had had, after
breakfast, to ride nearly thirty miles with the constant risk
of further attack on the way. I had had to do all this
after being cooped up for a month in a house without
being able to stir outside it. I had therefore to compose
and cipher my telegram when 1 was physically exhausted
and depressed in spirit. I knew that military considera-
tions, and Imperial considerations, and international con-
siderations, and every other consideration which hampers
action, were dead against my proposal, and I was not in
the mood to be respectful towards them. Still, I was ill-
advised to let my telegram have the slightest tinge of
brusqueness in it. If I wanted to get the thing done, I
should have preserved that marvellous imperturbability
and cheery good sense which, from the Strangers' Gallery,
I have so frequently admired in British Ministers in the
House of Commons. AU this I note for the benefit of
future leaders of unpopular Missions. For the effect of
my telegram was not to further the object I had in view
— the making of aU preparations for keeping the Mission
at Lhasa for the winter, if need be. It merely earned for
me a reprimand from Government, who telegraphed back
on June 14 that they found it necessary to remind me
that any definite proposals I made for their consideration
should be, as far as possible, in conformity with the orders
and present pohcy of His Majesty's Government ; and I
was to remember that the policy of His Majesty's Govern-
ment was based on considerations of international relations
wider than the mere relations between India and Tibet,

200 GYANTSE

which were not only beyond my purview, but also beyond
the purview of the Government of India. They expected
me, therefore, to do my utmost to carry out the present
plans until there was unquestionable proof that they were
impracticable. It was impossible, I was told, to argue
the pohtical necessity for remaining at Lhasa during the
winter until I had arrived there and gauged the situation ;
and the military objections were great and obvious.

My reply to this is not published, so I will not quote
it. I will only say that I pretty well despaired of getting
this business through. Lord Curzon was away in England,
and evidently now military, and not political, considerations
were having the upper hand. I knew about the " inter-
national relations " and the " wider view," for copies of all
the important despatches to our Ambassadors were sent
to me. But there were dozens and scores of men to repre-
sent those " wider " views, which need not, as is so often
imagined, be wiser simply because they are wider, whereas
there was only one person, and that was myself, to repre-
sent the narrower view, but which, because it was local,
need not be inferior, or less important.

The narrow local point of view was, then, that for
thirty years continuously we in India had been trying
to settle a trumpery affair of trade and boundary with
a semi-barbarous people on our frontier, and time after
time we had been put off by these " considerations of
international relations wider than the mere relations
between India and Tibet." But now we had the chance
of a century of settling this business once and for all.
We had, after years of negotiations and correspondence,
made our effort. We had taken immense trouble and
gone to great expense. And all I wished to do was to
represent from my restricted point of view that I ought
to have plenty of time to make the most of this oppor-
tunity. I should have represented my views in less
provocative language, I admit ; but the main contention
was, I am sure, sound, and it would have been better now
if it had been acted on. If I had not been rushed at
Lhasa, but had had plenty of time to gauge and report
the situation there, and to receive the orders of Govern-

RENEWED PLEDGES TO RUSSIA 201

merit on any modifications which might be suggested by
the circumstances, I should have been able to conclude
with both the Chinese and Tibetans a treaty which my
own Government as well as they would have accepted.

The Russian Government now began again to refer
to Tibetan affairs. On April 13 Lord Lansdowne had
assured the Russian Ambassador* that " nothing had
happened to modify the objects with which we had
originally determined to send Colonel Younghusband's
Mission into Tibetan territory." And on June 2,f the
Ambassador having on several occasions expressed a hope
that our policy towards Tibet would not be altered by
recent events, Lord Lansdowne informed him in writing
that, in sanctioning the advance of the Mission to Gyantse,
they announced to the Government of India that " they
were clearly of opinion that this step should not be
allowed to lead up to the occupation of Tibet, or to
permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs. They stated
that the advance was to be made for the sole purpose of
obtaining satisfaction, and that as soon as reparation had
been obtained, withdrawal would be effected. They added
that they were not prepared to establish a permanent
mission in Tibet, and that the question of enforcing trade
facilities in that country was to be considered in the light
of this decision." " I am now able to tell you," continued
Lord Lansdowne, " that His Majesty's Government still
adhere to the policy thus described, though it is obvious
that their action must to some extent depend upon the
conduct of the Tibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's
Government cannot undertake that they wiU not depart
in any eventuality from the policy which now commends
itself to them. They desire, however, to state in the most
emphatic terms that, so long as no other Power endeavours
to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, they would not attempt
either to annex it, to establish a protectorate over it, or
in any way to control its internal administration."

This, in the sequel, was to be a clinching fetter on the

* Blue-book, III., p. 1. t Ibid., p. 15.

202 GYANTSE

action of the Indian Government. They still wanted a
representative at Lhasa ; and in view of the determined
hostility of the Tibetans, they wanted discretion to occupy
the Chumbi Valley as a guarantee for the fulfilment of
the treaty ; and when the Russians had permanently
stationed thousands of troops in Manchuria, had con-
structed railways, built forts, and established posts, where
seventeen years before I had not seen a single Russian,
and when they had Consular representatives all along
their border in Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia, it was
hard to see on what grounds they could have objected to
the very mild measures which the Government of India
desired to adopt. In any case, when the Tibetans had
shown, not merely passive obstinacy, but downright hos-
tility, and when, even though it might be the case that, in
the words of Count LamsdorfF to Sir Charles Hardinge,*
" the relations between Russia and Tibet were of a purely
religious nature, due solely to the large number of Russian
Buriats who regarded the Dalai Lama as their Pope," it
was clear that the Tibetans relied on those merely religious
relations as a support against us, the Government of India
might have hoped that their hands would be freed to
enable them to definitely settle up this intrinsically not
very important Tibetan affair. But " wider international
considerations " were, as so often happens in Indian affairs,
to tell hardly against the Government of India. Since the
Mission had started into Tibet war between Russia and
Japan had broken out. Our relations with Russia were,
consequently, at a very delicate stage. War was in the
air, and statesmen had to be careful. For the sake of
this insignificant business with Tibet, it would be hardly
worth while endangering our relations with Russia,
especially when her adhesion to our arrangement with
France in regard to Egypt was required. Yet when we
look at the map at the end of this book, and see how far
the Russian frontier is from Tibet and to what a length
our own actually touches it, and when we remember, too,
that there was actually in Lhasa at this time a Russian
subject who had been accustomed to go backwards and

* Blue-book, III., p. 20.

FETTERING RESULT OF PLEDGES 203

forwards between Lhasa and St. Petersburg, and served
therefore all the purposes required of those religious rela-
tions which it was very natural should subsist between the
Dalai Lama and Russian Buddhists, it does seem hard
that the Government of India, now at the climax of all
their efforts, should have been tied down through defer-
ence to the distant Power.

It is a remarkable coincidence, in this connection, that
while the Russians were making protests and representa-
tions upon a move of ours which was not within a thousand
miles of their frontier, the Chinese Vice- Minister, when
Sir Ernest Satow informed him* that we intended to
advance to Lhasa, received the news with perfect equa-
nimity, raised no objection, and remarked that the Dalai
Lama was ignorant and pigheaded.

I reached Chumbi on June 10, and spent the next few
days in discussing details of the advance with General
Macdonald. The change from the monotony of the
investment at Gyantse and from the barrenness and high
altitude of Tibet was refreshing in the extreme. I met
old friends again : Colonel J. M. Stewart, who had years
before reheved me when I had been arrested by the
Russians on the Pamirs ; Major Beynon, who had been
Colonel Kelly's Staff Officer in the Relief of Chitral ; and
my brother-in-law, Vernon Magniac, who was to accompany
me now as private secretary, and whose companionship
was the greatest relief in the midst of a host of the usual
official worries. The drop from 13,000 feet at Gyantse to
9,000 feet in Chumbi, and the change from constant risk
to absolute security, all eased the tension on me ; and the
joy of being once more amidst luxuriant vegetation, with
gorgeous rhododendrons, dense pine forests, roses, primulas,
and all the wealth of Alpine flowery beauty, was a soften-
ing and welcome relaxation.

At Phari, on my way to Chumbi, I had met the
Tongsa Penlop, now the Maharaja of Bhutan, who had
recently come to interview General Macdonald and myself.

* Blue-book, III,, p. 19.

204 GYANTSE

Mr. Walsh, who had been in poUtical charge of Chumbi,
had interviewed him on June 3, and to him the Tongsa
Penlop had admitted the unreasonableness and folly of
the Tibetans, but argued that it was due to the bad advice
of the Councillors, who had, in consequence, all been put
in prison. He said, though, that nothing could be gained
by our going to Lhasa, as the Dalai Lama and the Govern-
ment would all leave before our arrival, and we should find
no one there with whom to negotiate. He had written to
the Dalai Lama, informing him of what I had told the
Trimpuk Jongpen at Tuna we wanted, and the Dalai
Lama had replied that the Sikkim boundary must be
as it was, that no trade-mart could be established, and
that no communication from the Indian Government
could be received by the Tibetan Government. The
Tongsa Penlop added that the rumour in Bhutan
was that Mr. Walsh had been killed at Guru, that
I had been killed at Gyantse, and that Russians had
landed at Calcutta, defeated the English, and set up five
banners.

This was a somewhat gloomy outlook ; still, I was a
good deal encouraged by my interview with the Tongsa
Penlop. Mr. Walsh had been able to dispel many
illusions, and at subsequent interviews the Tongsa Penlop
had been a good deal impressed by General Macdonald
and Mr. White, the latter of whom founded a friendship
which has had most beneficial subsequent results.

The Tongsa Penlop I found to be a straight, honest-
looking, dignified man of about forty-seven years of age.
He bore himself well, dressed well, gave me costly presents,
and altogether showed himself a man of importance and
authority. He said he was most anxious to effect a settle-
ment between us and the Tibetans. The latter had been
very obstinate and wrong-headed, but the Dalai Lama
was a young man, who needed good counsellors, and un-
fortunately there were bad men in Lhasa, who acted in his
name to the detriment of the country. General I^ac-
donald had told him that we were prepared to receive
negotiators up to June 25, and he (the Tongsa Penlop)
had, accordingly, written urgently to the Tibetans to send

THE TONGS A PBNLOP (nOW MAHAEAJA OF BHUTAN).

INTERVIEW WITH TONGSA PENLOP 205

a negotiator before that date. Would not I, therefore,
show patience up to then ?

I asked him whether he himself would be inclined to
be patient if he had been attacked four times at night
after waiting eleven months for negotiators to come. He
admitted that he would not, and would feel more incUned
to go about killing people ; but he said I was the repre-
sentative of a great Government, and ought to be more
patient than he would be. I said I had named June 25
as the date up to which I would receive negotiators, but
since then I had been again attacked at Kangma, and I
could not answer for it that the Viceroy would still allow
me to receive negotiators.

I said no Englishman liked killing villagers who were
forced from their homes to fight us. We knew they did
not want to fight, and we had no quarrel with them. But,
unfortunately, it seemed impossible to get at the real
instigators of the opposition to us except by fighting, in
which the innocent peasant-soldiers, and not the authors
of the trouble, suffered most. If these latter would only
lead their men I would be better pleased, for then they
would appreciate what opposition to the British Govern-
ment really meant. The Tongsa Penlop was much
amused at the suggestion, but said the leaders always
remained a march behind when any fighting was likely to
take place.

Continuing, I said that, though I had little hope that
any settlement would be arrived at without fighting, yet,
fighting or no fighting, I had to make a settlement some
time, and one that would last another hundred years. If
the Tibetans had only been as sensible as the Bhutanese,
and come and talked matters over with me, we could
easily have arrived at a settlement long ago. All we
desired was to be on friendly and neighbourly terms with
States like Bhutan and Tibet lying on our frontier. War,
though it could have but one result, gave us much trouble,
which we had no wish unnecessarily to incur. We, there-
fore, much preferred peace. I sent my respects to the
Dharm Raja, and asked the Tongsa Penlop to write to
me often and give me advice regarding the settlement

206 GYANTSE

with Tibet, and he fervently assured me of the good-will
of the Bhutanese, and said that they would never depart
from their friendship with the British Government.

In this interview I purposely appeared indifferent
about receiving negotiators, for the less anxious I seemed
for them to come the more likely was their arrival. As a
fact, when, a fortnight later, there really were signs of their
appearance, I asked Government to agree, which they
readily did, to grant a few days' grace beyond the 25th to
allow them to come in.

Besides this friendly support from Bhutan on our right,
we had also further evidence at this time of equally
friendly, and much more valuable, support from Nepal on
our left. The Nepalese Minister informed Colonel Raven-
shaw that he had received a letter and some presents from
the Dalai Lama, but that he made no allusion to our
Mission, which omission led the Minister to think that
the Dalai Lama was kept in ignorance of what was going
on. And this surmise was, I think, perfectly correct, and
represented one of the great difficulties with which we
had to contend. No one dared inform this little god that
things were not going as he would like them, and yet
they had to get orders from him, for they would do nothing
without his orders.

The Nepalese Minister, to remove this difficulty, wrote
early in June to the Dalai Lama, expressing liis anxiety
at " the breach of relations [between India and Tibet]
which had been brought about by the failure of the
Tibetan Government to have the matters in dispute settled
by friendly negotiation." He referred to the letter which
he had written to the four Councillors in the previous
autumn, and he went on : " Wise and far-seeing as you
are, the vast resources of the British Government must be
well known to you. To rush to extremes with such a big
Power, and wantonly to bring calamities upon your poor
subjects without having strong and valid grounds of your
own to insist upon, cannot readily be accepted as a
virtuous course or wise pohcy. Hence it may fairly be

MORE AID FROM NEPAL 207

inferred that the detailed circumstances of the pending
questions have not been properly and correctly represented
to you." The Minister then urged the Dalai Lama at
once to send a duly authorized Councillor to meet the
British officers, to desist from fighting with the British
Government, and to try his best to bring about a peaceful
settlement ; otherwise he saw clearly that great calamities
were in store for Tibet. He concluded by saying that
His Holiness was too sacred to be troubled with mundane
affairs, but the present critical condition in Tibet demanded
his utmost foresight, and on him depended the salvation of
his country.

It is melancholy to think that the Dalai Lama paid
no heed to this well-intentioned advice, and then, when
calamities had fallen upon his country and we were just
outside Lhasa, fled on the pretext of retiring into reUgious
seclusion, and left his country to take care of itself

CHAPTER XIV

THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

Strong reinforcements had now come up from India :
the remainder of the mountain battery, under Major
Fuller, a wing of the Royal Fusiliers, the 40th Pathans,
and the 29th Punjabis ; and on June 13 I set out to return
to Gyantse with General Macdonald to relieve the Mission
escort at Gyantse and, if need be, to advance to Lhasa,
while Colonel Reid remained in charge of the communi-
cations.

At each post we stopped at the officers in charge
invariably reported that the people were well content with
us on account of our liberal treatment. The villagers
themselves were thoroughly friendly. They were making
money by selling their produce at rates very favourable
to themselves. They were only afraid of the officials and
Lamas. Captain Rawling, who had explored in Western
Tibet in the previous year, and was well acquainted with
the Tibetans, and who was now stationed at Phari in
charge of a transport corps, specially remarked this.
What the people were now afraid of was not our stopping,
but our withdrawing, and leaving them to the vengeance
of the Lamas.

This is a dilemma in which we are constantly being
placed on the Indian frontier. The people of a country
into which we advance are often ready to be friendly with
us if they could be certain we would stay and be able to
support them afterwards. But if they know we are going
to withdraw they naturally fight shy, for those who show
us friendship would get into trouble when we left. This
is one of the many reasons which make me favour our
keeping up a strong continuous influence when once we

208

MACDONALD ARRIVES AT GYANTSE 209

have been compelled to advance into a semi-civilized or
barbarous country. It is often highly inconvenient to have
to do this, but it is the most humane course, and I am
not sure that it would be so inconvenient if it were
followed consistently. It need not mean annexation or
petty interference, but it must mean sufficient influence
to prevent relapses to barbarism.

We reached Kangma without incident on June 22,
and halted a day while Colonel Hogge was sent to disperse
a body of 1,000 Tibetans who were holding a sangared
position on the road which runs down here from the
Karo-la. While halted I received a telegram from the
Tongsa Penlop at Phari to say that a big Lama and one
of the Councillors were coming to Gyantse, and that a
parcel of silk had arrived for me. The Penlop also said
he wished to come himself to see me at Gyantse.
Thinking this might indicate anxiety of the Tibetans to
come to terms at last — at literally the eleventh hoin-, for
there were only two days left up to the exjjiry of the time
beyond which I had signified that I would no longer be
able to negotiate at Gyantse — I telegraphed to Govern-
ment, recommending that a period of five days' grace,
up to June 30, should be given to them. Government
replied, on June 24, that the advance to Lhasa might
certainly be deferred for that purpose, and I so informed
the Tongsa Penlop.

On June 26 we reached Gyantse, after encountering
considerable opposition at the village and monastery of
Niani, which was held by 800 Tibetans. The fight lasted
from 10 a.m. till 2 p.m.. Colonel Brander from Gyantse
assisting by occupying the hills above the village. Major
Lye, 23rd Pioneers, was here severely wounded in the
hand and slightly in the head. On its arrival our force
was ineffisctuaUy bombarded from the jong.

General Macdonald had now to break up the Tibetan
force investing Gyantse. On the 28th he attacked a
strong position on a ridge on which were the Tse-chen
monastery and several fortified towers and sangars. The
process of clearing the villages in the plain below lasted
most of the day. At 5.30 the position itself was stormed

210 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

by the 8th Gurkhas and the 40th Pathans, supported
by the mountain battery. The fight was severe, for the
hillside was very steep. Captain Craster, 46th Pathans,
was killed whilst gallantly leading his company, and
Captains Bliss and Humphreys sHghtly wounded. The
capture of this position much disheartened the Tibetans ;
communications between Gyantse Jong and Shigatse were
cut off, and the jong was now surrounded on three sides.

Hearing that the big Lama from Lhasa, known as the
Ta Lama, was at Shigatse, and that the Councillor was at
Nagartse, on the road to Lhasa, I made a Lama in our
employ write to these two on June 28, saying that the
Tongsa Penlop had told me that they wished to come
here to settle matters, but were afraid. I promised them,
if they had proper credentials to effect a settlement, to
guarantee their safety and treat them with respect ; but
I said they must come at once, for we were about to start
for Lhasa. These letters I sent by the hands of prisoners.

One of these messengers was seized by the Tibetans
and brought to the jong, where a council was held to
consider its contents, as a result of which, on the following
morning, a messenger with a flag of truce of enormous
dimensions was sent to the Mission post. The whole
garrison crowded to the walls to see his arrival, for this
was the first indication of peace. He said the Tibetan
leaders desired an armistice till the Ta Lama, who was at
Penam, halfway to Shigatse, and who could be at Gyantse
on the following day, could arrive to negotiate with me.
The messenger said that he and the Councillor coming
from Nagartse had powers from the Dalai Lama to treat.

After consultation with General Macdonald, I replied
to the Tibetans that I would grant the armistice they
asked for till sunset of June 30, to enable the Ta Lama to
reach Gyantse; but that as I was attacked on May 5 with-
out warning, though I had informed the Tibetan Govern-
ment that I was ready to negotiate there, and as Tibetan
armed forces had occupied the jong and fired into my
camp ever since, General Macdonald, who was responsible
for the safety of the Mission, demanded that they should
evacuate the jong and withdraw all armed force beyond

ARRIVAL OF TA LAMA 211

Karo-la, Yang-la, and Dongtse. A reasonable time for
this would be given.

By June 30 neither of the Tibetan delegates had
arrived, but both the Tongsa Penlop and the Ta Lama
were to arrive the next day, and we allowed the armistice
to extend informally till they arrived. The Tongsa Penlop
arrived first, though he had had twice the distance to
travel, and at once came to see me, and showed me a
letter he had received from the Dalai Lama, saying he
had heard we had appointed a date up to which we would
negotiate, and after which we would fight ; but as fighting
was bad for men and animals, he asked the Tongsa Penlop
to assist in making a peaceful settlement, and he was
appointing the Ta Lama, who was a Councillor, the Grand
Secretary, and representative of the three great monas-
teries, to negotiate. The Tongsa Penlop also produced
a packet of silks, which he said the Dalai Lama had
sent me.

About three in the afternoon the Ta Lama arrived in
Gyantse, and as he was already a day later than the date
of the armistice, and six days over the date of the original
ultimatum, I sent a message to say I should be glad to see
him that afternoon. He replied that he proposed to visit
the Tongsa Penlop on the following day, and would come
and see me some time after that. 1 returned a message
to the effect that unless he visited me by nine on the
following morning military operations would be resumed.

Undisturbed by this threat, he shortly after nine on
the following morning proceeded to visit the Tongsa
Penlop ; but as he had to pass my camp, I sent out Captain
O'Connor to say that 1 insisted on his coming to pay his
respects to me, unless he wished me to consider he was
not anxious to negotiate. He was at perfect hberty to
discuss matters with the Tongsa Penlop, but he must no
longer delay paying his respects to me, and giving me
evidence that the Tibetan Government were sincere in
their wish to negotiate.

At eleven I received the Ta Lama and th^ Tongsa
Penlop in Durbar. There were also present the Tung-yig-
Chembo (the Grand Secretary, who was one of the dele-

212 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

gates at Khamba Jong last year), and six representatives
of the three great Lhasa monasteries. As all except the
Grand Secretary were men who had not met me before,
and were probably ignorant of our view of the situation, I
recounted it at length, showing how we had lived on very
good terms with Tibet for nearly a century and a half,
and it was only after the Tibetans had wantonly invaded
Sikkim territory in 1886 that misunderstanding had
arisen ; that Mr. White had for years tried at Yatung to
make them observe the treaty made on their behalf by the
Chinese ; and that when I came to Khamba Jong, a place
of meeting which the Viceroy had been informed was
approved of both by the Emperor of China and the Dalai
Lama, they still repudiated the old treaty, refused to
negotiate a new one, or have any intercourse at all with
us ; while after my arrival at Gyantse, when I told them I
was ready to negotiate, instead of sending me negotiators,
they sent soldiers and treacherously attacked me at night.
I concluded by saying that the Viceroy, on hearing this,
had directed me to write letters to the Dalai Lama and
the Amban, announcing that if proper negotiators did not
arrive here by June 25 we would advance to Lhasa to
compel negotiations there ; but these letters had been
returned by the commander in the Jong, no negotiators
had arrived by the 25th, and it was only because on the
24.th the Tongsa Penlop had informed me that negotiators
really were on the way that the British Government, in
their anxiety for a peaceful settlement, had been pleased
to grant them a few days' grace. We were ready to go on
to Lhasa the next day. If they were really in earnest and
had power to make a settlement, I was prepared to nego-
tiate with them. If they were not empowered to make a
settlement, we would advance to Lhasa forthwith. Had
they proper credentials ?

The Grand Secretary replied, on behalf of the Ta
Lama, that we had come by force into the country, and
occupied Chumbi and Phari, and though the Tibetan
soldiers at Guru had strict orders not to fire on us, we
had fired on them and had killed all the high oflScials.
He said they did not know I was here when this camp

TA LAMA AND TONGSA PENLOP 213

was attacked on May 5 ; but they now had orders to
negotiate with me. They had no special credentials, but
the Dalai Lama, in his letter to the Tongsa Penlop, had
mentioned that they were coming to negotiate, and the
fact of a man in the Ta Lama's high position being here
was evidence of their intentions.

I replied that I did not wish to discuss the past except
to make clear one point. They were not at the Guru
fight, but I was, and I saw the first shot fired by the
Tibetans after General Macdonald had purposely restrained
his men from firing. But what concerned me was the
future. If they made a settlement with me now, would it
be observed, or would it be repudiated like the last one ?
They at first replied that this would depend upon what
was in the settlement, but subsequently explained that,
though they might have to refer to Lhasa for orders, yet,
when once the Dajai Lama had placed his seal on a treaty,
it would be scrupulously observed. They said they wished
to talk matters over with the Tongsa Penlop, who would
act as mediator and arrange matters with me. I informed
them that I would be very glad if they could discuss the
situation with him, and I was quite willing that he should
accompany them when they came to see me, but they
themselves must come to me if they desired that negotia-
tions should take place. They said they would have a
talk with him the next day, and come and see me the day
after. I told them, however, that they must have their
talk before noon on the following day, and come and see
me again at that hour, as I was not yet satisfied of the
earnestness of their intentions.

The same afternoon they had a prolonged interview
with the Tongsa Penlop, who asked them what they had
gained by their silly attitude of obstruction, and advised
them to give up fighting and make terms with us. The
Tongsa Penlop informed me he thought the delegates, or
certainly the Dalai Lama, were really anxious to make a
settlement.

On July 3 the Tongsa Penlop arrived half an hour
before the time fixed for the reception of the delegates.
At noon I took ray seat in the Durbar, which was attended

214 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

by General Macdonald and many military officers, while a
strong guard of honour lined the approach. I waited for
half an hour, but as at the end of that time the Tibetan
delegates had not arrived, I rose and dismissed the
Durbar.

At 1.30 the Tibetans appeared ; but as the dilatoriness
they had shown in coming to Gyantse and after their
arrival in coming to see me was a pretty clear indication
that they had not even yet realized how serious the situa-
tion was, I saw that I should have to do something yet to
impress them with its gravity. 1'he Tongsa Penlop was
able to come from much farther and reach Gyantse before
them. He had come to see me at once on arrival, while
they had delayed till the next day ; he had come half an
hour before the time fixed for the Durbar, while they had
come an hour and a half late. All this indicated that,
while they were still so casual and indifferent, no negotia-
tion that I could enter into with them would produce the
smallest result. They had yet to be shown that we were
not to be trifled with any longer. So on their arrival I
had them shown into a spare tent, and informed that I
had waited for them in Durbar for half an hour ; that as
they had not arrived by then, I had dismissed the Durbar,
and M'ould not now be at leisure to receive them for
another two or three hours.

By four o'clock the Durbar was again assembled, with
General Macdonald and his officers, aU my staff, and a
guard of honour. Captain O'Connor then led in the
Tibetan delegates, and showed them to their places on
my right ; but I made no signs of receiving them, and
remained pei'fectly silent, awaiting an apology. They
moved about uncomfortably during this deadening silence,
and ^t last the Ta Lama, who was really a very kindly,
though perfectly incapable, old gentleman, and absolutely
in the hands of the more capable but evil-minded Chief
Secretary, murmured out a full apology. I informed
them that the inference I drew from the disrespect they
had shown me in arriving an hour and a half late was that
they were not in earnest in desiring a settlement. The
Ta Lama assured me that they were really in earnest, but

INTERVIEW WITH TA LAMA 215

that the Grand Secretary was ill. I then informed them
that, as I had been attacked at Gyantse without any warn-
ing, and after I had written repeatedly to the Amban
saying I was waiting there to negotiate, and as I had been
fired on from the Jong continually for two months since
the attack, I must press for its evacuation. General Mac-
donald was prepared to give them till noon of the 5th —
that is, nearly two days — in which to effect the evacua-
tion ; but if after that time the jong was occupied, he
would commence military operations against it. Irrespec-
tive of these operations, I would, however, be ready to
receive them if they wished to make a settlement, and
prevent the necessity of our proceeding to Lhasa.

The Grand Secretary then said that if the Tibetan
troops withdrew from the jong, they would expect that we
also would withdraw our troops ; otherwise the Tibetans
would be suspicious. I replied that the Tibetans did not
at all seem to realize that they would have to pay a
penalty for the attack they had made on the Mission, and
that I could not discuss the matter further. They must
either leave the jong peaceably before noon on the 5th, or
expect to be then turned out by force. On leaving, the
Ta Lama very politely and respectfully expressed his
regrets for having kept me waiting, and begged that I
would not be angry. But the Grand Secretary went
away without a word of apology. He was the evil genius
of the Tibetans throughout this affair.

The following morning the delegates had a long inter-
view with the Tongsa Penlop, and asked whether time
could not be given them to refer to Lhasa for orders. I
sent back a message saying that it was already nearly a
week since I had let the Ta Lama know that the evacua-
tion of the jong would be demanded, that they ought to
be grateful for the opportunity that had been given them
of withdrawing unmolested, and that no further grace
could be allowed.

The Tongsa Penlop also informed me that they were
very suspicious, and wanted an assurance that we really
wished a settlement. I told him he might inform them
that the best evidence that we desired a settlement was

216 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

the fact that the control of affairs was in my hands. If
we had intended war the control would have been in the
hands of a General.

The delegates and the commanders in the jong were
still undecided. No one would take the responsibility of
evacuating the jong. On the morning of the 5th the
Tongsa Penlop with some Lhasa Lamas came to see me,
and I sent one of the latter over to the delegates, saying
that at twelve a signal gun would be fired to warn them
that half an hour afterwards firing would commence. I
told them that if they came over either before or after
with a flag of truce they would be given an asylum in the
Tongsa Penlop's camp. I begged that the women and
children should be taken out of the town ; and I sent a
special warning to General Ma, the local Chinese official.
No notice was taken of any of these warnings. At twelve
I had a signal gun fired, and at 12.30 I heliographed to
General Macdonald that he was free to commence firing.

The Tongsa Penlop had stayed with me on the
ramparts of our post up till noon, and I asked him to
remain and see the fight. But he said he would prefer to
see it from a little farther off, and I dare say he did not
yet feel quite certain that we should win. For it was a
tough task that lay before General Macdonald. We
were right in the heart of Tibet, with all the strength that
the Lamas, with a full year of effort, could put forth.
The fortress to be attacked from our little post in the
plain looked impregnable. It was built of solid masonry
OH a precipitous rock rising sheer out of the plain. It was
held by at least double, and possibly treble, our own force,
and they were armed, many hundreds of them, with Lhasa-
made rifles, which carried over a thousand yards. In
addition, there were several guns mounted. No wonder
the Tongsa Penlop thought it best to be a little distance
off, and not too decidedly identified with either side.

General Macdonald probably never would have been
able to take the jong if his guns had not just been supplied,
on the recommendation of General Parsons, the Inspector-
General of Artillery, with " common " shell as well as the
shrapnel, which was all that up till now they had carried

NIGHT ATTACK ON GYANTSE TOWN 217

with them. Shrapnel is of use only against troops.
Common shell is more solid, and can be used against
masonry, and against the jong it proved tremendously
eflFective when fired by the accurate and hard-hitting little
10-pounders.

At 1.45 p.m. on July 5 General Macdonald began his
operations by renewing the rifle tire on the jong. Then,
at 3.30 p.m., two guns, six companies of infantry, and one
company of mounted infantry, were sent to make a feint
on the monastery side of the jong. This succeeded in
inducing the Tibetans to reinforce largely that side of
their defences. But after dark this column was with-
drawn, and shortly after midnight a force of twelve guns,
twelve companies of infantry, one company of mounted
infantry, and half a company of sappers moved out in two
columns to take up a position south-east of Gyantse.

We in the Mission post naturally spent the night on
the ramparts awaiting events. It was 3.30 a.m. by the
time the columns had taken up their position. Da^yn had
not yet appeared. All was still and quiet. The stars
shone out in all the brilliance of these high altitudes, and
nothing could be more serene and peaceful than this clear
summer night. Suddenly a few sharp rifle cracks spat
out, telling us that the enemy had seen our assaulting
columns. Then the dull, heavy thud of an explosion
showed that some doorway had been blown open. And
after that came the full blaze of the fight, the whole jong
lighting up with the flashes of rifle and jingal fire, and
down below our own fire getting hotter and hotter.

As day dawned we could see that we had gained a
footing in the town which was the immediate object of
General Macdonald's attack previous to the assault on the
jong itself. What had happened was this : The Tibetans
had opened an unexpectedly heavy fire before the assault-
ing columns could get close up under the walls of the
outlying parts of the town, and our three columns were
reorganized into two — that on the right under Colonel
Campbell, of the 40th Pathans, a tried and experienced
frontier officer, and that on the left under Major Murray,
8th Gurkhas. With Colonel Campbell was Captain

218 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

Sheppard, R.E., who, with that dash and effectiveness
which always characterized him, succeeded in laying and
firing a charge under the walls of the most strongly held
house, and blowing in it a breach, which, with the damage
done by the fire of the 7-pounder gun, gave an opening
for the assaulting column. On the left Lieutenants
Gurdon and Burney also succeeded in blowing breaches in
the walls of the houses ; but, to the grief of all, Gurdon
was killed — it is believed by the falling debris of the very
wall which he had blown up. He had been with the
Mission escort from the very first, and in many of these
very dangerous assaults on villages had displayed most
daring courage. He was a brother of the Captain (now
Lieutenant-Colonel) Gurdon who had so distinguished
himself in the Siege of Chitral, and who was one of my
closest friends. When the news came in to me from the
front, I felt how sad indeed it was that one so young and
so full of promise, with a great and useful career most
certainly before him, should have been thus in an instant
cut off. But he did not faU in vain, for what he had done
at the cost of his life enabled the assaulting columns
to enter the town, which by 7 a.m. was in our possession.

The troops began to make good their position in the
area thus won, but the real business had yet to be
accomplished. The Jong, with 5,000 or 6,000 Tibetans
inside it, still had to be assaulted. During the morning
there was a general lull in the proceedings while the
troops rested. But about two o'clock Colonel Campbell,
who was in command of all the advanced troops in the
town, sent back word to General Macdonald, who was in
the Palla village, recommending that an assault should be
made on the extreme east of the jong. To him in his
advanced position, immediately under the walls of the
jong, it appeared that if our guns could make a breach in
the wall itself an assault could be made, though the storm-
ing party would have a stiff, hazardous climb over the
steepest part of the rock. General Macdonald adopted
the proposal, and as the Tibetans now appeared somewhat
exhausted, ordered the assault to be made at once.

At three o'clock General Macdonald ordered forward

THE ASSAULT ON JONG 219

four companies of the reserve, and directed the 10-pounder
guns to concentrate their fire on the portion of the wall to
be breached for the assault. As the reinforcements crossed
the open to the town the Tibetans redoubled their fire,
but our fire from all parts of the field also increased. The
10-pounder battery under Major Fuller did magnificent
work. Stationed only 1,000 yards from the point to be
breached, it placed one shell after another in exactly the
same spot. Bit by bit the wall came tumbling down. A
larger and larger gap appeared, and by four a breach suffi-
ciently large for an assault had been made.

Then the hehograph fiashed from post to post that the
jong was now to be assaulted. Major Fuller immediately
gave the order for " Rapid firing " on the upper buildings.
Maxims from three different directions began rattling
away with peremptory emphasis. Every man poured in
his rifle fire with increasing energy. Then a little cluster
of black figures, ever augmenting in numbers, was seen,
like a swarm of ants, slowly making its way up the nearly
precipitous rock towards the breach. A cheer was raised,
which was taken up from post to post all round our
encircling force and back to the reserves in the rear. The
Tibetans could still be seen firing away in the breach and
hurling down stones, but we only redoubled our fire upon
them.

Very, very gradually — or so it seemed to us in our
suspense below — the Gurkhas, under Lieutenant Grant,
made their upward way. First a few ali-rived just under
the breach, then more and more. Then came the crisis,
and Grant was seen leading his men straight for the
opening. Instantly our bugles all over the field rang out
the " Cease fire," so as not to endanger our storming
party. The Tibetans, too, now stopped firing ; and
where a moment before there had been a deafening din
there was now an aching silence. We held our breath,
and in tense excitement awaited the result of the assault.
We saw the little Gurkhas and the Koyal Fusiliers,
who formed the storming party, stream through the
breach. Then we watched them working up from
building to building. Tier after tier of the fortifications

220 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

was crowned, and at last our men were seen placing the
Union Jack on the highest pinnacle of the jong. The
Tibetans had fled precipitately, and Gyantse was ours.

The Tongsa Penlop next morning came over to con-
gratulate General Macdonald and myself ; and we went
over the jong together. Till I had got up there and
looked down through the Tibetan loopholes on our insig-
nificant Mission post below, I had not realized how certain
the Tibetans must have felt that they could overwhelm
us, and how impossible it must have seemed that we could
ever turn the tables upon them. If one stood in the Round
Tower of Windsor Castle and looked down from there
upon a house and garden in the fields about Eton, held by
some strangers who said they had come to make a treaty,
one would get the best idea of what must have been in
the Tibetans' minds. They were in a lofty and seemingly
impregnable fortress in the heart of their own country.
We were a little dot in the plain below. The idea of
making a treaty with us, if they did not want to, must
have appeared ridiculous. And as I stood there in their
position and looked down upon what had till just then
been my own, I soon understood how it was that the
Ta Lama and other delegates had been so casual in their
behaviour.

Yet, in spite of our success, and to a certain extent by
reason of it, I was still ready to negotiate with Tibetan
delegates. I had disUked, with an intensity which only
those can know who have been in a similar position, the
idea of making any mention of negotiation during all that
critical time in May, while they were firing proudly at us
from the jong, and were surrounding me in my little post
below. Now that, through General Macdonald's skilful
dispositions and the bravery of his troops, I was in the top
place, I readily tried to negotiate. And I thought that
His Majesty's Government were anxious that further
efforts to negotiate here should be made ; for on June 25
they had telegraphed that if there was reasonable expecta-
tion of the early arrival of the Resident, accompanied by
competent Tibetan negotiators, the advance to Lhasa might
be postponed. They thought that the advance should

CAPTURE OF JONG 221

not be undertaken unless there was adequate ground for
doubting the competency of the Tibetan delegates or the
earnestness of the Tibetan Government. Moreover, some
few days' delay was necessary for General Macdonald to
complete his arrangements for the advance, to collect
sufficient suppUes, and to establish Gyantse as his
secondary base.

I therefore, immediately the jong was captured, asked
the Tongsa Penlop to send messengers to tell the Ta Lama
and the Councillor at Nagartse that I was still ready to
negotiate, as previously announced, but that they must
come in at once, as otherwise we would proceed to Lhasa.
But the messenger found the monastery in which they
had been staying deserted and the delegates fled.

On July 9 the Government of India telegTaphed
to me that they considered the advance to Lhasa in-
evitable, but that if the delegates could be induced to
come in and negotiate en route I might invite them to
accompany me, explaining the terms of His Majesty's
Government, and warning them that any further resist-
ance would involve a settlement less favourable to Tibet.

By July 13 General Macdonald's preparations were all
complete. He had reconnoitred the country both up and
down the valley, and found the Tibetans had fled in every
direction. He had amassed plentiful supplies. He had set
about repairing the jong, in which he was, to my infinite
regret, to leave Colonel Hogge, and the 23rd Pioneers, and
he was ready to leave for Lhasa the next day. It was sad
that the old Pioneers, who had borne the burden and the
cold of the day at Tuna all through that dreary and
anxious winter should be left behind, while other regiments
who had but just arrived from India should have the glory
of going to Ijhasa, and I would willingly have had it
otherwise.

AU were now eager and ready for the advance, and I
wrote to the Chinese Resident, that as neither he nor any
competent Tibetan negotiator had come to Gyantse I was
proceeding to Lhasa. I stated that my purpose was still
to negotiate, but that I must ask him to prevent the
Tibetans from further opposing my Mission, and I inti-

222 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG

mated that the terms 1 was demanding would be still
more severe if we encountered opposition.

The Tongsa Penlop also, at my request, wrote to the
Ta Lama, saying that I was prepared to carry on negotia-
tions en route, in order that the settlement might be ready
for signature at an early date at Lhasa. And I asked the
Tongsa Penlop, further, to write to the Dalai Lama him-
self, giving an outline of the terms we should demand.

Lastly, I issued a proclamation, drafted by the Govern-
ment of India, stating that we had no desire to fight with
the people of Tibet or to interfere with their liberties or
rehgion, but that it was necessary to impress unmistakably
upon the Government of Tibet that they could not with
impunity offer insults to the British Government, and that
they must realize the obligations they had entered into
and act up to them in all respects. The people were
warned that any opposition to our advance would only
result in making the terms demanded more exacting.

CHAPTER XV

THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

Just a year had now elapsed since we had arrived at
Khamba Jong, and now at length all were united ih the
single purpose of advancing to Lhasa — the Imperial
Government, the Indian Government, and the military
authorities. A year had been wasted in futile forbearance
for the benefit of the British public, but at length what
the responsible Government of India had advocated since
January of the previous year was to be carried into effect,
and on July 14 we left our dreary little post at Gyantse
and set out, full of enthusiasm, for Lhasa.

Though we were so high above sea-level, it was quite
hot now in the middle of the day, for the sun in these low
latitudes and in this clear atmosphere struck down with
considerable force. But we also had some very heavy
rain in the next few days.

As we approached the Karo-la (pass), the scene of
Colonel Brander's gallant little action, I received a letter
from the Tongsa Penlop at Gyantse, enclosing a letter he
had received from the Dalai Lama. It said :

" We have written to the Yutok Sha-p^, inquiring from
him whether it wiU be easy to effect a settlement or not.
Will you also request the English privately not to nibble up
our country ? Please use your influence well both with
the English and the Tibetans, I cannot at present speak
with exactness with regard to the frontier, but I have
said something on the matter to the Pukong Tulku, so it
will be well if the negotiations are begun quickly. Once
they have begun, we shall hear gradually who is in the
right."

On the next day, July 17, we marched to a camp

223

224 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

immediately below the Karo-la, and there we found the
Bhutanese messenger who had carried a letter from the
Tongsa Penlop to the Yutok Sha-p^'s camp had returned,
saying that some Tibetan officials would come over pre-
sently to see us. The Tibetans, however, fired at our
mounted infantry from the wall on the far side of the
pass, and no officials appeared.

This looked as if we were to have another fight.
Before we left Gyantse we had heard that the pass was
occupied by 2,000 Tibetans, and that there were 2,000
more in support, and the mounted infantry now reported
the pass to be strongly held and fresh walls and sangars
to have been built. All the villages en route, too, had
been deserted, so we fully expected a fight.

Our camp under the pass was right in among a lofty
knot of mountains, one of which rose to a height of over
24,000 feet above sea-level. A magnificent glacier de-
scended a side valley to within 500 yards of the camp.
The whole scene was desolate in the highest degree. And
though we were on the highroad to Lhasa, the road was
nothing but the roughest little mountain pathway rubbed
out by the traffic of mules and men across it.

The afternoon and evening of the 17th were occupied
in reconnoitring the position of the Tibetans. They were
very strongly posted at a narrow gorge three miles from
our camp on the north side of the pass, and their position
was flanked by impassable snow mountains. The old
wall of Colonel Brander's time had been extended on
either hand till it touched precipices immediately under
the snow-line. Behind this lay a second barrier of
sangars. Like aU the walls which the Tibetans so skil-
fully erected at such places, this was built up of heavy
stones. The position was manned, according to our latest
information, by about 1,500 Tibetans.

At 7 a.m. on the morning of the 18th, when now,
even in the height of summer, there was still a nip of
frost in the air, the advance troops marched off. The
Royal Fusiliers, under Colonel Cooper, were to attack
the centre, and on either side parties of the 8th Gurkhas
were to turn the flanks.

ACTION AT KARO-LA 225

While the Gurkhas were slowly plodding up the
mountain-sides, I seated myself beside Major Fuller's
mountain battery, and watched the effects of gun-fire at
these altitudes. It was most interesting. The pass
itself was 16,600 feet, and the battery was a few hundred
feet above it, and was for some time firing at groups
5,000 yards away, and some of them on the glacier at
about 18,000 feet above the sea. In such a rare atmosphere
ordinary sighting and ordinary fuses were quite useless.
The shells would cleave through the thin air at very con-
siderably greater velocity than they would pass through
the thicker air at sea-level. AH the sighting and the
timing of the fuses had, therefore, to be completely read-
justed by trial and guesswork. Despite this, however,
wonderfully accurate shooting was effected by these
splendid little guns, and it would have made all the differ-
ence to Colonel Brander if he had had them instead of the
useless 7-pounders.

The Gurkhas and Pathans, after a long and difficult
climb to 18,000 feet, turned the position, but the Tibetans
in the centre had not waited. They knew that the
dreaded mounted infantry would be after them, so each
determined that he, at any rate, would not be the last to
leave the position, and all had cleared off before our troops
arrived. Most, indeed, had retreated in the night, and in
reality only about 700 Kham men were left to hold the
position. Many of these escaped high up over the snows,
pursued only by our shrapnel shells. Our mounted
infantry reconnoitred up to within two miles of Nagartse
Jong, which was found to be occupied, while reports
came in that 1,300 more men from Kham were expected.

Nagartse was reached on the 19th, and close to it I was
met by a deputation from Lhasa. Here were signs of
negotiations at last. I said I would have a full interview
at three that afternoon, but must warn them at once that
it would be necessary for me to occupy the jong, and to
advance to Lhasa, though I was ready to negotiate on the
way. The deputation, which consisted of the Yutok Sha-p^,
the Ta Lama, the Chief Secretary, and some monks,
arrived in my camp shortly before the time appointed.

226 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

The Yutok Sha-p^ took the chief place. He was a genial,
gentlemanly official of good family and pleasant manners.
But it soon became apparent that both he and the Ta
Lama were in the hands of the Chief Secretary, the monk
official who, from our first meeting at Khamba Jong, had
ever been an obstacle in our way. This latter official,
acting as spokesman, said they had heard from the Tongsa
Penlop that we wished to negotiate at Gyantse, and they
had set out to meet us when they heard that we were
advancing. They were quite willing to negotiate if we
returned to Gyantse, and in that case they would ac-
company us and make a proper settlement with us there.

I repeated for the fiftieth time that I had waited for
more than a year to negotiate ; that even at Gyantse I had
given them many opportunities ; that when I had first
arrived there I had announced my desire to negotiate ;
that after the attack upon me I had still declared iny
willingness to negotiate up to June 25 ; that on the inter-
cession of the Tongsa Penlop the Viceroy had extended
tliat term for some days ; that even after the capture of
the jong I had sent messengers over the country to find
them, and waited for another week at Gyantse ; but that
eventually the patience of the Viceroy had become com-
pletely exhausted, and His Excellency had ordered me to
advance to Lhasa forthwith, as he had reluctantly become
convinced that only there could a settlement be made.
We were now advancing to Lhasa. I would be quite
ready to negotiate with them on the way, and if the
Tibetan troops did not oppose us we would not fight
against them ; but as our troops had on the previous day
been fired at from the jong, we must send our troops in to
occupy it. We would, however, allow the delegates to
remain unmolested, and would see that their property was
not disturbed, and that they themselves were accorded
proper marks of respect.

The delegates replied that if we went on to Lhasa there
was no chance of a settlement being arrived at ; that they
had come here with the sincere intention of making
friendship with us and securing peace, but if we sent
troops into the jong they did not see how they could be

LHASA DELEGATES ARRIVE 227

friends with us ; they were the two biggest men in Tibet
next to the Dalai Lama, and it was both against their
rehgion and disgusting to them to have soldiers in the
same place where they were staying. T said they must,
after all, allow that this could not be half so disgusting to
them as having their soldiers firing into my camp at
Gyantse, while I was asleep, was to me. They continued
one after another wrangling and protesting against our
occupying the jong. After listening for an hour to their
protests, I asked them if they would now care to hear the
terms we intended to ask of them. They replied that
they could not discuss any terms till we returned to
Gyantse. I said I had no wish now to discuss the terms,
but merely desired to know if they wanted to be acquainted
with them. They continued to protest that they would
discuss nothing here, and it was only after considerable
fencing that I got them to admit that they had heard the
terms from the Tongsa Penlop.

I then said that I wished them to understand that if
we were further opposed on the way to Lhasa, or at
Lhasa itself, these terms would be made stricter. I said the
British Government had no wish to be on any other than
friendly terms with Tibet, that we had no intention of
remaining in Lhasa any longer than was required to make
a settlement, and as soon as a settlement was made we
would leave. But I had the Viceroy's orders to go to Lhasa,
and go there I must. I desired, however, to give them
most earnest advice and warning. They were the leading
men of Tibet, and upon them lay a great responsibility. I
was quite prepared on arrival at Lhasa to live on as
friendly and peaceable terms with the people as I had at
Khamba Jong, and as I had when I first arrived at
Gyantse ; to pay for everything, and to respect their
religious buildings. It rested with them now to decide
whether our stay at Lhasa should be of this peaceable
nature and of short duration, and whether the settlement
should be of the mild nature we at present contemplated,
or whether we should have to resort to force, as we had
been compelled to do at Gyantse, to impose severer terms,
and to prolong our stay.

228 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

The delegates listened attentively while I made this
exhortation to them, but, after consulting together, replied
that even if we did make a settlement at Lhasa, it would
be of no use, for in Tibet everything depended on religion,
and by the mere fact of our going to Lhasa we should
spoil their religion, as no men of other religions were
allowed in Lhasa. I asked them if there were no Moham-
medans living in Lhasa, and they repUed that there were
a few, but they were not allowed to practise their religious
rites — a sad admission in view of the toleration which the
Buddhist religion in reality enjoins. I added that we
would not have gone to Lhasa unless we had been abso-
lutely compelled to by their incivility in not meeting us
elsewhere ; that personally I had already suiFered great
inconvenience, and would much prefer not to have the
further inconvenience of going to Lhasa ; but no other
resource was now left to us, and my orders from the
Viceroy were final.

The Yutok Sha-p^ throughout was calm and polite,
and at his departure was cordial in his manner. The
Ta Lama, though more excited, was not ill-mannered.
The Chief Secretary was very much excited throughout,
and argumentative and querulous. The whole tone of the
delegates showed that they — or, at any rate, the Dalai
Lama — had not even yet realized the seriousness of the
position. The tone they adopted entirely ignored their
serious breaches of international courtesy, and was that of
people with a grievance against us and quite ignorant of
the fact that We had grievances against them ; they were,
too, excessively unbusinesslike and impracticable, and I
anticipated an infinity of trouble in carrying through a
settlement with such men. On the other hand, the dis-
position and manners of the Yutok Sha-p^ gave one more
confirmation of the impression I had long formed that the
laymen of Tibet were by no means inimical, and that but
for the opposition of the monks we might be on extremely
friendly terms with them.

Under General Macdonald 's well-thought-out arrange-
ments the occupation of the jong was effected without
any mishap or loss of life. Captain O'Connor accom-

ATTEMPTS TO STOP OUR ADVANCE 229

panied the delegates back towards the jong, which, how-
ever, they did not again enter, but took up their quarters
in the village, whUe their followers and baggage were sent
down to them there. I expressed my regret to the Yutok
Sha-p^ that at our first meeting I should have had to put
him to such inconvenience. But the occupation of the
jong was a military necessity. It was a matter of con-
gratulation that it should have been effected without the
loss of life on either side.

The following day the Tibetan delegates held another
prolonged interview with me, lasting three and a half
hours. They made no further mention of the occupation
of the jong, but were very insistent that we should not
advance to Lhasa. The Yutok Sha-p^ was the chief
spokesman at first, but during the course of the interview
each one repeated separately much the same arguments.
They said that in Ijhasa there were a great number of
monks and many unruly characters, and disturbances might
easily arise ; to which I replied that I should much regret
any such disturbances, and hoped the delegates would do
their best to prevent them, for the result could only be
the same as the result of the disturbances at Gyantse.

Another argument the delegates used was that, if we
went to Lhasa, we should probably find no one there. To
tliis I replied that this would necessitate our waiting until
people returned. I reminded them that they lived apart
from the rest of the world, and did not understand the
customs of international intercourse. To us the fact of
their having kept the representative of a great Power
waiting for a year to negotiate was a deep insult, which
most Powers would resent by making war without giving
any further chance for negotiation. But the British
Government disliked making war if they could possibly
help it. They had therefore commanded me to give the
Tibetans one more chance of negotiating, though that
chance could only be given at Lhasa itself. Let them
make the most of this opportunity.

The delegates replied that they had intended no insult
by keeping me waiting a year ; it was merely the custom
of their country to keep out strangers. " But, anyhow,"

230 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

they said, " let us forget the past ; let us be practical, and
look only at the present. Here we are, the leading men
in Tibet, ready to negotiate at Gyantse, and make a settle-
ment which wUl last for a century."

I repUed to the Yutok Sha-p^ that I had no doubt that
if a sensible man like himself had been sent to me sooner,
we might have made up a satisfactory settlement long
ago, and there would have been no necessity for us to go
through all this inconvenience of advancing through an
inhospitable country to Lhasa ; but after the many chances
which had been given them of negotiating at Gyantse,
they could hardly consider it reasonable that we should
give them any more. Moreover, the Viceroy had formed
the opinion, from the fact of the Ta Lama having told me
at Gyantse that he had no authority to evacuate the Jong
without referring to Lhasa, and from the fact of his run-
ning away, that he had not sufficient power to make a
settlement. For all these reasons we were compelled to
go to Lhasa, though I was ready to negotiate on the way,
and we would return directly a settlement was made.

They then made further reference to their religion
being spoilt if we went to Lhasa, and I asked them to
make more clear to me in what way precisely their re-
ligion would be spoilt. I said we were not intolerant of
other religions, as they themselves were. They had yester-
day told me that, though there were some Mohammedans
in Lhasa, yet they were not allowed to practise their
religious rites. We had no such feelings towards other
religions. On the contrary, we allowed the followers of
each to practise their religious observances as they hked.

The delegates said that they were not so intolerant to
the Mohammedans: they merely forbade building mosques,
and prevented any new Mohammedans coming into their
country. I said that at any rate soine were there, and
apparently they had not spoilt the religion of the
Tibetans. They replied that the ancestors of these had
come many, many years ago, and the Tibetans had become
accustomed to them ; to which my rejoinder was that if
Mohammedans had lived among them practising their
religious rites for all these years — apparently for centuries

DELEGATES REFUSE DISCUSS TERMS 231

— without spoiling the religion of Tibet, I could not
believe that the fact of our going to Lhasa for a few
weeks only could have any permanent ill-effect on the
religion of Tibet.

They then remarked that if we now went to Lhasa all
the other nations would want to go there, and see the
sights, and establish agents there. I told them I had not
the smallest wish to see the sights of Lhasa. I had
already travelled in many different lands, and seen finer
sights than they could show me at Lhasa ; and as to
stationing an agent there, we had no such intention.
Could they tell me if any other nation wished to ? They
replied that the Russians would be wanting to send an
agent to Lhasa. I told them they need not be in any fear
on that score, for the Russian Government had assured
our Government that they had no intention of sending an
agent to Tibet. I added that, though we had no intention
of establishing a political agent at Lhasa, we desired to
open a trade-mart at Gyantse on the same conditions as
the trade-mart at Yatung had been opened— that is, with
the right to send a British officer there to superintend the
trade.

The delegates would not, however, be led into a dis-
cussion of the terms. They said they could only discuss
the terms at Gyantse, and the conversation drifted back
into the old hues of withdrawing to Gyantse. Each of the
four members of the delegation repeated in turn the same
arguments for withdrawing to Gyantse, and I gave to
each in turn my reasons for advancing to Lhasa. I said I
feared they must think me extremely obstinate, and I felt
sure that, if they had been deputed by their Government
earlier in the day, I should have been able to agree to
their wishes, and we could have soon come to an agree-
ment. As matters stood at present, I could do nothing
but obey the orders of the Viceroy. They asked if I
could not stop here, represent to His Excellency what
they had said, and await further instructions. I replied
that the Viceroy only issued his orders after very careful
deliberation, but once they were issued, he never revoked
them.

232 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

I endeavoured throughout the interview to avoid being
drawn into petty wrangling. Even more important than
the securing of a paper convention, which might or might
not, be of value, was, I stated to Government at the time,
the placing of our personal relations with the officials of
Tibet upon a good footing from the start. I had to be
severe with them at Gyantse, because they would not pay
proper respect to me ; but at each interview since they had
come well before the appointed time, they were thoroughly
respectful throughout, and I was able to treat them with
the politeness I preferred to show them when they made
this possible. I trusted that, after I had suffered two
interviews, one of three and a quarter hours and another
of three and a half hours, they would feel that I was at any
rate accessible, and that they would have no compunction
in coming to see me whenever they felt inclined. Until,
however, they received further orders from Lhasa, there
was nothing more to be said on either side.

We had halted a day at Nagartse to collect supplies,
of which we were short, and some question arose whether,
as we had the negotiators here, it would not be better to
stop and negotiate. By being too uncompromising we
might be simply stiffening them up to renewed fighting,
and in the desolate country in which we found ourselves,
with practically no supplies and with a lofty pass behind
us, we might find ourselves in a very awkward predica-
ment. All this had certainly to be taken into considera-
tion. Still, we should be sure to find supplies in the Lhasa
Valley, unless the Tibetans resorted to the extreme course
of destroying or carrying off all their foodstuffs ; and as the
Tibetans were now evidently on the run, I never had any
real doubt that we should keep them on the run, and
follow them clean through, right up to Lhasa.

On the 21st we found that the delegates had decamped
in the night. Perhaps, after all, I had made a mistake,
and allowed these very coy birds to escape just as they
had come into my hand. On the whole I thought not.
I believed others would soon come in. So I marched very
contentedly along the shores of one of the most beautiful
lakes I have ever seen — the Yamdok Tso. It was 14,350

A LOVELY LAKE 233

feet above sea-level. In shape it was like a rough ring, sur-
rounding what is practically an island ; and in colour it
varied to every shade of violet and turquoise blue and
green. At times it would be the blue of heaven, reflect-
ing the intense Tibetan sky. Then, as some cloud passed
over it, or as, marching along, we beheld it at some
different angle, it would flash back rays of the deep greeny-
blue of a turquoise. Anon it would show out in various
shades of richest violet. Often, when overhead all was
black with heavy rain-clouds, we would see a streak of
brilliant light and colour flashing from the far horizon of
the lake ; while beyond it and beyond the bordering moun-
tains, each receding range of which was of one more
beautiful shade of purple than the last, rose once more
the mighty axial range of the Himalayas, at that great
distance not harsh in their whity coldness, but softly
tinted with a delicate blue, and shading away into the
exquisite azure of the sky. \Vhat caused the marvellous
colouring of this lake, which even the Tibetans call the
Turquoise Lake, we could none of us say. Perhaps it was
its depth, perhaps it was its saline character, or some
chemical component of its water. But whatever the
main cause, one cause at least must have been the in-
tense blue of the Tibetan sky at these great altitudes, so
deep and so translucent that even the sky of Greece and
Italy would pale beside it.

This latter theory is what Lord Rayleigh would adopt.
In a lecture which he delivered this year at the Royal
Institution on the causes of the coloration of water, he
gave his conclusion, from careful observations and tests,
that the cause of the blueness of, say, the Mediterranean
Sea was the Mediterranean sky, which was exactly the
theory we had thought must apply to this Tibetan lake.

Marching along by this lake we had much rain, turning
into snow at night. Pete Jong, a picturesque little fort
close to the shore, was reached on the 22nd, where, as at
Nagartse, a company of infantry and a few mounted
infantry were left to keep up the line of communications.
From here the mounted infantry, reconnoitring ahead,
reported the remnants of the Kham force to be retreating

234 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

in a disorganized condition, and looting the country en
route.

Another of the Tibetan stone walls, running from the
waters of the lake far up the mountain-side, was found
deserted on the next day, and that same day we crossed
the last pass on the way to Lhasa, the Kamba-la, 15,400
feet. The ascent was steep, but we all eagerly clambered
up in the faint hope of getting some distant glimpse of
Lhasa, or at any rate of the mighty Brahmaputra River,
which still lay in between us and the sacred city. The
enthusiastic Perceval Landon was quite certain that
through some chink he saw the glitter of a gilded cupola,
and refused to be convinced by the prosaic survey officers
that whatever it might be it at any rate was not the roof
of the Potala.

But if we were not yet to catch a sight of our goal we
had many other exciting incidents on that day. We
descended rapidly from the pass by a very steep path to
a camp on the banks of the great Brahmaputra itself,
called here the Sanpo, and presumed to be identical —
though this is a great geographical problem yet to be
solved — with the Brahmaputra of India. It was here
11,550 above sea-level, and spread out in many channels,
but farther down, where it was narrowed into a single
channel, it was 140 yards wide and flowing with a strong,
swift current. The valley was wide and well cultivated
with wheat and barley, and several cultivated valleys ran
into it. In these valleys were plenty of trees, poplars
and willows, but the hillsides were not wooded, as we
had hoped.

General Macdonald sent on his mounted infantry to
seize the Chaksam Ferry, and they succeeded in capturing
the two large ferry-boats, and occupied Chaksam for the
night. This was a great stroke, as if the Tibetans had
kept the boats on the other side of the river our difficulties
in surmounting this most serious obstacle would have
been immensely increased.

Another great event on this day was the receipt of
what was, I think, the first written communication which
any British official had received from a Tibetan official

LETTER FROM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 235

since the time of Warren Hastings. It was addressed to
" The all-wise Sahib sent by the English Government to
settle aifairs, from the Tibetan National Assembly." It
ran as follows :

" Recently the Tongsa Penlop sent a letter to the
Dalai Lama, and also communicated with the two
delegates, but hitherto a treaty has not been eiFected.
The Sahibs say that they intend to come to Lhasa and to
see the Dalai Lama and to negotiate there, and that they
will there establish friendship. The letter which contains
the nine terms of the Convention has arrived here. This
is a matter of great importance, and therefore the
Chigyab Kenpo (Lord Chamberlain) has been sent to
Chisul. Now, our Tibetan religion is very precious, so
our Regent, officials, monks, and laymen have consulted
together. Formerly we made a National Convention
that none was to enter the country. So now, even if the
Sahibs should come to Lhasa and meet the Dalai Lama,
this will not advantage the cause of friendship. Should a
fresh cause of dispute arise, we greatly fear that a dis-
turbance, contrary to the interests of friendship, may
follow. So we beg of the Sahibs both now and in the
future to give the matter their earnest consideration, and
if they will negotiate with the delegates who are now here
all will be well. Please consider well all that has been
said, and do not press forward hastily to Lhasa.

" Dated the Wood Dragon year."

This letter was brought by a messenger, who said that
the new delegates were then at Chisul, on the opposite
bank of the river. And now again arose the question
whether we should make use of this new chance of
negotiating or should still press on to Lhasa. We had
in front of us the serious obstacle formed by the Brahma-
putra River, which, if we crossed it, would be a nasty
impediment to have in our rear. On the other hand, we
had negotiators here with more ample credentials than
any had had before, and we had the National Assembly

236 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

itself in communication with us. The fear of our going
to Lhasa might have more effect than our actual presence
in the place. The mere dread of our advance might make
them agree to our terms, while if we actually advanced to
their sacred city we might find that the most determined
defence had been reserved for the capital ; and that we
had put our heads into a hornets' nest, and irritated 20,000
monks into buzzing about our ears. This was an eventu-
aUty on which I had to count, and of which I had been
warned by speeches by responsible men in England which
did httle to encourage me in my task. An ex-Prime
Minister, Lord Rosebery, had said in February in the
House of Lords that this Mission bore "in its circum-
stances so melancholy a resemblance to that first war in
Afghanistan, which we conducted under the late Lord
Lytton, that it must give all those whose minds and
memories recurred to the past serious grounds of mis-
givings when they saw once more His JNIajesty's Govern-
ment proceeding in the same direction to an end M'hich
they could not see themselves." A future Prime Minister,
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in pressing for the recall
of the Mission, had said in the House of Commons in
April that " we had had experience before, and the associa-
tions connected with the name of Cavagnari did not seem
to invite us to undertake a similar policy again."

If we pressed on to Lhasa, mto this swarm of fanati-
cally hostile monks, we might all share the fate of
Cavagnari, while if we simply held up the threat of
advancing we might get the treaty through. It was an
alternative which I had to consider ; but I felt fairly sure by
now that I had rightly taken the measure of the Tibetans,
so I sent a verbal intimation by the messenger that I
would be glad to receive the delegates, but that I could
not consent to defer my advance to Lhasa. And, in reply
to the letter of the National Assembly, I wrote to the
Dalai Lama that more than a year ago I had arrived at
Khamba Jong, which he had approved as a meeting-place
for the negotiations, but that the appointed delegates
refused to negotiate. I had advanced to Gyantse, but
still no negotiators had arrived, and instead, I was

MAJOR BRETHERTON DROWNED 237

treacherously attacked at night. Now the Viceroy had
ordered me to advance to Lhasa to negotiate there.
Those orders I had to obey, but I had no desire to create
disturbances in Lhasa or interfere with the rehgion of the
country, and as soon as I had obtained his seal to the
Convention 1 had been instructed to negotiate, I would
retire from Lhasa. No religious places which were not
occupied by Tibetan soldiers would be occupied by British
soldiers ; our soldiers would not fire if no opposition was
offered to them ; and all supplies taken from the peasants
would be paid for. But if opposition were offered, our
troops would be compelled to commence military opera-
tions, as they did at Gyantse, and the terms of the settlement
would be increased in severity.

This letter I despatched on the 25th, and the same
day we marched six miles down the banks of the Brahma-
putra River, to Chaksam Ferry. For the purpose of
crossing this river we had brought with us from India
four collapsible Berthon boats, and with these and the
local ferry-boats seven companies of infantry and one
company of mounted infantry were crossed over by
nightfall.

But a sad accident occurred : one of the boats capsized
in the rushing, eddying current, and Major Bretherton,
the Chief Supply and Transport Officer, and two Gurkhas
were drowned. There was no more capable and energetic
officer in the Force. Our success depended much less on
fighting than on supply and transport arrangements, and
these had been weUnigh perfect. Major Bretherton, in the
Kashmir, Gilgit, Chitral, and North- West frontiers, had
almost unrivalled experience of rough transport work, and
his driving power, his readiness, quickness, far-sightedness,
and inexhaustible buoyancy and cheerfulness were of
inestimable value in carrying through such an enterprise
as that which we had now so nearly completed. It was
hard that young Gurdon should lose his life just at the
beginning of so promising a career ; it seemed almost
more cruel that a man who had achieved so much, and
who was just within sight of the goal for which he had
worked longer and harder than any one of us, should have

238 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

been swept away in an instant and have never seen his
reward. It is in reflecting on cases such as these that one
begins to wonder whether our touching trustfulness in the
mercy of Providence is altogether justified.

We had to halt some days now, while the troops and
baggage were being transported across the river, and on
the 27th I had a three hours' interview with this new
deputation from Lhasa, which consisted of the Dalai
Lama's Chamberlain, a man of some capacity, with an air
of great consequence, who was evidently regarded with
much respect ; the Ta Lama, the somewhat effete, but
genial, old gentleman who had met me at Gyantse ; and
a Secretary of the Council, a brisk, cheery gentleman, with
an ever-ready smile, and very different from the other
Secretary who had met us at Khamba Jong, Gyantse, and
Nagartse.

They brought with them a letter from the Dalai
Lama, and repeated the old request that we should not
go to Lhasa. The only new argument they used was
that our going to Lhasa would so spoil their religion that
the Dalai Lama might die. I told them that I should
much regret that our arrival in Lhasa should have any
such melancholy result, but I had studied their religion,
and could hardly believe it was so weak that it would not
stand our presence in Lhasa for a few weeks. The dele-
gates repeatedly urged me to realize the personal incon-
venience our presence in Lhasa would be to the Dalai
Lama. The Ta Lama explained that the Chamberlain
was in constant personal attendance on the Dalai Lama,
and enjoyed his fullest confidence, and for that reason had
been specially deputed by the Dalai Lama. I was given
to understand that this was a very unusual favour, and I
was earnestly begged to accede to the Dalai Lama's per-
sonal wishes ; the delegates further told me that if I did
not accede to them they would themselves be severely
punished by the Dalai Lama.

In reply I expressed my inability to accede to the
Dalai Lama's wishes, but trusted they would ask His
Holiness to excuse my insistence. They had spoken of
the inconvenience our presence in Lhasa would cause the

ENVOY FROM DALIA LAMA 239

Dalai Lama, but His Holiness would, I felt sure, realize
the inconvenience we had already suffered through the
delay in the arrival of negotiators. I could assure them
that the Viceroy had every desire to consult the feelings
of the Dalai Lama, and it was because we knew that His
Holiness was averse to the presence of strangers in Lhasa
that His Excellency had not sent me there in the first
instance, though the capital of a country was the natural
and usual place in which to conduct negotiations. It was
only after we had found it impossible to effect a settle-
ment anywhere else that I had been ordered to proceed to
Lhasa.

I added that after an Envoy had been kept waiting for
a year, and had been attacked and shot at for two months,
most rulers would have refused to allow their representa-
tive to negotiate till the capital had been captured. We
were not, however, advancing with that object. They
could see that here we were paying for aU supplies we
took, and the monastery immediately outside the camp
was left unmolested. I was prepared to show like con-
sideration on our arrival at Lhasa if we were unopposed,
and I trusted His Holiness would appreciate this con-
cession.

The delegates assured me again that the Dalai Lama
was really anxious to make a settlement, that they had
come in a peaceful manner, and had let the army they had
with them a few days ago disperse to their homes. I
had little difficulty in believing these assertions, for we had
received accounts that the Tibetan army had scattered in
a panic, the Kham levies looting in all directions. A
peaceful settlement was undoubtedly, therefore, the sincere
desire of the Dalai Lama, though turbulent monks might
yet create a disturbance in Lhasa. As to the delegates
being punished if we advanced to Lhasa, I said that I
myself would be punished if we did not.

A discussion afterwards followed on the question of
other foreigners coming to Tibet if we were allowed there.
I told them it was the usual custom for neighbouring
countries to have representatives at each other's capital,
and we would probably have avoided all the misunder-

240 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

standings which led to the present troubles if we had had
a representative at Lhasa and they had had one in
Calcutta. We knew, however, their aversion to keeping a
British agent at Lhasa ; we were not, therefore, pressing
the point, and were only insisting upon having trade
agents at Gyantse and other marts. There would, how-
ever, in any case, have been no reason for other foreigners
establishing an agent at Lhasa. Russia had declared that
she had no intention of sending an agent to Tibet. The
delegates replied that our establishing an agent even at
Gyantse would be against their custom, and spoil their
religion. I said that I understood, then, that they were not
prepared even now to agree to our terms, and they
informed me that they were only authorized to discuss
them, and they would have to be considered in the
National Assembly. " You expect me, then," I said, " to
remain out here in a half-desert place discussing terms. I
have already remained for months together in desert
places in Tibet, and can now negotiate in no other place
than Lhasa." I begged the Chamberlain as a practical
man to accept this as inevitable, and to turn his mind now
to insuring that there should be no more useless blood-
shed on the way, and that we should be enabled by the
speedy conclusion of the settlement to leave Lhasa at an
early date.

Before closing the interview, I had some conversation
with the delegates on the general question of intercourse
between Tibet and India. I said that we should be very
glad if they would more frequently accept the hospitality
we were always ready to offer them in India. They would
find that in India they could travel wherever they liked,
and would everywhere be protected and welcomed. They
would see, too, that though we were Christians we not
only tolerated but protected Buddhists, Hindus, and
Mohammedans. We even spent large sums of money in
preserving ancient buildings of other religions. In this
camp was an officer. Colonel WaddeU, who had spent his
life in studying the Buddhist religion, and while reading
the ancient books had discovered instructions indicating
exactly where the birthplace of Buddha could be found.

DISCUSSION REGARDING RELIGION 241

The British Government had spent a considerable amount
of money in clearing away forests, and the town in which
Buddha was born was actually discovered. We did not
believe that every religion except our own was wrong. On
the contrary, we believed that the same God whom we all
worshipped could be approached by many different roads,
and we were ready to respect those who were travelhng to
the same destination, though by a different road to that
which we ourselves were following.

The delegates expressed their satisfaction that we
should have studied their religion, but the conversation
soon returned to the more pressing question of our advance
to Lhasa. The Chamberlain was the most sensible,
practical man we had so far met, and I was specially polite
to him, as in the event of the flight or murder of the
Dalai Lama he might be a possible Regent. But even he
had evidently very little power, and while he was nervous
throughout the interview, was clearly more nervous of his
own people than of us.

After the interview had lasted three and a half hours, I
asked them to report my words to the Dalai Lama, and I
told them that I should be very glad to see them again
whenever they liked, either to discuss further official
business, or, putting official matters aside, to pay me a
friendly private visit. They took one of my Tibetan
Munshis with them, and gave him a special present of silk
for Captain O'Connor, and also told the Munshi that the
man who had brought all this trouble on Tibet was the
Tung-yig-Chembo (the Chief Secretary), who was at
Khamba Jong, Gyantse, and Nagartse, but who was not
present at this interview. It was satisfactory to find that
two such influential men as the Chamberlain and the
Ta Lama had discovered this, and I thought that if the
man was now cast aside, our chance of getting on terms of
friendship with high Tibetan officials would be vastly
increased.

I now accepted the silk which the Dalai Lama had sent
me through the Tongsa Penlop, but which I had at the time
refused to accept unless accompanied by a letter or handed
to me by one of the Dalai Lama's own officials. The

242 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

present was mentioned in the Dalai Lama's letter to me,
and the Chamberlain also told me the Dalai Lama begged
me to accept it. I could therefore accept it without loss of
dignity. I sent him in return a large and very handsome
silver-gilt bowl.

This letter was certainly the first letter which any
Dalai Lama had written to an Englishman, and was
addressed " To the Sahib sent by the English Government
to settle aifairs," and ran as follows :

" In a letter recently received by the Sha-p^ from the
Tongsa Penlop he says that the establishment of friend-
ship has now become difficult, as the English officers with
their escort say that they are about to proceed to Lhasa to
make a treaty and to meet the Dalai Lama. With this
communication the nine terms of the Convention were
also received. The National Assembly has been consulted
regarding this matter, and as it has decided for friendship
it has sent a separate communication to the British. I too,
in accordance with the religious customs of Tibet, am
at present in retreat, and it would be a difficult matter for
me to meet the Sahibs. 1 have sent two representatives
on ahead to negotiate regarding friendship, and also the
Chikyab Kenpo, who lives always near me. It wiU be well if
matters are discussed with my delegates there for the sake
of peace. But it is not well for the establishment of an
agreement between the two countries if you come to
Lhasa contrary to my wishes. Please consider this well.
I send a scarf and have already sent some silks separately.

" Dated the 8th day of the 6th month,
"Wood Dragon year."

To this letter I replied that I was sure he would
recognize the inconvenience it would be to me now that I
had left Gyantse to negotiate at any other place than
Lhasa itself, but that I would disturb His Hohness as
little as possible in his religious seclusion.

The Dalai Lama's Chamberlain returned to Lhasa
immediately^ but on the 29th the Ta Lama, accompanied
by the same Secretary of Council who was present at the

LETTER FROM DALAI LAMA 243

interview of July 27, again came to visit me. He explained
that the Chamberlain had returned to Lhasa to report
personally to the Dalai Lama the result of his interview
with me, and he hoped that I would wait here till the
reply of the Dalai Lama should reach me. I informed
him that I could not wait here longer than the 31st, that
it was not our custom to act in a dilatory manner, and
that I was indeed daily expecting a telegram from the
Viceroy asking me for an explanation of the delay which
had already occurred.

During the interview, which lasted three hours, , the
conversation was of a discursive nature, as the Ta Lama
clearly had no power even to discuss anything else than
our advance to Lhasa. I gathered that what he and the
other delegates, and probably also the Dalai Lama himself,
feared was the turbulence of the war party among the
monks of the three great monasteries, leading to some
futile collision with our troops which would not have the
slightest effect in stopping us, but which would merely
irritate us into sacking Lhasa. ' Probably what the Dalai
Lama's party also feared was that these same turbulent
monks might turn upon the Dalai Lama himself and
make away with him.

I told the Ta Lama that I considered it a great pity
that he and the other able councillors who had recently
met me had not come to Khamba Jong, for the Secretary
of Council who had met Mr. White and me there had not
comported himself in at all a conciliatory manner ; he had,
in fact, irritated us considerably, and made a peaceful
settlement impossible. This surprised me the more
because the Chinese Government had informed the
Viceroy that the Dalai Lama had agreed to Khamba
Jong as the meeting-place where negotiations should take
place.

The Ta Lama replied that what the Dalai Lama
meant was the Khamba boundary, not Khamba Jong.
I told him that this was hardly intelligible, as the Khamba
boundary was along the top of mountains. We clearly
could not sit on the top of a mountain and negotiate : we
had to meet on either the one side or the other, and as the

244 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

Amban and Tibetan officials had come to India on the
last occasion, it was natural that we should expect to
meet in Tibet on this. I added that when the Chinese
and Tibetan officials came to India we treated them as
our guests, as Mr. White, who was present at DarjiUng,
could testify ; we provided houses, food, and transport for
them ; allowed them to have their own soldiers as escort ;
and took them down to Calcutta to visit His Excellency
the Viceroy. On the other hand, when Mr. White and I
arrived at Khamba Jong last year we were not even allowed
to 5?<2/ supplies.

The Ta Lama said that what was meant by the
Khamba boundary was not the top of the mountaius, but
the wall at Giagong. He did not deny that Tibetan
officials had been treated as guests at Darjihng, but he
said we did not realize the great expense the Tibetan
Government had incurred in transporting them to the
Indian frontier. I then asked the Ta Lama what reason
they had for originally starting this trouble, which after all
originated in their invasion of Sikkim in 1886. Why did
they send troops into the territory of a British feudatory
State ? We had lived for so many years without troubling
one another : why did they start a trouble which had lasted
up to the present time ?

He replied that they considered Sikkim to be a
feudatory of Tibet, and the Dalai Lama was accustomed
at that time to send orders to the Sikkim chief. I said
that they must surely have been aware of the treaty which
had been concluded more than twenty years previous to
the Tibetan invasion of Sikkim, between Sikkim and the
British Government, by which the former acknowledged
the suzerainty of the latter. If the Tibetans had had any
objection, the proper course would have been to make
representations at the time, and not twenty years after to
send troops into Sikkim.

As regards the treaty we now wished to make with
them, how would the negotiations be conducted ? I asked,
and who had the final authority in the State ? The Ta
Lama said that Councillors and secretaries and representa-
tives of the National Assembly would meet me and discuss

DELEGATES UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE 245

the terms. The final authority was the National Assembly,
which was composed of representatives from all over
Tibet, but chiefly from the three great monasteries at
Lhasa. Both monks and laymen attended as well as
many officials, but the Councillors (Sha-p^s) were not
included in it, and the Dalai Lama had no representative
there,

I told the Ta Lama that this seemed rather extra-
ordinary, for the Councillors were presumably the most
able men in the State, and yet their counsels were liable
to be overridden by the decision of a body of irresponsible
and less capable men. " Supposing," I said, " that the
Dalai Lama and the Councillors wished to agree to the
terms I was asking and the National Assembly declined
to agree, whose views would be adopted ?" The Ta Lama
said that the Dalai Lama and the Councillors never dis-
agreed with the National Assembly, for the decision of
the latter was final. I said this made matters very difficult
for me ; for I negotiated with the Councillors as being the
leading men in the State, and yet they could not even
enter the National Assembly to report what I had said
to them. The Ta Lama said the custom was for the
Councillors to send one of the secretaries to present their
views to the National Assembly. 1 asked who presided,
what was the number of representatives, and whether the
decision was arrived at by votes. He said no one presided,
that there were about 500 representatives, and that they
arrived at a decision by discussing till they were all of one
mind.

I remarked that in these circumstances the negotiations
promised to last a considerable time. Did he think they
would be concluded in a year ? He said a good deal
depended upon how we proposed to set about negotiating.
If we took each point separately, and had it discussed in
the National Assembly till agreed to, the settlement
might be made fairly quickly ; but if we gave the whole
treaty in a lump, and said this and nothing less must be
agreed to, he did not think a settlement would ever be
made.

I told the Ta Lama that it was a matter of indifference

246 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

to the British Government how long the negotiations
lasted, for we should expect the Tibetan Government to
pay for our expenses from the date of the attack on the
Mission at Gyantse till the date of the conclusion of the
treaty. The Ta Lama urged that we should not be hard
on the Tibetans by demanding an indenmity, for if we did
we could never be friends. I answered that we would not
have demanded an indemnity if they had been reasonable
and had negotiated at Khamba Jong or Gyantse, but as
they had chosen to fight, and had been worsted, they must
take the consequences of their own actions.

The Ta Lama then dwelt upon the habit of the
Tibetans to take plenty of time in making decisions.
They liked to think well before taking action, and could
not stand being hurried. I informed him that we also
tried to think well before taking action, but we thought
quickly and acted at once, so as to get on without delay
from one thing to another. The hves of men were short,
and we wished to get through as much as possible in the
little time we were here. The Ta Lama said that their
time was taken up with the study of religion, which did
not admit of hurry. During this latter part of the dis-
cussion the Ta Lama and the Secretary laughed heartily,
then the former, after asking leave to depart, repeated, as
I was shaking hands with him, another appeal to me not
to go to Lhasa.

On the same day as I was having this interview I also
received from the Chinese Resident a letter, in which he
expressed sympathy with me in the trials of my long
journey, and said that the Tibetans were " dull, unlettered
men, obstinately averse to receiving advice," and that he
was truly ashamed at the state of affairs. He said he
was sending me the Chief of the Military Secretariat to
acquaint me with the condition of affairs. He had im-
pressed on the Dalai Lama that the Tibetans were on no
account to treat me unceremoniously, but he warned me
that these Tibetans were " cunning and insincere to a
degree, and that it was necessary to obtain guarantees
from them before a settlement of anything could be
made."

WE CROSS BRAHMAPUTRA 247

On July 31 all the troops, except a small garrison to
guard the ferry, having crossed the river, we set out again
towards Lhasa. As I was passing Chisul the Ta Lama
asked me to stay for a short time to talk to him. He
said he was much surprised at our advancing, as he had
understood from me that we wished to make a settlement
and be on friendly terms, and, if we advanced, there might
be disturbances. I reminded him that I had always said
we would advance, and remarked that, if there were dis-
turbances, the responsibility would rest upon the Tibetan
Government, for I had informed him many times, and
had written to both the Amban and the Dalai Lama to
say that we would not commence fighting, and our troops
had orders not to fire unless they were fired upon.

The Ta Lama then begged me to stay till the
Chamberlain returned with the reply from the Dalai
Lama. His Holiness would not at aU like our advancing
without his permission, but if we waited for his reply, we
might find that he was willing for us to advance, and he
would give orders to the Tibetan soldiers to allow us to
pass. I replied that we had already waited nearly a week
at Chaksam Ferry, that there had been plenty of time to
issue such orders if there was any intention to issue them,
and that, in any case, whatever the Dalai Lama's reply
was, I should have to advance to Lhasa.

The Ta Lama then tried to persuade me to advance
with only a small following ; he said that my entering
Lhasa with a large army would alarm the Tibetans, and
make the Dalai Lama think that our intentions were not
really friendly. I recalled to his remembrance that only
a few minutes before he had spoken of the possibility of
disturbances. It was to protect ourselves in case of dis-
turbances, and to guard ourselves against such another
attack as that which was made upon me at Gyantse in
May, that we were taking a sufficient force to Lhasa.

The Ta Lama begged me not to be always harping
upon what had occurred at Gyantse. Let all that be for-
gotten, he said. The Tibetans were now really anxious
to make a settlement, and he would give me a promise in
writing that no harm would befall us if I went to Lhasa

248 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

with only a small following. I told him the Tibetans
already had a promise in writing from me in my letter to
the Dalai Lama that we would not fight unless opposed,
and if, with that in their hands, they allowed disturbances
to occur, I should presume they were not anxious for a
settlement. I required no written promise from them not
to harm us, but relied upon their sense of self-interest not
to bring on further disturbances.

The Ta Lama, as a final effort, begged me to stay here
for a day ; and, last of all, as he was shaking hands with
me — a ceremony which lasted a quarter of an hour —
entreated me not to enter Lhasa city. I told him that I
had the highest admiration for his eloquence and power of
persuasion, and would have great satisfaction in telling the
Dalai Lama that he really had done his utmost to delay
us. I, of course, realized the position in which he stood,
and that it was his business by every means in his power
to prevent us reaching Lhasa. At the same time, I was
sure, I said, that a man of his sense knew in the bottom
of his heart that the Tibetans were extremely fortunate in
having been able to secure our peaceful entry to Lhasa,
and prevented the capture of the city by force of arms.
We had promised not to occupy Lhasa if we were not
further opposed, and with that promise they must be
content.

The Ta Lama, though excessively urgent towards the
close of the interview, was perfectly polite throughout.
But so extraordinarily impracticable are these Tibetans
that he evidently thought that, because I had assured him
at previous interviews that we wished to make a friendly
settlement, we were therefore committing a sort of breach
of faith in now advancing to Lhasa. I had never ceased
to assure him that we did intend to advance, but now that
we actually were advancing he regarded it as a grievance.

For the next two days we marched steadily on
towards Lhasa, expecting at each corner we turned to
catch sight of the Potala in the distance, or at least to
hear from the reconnoitring parties of mounted infantry
that they had seen its gilded roofs. On August 2, at our
last camp, a dozen miles only from Lhasa, which now

TIBETANS' LAST EFFORT 249

really could be seen in the distance, I received the final
deputation, which had come to make the last great effort to
induce us to stop. It consisted of the old Ta Lama, the
General who had met Mr. White and me at Khamba Jong,
and had since been promoted to the post of Councillor, and
known as the Tsarong Sha-p^, the Chinese official deputed
by the Resident, the Abbot in private attendance on the
Dalai Lama, a Secretary of Council, and the Abbots of
the three great Lhasa monasteries. They repeated the
usual requests that we should not go to Lhasa. I re-
iterated my usual statements that we must go there.
They said that if we would remain where we were they
would supply us with everything — of course, on payment.
The Dalai Lama's private Abbot made a special appeal
on behalf of the rehgion of Tibet. I told him I was
particularly interested in hearing his views on religion,
but I trusted he would not object to my reminding him
that, while he was an eminent authority on religion, he
had little experience of politics. In political life, when a
country repudiated a treaty, decUned to negotiate a new
one, and attacked the Envoy who was sent for that
purpose, it was considered that that country had com-
mitted three very serious offences, any one of which
would be justification for the capture of the capital of the
offending country. In the present case, out of considera-
tion for the special sanctity of the city, we were prepared,
if we encountered no opposition, to abstain from capturing
Lhasa, and I trusted the Abbot would appreciate the
consideration. Perhaps if he had himself been fired on
continually for two months he would not have been
equally moderate. The Abbot laughed, but remarked
that they also had had to suffer.

I promised the Abbot to respect the monasteries.
If they were occupied by soldiers, and we were fired
at from them, as we were from the monasteries round
Gyantse, we should, of course, have to attack them.
But we did not wish to be obliged to resort to force,
and as long as we were not attacked we would prevent
our soldiers from entering the monasteries. I would
also see that soldiers and followers did not enter the

250 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA

city of Lhasa unless in attendance on an officer. The
Tsarong Sha-p^ asked me to give them a written agree-
ment to this effect. I said I would, provided they would
give me a written agreement that traders from the city
would not be prevented from coming to seU things to the
soldiers in camp, as the Gyantse traders had done. The
Tsarong Sha-p^ said that this would be impossible without
the consent of the National Assembly. I told him that I
could not in that case give them the written agreement,
and I rose at once and closed the Durbar.

The final effort to stop us had failed, and on August 3
we set out on our last march. The eventful day, to
which we had so long looked forward, had at length
arrived. We marched up a well- cultivated vaUey two
or three miles broad, bounded by steep snow-capped
mountains, and with a rapid river as wide as the
Thames at Windsor running through it. We passed
numbers of httle hamlets and groves of poplars and
willows. And then we saw, rising steeply on a rocky
prominence in the midst of the valley, a fort-like domi-
nating structure, with gilded roofs, which we knew could
be none other than the Potala, the palace of the Dalai
Lama of Lhasa.

The goal of so many travellers' ambitions was actually
in sight ! The goal, to attain which we had endured and
risked so much, and for which the best efforts of so many
had been concentrated, had now been won. Every obstacle
which Nature and man combined could heap in our way
had been finally overcome, and the sacred city, hidden so
far and deep behind the Himalayan ramparts, and so
jealously guarded from strangers, was full before our
eyes.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TERMS

I HAVE often been asked what were my feelings when I
first saw Lhasa — whether I was not filled with a sense of
elation. I was filled with nothing of the kind. It was
when I left Lhasa that I reaUy had all that feeling of
intense relief and satisfaction which everyone experiences
when he has set his heart on one great object and attained
it. When I left Lhasa I had my treaty, and — what I had
always put at more value than the treaty itself — ^the good-
will of the people. When I arrived at Lhasa it was very
doubtful if I should be able to get a treaty at all, and still
more doubtful if I could get it with the good- will of the
people, without which any paper treaty would be useless.
To negotiate a treaty with a people acknowledged by those
who knew them best — the Chinese, the Nepalese, and the
Bhutanese — to be most obstinate and obstructive, time
was required. To break through the reserve of so ex-
clusive a people, to make friends of men with whom we
had just been fighting, still more time was essential. Yet
it was just time that was denied me. I had pressed for it
in June, but in too ineffectual a manner, and had been
rebuffed. Though this was an avowedly political Mission,
military considerations were allowed to preponderate. I
could only stay in Lhasa a month and a half or two
months. We must be back before the winter. And thus
tied, I had to set to work with all speed, but with the
outward appearance of having the utmost leisure, to
negotiate the treaty. Hurried as I was, I had yet to
assume an air of perfect indifference whether the negotia-
tions were concluded this year, next year, or the year after.
And irritated though I might be, I had above all to

251

252 THE TERMS

exercise as much control as I could possibly bring to bear
to keep down any feelings of hastiness or exasperation,
which might ruin our chances of securing the eventual
good-will of the people.

I had, then, too much before me and still too much
anxiety in regard to the very immediate present, to yet
feel much elation on our first arrival at Lhasa, and my
chief thought was how to start the negotiations without
showing in what a hurry I really was.

Before, however, describing the course of the negotia-
tions which were now to take place, I must give an
account of the terms which I had been directed to make
with the Tibetans, and the considerations on which those
demands were based. Already, before I left Gyantse, I
had received fi:-om the Government of India a copy of the
despatch, dated June 30,* containing their views on the
terms which they had sent to the Secretary of State. I
was to understand that the proposals contained therein
had not yet been approved by His Majesty's Govern-
ment, but I was, without committing Government, to
ascertain how the Tibetan Government would regard
them.

It was the terms contained in these proposals — with
the exception of asking for the establishment of a Resident
at Lhasa — of which I informed the Tongsa Penlop, and
asked him, as I have mentioned previously, to com-
municate to the Dalai Lama.

The first point on which the Government of India laid
stress in their communication to the Secretary of State was
the acceptance by the Tibetans of an accredited British
agent in their country, preferably in Lhasa itself. The argu-
ments against such a measure were largely based on the
declarations of His Majesty's Government, and on con-
sideration of international policy. And apart from such
considerations, the Government of India declared them-
selves deeply impressed by the grave responsibiUties
which they must incur by placing a resident agent at the
capital of Tibet. Still, they felt it their duty reluctantly
to assume the burden of that measure.

* Blue-book, III., p. 33.

NECESSITY FOR AGENT AT LHASA 253

His Majesty's Government had already recognized the
necessity of asserting the predominance of British influence
in Tibet, and Lord Lansdowne had clearly apprised
Count BenckendorfF of our attitude in this matter. To
establish such an influence it was evident that we must
now acquire something more practical than the nominal
concessions acquired by the treaty of 1890 as the fruits of
our operations in 1888. Our experience then gained
showed that we could not trust to our recent military
successes leaving any lasting impression. It was difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the best guarantee for the due
observance of the new Convention, and for the adequate
protection of our rights as the only European Power
limitrophe with Tibet, must be that, in addition to the
appointment of officers to watch over our commercial
interests at the marts to be established in Tibet, we should
demand the acceptance of an accredited British agent in
Tibet.-

The place at which this agent should reside was a ques-
tion t)n which opinions might easily .differ, and it might,
the Indian Government thought, be left open until they
were in possession of the fuller information that would be
acquired after the Mission had reached Lhasa. The
arguments in favour of placing him at Lhasa were the
foflowing: Lhasa was the pivot of the rehgious and
political life of Tibet ; it was the seat of the Dalai Lama
and his Council, with whom we had to establish official
relations ; and it was the focus of the priestly influence,
which we had to conciliate or overcome. It might be
argued that it was undesirable to arouse the resentment of
the Tibetans by requiring them to receive a representative
of a strange race and a strange religion in the home of
their most sacred associations. But after the manner in
which for the past fifteen years the Tibetans had re-
pudiated their obligations and had derided the patience
with which we had submitted to their insults, Government
beheved tha,t, even should such a feeling exist, it might be
better to face it than to allow of the misconstruction
which would be placed upon the location of an agent at
any place outside Lhasa.

254 THE TERMS

They saw, however, no reason why the presence of a
resident agent in Lhasa should be a lasting source of
irritation. For more than eighty years we had now had
an agent at Khatmandu, a capital the isolation of which
from foreign intrusion had been guarded hardly less
jealously than that of Lhasa itself, and that by a people
whose prowess had been proved in our own armies. The
hostilities which preceded the first appointment of a
British Minister at Peking, under the treaty of 1860, were
also far more serious than any opposition which had so far
been encountered, or was likely to be met with, on the way
to Lhasa. The Government of India saw, then, no
reason to anticipate greater risk in placing a Resident at
Lhasa than was incurred in sending a British representa-
tive to Khatmandu or Peking.

Despite the hostility which, under the influence and
leadership of the monkish faction, they had displayed
against us, the Tibetan people had no dislike for us as a
race, and there was nothing in the tolerant Buddhist creed
which counselled hostility to strangers of a different faith
or encouraged fanaticism. The exclusion of British sub-
jects and Europeans was merely based on a concordat of
the present dominant class in Tibet, and was not in any
way a religious obligation. The monks were at present
opposed to us, fearing the loss of their influence, but their
antipathy was based on suspicion and ignorance, and with
tact and patience it might be eradicated — a view which
was supported by the friendly relations which the Mission
was able to establish at Khamba Jong with ecclesiastical
Envoys from the Tashi Lama of Shigatse.

It had always to be borne in mind that subjects of all
her other neighbours — China, Nepal, and Kashmir— were
allowed freely to resort to, and trade in, Tibet, while
China and Nepal had official representatives at Lhasa. As
at Khatmandu, our agent would, like the Nepal repre-
sentative at Lhasa, abstain from all interference with the
internal administration of the country, and would confine
himself to watching over our trade interests and in guard-
ing against the introduction of foreign influences. His
presence, therefore, at Lhasa would be ui no sense a

ARGUMENTS FOR AGENT AT LHASA 255

contravention of the policy declared by His Majesty's
Government.

As to the objection which might be raised on the
grounds of the difficulty of keeping open communication
with the agent at Lhasa, the Government of India con-
tended that such an objection was based upon a mis-
apprehension, and that there was no real difficulty, except
on the southern side of the watershed, to such free passage
to and from Tibet as might be necessary for the adequate
support of a British representative, either at Lhasa or
Gyantse ; and our recent operations had demonstrated
that, however great the physical difficulties of communica-
tion might be, they were not insuperable even at the worst
time of the year. Moreover, the difficulties on the Indian
side of the Himalayas would be obviated by a road
through Chumbi, which they were examining, that ran
down the Amochu to the plains of Bengal, avoiding the
Jelap-la.

The Government of India felt, then, that it was a
necessity to have an agent at Lhasa, and they were quite
willing to undertake the responsibility. That was the
view of the responsible Government on the spot. The
Imperial side of the question had stUl to be weighed, and
of that the Imperial Government would be the judge, but
in regard to that aspect the Government of India made
the following observations :

Lord Lansdowne had given assurances to the Russian
Ambassador, but he had expressly added when making
them that the policy then announced was not unalterable
in any eventuality, and that the action of His Majesty's
Government was to some extent dependent on the action
of the Tibetans themselves. The Government of India
did not desire to depart from the declaration which Lord
Lansdowne had made that, so long as no other Power
endeavoured to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, no attempt
would be made to annex it, to establish a protectorate
over itj or in any way to control its internal administration ;
but they thought that recent developments might make
it incumbent upon them to recommend to His Majesty's
Government a reconsideration of the opinion they had

256 THE TERMS

expressed in their telegram of November 6, 1903, in so
far as it concerned the establishment of a permanent
Mission in the country.

As to the desire not to accelerate political complica-
tions regarding the integrity of China, the Government of
India pointed out that no other European Power adjoined
Tibet or had any interests there, and that, so far, our
arrangements had been made with the cordial co-operation
of the Chinese officials deputed to, meet the Mission, and
it was understood that they met with the sympathy, if not
with the avowed approval, of the Chinese Government, as
was evidenced by Sir Ernest Satow's telegram of June 15.

So much was urged by the Government in regard to
the estabhshment of an agent at Lhasa. The next
cardinal point in the policy which they wished to recom-
mend was the retention of the Chumbi Valley.

They explained that this valley lay to the south of the
main watershed, and was Indian rather than Tibetan in
character. Our Mission had been well received by the
people, and Mr. Walsh, the Political Agent who had been
located among them, reported that they regarded our
presence with unmixed satisfaction, and that their only
fear was lest we might evacuate the valley, and expose
them to the vengeance which the Lamas would surely
take upon them for having lived on terms of friendliness
with us. The occupation of this region was recommended
by all the local authorities as far back as 1888, was strongly
urged by the Bengal Government in Mr. Cotton's letter,
dated July 22, 1895, but was deferred owing to Chinese
susceptibilities. The contumacious disregard of the
Tibetans for their treaty obligations and for the authority
of their Suzerain had culminated in armed resistance to
the passage of a friendly Mission despatched by us with
the full cognizance of that Suzerain, and accompanied by
Chinese representatives throughout. It appeared Xo
Government that recent developments might make it
necessary to take material guarantees. They had referred
to a road th^^ough the Chumbi Valley as desirable in order
to secure the position of our representative in Tibet, if
such a one should be appointed. The route which was

OCCUPATION OF CHUMBI 257

projected along the Amo Chu Valley would lead into the
foot of the Chumbi Valley, and it was obviously desirable
that it should continue under our control up to the point
where it debouches on to the open plateau of Tibet beyond
the Tang-la. The opening up of such a route into Tibet
proper must evidently be the precursor of any real develop-
ment of trade, and, what was of far greater importance, it
would provide one of the surest guarantees for the pre-
dominance of our influence and the safety of our Agents
in the country.

It had been estimated that, if our forces had all left
Tibet by October, the cost of the expedition would not
be less than £648,000. The contingency of such an
early withdrawal was remote, and it seemed probable that
the operations necessary to assert our treaty rights and to
exact reparation from the Tibetans would cost us not less
than a million sterling.

The Indian Government were, therefore, of opinion
that, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Convention,
and as a security for the payment of the indemnity, that
they proposed to require, as weR as in the interests of the
people of the valley themselves, the occupation of the
Chumbi Valley for such period as might be necessary for
the due protection of our treaty rights, and international
interests would become inevitable.

The next point to be considered was this question of
demanding an indemnity.

Now that it had become necessary to send a regular
military expedition to Lhasa, Government submitted that
they had a good claim to be recouped the expense to
which they had been put. It was obvious that the re-
tention of the Chumbi V^aUey would not, from a monetary
point of view, be an adequate return for the outlay in
which they had been involved, and Government thought
it well to put forward a claim to compensation against the
Tibetans. Further, they considered that, having regard to
the recent attacks upon their Mission at Gyantse, and as a
measure calculated to increase the security of their repre-
sentative in Tibet, they should follow the precedent of the
demands presented by the allied Powers to the Chinese

258 THE TERMS

Government after the events of 1900, and should insist on
the razing of all fortified positions which might impede the
course of free communication between our frontier and
Lhasa, and on the prohibition of the importation of arms
into Tibet or their manufacture within the country except
with their special permission.

Finally the Government of India discussed what
might be done if His Majesty's Government declined to
agree to the appointment of a representative at Lhasa. In
that case they would urge that a Resident Agent should
be posted at Gyantse, whose functions would primarily be
to supervise and maintain the trading facilities which we
must undoubtedly secure. Although the duties of such
an agent would be mainly commercial, they would
necessarily comprise that of seeing that the Convention or
treaty which we should eventually conclude with the
Tibetan Government was observed in all respects. The
agent should, therefore, have the right of proceeding to
Lhasa, as occasion might require, to discuss matters with
the Chinese Amban or with the high officials of the
Dalai Lama.

In making the terms of his appointment Government
considered that the grounds and conditions of our self-
restraint in this matter should be clearly indicated to the
Tibetans. It should be explained that His Majesty's
Government consented to waive their claim to the appoint-
ment of a Resident Agent at Lhasa solely out of regard
for the Tibetan desire to maintain their freedom from
contact with European influence at the political and
religious capital of their country ; that they were pre-
pared to forego this demand, so long as the Tibetan
Government preserved an attitude of isolation from
external affairs, and avoided all intercourse with other
European Powers ; but that, in the event of any de-
parture by the Tibetans from this policy in the future,
the British Government would reserve to themselves the
right to require the acceptance of an agent at the capital
itself.

Government considered, however, that this alternative,
the least which could be contemplated, was not calculated,

FACILITIES FOR TRADE 259

in the same degree, to aiford a guarantee of satisfactory
results. An agent at Gyantse, though possibly in greater
personal security, would probably not be in so good a
position for knowing what transpired in political circles at
Lhasa.

But whether or not a British agent was established in
Tibet, Government considered that recent events justified
their requiring from the Tibetans and from the Chinese
Government a formal recognition of our exclusive political
influence in Tibet, and an engagement that they would
not admit to Tibet the representative of, that they would
cede no portion of Tibetan territory to, and that they
would enter into no relations regarding Tibet with, any
other foreign Power, without the previous consent of the
British Government.

Turning to less contentious matter, namely, that of
facilities for trade with Tibet, to secure which was the
primary object of the Mission when it was originally
despatched on an errand, which was then indubitably
peaceful in character and intention, Government con-
tended that it was, of course, necessary to insist on access
for purposes of trade to convenient centres in Tibet
proper in the place of Yatung, which was beyond all
question unsuitable for the object for which it was in-
tended. In Central Tibet present information led to the
belief that the town of Gyantse provided the site which
was best fitted to our requirements. And, in view of
recent developments, they thought that it might be ad-
visable to insist on the opening up to trade of the neigh-
bouring town of Shigatse, the seat of the Tashi Lama,
and also of Lhasa itself, if a British Resident should be
posted to the capital. They considered, too, that the
present opportunity should be taken of completing the
road to the frontier, and of opening another market at
Gartok or some other convenient place in Western Tibet,
which, with its vicinity to Chinese Turkestan, might
acquire considerable importance in the future.

It would be useless at the present stage, the Govern-
ment of India thought, to enter into details of the draft
Convention, of the trade regulations, of the terms as to

260 THE TERMS

Customs duty, of the arrangements in regard to mining
rights and concessions which appeared to be necessary,
and of the boundary settlements on the Sikkim and
Garhwal Frontiers which stood for decision. These ques-
tions must first be discussed by their Commissioner with
the representatives of the Tibetan Government.

Summarized, the proposals of the Government of India
were : the placing of a Resident at Lhasa, or, faUing that,
an agent at Gyantse, with the right to proceed to Lhasa ;
the formal recognition of exclusive political influence ; the
demand of an indemnity ; the occupation of the Chumbi
Valley as security ; the establishment of trade-marts at
Gyantse, Yatung, Shigatse, and Gartok ; the settlement
of the Sikkim and Garhwal boundaries. Customs duties,
and trade regulations. The amount of the indemnity to
be demanded was not mentioned in the despatch, but in a
telegram to me, giving a summary, and which was also
sent to the Secretary of State on June 26, it was sug-
gested that it should be £100,000 for every month from
the date of the attack on the Mission at Gyantse until one
month after the signature of the Convention.

These proposals appeared to His Majesty's Government
to be excessive, and after some telegraphic communication
with the Government of India the Secretary of State tele-
graphed on July 26* the terms which might be named to
the Tibetans, and which the Government embodied in a
draft Convention which they afterwards sent to me.

Neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere was a Resident to be
demanded. Provisions for the maintenance of our exclu-
sive political influence in Tibet were to be made. An in-
demnity was to be asked, though the sum to be demanded
was not to exceed an amount which it was believed would
be within the power of the Tibetans to pay, by instal-
ments, if necessary, spread over three years, but I was
"to be guided by circumstances in the matter." Trade-
marts were to be established at Gyantse and Gartok ia
addition to Yatung, and a British agent was to have right
of access to the Gyantse mart ; the Chumbi Valley was
to be occupied as security for the indemnity and for the

* Blue-book, III., p. 42.

DECISION OF SECRETARY OF STATE 261

fulfilment of the conditions regarding the trade-marts ;
the boundary laid down in the Convention of 1890 was to
be recognized ; the two Sikkim-British subjects who had
been captured in 1903 were to be released ; fortifications
were to be demolished.

In amplification and explanation of these telegraphic
instructions the Secretary of State, on August 5, addressed
to the Government of India a despatch,* setting forth the
deliberate policy of His Majesty's Government. They had
to consider the question, not as a local one concerning
India and Tibet alone, but from the wider point of view
of the relations of Great Britain to other Powers, both
European and Asiatic, and as involving the status of a
dependency of the Chinese Empire. Formerly European
nations and their interests were, in the main, far removed
from the scope of Indian policy, and the relations of India
with the States on her borders rarely involved any European
complications ; but the effect of Indian policy in relation
to Afghanistan, Siam, Tibet, or any other dependency
of the Chinese Empire was now liable to be felt through-
out Europe. This immediate responsibility towards
Europe, which Indian policy nowadays imposed on this
country, necessarily involved its correlative, and the course
of affairs on the Indian frontiers could not be decided
without reference to Imperial exigencies elsewhere.

His Majesty's Government had also been consistently
averse to any policy in Tibet which would tend to throw
on the British Empire an additional burden. The great
increase to our responsibilities, however necessary, which
recent additions to the Empire had involved, made it
obvious that it would be imprudent further to enlarge
them except upon the strongest groimd. In military and
naval matters the resources of Great Britain and India
must be considered together. India had fi:om time to
time given effective and ready help in the defence of
British interests and British Colonies. On the other hand,
it had to be remembered that the British army largely
existed in order to defend India, and every new obligation
undertaken by India was as much a charge upon the

* Blue-book, III., p. 46.

262 THE TERMS

common stock of our heavily burdened resources as if it
were placed upon the people of this country.

The satisfactory nature of the assurances given by
Russia in regard to Tibet rendered it unnecessary and
undesirable that any demand for the recognition of a
Political Agent, either at Gyantse or at Lhasa, should be
made to the Tibetans. His Majesty's Government held
that such a political outpost might entail difficulties and
responsibilities incommensurate with any benefits which,
in the situation created by the Russian assurances, could
be gained by it.

They did not even consider it desirable to claim for
the agent, who under the Trade Regulations would have
access to Gyantse, the right in certain circumstances to
proceed to Lhasa. The eiFect of this proposal, they con-
sidered, would be to alter the character of the duties of
the agent, which, it was intended, should be essentially
commercial, and to assimilate them to those of a Political
Resident.

" As regards the amount of the indemnity," continues
the despatch, "our ignorance of the resources of the
country makes it impossible to speak with any certainty.
The question, in the circumstances, must be left to the
discretion of Colonel Younghusband. The condition that
the amount should be one which, it is estimated, can be
paid in three years, indicates the intention of His Majesty's
Government that the sum to be demanded should con
stitute an adequate pecuniary penalty, but not be such as
to be beyond the powers of the Tibetans, by making a
sufficient effort, to discharge within the period named."

This despatch did not reach me till after the Treaty
was signed.

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEGOTIATIONS

The very day that we arrived at Lhasa I made a com-
mencement at negotiating a treaty based on the terms set
forth in the preceding chapter. I had already, before I
left Gyantse and before Government had made up their
minds as to the terms which should be asked, told the
Tongsa Penlop informally what we were likely to ask, so
that the Tibetans might have a rough idea of our demands ;
and as the Chinese Resident had intimated to me that he
would come and visit me on the afternoon of our arrival,
I thought it well to make a start with him at once.

The interview was interesting, for I had been waiting a
year to see this Amban. I had seen Chinese officials in
Peking ; I had seen them at the extreme eastern end of the
Empire in Manchuria ; I had seen them at the extreme
western end, in Chinese Turkestan ; and I now saw
them here at Lhasa. They were always exactly the same ;
in their official robes, dressed precisely alike, with the
same good manners, the same dignity, the same air of
something very much akin to superiority, and with the
same evidence of solid intellectual capacity and sterling
character. The Resident, Yu-tai, was not different from
the rest. He was not, indeed, strikingly clever, and I did not
see him at his best, for the recalcitrance of the Tibetans
had put him in a most humiliating position, which he
must have felt or he would not have paid me a visit before
I had visited him. But he kept up appearances and made
a brave show with all the aplomb of his race, and I had a
real feeling of relief in talking to a man of affairs after so
many long, dreary and ineffectual interviews with the
obtuse and ignorant Tibetans.

264 THE NEGOTIATIONS

I received him, as, indeed, I had received the Tibetans
all through, at official interviews, in full dress uniform,
with all my Political Staff in similar dress. He made the
usual polite inquiries, and then said that he wished to
work with me in effecting a speedy settlement with the
Tibetans. He had hoped to meet me before, and had
hastened to Lhasa at unusual speed, but the Tibetans had
refused to furnish him with transport, and he had, there-
fore, been unable to proceed beyond Lhasa. I said I
quite appreciated the difficulties he must have had with
the Tibetans, for I had had some experience of them now,
and a more obstructive people I had never come across.
He agreed that they were an exceedingly obstinate people.
He said he feared I must have had a very unpleasant time
at Gyantse, and I told him that we had come there to
negotiate, and not to fight, and therefore had very few
soldiers with us at the time the attack was made. Later
on. General Macdonald arrived with reinforcements, and
the Tibetans had to suffer heavily for their misconduct.
On the present occasion, however, we had come ready
either to negotiate or to fight. We were prepared to
negotiate ; but if the Tibetans were obstinate, we would
not hesitate to fight. I should be glad if he would impress
upon the Tibetans with all his power that we were no
longer to be trifled with.

I added that one of the conditions we intended to
impose was an indemnity, to cover part of the cost of mili-
tary operations, and I should be asking them Rs. 50,000
per diem from the date the Mission was attacked up to a
month after the date the Convention was signed. Every
day they took in negotiation would cost them Rs. 50,000,
so the sooner they concluded an agreement the better.
The Amban thought this would be an effective way of
dealing with them, and he promised to urge the Tibetans
to be reasonable, and make a settlement without further
loss of time.

The Resident made a special present of food to the
troops, and he had already, at my request, collected two
days' supplies.

The next day I had to return his visit, and now arose

>i=i

PROCESSION THROUGH LHASA 265

a problem. His residence was on the far side of the
city, and the point was whether we should ride through
Lhasa or round it. It was risky to ride through this
sacred city, swarming with monks who had organized the
opposition against us. We had been so recently fighting
against them that we could not be sure of their attitude.
Peace was not yet concluded, and they had shown no
signs, so far, of really negotiating,' but had, on the con-
trary, been doing their best to stave us off from Lhasa.
So our reception was uncertain, and, if anything hap-
pened to us, the matter-of-fact, common-sense person at
home would, without compunction, have criticized me for
running the risk without any necessity. But from my
point of view there was a necessity. All this trouble had
arisen through the Tibetans being so inaccessible and
keeping themselves so much apart ; and now I meant to
close in with them, to break through their seclusion, to
brush aside their exclusiveness, and to let them see us and
us see them as the inhabitants of the rest of the world see
each other ; and I meant to make a beginning at once.
So I determined now, on the very first day after our
arrival, to ride right through the heart of the city of
Lhasa.

The Chinese Resident sent his bodyguard with pikes,
and three-pronged spears, and many banners to escort us,
and of our own troops I took two companies of the Royal
Fusiliers and the 2nd Mounted Infantry. Two guns and
four companies of infantry were also kept in readiness in
camp to support us at a moment's notice.

Many a traveller had pined to look on Lhasa, but now
we were actually in this sacred city, it was, excfept for the
Potala, a sorry affair. The streets were filthily dirty, and
the inhabitants hardly more clean than the streets ; the
houses were built of solid masonry, but as dirty as the
streets and inhabitants ; and the temples we passed, though
massive, were ungainly. Only the Potala was imposing ;
it rose from the squalid town at its base in tier upon tier
of solid, massive masonry, and, without any pretence at
architectural beauty or symmetry, was impressive from its
sheer size and strength and dominating situation.

266 THE NEGOTIATIONS

We passed numbers of clean-shaven, bare-headed
monks from the great monasteries round, one of which
alone held 8,000. They were a dirty, degraded lot, and
we all of us remarked how distinctly inferior they were to
the ordinary peasantry and townsmen we met. The
monks, as a rule, looked thoroughly lazy and sensual and
effete ; the countrymen and the petty traders in the town
were hardy, cheery people, and as we rode through the
city really paid very little attention to us.

The Resident, with his staff, received me in the usual
pagoda-shaped, Chinese official residence. He again
referred to the obstinate and insubordinate attitude
assumed by the Tibetans, and said that in Eastern Tibet
they had given the Chinese a great deal of trouble. I
expressed my opinion that the Tibetans were grossly
ungrateful, for they owed much to the Chinese, and cer-
tainly, after the Sikkim campaign, they would not have
come off so easily in the ensuing settlement if the Chinese
had not interceded on their behalf. It was merely on
account of the friendly feeling we entertained towards the
Chinese that the settlement we then made was so light.
Now, however, that they had repudiated the settlement
which the Amban had made on their behalf, and had
otherwise offended us, the new settlement would, of
course, be more severe, and I should be greatly obliged if
the Amban would make them understand from the start
that the terms which I was going to demand from them
would have to be accepted.

The Amban asked me if I would give him the terms.
I replied that if he would send over one of his Secretaries
to Mr. Wilton, he would inform him of them and explain
them to him, and the Amban and I could then talk the
matter over at an early opportunity.

I then asked the Amban if he would get the Tibetans
to depute two or three representatives for the special
purpose of negotiating a settlement with me. A variety
of delegates had been sent to meet me on the way up, but
it was desirable that the same men, without change, should
continue to negotiate with me till the settlement was
arrived at. The Amban promised to arrange this. After

NEPALESE AND BHUTANESE 267

apologizing for introducing business matters into the con-
versation during my first visit to him, I took leave of the
Amban and returned to camp by a detour through the
heart of the city.

Two of the Councillors, with two Secretaries, called
upon me on the following day with 280 coolie-loads of tea,
sugar, dried fruits, flour, peas, and butter, and bringing
also 20 yaks, 50 sheep, and Rs. 1,500 in cash. With the
object of getting into the next best house in Lhasa, I
made a pretence of wishing to go into the Dalai Lama's
Summer Palace, which was in the plain close by, and
eventually arranged that the house of the first Duke in
Tibet should be at my disposal. This would contain the
whole of my staff, as well as an escort of two companies,
and was therefore, both for purposes of possible defence
and also for receptions, much more suitable than a camp
in the open plain.

I had now got into touch with both the Chinese Resi-
dent and the highest Tibetan officials, and I was also on
the same day — August 5 — to see the two men who were
eventually to be of the greatest help to me as inter-
mediaries — the Nepal representative who was permanently
stationed at Lhasa, and the old Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan,
who had just arrived from Gyantse.

Captain Jit Bahadur had been many years in Lhasa,
and was much respected. He had very courteous manners,
and was much more quick and alert than the Tibetans.
He had orders from his Government to give me every
assistance, and no one could have been more helpful.

The Tongsa Penlop had neither the local knowledge
nor the quickness of Captain Jit Bahadur ; but he was a
man of more importance — he is indeed now Maharaja of
Bhutan — and his representations carried weight. He and
Mr. White soon made a firm friendship, and together they
did much to bring the negotiations through.

There was still no sign, though, of any definite dele-
gates being appointed to negotiate with me, and on
August 8 I had to report to Government that the
Tibetan Government was in utter confusion. My old
friend the Ta Lama had been disgraced, as, poor man, he

268 THE NEGOTIATIONS

always told me he would be if we advanced to Lhasa, My
other friend the Yutok Sha-p^, who had met me at
Nagartse, had very sensibly, or perhaps naturally, gone
sick. Of the two remaining Councillors, one was useless
and the other inimical. The National Assembly sat con-
tinuously, but only criticized what anyone did, and was
afraid to do anything itself without reference to the
Dalai Lama. And the Dalai Lama, who had fled on
our approach to Lhasa and was three days distant, would
not in his turn act without sanction of the Assembly.
Everyone was in fear, not now of us, but of his next-
door neighbour: and each was working against the
other. No attempt at commencing negotiations had been
made, though I had given the Resident an outline of
our terms. The Tongsa Penlop and the Nepalese repre-
sentative constantly visited me, but expressed despair
at the silliness of the Tibetans, and said their heads ached
with arguing with them. The general attitude of the
Tibetans, though exasperating, was, I thought, probably
more futUe and inept than intentionally hostile. But yet
it was not easy to see then how in my limited time I was
to get a definite treaty signed, sealed, and delivered out of
such an intangible, illusive, un-get-at-able set of human
beings as I now found in front of me.

The very next day, though, a ray of light appeared
which was in the end to show the way to a solution of our
difficulties. The Nepalese representative came to inform
me that on the previous night he went to see the Ti
Rimpoche, the Regent to whom the Dalai Lama had
handed over his seal, and had explained to him that
matters were getting serious. The Regent rephed that he
and the Dalai Lama's brother were anxious to make a
settlement, and were of opinion that the Government
terms might well be accepted with two or three modifica-
tions. The Regent thought that the amount of indemnity
I had named — Rs. .50,000 a day — was excessive. And he
would ask that if they released the two Lachung men we
should release the yaks and men whom we had seized last
year in retaliation. With those modifications he thought
the National Assembly might reasonably accept our terms.

THE TI RIMPOCHE 269

The Nepalese representative said the Regent was a
moderate man, more inclined to make a peaceful settle-
ment than the generality of the National Assembly.
Captain Jit Bahadur having hinted that the Regent and
the Dalai llama's brother were anxious to visit me, I told
him to let the Regent know that I would be glad to
receive him ; and I asked him to tell the Regent from me
that we had no wish to be other than on friendly terms
with the Tibetans. We had no desire to make war upon
them or object to gain by it ; we did not wish to annex
their country ; and the Viceroy had given me the very
strictest orders to respect their religion, so that when I
heard from him (the Nepalese representative) and the
Tongsa Penlop that the Tibetans considered the Summer
Palace a sacred building, I had consented to take up my
residence elsewhere, even though at inconvenience to
myself. But while we had thus no wish to make war, and
were prepared to respect their religion, the Tibetans were
putting me in a very difficult position. They had asked
me to stop hostilities, saying they wished to make a settle-
ment, but although they had been acquainted with the
terms for three weeks, and I had akeady been here a
week, yet not one word of negotiation had yet passed
between me and them. Nor had they made proper efforts
to furnish the troops with supplies. If they failed to
negotiate, what could I do ? It seemed to me that the
Tibetans were like men in a bog. They were sinking
deeper and deeper. Last year they were in up to their
knees only. A month ago they were up to their waists.
Now they were up to their necks. And in a short time,
if they would not accept the hand which was stretched out
to them by the Regent, they would be in over their heads.

I called upon the Chinese Resident on the 10th and
impressed upon him the responsibility which lay on the
Chinese Government to induce the Tibetans to make
a settlement. He said he was most anxious to work with
me, and had sent a message to the Dalai Lama to return.
But I heard from other sources that the Dalai Lama was
now eight marches off, and had with him the Siberian
Buriat Dorjieff, to whom the Tibetans attributed all their

270 THE NEGOTIATIONS

troubles, but who was reported to have very sagaciously
advised the Dalai Lama to retire for a bit, as the English
would soon calm down and disappear again like the
bubbles in boiling water which subside when the water has
cooled.

The Tibetans' so-called reply to our terms was the
next day communicated by the Resident's secretary to
Mr. WUton. The Tibetans refused each single point, and
said that an indemnity was due from us to them rather
than from them to us. The only trade-mart they would
concede was Rinchengong, which was scarcely two miles
beyond Yatung. I had the document returned to the
Resident with a message that I could not officially re-
ceive so preposterous a reply.

The Resident called upon me the next day and said he
had received a reply to our terms, but it was so im-
pertinent he could not even mention it to me officially. He
had sent it back to the Tibetans censuring them for their
stupidity, and ordering them to send a more fit reply. He
had pointed out to them their folly in not setthng with us,
and how impossible it was for them to contend against us.

He then made a singularly interesting remark. The
ordinary people, he said, were not at all iU-disposed
towards us. They liked us, and were anxious to trade
with us. Reports of our treatment of the wounded, and
of the liberal payment we made for supplies, had spread
about the country, and the people in general would be
glad enough to make a settlement and be on good terms.
Where the opposition came from was from the Lamas,
more especially those of the three great monasteries. They
and they alone were the obstructionists, and if they were
out of the way there would be no more trouble, and the
people would speedily be friends with us.

I told the Amban that this was extremely interesting
and gratifying to hear, and that what he had said entirely
bore out my own conclusions. It made me all the more
sorry that so many of these poor peasants with whom we had
no quarrel, and who only wished to be friendly with us,
should have been killed, and this was one consideration
which was restraining us from fighting now. I had on

INTERVIEW WITH CHINESE RESIDENT 271

several occasions during the recent fighting gone round
the dead Tibetans, and invariably found that they were
peasants. A Lama w^as never seen. If we could be quite
sure that the originators of all this fighting would fight
themselves, I was not sure that we would have been so
ready to suspend hostilities.

Before the close of his visit I asked the Amban if the
Nepalese and Kashmiris kept on good terms with the
Tibetans here. He replied that they got on well enough
with the ordinary people, but avoided the Lamas, as contact
with them was liable to lead to trouble. He added that
the Nepalese representative had been ordered by the
Prime Minister of Nepal to advise the Tibetans to be
reasonable and come to a settlement with us, and to tell
them that the British respected the religion of others and
would not interfere with theirs. I said I had heard of
this, and if the Tibetans had only followed this good
advice, which was given a year ago, we might have settled
up everything at Khamba Jong. What the Prime
JNIinister of Nepal had said about the tolerance of other
religions was perfectly true. We had many millions of
Buddhists under our rule, about 200,000,000 Hindus, and
70,000,000 Mohammedans. The Tibetan fear that we
would interfere with their religion was altogether un-
founded. The Amban replied that they were so jealous
of their religion that they tried to prevent even Chinese
Buddhists of other sects from their own from entering
Tibet.

On August 13 two Sha-pds, the Dalai Lama's private
Abbot, a Secretary of Council, and the Accountant-
General paid me a formal visit. I remarked that the
Amban had told me that they had drawn up a document
which they had presented to him as a reply to our terms,
but which was so impertinent that the Amban had said he
could not even mention it to me officially. The deputa-
tion rephed that they were really anxious to make a settle-
ment, and the document they had presented to the
Amban merely represented their views, and was not
intended as a reply to me. Their idea was to give the
Amban their opinion, and he would give orders upon it.

272 THE NEGOTIATIONS

I asked them whether they were prepared to obey the
orders of the Amban. They said that if the Amban gave
orders acceptable to both them and him they would obey.
I asked them if by that they meant that they would obey
his orders if they liked them, but would pay no attention
to them if they were not according to their taste. They
replied that their idea was that the Amban should act as a
sort of mediator. We would both present our views to
him, and he would decide between us, and make a settle-
ment satisfactory to both. When they had stated then-
case to him they had no intention to be impertinent ; they
were a small people, and ignorant of the ways of great
nations ; they thought that if they asked much at first,
they might not obtain all they asked, but would obtain
a part.

I told them I had already warned the Amban that
I was not here to act the part of a merchant in the bazaar
and haggle over terms. When I arrived at Khamba
Jong last year, I had, indeed, then been prepared to discuss
the terms of a settlement, and by give and take arrive at a
mutually satisfactory agreement. I had, for instance,
announced that we were prepared to concede the Giagong
lands to them if they showed themselves reasonable in
regard to trade concessions elsewhere. But they had
declined to negotiate, and had chosen to fight. They had
been beaten, and had no further means of continuing the
struggle against us. They must, therefore, accept our
terms or expect us to take still further action against
them. The terms we were now asking were extremely
moderate, but if we were compelled to undertake more
military operations they would have to be made much
more severe.

They begged me to be more reasonable and to discuss
things more quietly ; they said they were accustomed to
talk matters over at great length ; they hoped that
the Resident would be able to persuade me to be more
considerate ; and they suggested that I should ask the
Viceroy to let me demand easier terms from them. I
reminded them that they had been aware of the terms for
three weeks now, and I had been ready, on the way up

THE TI-RIMPOCHE.

To face page 273.

INTERVIEW WITH REGENT 273

here, to explain them to them. I had now been ten days
at Lhasa ; they had not yet come to talk to me about
them ; and I had heard from the Resident that, so far from
showing any inclination to agree with them, they had
written about them in very impertinent terms. They
must not be surprised, therefore, that my patience was
exhausted. The terms which I had shown them were
issued by command of the British Government, and no
reference to His Excellency the Viceroy would have the
slightest effect in modifying them.

The next day I had a much more interesting interview.
The Ti Rimpoche himself came to see me. He was the
Chief Doctor of Divinity and Metaphysics of Tibet, and
was an old and much respected Lama, to whom the Dalai
Lama had left his seals of office and whom he had
appointed Regent. He remembered seeing Hue and Gabet
as a boy, and he was a cultured, pleasant-mannered,
amiable old gentleman, with a kindly, benevolent expres-
sion. He was accompanied by the Nepalese representa-
tive, and brought with him a present of gold-dust and
some silk from the Dalai Lama's brother.

After some polite observations, he asked me whether
we English believed in reincarnation. I said we believed
that when we died our bodies remained here and our souls
went up to heaven. He said that that might happen
to the good people, but where did the bad people go to ?
I replied that we had no bad : we were all good. He
laughed, and said that, at any rate, he hoped that both of
us would be good during this negotiation. Then we
might both go to heaven. I said I had not the smallest
doubt that we should.

He then said he would have liked to come and see me
before, but was afraid of the Sha-p^s. He told me how he
had been hastily summoned by the Dalai Lama a few weeks
ago, but on his arrival had found the Dalai Lama had fled.
He had greatly disliked taking up politiqal business, for
he had spent his whole life in religious study, and was
altogether ignorant of the methods of public affairs. But
the Sha-p^s and people in the palace had given him a
message from the Dalai Lama, handing over the Dalai

274 THE NEGOTIATIONS

Lama's seal to him, and telling him he was to act as
Regent during the Dalai Lama's absence.

The Ti Rimpoche then stated that what he had come
to see me about was to ask me to show consideration
towards their religion, and not destroy their monasteries.
When he had come to look into affairs, he had convinced
himself that those responsible for the conduct of them
had acted very stupidly, and should have made a settle-
ment with us long ago. Now they were beaten and had
to accept our terms, but he hoped we would show them
consideration. They were sending to the Dalai Lama
to return, and he thought he ought to be here to make a
settlement w|ih us.

I told him that I thoroughly sympathized with him in
the ve^y unpleasant position in which he was placed.
Others had brought trouble upon the country, and he had
been called in at the last moment to repair the mischief.
But while he was in an awkward position, I hoped he
would realize this difficulty in which I also was placed. I
had received the orders of the Viceroy to show the utmost
consideration to their religion. I had also received orders
to make a settlement on the terms which had been
determined on by the British Government. But the
settlement on these terms had to be made with the
National Assembly, which was almost entirely composed
of ecclesiastics. The Resident had told me yesterday that
the reply which they had made to our terms was so im-
pertinent that he dare not even mention it to me officially.
If, then, this assembly of ecclesiastics refused our terms,
what was I to do ? I had to show consideration to them
and their monasteries because of their sacred calling. I
had also to get my terms agreed to. Could he suggest
any way of doing this except by force ?

The Ti Rimpoche said he altogether disagreed with the
reply which had been sent to the Amban, but the others
were determined to send it ; not that they rteally meant
what they said, but they thought that if they put their case
strongly at the beginning, they might get easier terms out
of me. He again begged me, however, to show con-
sideration.

TROUBLE WITH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 275

I said I would be very much obliged to him if he
would at the earliest opportunity try to persuade the
National Assembly that I was not here to bargain over
terms. I was here, by direction of the Viceroy, to carry
out the commands of the British Government in making a
settlement. The terms of that settlement were dra^vn up
with an especial regard for their religion. We were
annexing no part of Tibet ; we were not asking for an
agent here at Lhasa itself; but we had to ask for an
indemnity, because the military operations which had been
forced on us in 1888 and in the present year had cost
a very great deal of money. The Tibetans had caused the
trouble. We had, therefore, to ask them to pay at least a
part of the expense. We knew, however, that Tibet was
too poor a country to pay the whole. We were, therefore,
asking scarcely half of the real cost, and we expected that
the Tibetans would give us, who had to suffer by having
to pay the remainder of the cost, the advantage of being
able to come to Tibet to buy wool and other things which
were produced more cheaply here than in India, and of
selling to the Tibetans the surplus of articles produced
more cheaply in India.

The Regent said he thought this quite reasonable, and
he would explain my view to the National Assembly. As
to the Dalai Lama, I said I was quite prepared to give
him the most positive assurance that he would be safe
from us if he returned here. I did not wish to discuss
personally with him the details of the settlement, but
wished him to afRx his seal in my presence ; and it would
certainly be more convenient if he were nearer Lhasa for
reference during the negotiations. The Regent said he
would send two messengers to him to-morrow, advising
him to return. The trouble was, though, that he had
nobody about him to advise him properly. At the close
of the interview I told the Ti Rimpoche that I should be
glad to see him again. He was an old man, and was, I
knew, very busy just now, but whenever he liked to come
and talk with me I should be most pleased to receive him.

The first sign of yielding came on August 15, when
the Resident intimated to me that he had pressed the

276 THE NEGOTIATIONS

Tibetan Government to make a start towards a settlement
by releasing the two Lachung men (British subjects) who
had been seized last year beyond Khamba Jong, and that
the Tibetan Government had agreed. He wished to
know when and in what manner they should be handed
over. I informed him that they should be handed over
to me the next morning by two members of the Council.

That morning I held a full Durbar, and two members
of Council, accompanied by two Lamas, brought the two
Lachung men before me. I told the men, who showed
the liveliest satisfaction at their impending release, that I
had received the commands of the King-Emperor to obtain
their release from the Tibetan Government, and they were
now free. His Majesty had further commanded that if
they had been ill-treated reparation should be demanded
from the Tibetan Government. I wished to know, there-
fore, if they had been ill-treated or not. They said they
had been slightly beaten at Shigatse, and their things had
been taken from them, but since their arrival in Lhasa
they had been well fed and had not been beaten. I told
them that they would be examined by a medical officer, to
ascertain if their statements were correct.

I then turned to the Tibetan Councillors and said that
the King-Emperor considered the seizure, imprisonment,
and beating of two of his subjects as an exceedingly
serious offence. It formed one of the main reasons why
the Mission had moved forward from Khamba Jong to
Gyantse, and one of the principal terms of the settlement,
which I had been commanded to make at Lhasa itself,
was the release of these men. If the Tibetan Govern-
ment had not cared to have them in Tibet they should
have returned them across the frontier, or, in any case,
have handed them over to us at Khamba Jong. Their
seizure and imprisonment for a year was altogether un-
pardonable. I trusted they now understood that the
subjects of the King-Emperor could not be ill-treated
with impunity, and that we would in future, as we did
now, hold them strictly responsible for the good treatment
of British subjects in Tibet.

The Lachung men were then taken out and examined

RELEASE OF SIKKIMESE PRISONERS 277

by a medical officer, in the presence of Mr. White and two
Tibetan officials. The medical officer reported that there
were no signs on their bodies of their having been beaten,
and that they were in good condition. On receiving this
report 1 expressed my satisfaction that the ill-treatment
had not been severe. I would not, therefore, press the
matter of reparation ; but imprisonment for a year was in
itself sufficiently bad treatment to British subjects who
had committed no offence, and we expected that no
British subjects would ever be so treated again. The
Sha-pes promised to respect the subjects of His Majesty
in future. They expressed their pleasure that one of the
terms of the settlement had been concluded, and hoped,
now a start was made, an agreement would quickly be
come to. It was, at any rate, their intention to proceed
as rapidly as possible in their discussions. It subsequently
transpired that the two men had been kept separately in
dungeons, twenty-one steps below the surface of the ground,
and had not seen daylight for nearly a year. But as they
were in excellent health and well fed, and as we had, while
at Khamba Jong, seized over 200 yaks in retaliation, I did
not pursue the matter farther. The most satisfactory
feature in this affair was the fact that the release had
taken place entirely on the initiative of the Amban.

I visited the Resident on the following day, and thanked
him for procuring the release of the two Sikkim men.
He said he would denounce the Dalai Lama to the
Emperor if he did not come back, and would summon the
Tashi Lama, with a view to making him the head of the
whole Buddhist Church in Tibet. He also said that he
recognized the Ti Rimpoche, who held the seal left by the
Dalai Lama, as the principal in the negotiations. This
was a decided advance, though it had taken a fortnight of
my precious six weeks to make ; and I was also able
to report to Government that the general situation was
certainly improving ; that supplies, which at first we had
been only able to secure by the threat of force and by
surrounding a monastery, were now coming in steadily ;
and people were showing growing confidence, while even
the National Assembly were slowly giving way, and the

278 THR NEGOTIATIONS

party in favour of settlement were increasing in in-
fluence.

On August 19 the Resident visited me, and handed
to me the second reply of the Tibetan Government to
his letter forwarding to them the terms of the settle-
ment we now wished to make with them. The first
reply he had been unable to forward, as it was too
impudent. This second reply, he said, I would find on
perusal was more satisfactory, though it still fell short of
what he would expect the Tibetans to agree to.

I told the Resident that I found it difficult to make the
Tibetans realize that the main points in the settlement we
should expect them to agree to without question. The
period in which the indemnity was to be paid might be a
matter for discussion, but there was no question as to its
having to be paid some time. Similarly, they must agree
to having marts at Gyantse and Gartok. I remarked that
I had all along been of opinion that nothing could be got
out of these Tibetans except by pressure, and I was fully
prepared to act. At the same time, it would be much
more satisfactory if the needful pressure could be put on
by the Resident, as I had no wish to take more action
unless absolutely compelled to.

I added that a difficulty I experienced in dealing with
the Tibetans was in talking with so many representatives
at the same time. Half a dozen delegates would come to
me, and each one insist upon having his say, and no respon-
sible head was recognized. The Amban said that he, too,
had had this difficulty, but that he had recognized the
Regent as the principal in these negotiations, and from
now on he intended to negotiate with him alone ; he was
the best man among the leading Tibetans, and came next
after the Dalai Lama in the Lhasa province. I said this
seemed to me a wise course, for I had found the Regent a
sensible man, and he was much respected by the people.

As regards the Convention itself, the Amban said he
would have to discuss the clause regarding trade-marts
with me. 1 said I was prepared to talk the matter over,
but we should have to insist upon estabUshing trade-marts
at Gyantse and Gartok, and I did not understand the

FLIGHT OF DALAI LAMA 279

Tibetan objections to the establishment of a mart at
Gyantse, for we had the right more than a century ago to
have one even at Shigatse. This right had not been
exercised for a great number of years, but at one time
Indian traders visited Shigatse regularly.

We now received certain information that the Dalai
Lama had finally fled. He had written to the National
Assembly, saying that the English were very crafty
people, and warning them to be careful in making an
agreement with them, and to bind them tight. He added
that he himself would go away and look after the interests
of the faith. His departure was not regretted by Tibetans.

The Ti Rimpoche and others came to me on the 21st
with silks to the value of Rs. 5,000, which I had imposed
as a fine for the assault which a monk with a sword had
made just outside our camp on Captains Cooke- Young
and Kelly, dealing the former a very severe blow over the
head. After this the Ti Rimpoche, the Tongsa Penlop,
and the Nepalese representative proceeded to talk over
the general situation. The Ti Rimpoche said that he
himself had no objection to our terms except in regard to
the indemnity, which he thought was too heavy, as Tibet
was a poor country. He pointed out the difficulty which
the Tibetans had found in paying up the small fine I had
imposed on them, and asked how they could be expected
to pay the sum of Rs. 50,000 a day which I was demand-
ing. He said, of course, we thought ourselves in the right
in this quarrel, but it was difficult for him to make the
Assembly acquiesce in this view, and it might be well if
I would impress our views upon them.

I said that if only they had behaved more sensibly in
the beginning all this trouble would have been saved : there
would have been no war, and no indemnity would have
been asked. We had not wished for war, and I had gone
with Captain O'Connor, without any escort, into their camp
at Guru, in January to reason quietly with the leaders there,
and ask them to report my views to Lhasa. If we had
wanted war I should never have so acted. That I did was
proof that we wished for peace. But they refused to report
my words to Lhasa, and hence this trouble. The Ti Rim-

280 THE NEGOTIATIONS

poche here interpolated that they were afraid to report
anything to the Dalai Lama. I went on to say that it
was not fair to expect India to pay all the cost of a war
brought on by the foolishness of the Tibetan rulers, so we
had to ask that the Tibetans should pay part of the sum.
Yet even now we were not asking for more than half of
the whole cost. I was demanding Rs. 50,000 a day from
the date of the attack on the Mission till a month after
the date on which the Convention was signed. The Ti
Rimpoche would note that I was not asking payment from
the date of the Guru fight, because that fight might have
been due to mere foolishness on the part of the leaders,
but from the date when the Tibetans deliberately attacked
the Mission at Gyantse, after I had repeatedly notified that
I had come to negotiate. From that date, therefore,
we expected them to contribute to the cost of military
operations.

The Ti Rimpoche had said that the Tibetans had very
little cash. If that was so, I was prepared to consider the
question of extending the period in which the payment of
the indemnity could be made. I would also consider
whether some of it could not be paid in kind to the trade
agent in Gyantse and the officer commanding in Chumbi.
The Ti Rimpoche said he wished the settlement with us to
be fully completed now, so that we could have it over and
be friends ; but if the Tibetans had to go on paying us an
indemnity for some years after, the raw would be kept up,
and friendship would be difficult. I rephed that if they
would now at once pay the indemnity, we should be only
too glad. But, in any case, we would not on our side
harbour any ill-feelings towards the Tibetans, with whom
we had no other desire than to live on terms of friendship.

The Tongsa Penlop then said that Tibet, Nepal, and
Bhutan were bovmd together by the same religion, and all
bordered on India. They ought, therefore, to look on
England as their fi-iend and leader. The EngUsh had no
wish to interfere with them, but did not like anyone else
interfering. They ought to stand together, therefore, for
if one was hurt all were hurt. They could rely, however,
on their big neighbour England to help them in time of

CHINESE DENOUNCE DALAI LAMA 281

trouble if they kept on good terms with her. The
Nepalese representative agreed with the Tongsa Penlop
that all four countries should be on terms of friendship
with one another, and that Tibet^ Nepal, and Bhutan
should always preserve good relations with their neighbour
England, The Ti Rimpoche said he trusted that when
this settlement was made Tibet and England would
always be on terms of Friendship. The Tibetans had no
wish to have relations with any other Power, and desired
now to keep on good terms with England. I replied that
we had been on perfectly good terms with Tibet for more
than a century up till the time of the Sikkim War, and I
hoped that when the present settlement was made we
should be friends for ever.

I visited the Resident on August 21, and told him I
had perused the Tibetan reply to him which he had
handed to me at our last meeting. It was more satis-
factory than the first reply, and there were some points
which the Tibetans would now evidently agree to. I
proposed, then, that we should get these points settled first
and out of the way, so as to make a start, and then work
on to the more contentious clauses.

I then remarked that I had heard the Dalai Lama had
without any doubt whatever fled the country. The
Amban said this was true, and he was evidently not flying
to China, but to the north — possibly to join the Great
Lama at Urga. I said he would hardly be flying to China,
for he would surely have obtained the Amban's per-
mission to proceed to Peking, or at least have informed
him of his intention. The Amban replied that he had
gone off without any warning, and he had now definitely
decided to denounce him to the Emperor, and would
to-day or to-morrow send me a telegram which he would
ask me to have despatched to Peking as quickly as
possible. I said I would do this service for him, and I
considered he was acting with great wisdom in denouncing
the Dalai Lama, for it was he who had brought all this
trouble upon his country, and he deserved to suffer for it.
I was not surprised, however, at so young a ruler coming
to grief, for our experience in India was that a young

282 THE NEGOTIATIONS

chief, even when he had only temporal authority in his
hands, was very liable to get into the power of un-
scrupulous and designing men, and rush off in a head-
strong way on a foolish course. For a young Dalai Lama,
who had not only temporal, but also supreme spiritual
power, the tendency to go wrong must have been almost
irresistible.

The Amban said this certainly had been the case with
the present Dalai Lama, who had always been headstrong
and obstinate, and had never followed good advice.

The four hostages which I had demanded, one from the
Government and one from each of the great monasteries, for
the good behaviour of the monks in future arrived on the
24th. They were in abject terror, and evidently thought
they would have their heads cut off before their time was
up. On the same day a proclamation was posted up in
Lhasa by the Government, forbidding the people to inter-
fere with foreigners in any way. This and the hanging
of the monk who had made the murderous assault on the
two British officers had the effect of stopping all other
fanatical assaults, and after the treaty was signed I
returned the fine and let out the hostages, who, much
to their surprise, had had a very good time with us and
been treated royally.

There was a considerable pause now in the course of the
negotiations, though Captain O'Connor the whole time
was, day by day and all day long, interviewing innumerable
Tibetans of every grade ; while Mr. White and I used to
see the Tongsa Penlop and the Nepalese representative,
and think of any means of getting over the difficulty
about the indemnity. On August 28 the Ti Rim-
poche, the Yutok Sha-p^, and the Tsarong Sha-p^,
accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop, called upon me.
They announced that they had been deputed by the
National Assembly to discuss the settlement direct with
me, as they thought there was delay in dealing through
the Resident. I remarked that I understood they were
fairly well agreed to accede to aU our terms except in
regard to the indemnity. They said they had written to
the Amban, saying definitely that they would agree to

DIFFICULTY REGARI>ING INDEMNITY 283

all the terms except that regarding the payment of an
indemnity, and except in regard to opening further marts
in future. They expressed a wish to make the settlement
directly with me, and when we had agreed upon it, then
they would communicate the result to the Resident. I
said that I should be ready to receive them whenever they
wished to discuss matters with me. What I should tell
them and what I should tell the Amban would be exactly
the same, but if they liked to hear my views from me
direct I would gladly receive them.

They then again announced that they were ready to
agree to all our terms but one. The indemnity they
could not pay. Tibet was a poor country, and the
Tibetans had already suffered heavily during the war ;
many had been killed, their houses had been burnt, Jongs
and monasteries had been destroyed ; and, in addition to
all this evil, it was impossible for them to pay an indemnity
as well. The little money they had was spent in religious
services in support of the monasteries, in buying vessels
for the temples and butter to burn before the gods. The
peasants had to supply transport for officials, in addition,
and there were no means whatever for paying the heavy
indemnity we were demanding.

I replied that the war in Sikkim had cost us a million
sterling, and the present war would cost another million.
After the Sikkim War the Tibetans had repudiated the
treaty which the Resident then made, and we might very
justifiably now ask for an indemnity for the Sikkim War,
as well as for this. We were, however, making no such
demand, and we were only asking from Tibet half the
cost of the present war. I knew, of course, that Tibet
had suffered from the present war, but no such suffering
need have occurred if they had negotiated with me at
Khamba Jong in the previous year. And, while they
had suffered, we also had not escaped without trouble.
Captain O'Connor had himself been wounded, and what
we looked upon as extremely serious in this matter was
that the representative of the British Government should
have been attacked. If they attacked the Resident here,
they knew well how angry the Emperor of China would

284 THE NEGOTIATIONS

be. I quite recognized, however, the difficulty they had
in paying the indemnity in cash within three years. I
would, therefore, be prepared to receive proposals from
them as to modifications in the manner of payment. If,
for instance, they thought it impossible to pay the whole
indemnity in three years, and would like the term
extended to five, I would submit such a proposal for the
orders of the Viceroy. Or, again, if they would prefer to
pay the indemnity at the rate of a lakh of rupees a year
for a long term of years, I would ask Government if the
difficulty might be met in that way.

They expressed their disappointment at this answer, as
they had hoped that when they had agreed to aU our terms
except this one I would have given way on it, and excused
them paying the indemnity, and they trusted I would not
send them back to the National Assembly with so dis-
heartening an answer. In most cases of bargaining, if
one party got half the things he had asked he would be
satisfied. I had got all the points except one, and still
was not satisfied. If I could not agree to that myself,
would I not refer it to the Viceroy ? If I did this they
had great hopes the Viceroy would excuse them the
indemnity.

I repUed that a reference to the Viceroy would be of no
use, for it happened that the terms I was now asking were
modifications ordered by the British Government. The
Ti Rimpoche said that if the British Government had
been lenient once they might be lenient again, and asked
me to put their petition before them. 1 replied that the
British Government had considered this matter most
carefully before issuing these demands, so if I now dared
to suggest that one of them should not be carried out
I should be immediately dismissed from my post. I was
prepared, as I had said, to submit proposals for alternative
methods of payment of the indemnity, and I would be
also prepared to submit proposals for privileges of con-
cessions in Tibet which might be taken in heu of part of
the indemnity, but the indemnity, in some manner or
other, would have to be paid.

The Tsarong Sha-p^ said we were accustomed to fish

METHOD OF MEETING THE DIFFICULTY 285

in the ocean, and did not understand that there were not
so jnany fish to be got out of a well as could be caught
from the sea. A field could only yield according to its
size and the amount put into it. A poor peasant got
only just enough from his field to support himself and
his family, with a very little over for religious offerings.
It was hard, therefore, that we should demand so much
from Tibet, and the National Assembly would be very
much disheartened at the result of this interview.

I replied that what they had agreed to was what cost
them nothing, and was, indeed, to their advantage. The
opening of trade-marts would in reality prove of much
more benefit to them than to us. The only thing that
really cost them anything they were consistently reftising.
Even on that point I was prepared to make it as easy
for them in carrjring out as possible, and I could not
acknowledge that they had any cause for complaint.

The Tongsa Penlop then said that he hoped I would
take into consideration the sufferings the Tibetans had
already gone through, and, if I could, lay the matter
before the Viceroy. I told the Tongsa Penlop that I was
always glad to hear suggestions from one who had proved
himself so stanch a friend of the British Government,
and if he could think of some way which would save
India from being saddled with the cost of this war, and at
the same time not weigh too heavily upon the Tibetans,
he would be doing a service which would be appreciated
by both the Government of India and the Tibetans.

I now came to the conclusion that the Tibetans were
trying to make dissension between the Resident and
myself, so I asked the Amban when he next came to see
me to bring the Tibetan Members of Council with him.
He capie on the 30th, accompanied by the Acting Regent
and three Members of Council. I told him that we had
had some misunderstanding with the Tibetans as to what
precisely they did and did not agree to. They had
informed me on a previous occasion that they had sent him
a written agreement to accept all our terms except that
regarding the indemnity. I proposed, therefore, on this
occasion to ascertain from them precisely what they did

286 THE NEGOTIATIONS

agree to point by point. I then addressed the Tibetans in
regard to Clause IX., which was the one I understood
they had least objection to. I explained to them that by
it we had not the least desire to supplant China in the
suzerainty of Tibet. The Chinese suzerainty was fully
recognized in the Adhesion Agreement, which it was
proposed the Resident should sign on behalf of the
Chinese Government, and China was not included in the
term "foreign Power." We were not placing a British
Resident here at Lhasa, and we were not asking for any
railway or other concessions. What we asked in this
clause was merely what was in accordance with their
traditional policy. Did they agree to the clause ?

They replied that they did not want to have anything
to do with foreign Powers. They would, therefore, be
able to agree to it.

The clause regarding the razing of fortifications was
then discussed, and they began to raise objections, but I cut
them short by observing that aU the fortifications named
were in our hands, and would be destroyed whether they
agreed or not. The clause had been drafted by Govern-
ment before the fortifications were in our possession.
Their agreement was, therefore, merely a formality. They
said that in that case they would agree.

We then discussed at length the clauses relating to
the opening of new trade-marts. They had an idea we
wished them to make a road from Gyantse to Gartok,
and to make big roads by blasting. I assured them that
all we wanted was that the roads from the frontier to
Gyantse, and from the frontier to Gartok, should be kept
in repair. We did not expect new roads to be con-
structed by them, but existing roads kept suitable for
trade purposes.

The sentence regarding the opening of more trade-
marts in future they very strongly objected to. I pointed
out, however, that we were merely asking them to con-
sider this, and not to decide on it now. I said we might
reasonably have now demanded a mart here, at Lhasa
itself, and in half a dozen other places, and I could not
permit them to refu§§ merely considering the question

SOME CLAUSES AGREED TO 287

of future extension. The Resident added that their
objections were frivolous, and trade-marts were to their
advantage. To the establishment of marts at Gyantse
and Gartok they agreed, and the discussion having now
lasted two hours, and I having told the Amban that we
had done about as much as it was possible to do in one
day, he dismissed them.

The next day the Ti Rimpoche, the Tongsa Penlop,
and the Nepalese representative came to see me. The
Ti Rimpoche said that there was a good deal of opposition
to the clause regarding opening other trade-marts in
future. The Tibetans did not wish to be bound by any-
thing in regard to the future. I said it was really the
least important sentence in the whole Convention. It
secured nothing definite for us. It did not say, for
instance, that after ten years a third trade-mart should be
opened, but merely that the matter should be considered.
Now, however, that the matter had, in the last official
interview with the Amban, been put forward in official
discussion by the Tibetan Council, I was bound to main-
tain the sentence. While I did not expect that they
should now accede to the future opening of trade^narts, I
could not accept their refusal to open them. The matter
must remain, as stated in the draft Convention, one for
future consideration.

The Ti Rimpoche then again dwelt upon the im-
possibility of paying what he considered so heavy an
indemnity. He said, laughing, that we must remember
the losses which not only we, but their own troops, had
inflicted on the country. I repeated my old arguments as
to the unfairness of saddling India with the whole cost of
a war necessitated by the foUy and stupidity of Tibetans.
It was bad enough to impose on India half the cost, but
anything more than that would be a great injustice. The
Ti Rimpoche said that we were putting on the donkey a
greater load than it could possibly carry. I replied that I
was not asking the donkey to carry the whole load in one
journey. It could go backwards and forwards many
times, carrying a light load each journey. The Ti
Rimpoche laughed again, and asked what would happen if

288 THE NEGOTIATIONS

the donkey died. I said I should ask the Resident to see
that the donkey was properly treated, so that there should
be no fear of its dying. Dropping metaphor, I told the
acting Regent I was really quite prepared to receive pro-
posals as to easier methods of paying the indemnity.
If, for instance, they could not pay the full amount in
three years, I would receive and consider proposals as to
paying in a larger number of years, or any other reason-
able proposal.

The Ti Rimpoche replied that the Tibetans disHked
the idea of prolonging the time during which they would
be under obligation to us. They wanted to settle the
business up at once and have done with it. I asked him if,
in that case, he had any other suggestions to make. He
made none, but the Tongsa Penlop suggested to him that
the Tibetans should let us collect the Customs duties at
the new trade-marts, and get the amount of the indemnity
from that source. The Ti Rimpoche said that, while he
personally saw the wisdom of agreeing to our terms, he
could not persuade the National Assembly to be reasonable.
I said I quite saw that he was more sensible than the
National Assembly, and that he was doing his best to
bring them to reason. When, therefore, I used hard
words and employed threats, he must consider them as
directed at the stupid, obstructive people, and not at
himself personally.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE TREATY CONCLUDED

We were now at the end of August ; my time was very
short, and I was in an awkward predicament. On the
30th I had telegraphed to Government that the Tibetans,
in spite of their protests of poverty, could really pay the
indemnity, but that I thought trade concessions in lieu of
a portion would be preferable. I also asked for liberty to
arrange for payment of the indemnity by instalments of
one lakh of rupees (£6,666) a year for a long term of
years, if that arrangement were preferred by the Tibetans,
a proposal which I had also made a month before. On
the same day I was told by General Macdonald that
September 15 was the latest date to which he could
remain at Lhasa. The Secretary of State had telegraphed
to the Viceroy* that "the date on which the return of
the force from Lhasa is to begin should be fixed by
the military authorities in communication with Young-
husband." In accordance with these instructions. General
Macdonald telegraphed to the Adjutant-Generalf that he
had consulted me with regard to fixing a date for our
departure, that I had said I could not fix any date, but
thought the beginning of October the earliest, and could
not guarantee that. The medical authorities considered
September 1 the latest safe date. The officers command-
ing units thought the 12th might be risked. General
Macdonald himself was prepared to stay till September
15, and would delay the departure a few days longer if
that would make the difference. There had already been
snow on the hills round Lhasa and Nagartse, there was
heavy snow on the Karo-la and at Ralung, "with severe

* Blue-book, III., p. 51: t I^^d., p. 242.

289 19

290 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

frost on the Karo-la, and the return march would take
nineteen days. General Macdonald concluded that Sep-
tember 13 was the latest safe date for our stay in Lhasa,
and would be glad of immediate orders, but, in the
absence of orders to the contrary, would fix the 15th for
the departure.

From the purely military point of view this was per-
fectly sound, and latterly the emphasis had been so much
laid upon military considerations that I had not much
hope of this date being altered. It had, indeed, got into
the papers from some military office in Simla, and reached
Peking. I was then in a very critical position. The
Treaty was almost within my grasp, but I might be
puUed back by military considerations before I had time
to conclude it.

On the other hand, Mr. White, Captain O'Connor,
and I had between us interviewed at length all the
principal men in Lhasa, and if we had not fiiUy con-
vinced them, we had, at any rate, broken down most of
their opposition. And the Nepalese and Bhutanese, and
the Chinese Resident, too, had worked away to bring
about the same result. The consequence was that about
this time I was pretty well convinced that the bulk of
them had at the back of their minds decided to agree
to our terms, and put an end to the business. They all
realized that the Dalai Lama, or his previous advisers, had
blundered into a hopeless position, out of which they
had to get as best they might. No one man liked to
get up and propose that they should agree to our terms.
But if they were put in a position when all had to agree,
no one would undertake the responsibility of objecting.
That was how I gauged the situation.

The time to strike had come. If I had moved
earlier, before the Tibetans had, each of them, had the
opportunity of blowing off steam, I should simply have
aroused more armed opposition. If I delayed, I might
have to leave Lhasa through military considerations before
I ever got the chance. I had asserted fifteen months
before, in a letter to my father written when just start-
ing for Tibet, that I would sit tight any length of

THE MOMENT FOR ACTION 291

time, but when my opportunity came, as come it must,
I would strike in hard and sharp. The psychological
moment had exactly arrived, and I determined to use it.
I told the Chinese Resident that I would call on him on
September 1 with the full final draft of the Treaty, and
that I would like the Tibetan Council and the members of
the National Assembly to be present when I met him.
In the presence of the Chinese representative, I meant to
inform the whole of the leading men of Lhasa, monk,
lay, and official, that they must sign the Treaty, or take
the consequences of refusal.

On the appointed day, September 1, with my whole
staff, all of us in full-dress uniform, I rode through the city
of Lhasa to the Chinese Residency. Here the Resident
received me with his usual courtesy, and after some
general conversation, I intimated to him that I would
proceed to business. He thereupon summoned the
Sha-p^s, who, after salutations, took their seats on stools
in the centre of the room. Most of the members of the
National Assembly then present in Lhasa also came in,
and were huddled into the corners.

I then rose and presented the Resident with the full
final draft of the Treaty (precisely as I had received
it from Government), in English, Chinese, and Tibetan.
The Resident handed the Tibetan copy to the Sha-p^s,
and when all were seated again, I asked the Resident's
permission to address a few words to the Tibetans in
regard to the Treaty. The Resident having assented, I
said that as this was the first opportunity I had had of
addressing members of the National Assembly, I wished
to take advantage of it to let them know that if they had
negotiated with me at Khamba Jong, or even at Gyantse
when I first arrived there, the terms would not have been
as severe as these we were now asking. We would
merely have arranged trade and boundary questions, and
there would have been no demand for an indemnity. By
following the advice the Resident had given them, they
might have been saved all the trouble in which they found
themselves involved. They had chosen to fight, and had
been defeated, and had to pay the consequences. Yet

292 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

even now we were not demanding the whole, but only
half, the cost of the military operations. The other half
would have to fall upon India. The sum we were now
asking would, if the Treaty were signed the next day,
be 75 lakhs of rupees, calculated at the rate of Rs. 50,000
a day from the date on which I was attacked at Gyantse
till one month after the date of signature of the Treaty.
If they signed it on September 3, the amount would be
75^ lakhs. If on September 4, 76 lakhs, and so on. I
was prepared to explain any point in the final draft which
they did not understand, but I could not further discuss
the terms. They had been especially framed with modera-
tion. They embodied the commands of the British
Government, and would have to be accepted. I would
give them another week within which they might receive
explanations and think matters over. But I could not
give them any longer time, for while they were punishing
themselves by adding day by day to the amount of the
indemnity, they were also punishing India, who had to
pay the other half of the cost.

They asked to be allowed to take away the final draft
and consider it. I said that, as long as they did not mind
paying Rs. 50,000 a day, they might consider it, and come
to me or my secretary for explanations. They then made
an appeal to the Resident to intercede with me on their
behalf. The Resident merely acknowledged their request,
and then, after asking me if I had anything further to say
to them, dismissed them.

When they were gone, I said to the Resident that I
was sorry to have to speak to them as I had done, but my
experience had been that soft words and reasoning had no
effect on their obstinate natures. I then said that the
Tibetans were agreeing to all the terms, which did not
hurt them in the least, and were, indeed, advantageous, but
were refusing the indemnity, the only one of the terms
which cost them anything. Excluding foreigners was in
accordance with their traditional poUcy, and was therefore
no sacrifice. As to opening trade-marts, that was to their
advantage. ' They were born traders and bargainers, as we
were finding to our cost, for they were extorting extravagant

THE FINAL DEMAND 293

prices from us for the articles they brought for sale to our
camp.

The Resident and his staff laughed heartily over this,
and said that trade-marts were of course to their advantage.
As to the indemnity, I said I had had some experience of
Native States, and comparing Tibet with them, I should
say Tibet was quite able to pay the amount we were
asking. If, however, the Tibetans could not pay the
whole amount within three years, I was quite prepared,
as I had informed them, to receive proposals for the
extension of the period of payment. The Resident
thought this reasonable, but made no further remark.

I then observed that the draft Convention which I had
received from Government was made out between me and
the Dalai Lama. Was there any chance of the Dalai
Lama returning in time to conclude the Convention with
me ? The Resident said there was not. I thereupon
asked with whom, in that case, I should conclude the Treaty.
He said that the Ti Rimpoche would act as Regent, and
would use the seal which the Dalai Lama had left with
him, and this seal would be supported by the seals of the
National Assembly, of the Council, and of the three great
monasteries.

My bolt had been shot : what would be the result ? This
was the thought which I kept asking myself as I rode
back through the streets of Lhasa. Would the Tibetans
fight ? Would they brazen it out, and still remain
obstinate ? Or would they, perhaps, fly as the Dalai Lama
had done ? On the whole, I thought they would take
none of these courses, or I would not have acted as I
had done, for all the way through I had tried to follow the
principle of looking before I made a step in advance,
so that when my foot was once down, I could keep it
down. It was a dull and heavy method of procedure, but
was the best way, I thought, of impressing an obstinate
people like the Tibetans. I considered, on the whole, that
their resistance to our demands would now collapse,
though I was naturally anxious as to the result.

On the day following, September 2, one of the
Councillors and some other officials visited Captain

294 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

O'Connor, and went through the draft Treaty with him
word by word. On the same day the Tongsa Penlop
suggested, on his own initiative, to the Tibetans that they
should let us collect the Customs duty at the marts, and
get the amount of the indemnity from that source. I
telegraphed to Government that I was making no move
in this matter of adjusting the difficulty about the in-
demnity till the Tibetans made definite proposals, but
that I thought it would be advantageous to move, and
would like the views of Government.

On September 4 the Ti Rimpoche (the Regent) and a
Secretary of Council, accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop
and the Nepalese representative, came to me and an-
nounced that the Tibetan Government were prepared to
conclude the Treaty with me if the term for the payment
of the indemnity would be extended, and the payment
made in seventy-five annual instalments of one lakh of
rupees each.

I kept Captain O'Connor talking with them for a few
minutes while I turned the whole question over in my
mind once more before I gave a final decision. One very
easy course I might have adopted was to say that 1 must
refer the matter to Government and await their orders. But
before I could get an answer military considerations might
have predominated, and I might find myself forced to leave
Lhasa. As the Government of India subsequently said,
the language of the communications which they received
from the Home Government was such as to impress on
them and me alike that they were strongly averse to any
prolongation of the stay at Lhasa. I had, therefore, no
assurance that I should have time to go on discussing this
point with the Tibetans. Then, again, I thought that in
the matter of the indemnity a certain amount of latitude
had been left me. The Secretary of State's instructions
on this point were : "In regard to the question of an
indemnity, the sum to be demanded should not exceed an
amount which, it is believed, will be within the power of
the Tibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread
over three years. Colonel Younghusband will be guided
by circumstances in this matter." The full despatch was

THE TIBETAN PROPOSAL 295

more definite than this telegram. But the despatch had
not yet arrived. Some degree of discretion was left me.
Was I justified by the very difficult circumstances in
which I found myself in stretching it to seventy-five
years ? This was the question I had to settle in my mind
while the Regent was waiting for my reply.

But this question of the indemnity did not stand alone.
It had to be taken in connection with another clause
which would give us the right to occupy the Chumbi
Valley until the indemnity was paid. I had, then, to ask
myself further: Would an occupation of the Chumbi
Valley for seventy -five years as a guarantee for the
payment of an indemnity run counter to any pledge we
had given to Russia ? Now, Lord Lansdowne, when he
gave his pledge, distinctly said that the action of Govern-
ment must to some extent depend upon the conduct of
the Tibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Govern-
ment could not undertake that they would not depart in
any eventuality from the policy which then commended
itself to them.

This was said to the Russian Ambassador on June 2,
before Government had heard the result of our announce-
ment to the Tibetans that we would be prepared to
negotiate at Gyantse up to June 25. Since Lord Lans-
downe had spoken to the Russian Ambassador, the
Tibetans had continued fighting, had attacked me at
Kangma, and by June 25 had sent no negotiators. The
conduct of the Tibetans had, therefore, been such as might
very well cause Government to alter their action.

Further, the Tibetans, during our advance to Lhasa,
had opposed us at the Karo-la, and fired on us from
Nagartse Jong. This opposition was indeed slight,
because we had been obliged, after June 25, to break
down at Gyantse the Tibetan forces which intervened
between us and our advance to Lhasa. Had General Mac-
donald not captured the Jong and dispersed the Tibetan
forces round Gyantse, the opposition to our advance to
Lhasa would have been very much greater than it was.

Since Lord Lansdowne had given his pledge to the
Russian Ambassador, events had occurred — the failure

296 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

to send accredited negotiators before June 25 and the
continued opposition of the Tibetans — which might, I
thought, be considered by His Majesty's Government
sufficient justification for departing in some slight degree
from the pohcy which on June 2, before they were com-
pletely aware of the nature of the Tibetan position,
commended itself to them. Lord Lansdo^^me had said
in April in the House of Lords, referring then to the
policy laid down in the telegram of November 6, 1903,
that he did not mean to say that, "whatever happened,
we were never to move an inch beyond the limits therein
laid down." And I -thought that the policy settled in
London, before Government were aware of the conditions
I should find at Lhasa, would admit of some little
elasticity.

Then, as regards the nature of the pledges themselves.
The pledges given were that, " so long as no other Power
endeavours to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, they [His
Majesty's Government] will not attempt either to annex
it, to establish a protectorate over it, or in any way to
control its internal administration."

The question was, " Did the right to occupy the
Chumbi Valley for seventy-five years, as security for the
payment of an indemnity, involve a breach of this pledge ?"
Burma, in somewhat similar circumstances, we had an-
nexed, but that meant turning out the native rulers,
constituting a Government of our own, and stationing
garrisons at the capital and throughout the country. Over
Native States in India we established protectorates, but that
necessarily involved subordinating their foreign relations to
our own. In many of them we controlled the internal
administration, but only by agents of Government being
deputed especially for that purpose. Would the occupation
of Chumbi, a valley lying altogether outside Tibet proper,
on the Indian and not on the Tibetan side of the watershed,
a valley which had not always belonged to Tibet, mean
annexing Tibet, establishing a protectorate over it, or
controUing its internal administration ? This was the
question I asked myself, and I answered it in the
negative. I said to myself it involved none of the

X
o

W
El

ACCEPTANCE OF TIBETAN PROPOSAL 297

three, and could not, therefore, be taken as breaking our
pledges to Russia.

Others might not think likewise. But even if they did
not,- 1 could not see that if I agreed to the Tibetan pro-
posals, including, as they would, the right for us to occupy
the Chumbi Valley for seventy-five years, I was thereby
involving Government in any fresh responsibility. I
should not, for instance, be giving to the inhabitants a
promise of our protection which it would be impossible for
Government to repudiate. I should be simply acquiring
for Government the right to occupy the Chumbi Valley
for seventy-five years if they wanted to, and if they did
not want to, they could go out whenever they liked. I
was not " compelling the Government to occupy the
Chumbi " Valley ; I was simply acquiring the right, which
they could abrogate if they did not want it.

Arguing thus with myself, I decided finally to seize
the golden opportunity. If I let it go 1 knew not what
might happen. The Regent might flee. The National
Assembly might sulk. The Chinese might wake up and
put in some obstruction. By agreeing I should be doing
nothing counter to the wishes of the Government of India,
for the amount of the indemnity was what they had them-
selves suggested, and they had on June 30,* after the
pledges to Russia were given, spoken of retaining the
Chumbi Valley, the occupation of which had been urged
by the Bengal Government as far back as 1888. By agree-
ing I should also be eflPecting what my own experience
showed me would be by far the most satisfactory per-
manent solution of the whole question. Chumbi is
the key to Tibet. It is also the most difficult part of the
road to Lhasa. Situated in the Chumbi Valley, we should
have a clear run into Tibet, for the Tang-la (pass) across
the watershed is an open plain several miles wide. The
Chumbi Valley is the only strategical point of value in
the whole north-eastern frontier from Kashmir to Burma.
It was the surest guarantee for the fulfilment of the new
Treaty which we could possibly get, except the establish-
ment of an agent at Lhasa, and the obtaining of a

* Blue-book, III., p. 36.

298 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

guarantee had from the first been placed as one of the
chief objects of my Mission.

Our main object was to put our relations with the
Tibetans on a permanently satisfactory basis. By saying
"yes" to the Regent's proposal I should be concluding
a settlement which would admirably meet all our local
requirements ; which would, as they themselves had made
it, best suit the Tibetans ; which would not, as far as I
could judge, run counter to any international obligations ;
and which would involve Government in no further re-
sponsibility.

I therefore turned to the Tibetans and said that, in
view of the representations which had been made to me as
to the difficulty of raising the money in cash, I would
agree to the payment being distributed over seventy-five
years. They must, however, clearly understand that
under the terms of the Treaty we should retain the right
to continue to occupy the Chumbi VaUey till the ftill
amount of the indemnity was paid. They said that they
understood this.

I then remarked that the amount due to us was,
to-day, 76 lakhs, not 75 lakhs, as two more days
had elapsed since I gave them the ultimatum, and for
each of those days Rs. 50,000 was chargeable. The
Tongsa Penlop, however, asked that this extra lakh
might be remitted, and to this I assented. The Tibetans
then asked that the amount might be paid in kind- — in
ponies, for instance. I replied that as the amount was so
small it would be better to pay it in cash, for if it were
paid in ponies or other articles there would be constant
disputes between us as to the value of the articles prof-
fered, and our good relations might be jeopardized.
Finally they asked that it might be paid in tangas, the
local Tibetan coin. I rephed that I had entered rupees in
the draft Treaty, and with that they must be content.

The Ti Rimpoche then affixed his private seal to the
draft Treaty.

The thing was done, but what I did in sajring those
half a dozen words agreeing to the Tibetan proposals was
considered afterwards to be a grave error of judgment, and

THE RIGHT TO GO TO LHASA 299

was to bring upon me the censure of Government. That,
of course, is what I had to risk. I knew that I was not
acting within my instructions. I was using my discretion
in very difficult circumstances with what the Government
of India afterwards described* to the Secretary of State as
" a fearlessness of responsibility which it would be a grave
mistake to discourage in any of their agents." And if I
really was in error, I think that those who tied their agent
down for time and bound him within such narrow lines
before they were aware in what conditions he would find
himself at Lhasa, cannot themselves be considered as
altogether faultless.

In another matter also I at this time acted on my
own responsibility. In the original proposals of the
Government of India regarding the terms about which I
was, without committing Government, to ascertain how
the Tibetan Government would be hkely to regard them.f
was one by which the agent at Gyantse was to have the
right of proceeding to Lhasa to discuss matters with the
Tibetan officials or the Resident. This reached me before
I left Gyantse, and when the Tongsa Penlop asked me for
our terms to let the Dalai Lama know what we wanted,
I gave him this among all the rest. Subsequently, I
received instructions not to ask for permission for the
Gyantse agent to proceed to Lhasa. I did not, however,
at once withdraw the clause from the list of terms,
because in the course of negotia,tions it might prove
useful as a point on which I could, if necessary, make
concessions to the Tibetans. But when I found the
Tibetans raised no special objections to the clause, pro-
vided the trade agent went to Lhasa only on commercial,
and not political, business, and only after he had found it
impossible to get this commercial business disposed of by
correspondence or by personal conference with the Tibetan
agent at Gyantse, I thought there would be no objection
to taking an agreement from the Tibetans to that effect ;
for, under such limitations and provisions, there could be
no grounds for assuming that in going there the trade
agent at Gyantse would be taking upon himself any

* Blue-book, III., p. 75. i Ibid., p. 22.

300 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

political functions, or adopting the character of a Political
Resident.

As this agreement was of a less formal character than
the rest of the Convention, I had it drawn up separately.
It ran as follows :

" The Government of Tibet agrees to permit the British
agent, who will reside at Gyantse, to watch the conditions
of the British trade, to visit Lhasa, when it is necessary,
to consult with high Chinese and Tibetan officials on such
commercial matters of importance as he has found im-
possible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or by
personal conference with the Tibetan agent."

To this also the Regent gave his consent.

On September 5 the Resident and the principal Tibetan
authorities came to arrange final details and formahties
regarding the signing of the Treaty. The first point to
decide was who should sign it. I asked the Resident
whose name should be entered in the place of the Dalai
Lama's. He said I might enter the name of the Ti
Rimpoche, and he added that representatives of the
Council, of the three great monasteries, and of the National
Assembly would also affix their seals. To this the Tibetans
assented. I then said the next point was to settle the
time and place for signature. There could be only one
place— namely, the Potala Palace— in which I would sign
it, and I was ready to sign as soon as the final copies of
the Treaty had been prepared. The Resident said that
he had no objection to the Treaty being signed in the
Potala. He then informed the Tibetans of our decision.
The Tibetans objected strongly, but without advancing
any reasons except that they did not wish it. I informed
them that they had at Khamba Jong and Gyantse grossly
insulted the British representative, and 1 now insisted that
I should be shown the fullest respect. I had been prepared
to show, and had shown, the utmost consideration for their
religion and sacred buildings, but I expected that they on
their part should show the fullest respect to the King-
Emperor's representative. They suggested that the
Treaty should be signed in the Resident's Yamen, but
I said I would be content with no other place than that

PLACE FOR SIGNATURE 301

in which the Dalai Lama would have received me if
he had himself been here to sign the Treaty. The
utmost respect it was within their capacity to show I
expected should on this occasion be accorded. They
began murmuring other objections, but the Resident told
them the matter was settled, and did not admit of further
discussion.

The question of the exact room in the Palace was then
discussed, and a certain room was suggested. I told the
Resident that I would send officers that afternoon to
inspect the Palace, and satisfy themselves that the room
suggested was the most appropriate one, and I asked him
to have Chinese and Tibetan officials deputed to accom-
pany my officers. To this he agreed. The date for the
ceremony of signing was then fixed for the next day.
The Resident said he would himself be present, though he
would be unable to agree to the Convention till he had
heard from Peking.

Messrs. White and Wilton, and Captain O'Connor,
with Majors Iggulden and Beynon from General Mac-
donald's staff, went over the Potala in the afternoon, and
reported that the hall suggested by the Tibetans was the
most suitable one in the Palace. That, therefore, was the
one we fixed on for the ceremony on the following day.

Though it was easy enough to speak decisively like this
about signing the Treaty in the Potala, 1 had many
qualms that night as to whether I had not perhaps at the
last moment made one false step. Since the days of the
eccentric Manning — whose name should never be forgotten
when Lhasa is mentioned — no European had been inside
this Palace, and these 20,000 turbulent monks in and
around Lhasa might flare up at the last moment, or else
commit some atrocity when we were once and completely
in their power inside the buildings. Such things have
happened before now to Political Agents in India. On
the other hand, the hall we were to go to was not a
temple, and the Dalai Lama himself, though considered a
sacred being, was also a political personage. It was not in
the temple of a god that I insisted upon signing the
Treaty ; it was in the audience-chamber of a poUtical chief.

302 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

And for the effect upon the Tibetans and upon men in
general, upon our own soldiers, British and Indian, and
upon the Nepalese, Bhutanese, and Sikkimese, and far
away up into Kashmir and Turkestan, it was necessary to
do something to strike their imagination, and to give some
unmistakable sign that the Tibetans had not been able
through aU these years to flout us without suffering the
penalty.

Here again to the common-sense man it would have
seemed ridiculous and foolish to run more additional risk
when the Treaty could have been signed comfortably and
without any fuss in either my room or the Resident's.
But those who have lived among Asiatics know that the
fact of signing the Treaty in the Potala was of as much
value as the Treaty itself Few would know what was in
the Treaty, but the fact that the British had concluded a
Treaty in the Potala would be an unmistakable sign that
the Tibetans had been compelled to come to terms. At
the Commencement of the Mission our prestige all along
our frontier with Tibet had been at zero-point. Every-
where it was thought that the Tibetans could defy us with
impunity. Our prestige had no value, and prestige in
Asiatic countries is a high practical asset. Through
prestige a few Englishmen, without a single British soldier,
are able to control a district or State in India containing
as many inhabitants as Tibet. Because they had allowed
their prestige to wane, the Chinese, even with soldiers,
were unable to control Tibet. It was to give an unmis-
takable sign, which all other countries could understand,
that our prestige was re-established in Tibet that I insisted
on having the Treaty signed in the Potala itself.

To the troops the news that the Treaty was concluded
was a completely unexpected announcement. For weeks
past they had heard of nothing but Tibetan obstruction.
They knew that we should soon be leaving Lhasa, and
they had made up their minds that we should have to
leave without a Treaty. They were overjoyed, then, when
they heard that the Treaty had been concluded and was
to be signed next day. On most of the frontier expeditions
upon which they had been engaged there was little to

PROCEED TO POTALA 303

show in return for all they went though. Now they had
been led to a remote sacred city, and had not only
reached their goal, but were also to bring back something
with them as the tangible result of their labours. Their
satisfaction was therefore great.

All the military arrangements for the ceremonial were
in General Macdonald's hands, and no one could have
arranged them with greater care and precaution. Every
detail both for effect and for defence was regarded. The
route to the Palace was lined with troops, equally for
show and for use in case of emergency, and a battery to
fire a salute or to bombard the Palace, as occasion might
require, was stationed in a suitable position.

On the political side we had to arrange the ceremonial
in detail, so that there might be no inconvenient hitch at
the last moment. The copy of the Treaty which the
Tibetans were to keep was written on an immensely long
and broad stretch of paper, so that the whole Treaty in all
three languages — English, Tibetan, and Chinese — might
be on one piece of paper. Four other copies had to be
made : one for Calcutta, one for London, one for the
Chinese Government, and one for our Minister in Peking.
All these were carried on a large silver tray by my
Bengali head clerk, Mr. Mitter, who had accompanied me
from the Indore Residency Office, and undergone all
the hardships and dangers with unfailing cheerfulness.
My camp-table was taken in to sign the Treaty on, and on
it was laid the flag which had flown over the Mission
headquarters throughout.

Half an hour before the time fixed for the ceremony
the whole of the route leading up to the Potala, and the
inside passages as well, were lined with troops. Soon
after 3 p.m. General Macdonald and I, accompanied
by the members of the Mission and the military staff",
reached the Potala. We were received in the Durbar
HaU by the Chinese Resident. The chamber was one
in which the Dalai Lama holds Durbars, and was large
enough to hold about 200 of our troops (some of whom
were formed up as an escbrt, whUe others had been
allowed to attend as spectators), and also about 100

304 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

Chinese, and over 100 Tibetans. The scene as we
entered was unique in interest. On the left were all
the British and Indian officers and men in their sombre
fighting dress. On the right were the mass of Tibetans,
the Councillors in yellow silk robes, and many others
in brilliant clothing, together with the Bhutanese in bright
dresses and quaint headgear. And in front the Resident
and all his staff, in their full official dress, advanced to
meet me, with the Regent by him, in the severely simple
garb of a Lama. The pillars and cross-beams of the roof
of the hall were richly painted. An immense silk curtain,
gorgeously embroidered, was hung immediately behind the
chairs to be occupied by the Resident and myself And the
whole scene was rendered curiously soft and hazy from the
light entering, not by windows at the sides, but through
the coloured canvas of an immense skylight in the centre.
The Ti Rimpoche (the Regent) sat next to the Resident
on his left. I was on his right. As soon as we were seated,
Tibetan servants brought in tea, and handed cups to all
the British and Chinese officials. Low tables of dried
fruits were then set before the two rows of officials.
When these were all cleared away, I said to the Resident
that, with his permission, I would proceed to business.

1 first had the Treaty read in Tibetan, and then asked
the Tibetan officials if they were prepared to sign it.
They answered in the affirmative, and the immense roll of
paper was produced, on which the Treaty was written in
three parallel columns in English, Chinese, and Tibetan,
according to their custom of having treaties in different
languages inscribed on the same sheet of paper. I asked
the Tibetans to affix their seals first, and the long process
began. When the seals of the Council, the monasteries,
and the National Assembly had been affixed I rose, and,
with the Ti Rimpoche, advanced to the table, the Resident
and the whole Durbar rising at the same time. The Ti
Rimpoche then affixed the Dalai Lama's seal, and finally
I sealed and signed the Treaty. Having done this, I
handed the document to the Ti Rimpoche, and said a
peace had now been made which I hoped would never
again be broken.

SIGNATURE OF TREATY 305

The same ceremonial was followed in the case of the
copies in the three languages for the Resident, which,
having been signed and sealed, I handed to him. The
three copies, each in three languages, for the British
Government, were then signed and sealed, the whole
operation lasting nearly an hour and a half.

When the ceremony was concluded I addressed the
Tibetans, saying that the misunderstandings of the past
were now over, and a basis had been laid for mutual good
relations in future. We were not interfering in the
smallest degree with their religion, we were annexing no
part of their country, we were not interfering in their
internal affairs, and we were fully recognizing the conr
tinned suzerainty of the Chinese Government. We
merely sought todnsure that they should abide by the
Treaty made on their behalf by the Amban in 1890 ; that
trade relations, which were no less advantageous to them
than to us, should be established with them as they had
been with every other country in the world, except Tibet ;
and that they should not depart from their traditional
policy in regard to relations with other countries. They
had found us bad enemies when they had not observed
Treaty obligations, and shown disrespect to the British
representative. They would find us equally good friends
if they kept the present Treaty and showed civility. As
a first token of peace I would ask General Macdonald
to release all prisoners of war, and I should expect that
they would set at liberty all those imprisoned on account
of dealings with us.

This speech was translated sentence by sentence by
Captain O'Connor, and the Resident's interpreter trans-
lated it sentence by sentence to the Resident. At its
conclusion the members of Council said that the Treaty
had been made by the whole people, and would never be
broken. We should see in future that they really intended
to observe it. I then turned to the Resident and thanked
him for the help he had given me in making the Treaty.
He said he was glad he and I had been able to work
together, and he hoped and thought the Tibetans would
keep the Treaty. A copy of the Treaty, as signed, is

306 THE TREATY CONCLUDED

placed in the Appendix. The three original copies I
brought back to India with me.

The Tibetans throughout showed perfect good temper
and the fullest respect. They often laughed over the opera-
tions of seaUng, and when we left they all came crowding
up to shake hands with every British officer they could
make their way to. The Resident was very courteous, and
showed special pleasure when my words regarding the con-
tinued suzerainty of China being recognized were translated
to him. Altogether the ceremonial very deeply impressed
the Tibetans, who, without being humiliated in a way
which could cause resentment, had now learnt to accord
us the respect which was our due. At the conclusion of
the Durbar I had the Lamas of the Potala presented
with Rs. 1,000. It was the first present, except to
the poor, which I had given since my arrival in Lhasa.
My motto had been : The " mailed fist " first and the
sugar-plums afterwards. The contrary procedure so often
leads to trouble.

^vvtvw

-V(^,

:.~ ..^^^^v JVa/,s2^^-^:^

■^^^^.S^^-—^-

/^yUch^A ,^\\,^yiA^ ■SJi-t/^'-^ M ■ "hfM

'ill

,<£e^*/ ^^^H -^/i -(^^-^clV

SEALS AFFIX]' D TO TREATY.

J'o /ace paj7c 306.

CHAPTER XIX

IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

With the signature of the Treaty a tense strain was
released, and as I rode down from the Potala I felt at
last at ease. That evening General Macdonald, Major
Iggulden, his chief staff officer, and the rest of the military
staff entertained the Mission at dinner, and among the
memories of that eventful day will always be included the
recollection of the warmly appreciative speech which
General Macdonald made on that occasion.

On the day following two Councillors visited me, and
I informed them that General Macdonald had agreed to
my request to release all prisoners of war. These were
paraded in front of the house, and General Macdonald
sent a staff officer to order their release and to give each
man Rs. 5 for work he had done.

The Sha-p^s then produced two men who had been
imprisoned owing to assistance they had given to Sarat
Chandra Das, the Bengali traveller, and two men who
had been imprisoned for helping the Japanese traveller,
Kawaguchi. The two first men had been in chains for
nineteen years, and showed signs of terrible suffering. All
were in abject fear of the Tibetans, bowing double before
them. Their cheeks were sunken, their eyes glazed and
staring, their expression unchangeably fixed in horror,
and their skin as white and dry as paper. Their release
was entirely due to the exertions of Captain O'Connor,
I thanked the Sha-p^s for their action, which I looked
upon as a sign that they really wished to live on friendly
terms with us. I trusted that they would never again
imprison men whose only offence was friendliness to
British subjects.

307

308 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

I returned to the Sha-pds the sum of Rs. 5,000,
which I had exacted from them, and released the hostages
I had demanded on the occasion of the attack hy a fanatical
Lama on two British officers. But I demanded back the
sum of Rs. 1,000 on account of the murder of one and the
brutal torture of another servant of the Mission caught in
the town of Gyantse on the night of the attack on the
Mission. I said we did not mind fair and square fighting
between men whose business it was to fight, but the
murder and torture of harmless and defenceless servants
was pure barbarity. The Sha-pds acknowledged that what
I said was just, but said they were not present, and knew
nothing of it. Rs. 1,000 were, therefore, retained to be
paid in compensation to the servants' families.

I then remarked that we had now had a general setthng
up of all accounts between us, and could start fair. The
Sha-pes said they hoped now we should always be on
friendly terms, and they certainly meant to observe the
Treaty.

The Tongsa Penlop paid me a formal visit on the 10th
to congratulate me on the successful issue of the negotia-
tions. He said that there was no resentment at the
settlement or at the manner in which it had been made,
and the Nepalese representative was of the same opinion.
The Tibetans were well satisfied with the issue of the
negotiations. And I dare say in their heart of hearts,
and despite aU their protests, they had fully expected us
to annex the whole country, as we had annexed Burma, or
at any rate to annex up to Gyantse, and were probably
quite surprised to have got off so lightly.

Congratulations from India and England soon came
pouring in. Only six days after the Treaty was signed
came a telegram from the Viceroy conveying the con-
gratulations of the King himself. His Majesty, though
away at Marienbad, had immediately telegraphed his
congratulations, a particular compliment which is rarely
given for work in India. To the troops this was especially
gratifying. The telegram was read out to them on a full
parade, which General Macdonald ordered for the purpose.
The Secretary of State, the acting Viceroy, Lord Ampt-

TIBETAN SECLUSION BROKEN 309

hill, Lord Curzon, from England, Lord Kitchener, and
very many others, also sent their congratulations ; and
now, while the Chinese Government were making up their
minds whether they would allow the Resident to sign his
adhesion to the Treaty, I had leisure and inclination to go
about Lhasa and see something of the monasteries and
temples, and talk with the people in a less forced and
formal manner than I had to while the strain of the
negotiations was on us.

We had so far seen the Tibetans only on the conten-
tious side. Now that the stress was over I wished to see
them as they really were. What especially I wished to
see was their monastic life. The priesthood ruled Tibet.
Religion was the chief characteristic of the people. Their
religion and the character of the Lamas, who both led the
religious life of the people and guided their political desti-
nies, were, therefore, the special objects of my interest.

From the first I had insisted that we should not be
denied access to the monasteries, for to get rid of mis-
understandings it was essential that we should close up
with the Lamas and come directly into contact with
them. But I had been careful to let only those officers
enter the monasteries who could be trusted to comport
themselves with propriety, and have all reasonable regard
for the feehngs and prejudices of the monks.

For this purpose Mr. White, Mr. Walsh, Captain
O'Connor, and Colonel Waddell, the well-known writer
on Lamaism, who was appointed Chief Medical Officer
and Archaeologist to the Mission's escort, were invaluable.
Each had his special qualification for the work, and each
made use of it by " peaceful penetration " to break through
the last barrier which separated us from the Tibetans.
Mr. White was known in person or by reputation as none
of the rest of us were, and had many friends who were
also friends of these Lamas. Through them he obtained
an invitation to the De-pun Monastery, and from this
start made rapid progress. Mr. Walsh, as Deputy Com-
missioner of Darjiling, and through his long acquaintance
with this frontier and intimate knowledge of the language
and history of the country, was also able to exert a most

310 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

useful influence after his arrival from Chumbi, while
Colonel Waddell interested himself in the libraries and in
historical research. As a consequence, when I visited
these monasteries, after the signature of the Treaty, I was
received as if the visit from a British official was the same
ordinary occurrence as it is in India.

Each monastery is a little town in itself, a compact
block of soUdly-built masonry — houses, halls, and temples.
The streets are narrow and not over-clean, but the halls
and temples are spacious. They are mostly of much the
same type, with pagoda-shaped roofs, painted wooden
pillars, and grotesque demonesque-like figures. In the
De-pun Monastery there were from 8,000 to 10,000 monks,
divided into, I think, four sections, each with its Abbot
and its separate temple hall and institutions.

In outward appearance the monks of some of these
Lhasa monasteries are not prepossessing. They look
coarse and besotted. Some are bright and cordial, but
hardly any look really intellectual or spiritual, and the
general impression I took away was one of dirt and
degradation. Of the higher llamas, also, my impression
was not favourable as regards their intellectual capacity or
spiritual attainments. The Regent (Ti Rimpoche), with
whom I carried on the negotiations, had great charm. He
was a benevolent, kindly old gentleman, who would not
have hurt a fly if he could have avoided it. No one could
help liking him, but no one could say that he had the
intellectual capacity we would ineet with in Brahmins in
India, or the character and bearing one would expect in
the leading man of a country. And his spiritual attain-
ments, I gathered from a long conversation I had with
him after the Treaty was signed, consisted mainly of a
knowledge by rote of vast quantities of his holy books.
The capacity of these Tibetan monks for learning their
sacred books by rote is, indeed, something prodigious ;
though about the actual meaning they trouble themselves
but little.

Some of the Abbots we met were cheery, genial souls,
much as we picture to ourselves the jolly friars of olden
days in England ; but as spiritual leaders of a rehgious

JAPANESE VIEW OF TIBETANS 311

people, I did not find the higher llamas impressed me any
more favourably than the ordinary monks.

These impressions, which in themselves would not
have much value, as my period for observation was so very
limited, are borne out by the courageous Japanese traveller
Kawaguchi, himself a Buddhist, and once Rector of a
monastery in Japan, who lived in the Sera Monastery,
and in his most valuable work, " Three Years in Tibet,"
written since we were in Tibet, has given to the English
public the results of his study.

For a few Lamas he had a sincere attachment. Like
myself, he greatly revered the old Ti Rimpoche, who
taught him Buddhism in its correct form, and " truly im-
pressed him as a living Buddha." He struck Kawaguchi
as not only having a juster ideal of the real spirit of
Buddhism than the other Lamas, but as also having
greater ability, which may have been due to what I had
not myself known— his father being a Chinaman. For
an ex-Minister of Finance, a Lama, Kawaguchi also had
gi*eat admiration, and certainly from him received unstinted
kindness, even when he risked his life in showing Kawa-
guchi attention. The Head- Priest of Wartang he also
thought very clever, and from him he received valuable
information on Buddhism.

These, however, were exceptional men, and most of
the Lamas were very disappointing to the Japanese. Even
the good ex-Financial Minister had the defect of living
with a nun. A Lama travelling companion was a " pe-
dantic scholar " who knew nothing of the essential prin-
ciples of Buddhism, and had only a vague notion of the
doctrines. The Abbot of Sakya had a son, though Lamas
are not allowed to marry, and Kawaguchi was " loth to
remain with so dissipated a priest." The tutor of the Tashi
Lama was disappointing in his answers about "grammar."

The doctors of the highest degrees, he said, were
unquestionably theologians of great erudition, and at
home in the complete cycle of Buddhist works. They
had, indeed, he considered, a better knowledge of Buddhist
theology than the Japanese divines. But such were few
and far between, and he seems to have agreed with the

312 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

observation of the Ti Rimpoche that it would " be better
to have even two or three precious diamonds than a heap
of stones." The Tibetan priesthood, he thought, contained
plenty of rubbish, with very few diamonds.

To account for this, he says that the main purpose of
Tibetans in entering the priesthood is " only to procure
the largest amount of fortune, as well as the highest
possible fame." To seek rehgious truth and to work for
the deliverance of men was not at all what, according to
this Japanese, they wished to do. They simply desired,
he says, to escape from the painful struggle of life, and
" enjoy lazy and comfortable days on earth as well as in
heaven." There is nothing deep that he could see in their
religious life and study ; service went in their eyes for
nothing.

Medicine, logic, engineering, and religious philosophy
were introduced into Tibet centuries ago from India ; but
nowadays, says Kawaguchi, there are almost no Tibetans
who are proficient in even one of these subjects.

Of the morality of the Lamas Kawaguchi gives no
very pleasant account. Most of these celibate priest-
nobles kept women somewhere, and the lower warrior-
priests really seem, he says, to be the descendants of
Sodom and Gomorrah. Some of the festivals were simply
bestial orgies.

These " warrior-priests " of the Sera Monastery, which
is one of those I visited, are a peculiar institution. Their
daily task is varied. It is to play flutes, lyres, harps,
flageolets, and to beat drums ; to prepare offerings for the
deities ; to carry yak-dung for fuel ; to practise throwing
stones at a target ; and to act as a bodyguard. Kawaguchi
made friends with them by doctoring, and found them
very true to their duties, and though they might look
very rough, they were more truthful than the noble and
other priests, who, though trustworthy at first sight, were
in reality deceitful in seeking their own benefit and
happiness, and under their warm woollen garments hid a
mean and crafty behaviour.

The ordinary student in these monasteries had certainly
to work hard. Kawaguchi worked till he got " a swelling

LAMAS' CATECHISM 313

on his shoulder"; and, to get a degree, some work for
twenty years, with examinations every year. Besides
Tibetans, there were numbers of Mongols, and also some
200 Buriats from Siberia. The Mongols were hard-
working and progressive, but " very quick-tempered,
proud, and uppish," and every Mongol had it in him to be
a great leader, like Jenghiz Khan, whose career was, how-
ever, according to Kawaguchi, but a meteoric burst.
Compared with these the Tibetan students, though,
generally speaking, very quiet, courteous, and intelligent,
were lazy and sluggish " beyond the powers of Westerners
to imagine," and on account of their laziness very dirty.

Catechism seems to have been their chief study.
" The object of the questions and answers is to free the
mind from all worldliness, and to get into the very
bottom of truth, giving no powers to the devils of hell
in the mind." It is by this means, continues Kawaguchi,
that the naturally dull and lazy Tibetans are guided to
understand Buddhism, and through it they are, for a half-
civilized nation, very rich in logical ideas. The catechisms,
which I should judge were really more in the nature of
philosophical debates which aU Orientals love, were
carried on in a most excited manner. Many texts and
reference books had to be read before anyone could take
part in them, and the catechists were always taught that
" the foot must come down so strongly that the door of
hell may be broken open ; and that the hands must make
so great a noise that the voice of knowledge may frighten
the devils all the world over."

Besides studying and being engaged in ceremonial
observances, the monks, however, also carry on business.
M ost of them are engaged in trade ; many are employed in
agriculture, others in cattle-breeding, and sheep-rearing ;
and others, again, in the manufacture of Buddhist articles,
the painting of Buddhist pictures ; while tailors, carpenters,
masons, and shoemakers are also found among the priests.
Those of the higher class live very comfortably, building
their own villas and temples. Some employ as many as
70 or 80 servants.

The lower-class priests, on the other hand, Uve in a

314 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

pitiful way. No words, says Kawaguchi, can describe
their poor condition. The scholar-priests have to earn
their living as well as their expenses as students. Yet
they are too busy to go out and make money, and what
they receive as offerings from believers and as salaries from
temples does not amount to enough to support them.
They get a drink of tea gratis, but no flour ; and such
is their pitiable condition that they will often pass a couple
of days without eating.

A noteworthy fact is, that though by their religion
the Lamas are not supposed to take life, yet they are said
not to be able to pass a day without eating meat, and
more than 50,000 sheep, goats, and yaks are killed at
Lhasa during the last three months of each year. Their
punishments, too, are so cruel — gouging out eyes, cutting
off hands, beating, etc. — as to excite the Japanese just as
much as ourselves.

It is altogether a sorry picture which Kawaguchi draws,
but it precisely bears out the casual impressions we got
during our limited stay in Lhasa, and from what inter-
course we had with the Lamas. Whether Lamaism has
on the whole been a success I doubt. It has had a
pacifying effect, it is true. If the Tibetans had been
Mohammedans, we should not have reached Lhasa as easily
as we did. And the Mongols also have lost their old
warlike tendencies. The numerous figures of the placid
Buddha sitting in calm repose have had their influence.
Cut in rocks, erected in imposing statues, or modelled
in bronze and brass, and set up in their temples and house-
hold altars, they have hypnotized the people to a sense of
peace and rest. The Tibetans, who once carried their
arms to Peking itself, are now one of the most peaceful
of people. And the Mongols, who had set up a dynasty
in China, conquered all Central Asia, and laid waste
Western Europe, are now an almost negligible quantity
in war.

Lamaism has certainly, then, nourished peace in Tibet
and Mongolia. But the peace that has been nurtured
has been the quiescence of sloth and decadence. The
Buddhist idea of repose and kindness all can appreciate.

FALLACY OF BUDDHIST IDEAL 315

There are few men who have no kindly feelings, and would
not wish, if they could, to be at peace with all the world.
Yet the idea may have its danger and be as likely to lead
downward as upward. It may lull to rest and render
useless passions and energies which ought to be given
play to. And the evil of Lamaism is that it has fostered
lazy repose and self-suppression at the expense of useful
activity and self-realization.

The Mongols in their deserts, the Tibetans in their
mountains, have had the amplest opportunity for carrying
into effect the Buddhist idea. I have seen the one in
the deepest depths of their deserts, and the other in the
innermost sanctuary of their mountains, and to me it
seems that they have both been pursuing a false ideal.
They have sought by withdrawing from the world into
the desert and into the mountain to secure present peace
for the individual, instead of, by manfully taking their
part in the work of the world, aiming at the eventual
unison of the whole. Peace, instead of harmony, has
been their ideal — peace for the emasculated individual
instead of harmony for the united and full - blooded
whole.

The Tibetan's main idea, in fact, has been to save his
own soul. He does not trouble about others so long as
he can save himself Indeed, he thinks it will require all
his energies to do even that much, for at heart he is still
full of his original religion of demonology. He looks
upon the spiritual world as filled with demons, ready to
prey upon him if he makes the slightest slip. Every
temple, almost every house, is fuU of fantastic pictures
of the most terrible and blood-curdling devils, with glaring
eyes, open fang-studded mouth, extended neck and out-
stretched arm, ready to pounce upon some miserable
victim. The belief in heaven is vague. The belief in hell
is the one great fact in their lives, and how real it is may
be imagined when we hear of these poor wretches, who,
in order to escape its terrors, voluntarily allow themselves
to be walled into solitary cells, from which for years they
never emerge, but take in their food once a day through
a narrow opening. Thus only do those poor deluded

316 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

creatures think they can escape from demons in the world
to come. But that they most sincerely beheve in a life
hereafter no more positive evidence could be afforded. An
interesting detail is that their hell is not hot, but cold. If
it were hot, the inhabitants of frozen Tibet would all flock
there.

As might be naturally expected, such a people are
ready believers in the supposed supernatural powers of
certain men. We could hear nothing of the wonderful
Mahatmas, and the Ti Rimpoche told Colonel Waddell he
was entirely ignorant of their existence. But, according
to Kawaguchi, oracles are held in high esteem. The
Ngpak-pas, or miracle-workers, the descendants of Lamas
who worked miracles, are supposed to possess hereditary
secrets, and are held in great awe as being magicians of
power. The people showed such practical faith in the
efficacy of the charms which the Lamas gave that they
rushed right up to our rifles, believing that our buUets
could not hit them.

Practically, then, the religion of the Tibetans is but
of a degraded form. Yet one does see gleams of real
good radiating through. The Tashi Lama whom Bogle
met was a man of real worth. His successor of the
present day produced a most favourable impression m
India, and excited the enthusiasm of Sven Hedin. Deep
down under the dirty crust there must be some hidden
source of strength in these Lamas, or they would not
exert the influence they do. Millions of men over
hundreds of years are not influenced entirely by chicanery
and fraud. And I think I caught a ghmpse of that
inner power during a visit I paid to the Jo Khang
Temple.

This temple, or cathedral, as it has sometimes been
styled, has been fuUy described by Sarat Chandra Das,
Perceval Landon, and others. The latter especially has
given a remarkably vivid description of his impression.
It is, as Colonel Waddell has aptly styled it, the St.
Peter's of Lamadom, and is chiefly noteworthy as con-
taining the image of Buddha, made in India, but brought
to Lhasa from China by the Chinese Princess who

VISIT TO THE JO KHANG 317

married a Tibetan King and introduced Buddhism into
the country.

I visited this temple with full ceremony after the
Treaty was signed, and was received with every mark
of cordiality by the Chief Priest. I was even shown
round what might be called the high-altar, in spite of my
protestations that I might be intruding where I should
not go. The actual building is not imposing. The original
temple, built about a.d. 650, according to Waddell, has
been added to, and the result is a confused pile without
symmetry, and devoid of any single complete architectural
idea. One sees a ' forest of wooden pillars grotesquely
painted, but no beautiful design or plain simple effect.
Moreover, dirt is excessively prevalent, there is an offensive
smell of the putrid butter used in the services, and the
candlesticks, vases, and ceremonial utensils, some of solid
gold and of beautiful design, are not orderly arranged.

StiU, this temple, from its antiquity, from its worn
pavements marking the passage of innumerable pilgrims,
from the thought that for a thousand years those wanderers
from distant lands had faced the terrors of the desert and
the mountains to prostrate themselves before the benign
and peaceful Buddha, possessed a halo and an interest
which the beauty of the Taj itself could never give it.

Here it was that I found the true inner spirit of the
people. The Mongols from their distant deserts, the
Tibetans from their mountain homes, seemed here to draw
on some hidden source of power. And when from the
far recesses of the temple came the profound booming of
great drums, the chanting of monks in deep reverential
rhythm, the blare of trumpets, the clash of cymbals, and
the long rolling of lighter drums, I seemed to catch a
glimpse of the source from which they drew. Music is
a proverbially fitter means than speech for expressing the
eternal realities ; and in the deep rhythmic droning of the
chants, the muffled rumbling of the drums, the loud clang
and blaring of cymbals and trumpets, I realized this
sombre people touching their inherent spirit, and, in the
way most fitted to them, giving vent to its mighty
surgings panting for expression.

318 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

Besides these visits to monasteries and temples, we
also saw something of the Tibetans socially during our
stay in Ijhasa, and Captain Walton, through his skill in
medicine, attracted many hundreds to his hospital, and
was able to get on terms of intimacy with unofficial
Tibetans of the highest position. Many would come and
dine with us, for the Tibetans, though they have the
ordinary class distinctions which are found in every people,
have not those rigid caste barriers which are such a
hindrance to social intercourse in India. Even the ladies
were very nearly induced by the persuasive Captain
O'Connor to come to tea, and the wives of the Councillors
had actually accepted an invitation, when at the last
moment shyness overtook them. Women are much to
the fore in Tibet, and have great influence with their
husbands, so we especially regretted not having seen
them.

The Tibetans, though they have their reputation for
seclusiveness, are not by nature unsociable. We found
them quite the reverse, and Kawaguchi says that they
were " originally a people highly hospitable to strangers."
This more natural sentiment was, he says, superseded by
one of fear and even of antipathy, as the result of an
insidious piece of advice which, probably prompted by
some policy of its own, the Government of China gave to
Tibet, and which was to the effect that if the Tibetans
allowed the free entrance of foreigners Buddhism would
be destroyed and replaced by Christianity. The people
had, too, the idea that we sought their gold-mines.

Whatever seclusive feeling they may have had, they
abandoned it when the Treaty was concluded. They
came to our gymkhanas, and wondered why only tlie
first should be given the prize when all the rest had
covered exactly the same distance. They watched with
wonder Vernon Magniac and other inveterate sportsmen
pulling fish out of the river by pieces of string attached
to long sticks. They watched theatrical performances,
and marvelled at our display of fireworks ; and they did a
magnificent business with us in the sale, not only of
supplies for the troops, but also of innumerable curios.

REASONS FOR ESTRANGEMENT 319

brass and bronze figures, turquoise ornaments, embroideries,
silks, etc.

The Tibetans are, indeed, born traders. Kawaguchi
calls them a "nation of shop-keepers." Men and women
— and the women more than the men — priests and laity,
all trade. And this is another irony of the situation, that
a people who are naturally sociable, and who are thus, too,
born traders, should have been put for so long in their
seclusive position. But of late years the departure of
Lhasa merchants to India had been becoming more
frequent, and Kawaguchi says that circumstances were
impressing the Tibetans with the necessity of extending
their sphere of trade, and they realized that if their wool
trade was stopped the people would be hard hit, for
sheep- rearers constituted the greater part of the whole
population.

How it was, from a Tibetan point of view, that of
recent years we became estranged is worth hearing. It
was, according to Kawaguchi, the explorations of the
Bengali gentleman, Sarat Chandra Das, coupled with the
frontier troubles which followed, that changed the attitude
of the Tibetans towards us. The two events had not the
slightest connection with one another, but the Tibetans
seemed to have been alarmed that the harmless journeying
of Sarat Chandra Das in 1881 was a deliberate design on
our part to subvert their religion. As to the frontier
troubles — presumably those of 1886 — Kawaguchi himself
says that it was the Tibetan Government who " most in-
discreetly adopted measures at the instance of a fanatic
Nechung (oracle), and proceeded to build a fort at a
frontier place which strictly belonged to Sikkim."

But the Tibetans were apparently thoroughly nervous
about the British, and prejudiced against us on account of
our subjugation of India. They were much impressed by
the moderation of our rule, by the freedom we gave, and
by the hospitals and schools. Tibetans in Darjiling who
had these advantages, and who were given small Govern-
ment posts, were much attached to our rule. And Queen
Victoria was believed to be an incarnation of the goddess
of the Jo-khang Temple. All this, says Kawaguchi, they

320 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

quite acknowledged, but when they considered that these
same Enghshmen annexed other people's lands to their
own dominions, their favourable opinion received a shock,
and they explained this to themselves by supposing that
" there must be two different kinds of Englishmen in
India — one benevolent and godly, and the other infernal
and quite wicked."

The Dalai Lama, who, though very anxious to clear
away all corruption from the Buddhism of Tibet, was
" richer in thoughts pohtical than religious," feared the
British, and was always thinking how to keep us out of
Tibet. The reason why he, " who was at first as timid as
a hare towards England, should become suddenly as bold as
a lion," was that he had a secret treaty with Russia, which
he believed to be the only country in the world strong
enough to thwart England. Kawaguchi then proceeds to
relate how DorjiefF virtually monopolized the confidence
of the young Lama, how he brought gold and curios from
Russia and liberal donations to all the monasteries, and
even a Bishop's robe from the Czar for the Dalai Lama.
He tells how DorjiefF wrote a pamphlet showing that the
Czar was an incarnation of one of the founders of
Lamaism, and how the Tibetans came to believe that the
Czar would sooner or later subdue the whole world and
found a gigantic Buddhist Empire. He mentions, too,
how one day after DorjieflF's return he saw a caravan of
200 camels, and that he was told they conveyed rifles and
bullets, and that 300 camel-loads had already arrived, and
the Tibetans were then elated, and said that " now for the
first time Tibet was sufficiently armed to resist any attack
which England might make, and could defiantly reject any
improper request."

These rifles were of American manufacture, and, I
believe through neglect, got so completely out of order
that the Tibetans were only able to use very few against
us. We have the assurance of the Russian Government,
too, that no agreement was made with Tibet. But these
ob)servations of the Japanese form a remarkable corrobora-
tion of the reports we had heard as to the mischief done
by Dorjieff's proceedings.

CHINESE AND TIBETANS 321

Summarizing the characteristics of the Tibetans, we
may say, then, that while they are affable outwardly and
crafty within, as most dependent people have to be ; whUe
they are dirty and lazy ; and while their religion is de-
graded, and they show no signs of either intellectual or
spiritual progress, yet at heart they are not an unkindly or
unsociable people, and they have undoubtedly strong
rehgious feelings. Immorality is not entirely unchecked.
The Lama who married a nun had his official career
blighted. Ministers have been known to refuse their
salaries as they had enough to live on without. There is
often much affection and staunch friendship among the
Tibetans. And there are in them latent potentialities for
good, which only await the right touch to bring them into
being.

Of the attitude of the Chinese to the Tibetans I took
particular note, for I was myself a Resident in an Indian
Native State, and I was interested in observing the attitude
of a Chinese Resident in a Native State of the Chinese
Empire. One point which immediately struck me about
it was its tone of high-handedness. A century ago
Manning had remarked how "the haughty Mandarins
were somewhat deficient in respect," and I noted the
same thing. Every British Resident gives a chair to an
Indian gentleman who comes to visit him, but I found
that the Chinese Resident did not give a chair to even
the Regent. He, Councillors, Members of the National
Assembly, Abbots of the great monasteries — -all had to
sit on cushions on the ground, while the Resident and his
Chinese staff sat on chairs. In his reception and dismissal
of them he preserved an equally high tone of superiority.
He did not rise from his chair to receive them, as any
British Resident would rise to welcome Indian gentlemen
or high officials ; he merely acknowledged their salutation
on entrance with a barely noticeable inclination of his
head. And, in dismissing them, he simply said over his
shoulder to his interpreter, "Tell them to go." Our
countrymen are often accused, and sometimes with justice,

322 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

of being too high-handed with Asiatics, but we are not so
high-handed with Asiatics as Asiatics are with one another.

In another respect the Chinese are very different from
us in their deaUngs with a feudatory State. Hardly one
of the Chinese officials we met in Tibet could speak a
word of Tibetan. Except that they married Tibetan
wives for the time that they were actually serving in Tibet,
they troubled themselves little about the people. They
remained quite aloof, took small interest in them, and
certainly never worried themselves, as a British Resident
would, to improve their lot in some way. The Chinese,
both here and in Chinese Turkestan, where I had also
observed them, preserved great dignity, were very
punctilious in ceremonial, were always, so to speak, in
full-dress uniform, and they were ever highly respectful to
one another. But the Tibetans were " barbarians " in their
eyes, were treated with disdainful contempt, and the
Chinese officials thought of httle else but how soon they
could get back to their own civilized country.

The Tibetans naturally resented this, and hated the
Chinese, but they were also greatly awed and brow-beaten
by them ; and I think, too, that the mere fact of seeing
more civilized men than themselves in their midst, and of
being attached to a great Empire, with an all-powerful
Court in the background, has in itself had much to do
with lifting the Tibetans out of barbarism. The aboriginal
Tibetans were a savage and warlike race, who constantly
invaded China. They have received both their civilization
and their rehgion from China, for Buddhism, as I have said,
reached them, not directly from India, but through a
Tibetan King's Chinese wife, the daughter of a Chinese
Emperor. Books and reUcs came from India, but it was
the personal influence of the Chinese wife which seems
to have had the greatest practical effect in establishing
Buddhism.

The Chinese nave, too, on occasions done great service
to the Tibetans in repelling invaders, and the march of
the Chinese general, over many lofty passes, to expel the
Gurkha invasion in 1792 was a military feat of which
any nation in the world might be proud. Chinese

CHINESE AND BRITISH METHODS 323

jprestige in Tibet had, according to Kawaguchi, who lived
in Lhasa for three years, dwindled since the Chino-
Japanese War ; and we had practical proofs even before
then that their influence was not as effective as a suzerain's
should be. But the memory of the prodigious efforts which
China does every now and then make always inspires a
certain awe in the Tibetans, and they never feel quite sure
when another may not be made.

The Chinese, then, undoubtedly impress the Tibetans,
but I am bigoted enough to think that their methods are
not practically so successful as our own. Tibet is a pro-
tected Chinese State; Kashmir is a protected Indian State.
In Tibet the Chinese Resident has, to support him, several
hundreds of Chinese soldiers, and in the present year 2,000.
In Kashmir the British Resident has not even a personal
guard of British soldiers or even of British-Indian soldiers.
In Tibet the Chinese are replacing the Tibetan by Chinese
police ; in Kashmir all the police are of the Kashmir State.
Kashmir is 80,500 square miles in extent, and contains
nearly as many inhabitants as Tibet, and it borders on
Tibet, Turkestan, and through its feudatories on Afghan
territory, while Russian territory is only twelve miles
distant. But the whole of this is controlled and the
bordering tribes are kept in order entirely through Kashmir
State troops. British officers are employed, but not a
single British or British- Indian soldier or policeman. Yet
it is unthinkable that Kashmir troops should, against the
wishes and orders of the British Government, invade the
territory of a neighbouring State, as Tibetan troops, against
the wishes and orders of the Chinese Government, invaded
Sikkim in 1886. And it is inconceivable that the
Kashmir State should repudiate and refuse to fulfil a
Treaty concluded on their behalf by the British Govern-
ment, as the Tibetans repudiated and refused to fulfil the
Treaty made on their behalf by the Chinese in 1890. By
all the logic of the case the Chinese, as fellow- Asiatics
and as co-religionists of the Tibetans, should have much
greater influence in Tibet than we as aliens, with a dif-
ferent religion, have in Kashmir. Yet the contrary is
most emphatically the case.

324 IMPRESSIONS AT LHASA

The relations between ourselves and the Chinese at
Lhasa I always tried to preserve as cordial as possible.
Chinese suzerainty was definitely recognized in the
Treaty, and all the way through the negotiations I had
tried to carry the Resident with me. Tt was no part of
our policy to supplant the Chinese. We had no idea of
annexing Tibet or establishing a protectorate over it.
We [merely wanted to insure that no one else had a
predominant influence in the country, that order was
preserved, and that ordinary trade facilities should be
accorded us. There was nothing in this to arouse the
antagonism or jealousy of the Chinese, and as I always
tried to treat the Resident with respect, I expected', and
did, in fact, receive, his hearty co-operation. We each of us
could and did help the other, to the advantage of both.

CHAPTER XX

THE RETURN

Loud Cromer, when I saw him at Cairo on my way
home, made a remark which showed an unusually appre-
ciative insight into situations such as we were in at Lhasa.
He said that everyone was praising us for reaching Lhasa,
but he thought most Englishman could do that. What
he considered really praiseworthy was our getting back
again. In such situations ragged ends are often left,
resentments incurred, entanglements formed, which make
it difficult to retire with grace or even to retire at all.
We were happy in this case to be able to return to India
on better terms with the Tibetans than we had ever been
before.

On September 22 I exchanged farewell visits with the
Chinese Resident. In the reserved Chinese way he was
cordial enough, and we had always got on well together.
But he was in a very nasty position between the Tibetans
on the one hand and his own Government on the other,
and he was subsequently degraded and put into chains for
having, it was locally reported, been too favourable to us.
The Members of the Council also visited me, bringing
presents, for the third time, and assuring me of their
friendly sentiments. They begged me never again to
entertain suspicion regarding them, and to believe that
they fully intended to carry out the Treaty.

Before leaving on the following morning, the Ti Rim-
poche visited me, and presented each of us with an image of
Buddha. He had also visited General Macdonald and
given him a similar image. He was full of kindliness, and
at that moment more nearly approached Kipling's Lama in
" Kim " than any other Tibetan I met. We were given to

326

326 THE RETURN

understand that the presentation by so high a Lama to
those who were not Buddhists of an image of Buddha
himself was no ordinary comphment. And as the
reverend old Regent rose from his seat and put the present
into my hand, he said with real impressiveness that he had
none of the riches of this world, and could only offer me
this simple image. Whenever he looked upon an image
of Buddha he thought only of peace, and he hoped that
whenever 1 looked on it I would think kindly of Tibet.
I felt like taking a part in a religious ceremony as the
kindly old man spoke those words ; and I was glad that
all political wranglings were over, and that now we could
part as friends man with man.

A mile from the town a large tent had been set up
by the roadside, and here we found the whole Council,
a number of the leading men of Lhasa, and the Chinese
Resident's first and second secretaries, all assembled
to bid us a final farewell. Tea was served, and then,
with many protestations of friendship, we shook hands for
the last time, remounted our ponies, and rode away.

When 1 reached camp, I went off alone to the mountain-
side and gave myself up to all the emotions of this event-
ful time. My task was over and every anxiety was passed.
The scenery was in sympathy with my feelings ; the un-
clouded sky a heavenly blue ; the mountains softly merging
into violet ; and, as I now looked towards that mysterious
purply haze in which the sacred city was once more
Avrapped, I no longer had cause to dread the hatred it
might hide. From it came only the echo of the Lama's
words of peace. And with all the warmth still on me
of that impressive farewell message, and bathed in the in-
sinuating influences of the dreamy autumn evening, I was
insensibly suffused with an almost intoxicating sense of
elation and good-will. This exhilaration of the moment
grew and grew till it thrilled through me with over-
powering intensity. Never again could I think evil, or
ever again be at enmity with any man. All nature and all
humanity were bathed in a rosy glowing radiancy ; and
life for the future seemed nought but buoyancy and light.

Such experiences are only too rare, and they but too soon

FAREWELL TO PIONEERS 327

become blurred in the actualities of daily intercourse and
practical existence. Yet it is these few fleeting moments
which are reality. In these only we see real life. The
rest is the ephemeral, the unsubstantial. And that single
hour on leaving Lhasa was worth all the rest of a lifetime

We of the actual Mission were now to leave the
military escort and ride rapidly back to India to arrange
final details with the Government of India. So on the
following morning we started early, and as we rode away
the whole of the 32nd Pioneers turned out to say good-bye.
Some native officers had come to me the previous evening
to say the men wanted us to leave camp through their
lines. As we rode by, the men all came swarming out of
their tents. The native officers clustered round our ponies
shaking our hands, and the whole regiment waved and
cheered as we passed out of camp. They had been with
the Mission from the very start ; indeed, they had been
working at the road in that steamy Sikkim Valley
before the Mission was formed. They had been through
all the fighting and through the dreary investment at
Gyantse ; and it did one good to feel that something
substantial had been obtained in return for their labours,
and that they would be able to go back to their villages
rewarded and happy. Indian troops of the best type have
a wonderful capacity for invoking attachment, and for
both the 32nd and 23rd Pioneers I shall always have a
warm affigction.

The behaviour of these Indian troops had also con-
tributed greatly to the change of feehng in the Tibetans.
Their discipline was excellent. They had fought hard
when fighting was necessary. When the fighting was
over they readily made friends with the Tibetans. And
the latter more than once told me that the people suffisred
more from their own troops than they did from ours.
This discipline and good behaviour of Indian troops we
take for granted. It is none the less very remarkable.
We had with us Gurkhas, trans-frontier Pathans, Sikhs,
and Punjabi Mohammedans. All of these in their natural
state, under their own leaders, and uncontrolled by British
officers, would have played havoc in Lhasa. Their good

828 THE RETURN

behaviour on the present occasion was one of the main
causes of the Tibetans suddenly swinging round as they
did in our favour.

With the relays of riding animals and transport which
General Macdonald had arranged for us at every stage
down the long line of communications we now pressed
rapidly on. We did not strive to emulate Mr, Perceval
Landon, who had a week or two before made the record
ride from Lhasa to India, but we doubled or trebled the
ordinary marches, and in a few days reached Gyantse
again.

Here a redistribution had to be made. Captain
O'Connor, to whom so much of the success of the
negotiations was due, was to remain here permanently as
Trade Agent under the new Treaty. Also a party had
to be sent to Gartok to arrange for the opening of the
new trade-mart there. And preparations for some ex-
ploration work had to be made.

As soon as the Treaty was signed and I could say for
certain that we would be returning to India, 1 obtained
from the Tibetans and Chinese, through Captain O'Connor's
and Mr. Wilton's powers of persuasion, leave for three
parties to return to India by three different routes besides
the one we came up by. One party was to go down the
Brahmaputra to Assam ; another party was to go up the
Brahmaputra to Gartok, and come out by Simla ; and
Mr. Wilton was to return to China through Eastern
Tibet. For aU these passports were given, but only the
second actually set out.

The journey down the Brahmaputra was the one in
which many adventurous officers at Lhasa and Sir Louis
Dane, the Foreign Secretary, were keenly interested. No
one to this day knows for certain that the San-po of Tibet
is the Brahmaputra of Assam. And it was to solve this
problem, to discover how and where this mighty river
cuts its way clean through the main axis of the Hima-
layas, and to see the falls and rapids which are involved in
a drop from 11,500 to 500 feet, that so many ardent
spirits were set. Mr. White was to have had charge of
this party, and Captain Ryder was to have accompanied

EXPLORING PARTIES 329

it as Survey Officer. All that was wanting was the
sanction of the Government of India, and that, unfortu-
nately, at the last moment was not forthcoming. The
party (^ would have had to find a way through some
truculent, independent tribes between the border of Tibet
and the Assam frontier, and Government were not at
that moment prepared to run any further risks. It was a
pity, and a sad disappointment to many, for it will be
many a year before we again have such an opportunity of
solving what is one of the greatest remaining geographical
problems.

Mr. Wilton's journey I had myself to stop, though
there is nothing 1 hate more than to block enterprise in
travel. The negotiations with the Chinese were not con-
cluded— in fact, had hardly commenced — and I could not
afford to part with anyone so valuable to us in India as he
had proved himself to be. We Indian officials are like
children in dealing with the Chinese, and the help of that
special experience with which Mr. Wilton so effectively
had aided us was particularly necessary at this time,
though it is deplorable to find from the latest Blue-book
how little advantage was taken of the advice he gave.

The Gartok party I put in charge of Captain Rawling,
as its main purpose was to open the new mart, and he had
in the previous year made a remarkable and most useful
journey in Western Tibet. Captain Ryder had been
detailed for charge of the survey operations of the
expedition down the Brahmaputra, and Lieutenant
Wood, R.E., who had been engaged for some time in
resurveying the peaks round Mount Everest in Nepal,
was to have done the survey work with the Gartok party.
But now that the project for the former expedition had
fallen through. Captain Ryder also accompanied the
Gartok party and took charge of the survey. He was an
officer of great capacity, and during the Mission had done
most valuable work in extending the triangulation of
India right up to Lhasa. He had now an even more
interesting piece of geographical work before him — the
survey of the upper course of the Brahmaputra (San-po)
to its source, and the settling definitely of the question

330 THE RETURN

whether there was any higher peak than Everest at the
back of the Himalayas.

But the party would have to race against time, for
they had many hundreds of miles to traverse, and had to
cross the Himalayas back to Simla before the winter
finally closed the passes. They had also to face the
possibihty of obstruction in the matter of supplies and
transport, and even the possibility of active hostility, for
they would be travelling with no other escort than a
Gurkha orderly apiece through a country which had only
recently been in open arms against us.

Captain O'Connor and Mr. Magniac accompanied
them as far as Shigatse, and Lieutenant Bailey, 32nd
Pioneers, a keen and adventurous officer, who had dis-
tinguished himself with the mounted infantry, and in his
leisure moments learnt Tibetan, was also attached to the
party to proceed to India.

Captain O'Connor was most warmly received by the
Tashi I>ama, and laid the foundation of as sincere a friend-
ship as Bogle had with his predecessor. Every arrange-
ment was readily made, and the party was despatched
under the best possible auspices. Its result Captain
Ryder, who was awarded the gold medal of the Royal
Geographical Society, has given in a lecture before that
Society.

The survey work had to be conducted under the most
trying conditions. Besides the ordinary march, high
mountains had to be ascended for purposes of observation,
and these observations in winds of hurricane force and in
piercing cold were weUnigh impossible to make. From a
spot directly opposite Everest the surveyors saw this superb
mountain towering up high above the rest of the range
with a drop of 8,000 feet on either side, and the point was
settled that there was no other peak on the north approach-
ing it in height. They surveyed the Brahmaputra (San-po)
to its source, as well as the Gartok branch of the Indus.
They established the trade-mart at Gartok, installing a
native agent there. They completed the survey of the
Sutlej from its source (which they concluded was among
the hills on either side of the lake region) to British

ARRIVAL IN SIKKIM 331

territory. In all they accurately surveyed 40,000 square
miles of territory. And after crossing the Himalayas by
the Ayi-la (pass), 18,700 feet, in deep snow and with the
thermometer 24° below zero, they reached British territory
on Christmas Eve, and Simla on January 11. It was a
good piece of work, magnificently executed, for which the
greatest credit is due to both Captain Rawling and
Captain Ryder, and it was an immense relief to hear of
their safe arrival in spite of the risks of hostihty and of
cold.

In the meanwhile Messrs. White, Walsh, Wilton, and
myself had proceeded on to India. It was fairly cold even
as we crossed the Tang-la, the thermometer not being
much above zero, but we were fortunate to escape the
blizzard, the 3 feet of snow, and 27° of frost which General
Macdonald and the troops experienced a week or two
later, and which caused the death of two men and about
200 cases of snow-blindness.

We had a long, steep, cold ride over our final pass —
the Nathu-la — and then we rode down and down through
all the glorious Sikkim vegetation into soft and balmy
ease. A scientific gentleman once asked what was the
chief effect of being a long time at high altitudes, and I
told him the principal effect was a desire to get to a lower
altitude as soon as possible. Now that we were back at
ordinary human altitudes, bathed in delicious air and
basking in the glorious sunshine, we realized what the
strain of those high levels, combined with the biting cold,
had been. Life seemed so easy now. There was no more
unconscious effort in breathing ; no more conscious fighting
against the cold. Existence was once again a pleasure,
and in the best season of the year, amid the most splendid
scenery in the world, with snowy peaks rising sheer out
of tropical forests into a cloudless sky, there was little
more a man could wish.

But in the midst of this dream of ease, and just the
very day before I reached Darjiling, came the rude shock
that the best points I had obtained at Lhasa were to be

332 THE RETURN

given up. I will deal with this matter in a subsequent
Chapter. It is enough here to state that all the pleasure
of my return was dashed from me in a moment, and I
bitterly regretted ever having undertaken so delicate a
task with my hands so tied.

As we approached Darjiling we passed an enthusiastic
tea-planter sitting at his gateway with a gramophone,
which, as we neared him, struck up " See the Conquering
Hero comes." He said he was by himself, and the
gramophone was all the band he had, but he felt he must
do something to welcome us ; and this, our first greeting
in British territory, given with such genuine feeling, went
no small way to restoring my spirits.

At the station outside Darjiling I met my wife, and
only then realized what the strain and anxiety to her my
absence in Tibet must have caused. We went by rail to
Darjiling itself, and there I had the unexpected honour of
being welcomed on the platform by the kindly Sir Andrew
Eraser, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and nearly the
whole of the European residents in the place. They had
all — and particularly Sir Andrew and Lady Eraser — been
so especially kind to my wife I could not thank them
enough. Mr. and Mrs. Macpherson, Mrs. Walsh, and
many others had never failed in their thoughtfulness, and
I hope when they read this they will believe that their
kindness will never be forgotten by either of us.

We stopped at Darjiling only a day, which 1 set apart
entirely for our little girl, and then Messrs. White and
Wilton, with my wife and myself, set out on our last
stage to Simla, where Lord and Lady Ampthill warmly
welcomed us to Viceregal Lodge. Lord Kitchener had
already asked us by telegram to dine with him our first
night at Simla, and from Sir Denzil and Lady Ibbetson,
Sir Arundel Arundel, Sir Louis and Lady Dane, and many
others we received the greatest kindness.

Nor could anything have been more generous than the
support which Lord AmpthiU and the whole Government
of India gave me in the matter of the disallowed points in
the Treaty. But what caused me anxiety was the view
which Lord Curzon would take of what I had done. He

AUDIENCE OF KING EDWARD 333

had recommended me originally on account of my dis-
cretion. As long as he was in India he had given me
unfailing and ungrudging support, besides the personal
encouragement of a real friend ; and if he thought that in
the end I had failed him I should have been miserable for
the rest of my days. I had acted absolutely and entirely
on my own responsibility in what, in most difficult circum-
stances, had seemed to me the best for my country ; and I
had to take the risk of my action being approved or dis-
approved. But it would have been indeed a blow if I
found Lord Curzon thought 1 had acted wrongly.

So I hastened home, and at Port Said stopped to meet
him on his way out to India again. In one moment he
set me right. I dined with him on the P. & O. steamer,
and for hours afterwards on deck we talked over aU the
stirring events which had happened since we had parted
in his camp at Patiala. Of all he was warmly appreciative.
There is no man more staunch in friendship, and no
keener patriot in England, than Lord Curzon ; and what
he did for the Indian Empire, and still more what he
would have done if he had been more amply supported
from England, wiU perhaps some day be more fully
recognized than it is at present. If this Mission had been
a failure, on him would have fallen the blame. How
much its success was due to him no one knew better than
I did.

On my arrival in England I had the honour of an
audience of His late Majesty, and the reward I most
appreciated for my services in Tibet was this opportunity
of personally knowing my Sovereign. I saw him quite
alone. He placed me in a chair by his desk, and then in
some indefinable way made it possible for me to speak to
him as I would have to my own father. He was himself
most outspoken. He did not merely ask questions in a
pea'functory way, but took a genuinely keen interest in
our proceedings. He warmly praised the conduct of the
troops. He was well aware of the deeds, and even
character, of individual officers, and he spoke most feel-
ingly of the loss of Major Bretherton, of whose splendid
work he was fully cognizant. It appeared to me that

334 THE RETURN

it was men, and not policies, which chiefly interested
him : human personahties rather than abstract principles.
He was himself, as all the world now knows, a generous
personality ; and not merely a great Sovereign, but a great
man. No one I have ever met has given me such an
impression of abounding vitality and warm - blooded
humanity, full and overflowing. And I left his august
presence not only rewarded, but re-inspired.

Through the kindness of H.R.H. Princess Christian, who
informed His Majesty of my wish, the flag* which 1 had
with me throughout the Mission, which was carried before
me on every march, which was planted before my tent in
camp, which was flown over the Mission quarters at
Gyantse, and which was placed on the table on which the
Treaty was signed at Lhasa, was deposited in Windsor
Castle, and by His Majesty's express commands was hung
in the Central Hall over the statue of Queen Victoria.

* The flag known as a " Viceroy's flag " — a Union Jack with a star
in the middle and the motto " Heaven's Light our Guide '' — flown by
political officers in India.

CHAPTER XXI

THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION

Even in the present year I was asked by a Cabinet
Minister what good we did in going to Lhasa. Since that
question was asked one striking result of our Mission has
come to hght, in the fact of the Dalai Lama, who before
we went to Lhasa would not even receive a communica-
tion from the Viceroy, now in person, at Calcutta itself,
appealing to tlie Viceroy to preserve his right of direct
communication with us. The suspicious and hostile atti-
tude of the Tibetans has so far changed that they have
now asked us to form an alliance, and to send a British
officer to their sacred city. To attribute this change
entirely to the effects of the Mission may not be
justifiable. Much is due to the tactlessness of the Chinese
treatment of the Tibetans. But the change in direction
of Tibetan feeling was visible before we left Lhasa, and
there is good cause for assuming that if Lord Curzon had
never despatched the Mission to break through the
Tibetan reserve, they would have still been as inimical to
us and as inclined towards Russia as they were six years
ago. The conversion of our north-eastern neighbours
from potential enemies into applicant alhes may be taken
as one result of the Mission.

When the Mission was despatched into Tibet, we had
for thirty years been trying to regulate our intercourse
with our Tibetan neighbours, but had obtained no success
whatever. The Treaty which their suzerain had made
with us was repudiated. Boundary pillars were thrown
down, trade was boycotted, our communications were
returned. And the Dalai Lama showed a decided leaning
towards the Russians. As a result of Lord Curzon's policy

335

336 THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION

in sending a Mission to Tibet, there had been signed
by the Tibetan Government in the audience-room of the
Dalai Lama's palace in Lhasa itself, in the presence of
the Chinese Amban and of all the chief men of Tibet,
a Treaty which defined our boundaries, placed our trade
relations upon a satisfactory footing, and gave us the
right to exclude any foreign influence if we should so
wish. And in spite of the military operations which we
were forced to undertake, and in spite of the Tibetans
being compelled to pay an indemnity, the position of
the Tibetans towards us was distinctly more favourable
when we left Tibet than when we entered it.

In making my final report to Government, I said
that I had always regarded the conclusion of a treaty on
paper as of minor importance, and the estabUshment of
our relations with the Tibetans on a footing of mutual
good-wUl as of fundamental importance. There was little
advantage in bringing back a Treaty which was not
framed or negotiated in such a manner as to carry with it
a considerable degree of spontaneous assent. And it was
especially necessary to secure the good-will of the people
in general.

The result of our Mission to Kabul in 1840 was to
estrange the Afghans from us from that time to this, and
an intense race hatred was engendered. It would be
unwise to predict that we shall never have any difficulty
in seeing that the present Treaty is properly carried out.
But I can safely say that no feeling of race hatred was
left behind by the Mission, and that after the Treaty
was signed the Tibetans were better disposed towards us
than they had ever been before. And this I consider to
be incomparably the most important result of the policy
which the Government of India had so unswervingly
pursued.

A further result was the friendship of Bhutan, When
the Mission started, the Bhutanese were practically
strangers, and their attitude was uncertain. When the
Mission returned they were our firm friends. The chief
visited Calcutta. Mr. White has twice been most cordially
received in Bhutan. , And the former Tongsa Penlop,

POLITICAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESULTS 337

now the Maharaja of Bhutan, has formally placed himself
under our protectorate.

Besides these political results, there were also scientific
results of no mean value. Captain Ryder's survey opera-
tions have already been referred to. Mr. Hayden made
valuable geological collections, which are on view in the
Museum at Calcutta, and which are described by him in
the Records of the Geological Survey of India. Captain
Walton's natural history and botanical collections are
placed in the Natural History Museum at South Kensing-
ton and in Kew Gardens, and have been described in
various scientific works. Colonel Waddell was unable to
discover any secrets of the ancient world said to be hidden
in Tibet, but he made a collection of Tibetan manuscripts,
which are deposited in the British Museum.

If all these political and scientific results may not
seem to the ordinary Enghshman to amount to much,
the most obtuse must at least see one good that came
from the Mission — the proving for all time that we can
get to Lhasa, and that, even at the cost of crossing the
Himalayas in mid- winter, we will see our treaties observed.
Anyone practised in affairs knows the advantage of a
reputation for enforcing obligations, and this at least
accrued to us from the Mission of 1904.

But I have already mentioned that the Secretary ot
State felt himself unable to approve of the Treaty as
signed, and I have now to show how it was that some of
the advantages to which the Indian Government attached
most importance had to be abandoned.

A week after the signing of the Treaty the Government
of India telegraphed to me that the Secretary of State
considered that a difficulty was presented by the amount
of the indemnity, especially when the provision for its pay-
ment was read in conjunction with Clause VII. of the
Treaty, the effect being that our occupation of Chumbi
might have to continue for seventy-five years. This was, the
Secretary of State said, inconsistent with the instructions
conveyed in his telegram of July 26, and with the declara-

338 THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION

tion of His Majesty's Government as to withdrawal.
The Government of India were, therefore, asked to
consider whether, without prejudice to the signed agree-
ment, it would not be possible to intimate to the
Tibetans that the amount of the indemnity would be
reduced on their duly fulfilling the terms agreed to and
granting farther facilities for trade.

Some correspondence followed, but, owing to the
shortness of my stay at Lhasa and the undesirabiUty of
attempting to alter a Treaty directly it had been made,
no action was taken, and I returned with the Treaty
intact.

The Government of India wrote on October 6 to the
Secretary of State* reviewing the conditions under which
I had had to make the Treaty, and saying that they con-
sidered I was fully justified in using my discretion as I
did and in signing the Treaty on September 7 without
awaiting approval of the amount of the indemnity and the
method of its payment, and pointing out that any alteration
in the terms at the critical moment would probably have
led to a recommencement of the whole discussion.

They also thought my action in acquiring the right for
our Agent at Gyantse to proceed to Lhasa under certain
conditions might be approved. They were stiU of opinion
that the right might be of the greatest value hereafter,
and, hedged in as it was by the conditions mentioned in
it, it could not be held, they thought, to commit us to any
political control over Tibet.

At the same time the Government of India expressed
their sincere regret that the instructions of His Majesty's
Government were not carried out to the letter, as they
would have been if communication with their Commis-
sioner had not been a matter of twelve days even by
telegraph.

Regarding the amendment of the Treaty to meet the
wishes of His Majesty's Government, they proposed by
telegram on October 21 1 that in ratifying it a declaration
should be appended by the Viceroy reducing the indemnity
from 75 to 25 lakhs, and affirming that after three annual

* Blue-book, III., p. 74. t Ibid., p. 70.

ABANDONED RESULTS 339

instalments had been paid the British occupation of the
Chumbi Valley should terminate, provided the terms of
the Treaty should in the meantime have been carried
out.

To this proposal the Secretary of State agreed on
November 7,* but he added that, as regards the agree-
ment giving the Agent at Gyantse the right of access to
Lhasa, His Majesty's Government had decided to disallow^
it, for they considered it unnecessary, and inconsistent
with the principle on which their policy had throughout
been based.

Finally, the Secretary of State reviewed the whole
affair in a despatch dated December 2. When Lord
Curzon, in his despatch of January 8, 1903, made his
proposal for a Mission to Lhasa, Tibet, though lying on
our borders, was practically an unknown country, the
rulers of which persistently refused to hold any com-
munications with the British Government even on neces-
sary matters of business ; and if the Tibetan Government
had become involved in political relations with other
Powers, a situation of danger might have been created on
the frontier of the Indian Empire. This risk had now
been removed by the conclusion of the Treaty. And it
was considered most satisfactory that, having regard to
the obstinacy of the Tibetans in the past, I should,
besides concluding the Treaty, have good reason to believe
that the relations which I had established with them at
Lhasa were generally friendly.

In the Treaty I had inserted a stipulation that the
indemnity was to be paid in 75 annual instalments, and I
had retained without modification the proviso that the
Chunjbi Valley was to be occupied as security till the full
amount had been paid. The effect of this was to make it
appear as if it were our intention to occupy for at least
seventy-five years the Chumbi Valley, which had been
recognized in the Convention of 1890 and the Trade
Regulations of 1893 as Tibetan territory. This would
have been inconsistent with the repeated declarations of
His Majesty's Government that the Mission would not

* Blue-book, III., p. 77.

340 THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION

lead to ©ccupation, and that we would withdraw from
Tibetan territory when reparation had been secured.

It had been hoped that it would be possible to alter
the Treaty before I left Lhasa, but it was clear in the
circumstances that it was not desirable that I should have
postponed my departure.

As to the separate agreement, the question of claiming
for the trade agents at Gyantse the right of access to
Lhasa was carefully considered before His Majesty's
Government decided that no such condition was to be
included in the terms of the settlement, and a subsequent
request made by the Government of India for a modifica-
tion of this decision was negatived by the telegram of
August 3. No subsequent reference was made to the
Secretary of State on the subject, and it was not tiU the
receipt of the letter of October 6 from the Government
of India that he learned that I had taken on myself the
responsibility of concluding an agreement giving the trade
agent at Gyantse the right to visit Lhasa to consult with
the Chinese and Tibetan officers there on commercial
matters, which it had been found impossible to settle at
Gyantse. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Govern-
ment had no alternative but to disallow the agreement as
inconsistent with the policy which they had laid down.

Attention had already been drawn to the fact that
questions of Indian frontier pohcy could no longer be
regarded from an exclusively Indian point of view, and
that the course to be pursued in such cases must be laid
down by His Majesty's Government alone. It was
essential that this should be borne in mind by those who
found themselves entrusted with the conduct of affairs in
which the external relations of India were involved, and
that they should not allow themselves, under the pressure
of the problems which confronted them on the spot, to
forget the necessity of conforming to the instructions
which they had received from His Majesty's Government,
who had more immediately before them the interests of
the British Empire as a whole.

Such were the final views and orders of the Secretary
of State upon the Mission. The reasons for my action

REASONS FOR ABANDONMENT 341

in extending the period of payment, in securing the right
to occupy the Chumbi Valley during that extended
period, and in obtaining the right for our Agent at Gyantse
to proceed to Lhasa, have been already given. I had to
act in circumstances that were very exceptional, and I
thought I was not taking more latitude than such cir-
cumstances naturally confer on an agent. The pledges
to Russia were given with a qualification, but the main
pledge, that we would not annex Tibet, or establish a
protectorate over it, or interfere in its internal adminis-
tration, had not, in my view, been infringed by the Treaty
I signed.

We may assume that Government had some pressing
international consideration of the moment which necessi-
tated their taking no account of the qualification to their
pledges, but there is some justification for thinking that if
the Treaty had not been modified, and the right to occupy
the Chumbi Valley and to send the Gyantse Agent to
Lhasa had been maintained, we might have prevented the
present trouble from ever arising.

CHAPTER XXII

NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

We had settled with Tibet direct, as was Lord Curzon's
chief object, and it had been proposed that China sliould
sign what was styled an Adhesion Agreement, formally
acknowledging the Tibetan Treaty. But Yu-tai, the
Resident at Lhasa, was instructed not to sign any such
agreement, and a Special Envoy was sent by the Chinese
Government to Calcutta to treat with the Indian Govern-
ment in the matter. Yu-tai himself had been specially
deputed for these negotiations regarding Tibet, but
apparently he was considered too complacent, and first of
aU, Mr. Tang, and then Mr. Chang, were sent to Calcutta,
and from now onwards the Chinese showed first great
diplomatic insistence, and then great military activity, in
regard to Tibet, till, profiting by the jealousy between
us and the Russians, which had prevented our reaping
all the fruits of the Mission to Lhasa, they one by one
gathered those fruits themselves.

Nothing resulted from Mr. Tang's visit to India, and
iU-health caused him to return to China. But on AprU
27, 1906, in place of an Adhesion Agreement, a Conven-
tion was signed at Peking between Great Britain and
China which "confirmed" the Lhasa Convention of 1904.
In addition, Great Britain engaged " not to annex Tibetan
territory, or to interfere in the administration of Tibet " ;
while the Chinese Government undertook " not to permit
any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or
internal administration of Tibet." We were entitled to
lay down telegraph-lines to connect the trade-marts with
India. And it was laid down that the provisions of the

342

LHASA CONVENTION CONFIRMED 343

old Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of
1893, remained in full force.

The signature of this Convention, far from improving
our status in Tibet, or conferring any increased regularity
upon our intercourse, seems to have had a precisely
opposite effect. The impression was spread abroad in
Tibet that this new Convention superseded the Lhasa Con-
vention, and the Chinese assumed that we had virtually
recognized their sovereignty in the country. They had
obtained from us the engagement not to annex Tibetan
territory, and with this and the renewed formal recognition
of their rights of suzerainty after they had shown them-
selves so incapable of carr5dng out their suzerain duties,
we might have expected that they would have shown at
least a neighbourly feeling in Tibetan affairs, but we have
so far been disappointed in this respect, and the 1906
Convention promises to be as little use to us as the 1890
Convention.

The first indications of the tone which the Chinese
were going to adopt in Tibet was furnished by Mn Chang,
who was now appointed a High Commissioner for Tibet.
On his arrival in Chumbi there was at once an " incident "
with the British officer. Lieutenant CampbeU, in political
charge there. Lieutenant Campbell had been specially
chosen for his knowledge of the Chinese language and
customs. He had spent a year in China learning the
language, and had carried out a remarkable and interesting
journey from Peking to Kashmir by Chinese Turkestan.
On Mr. Chang's arrival in Chumbi, Mr. Campbell pro-
ceeded in uniform to call on him, but he was first asked
to enter by a side door, and afterwards told that Mr.
Chang was not very well and was lying down. This inay
have been the case, but, combined with other acts, it
produced the impression that he meant to ignore the
British occupation and assert Chinese authority.

Mr. Chang's action at Gyantse gave rise to a similar
impression that he was aiming at the belittlement of
British influence rather than at cordially co-operating with
our oflScers as Yu-tai had. He posted there a Chinese
official named Gow as Sub-Prefect, with the title of

344 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

Chinese Commissioner in charge of the Chinese Trade and
Diplomatic Agency ; and this Mr. Gow proved so con-
tumacious that Sir Edward Grey had eventually to press
for his withdrawal. He threatened to stop the supply of
provisions by Tibetans to our Trade Agent unless they
were paid for at rates to be fixed by himself ; and he also,
apparently under sanction from Peking, claimed that in
all transactions between the Tibetans and British officers
he should act as intermediary.

This was a clear enough indication of Mr. Chang's line.
He meant to get in between us and the Tibetans. And the
Tibetans at Gyantse had many rumours just now that he
was going to eject the Europeans and the Indian troops
from Gyantse ; that if the Indian Government did not
agree, Chinese troops would be sent to expel us by force
from Tibet. It was explained that Chinese troops were not
sent to oppose us during the time of the Tibet Mission
because there was no time to collect them. It was also
reported that Mr. Chang intended to object to British
officials and other Europeans travelling in Tibet except
between the trade-marts and India. And this is what in
fact he did in the case of Sven Hedin. He wrote him a
very polite note saying what interest he took in geography
and so forth, but adding : " The last treaty between China
and Great Britain contains a paragraph declaring that no
stranger, whether he be Enghshman or Russian, an
American or European, has any right to visit Tibet, the
three market towns excepted." The Treaty has no such
clause. It simply confirmed the Lhasa Treaty, in which
was a clause stipulating that the agents or representatives
of foreign Powers should not be admitted. As a inatter
of fact Sven Hedin was not the agent of a foreign Power,
but a scientific traveller, and in any case the Lhasa Treaty
simply laid down that agents should not be admitted
" without the previous consent of the British Government."
Sven Hedin was then at Shigatse. He was being most
cordially received by the Tashi Lama, who was quite
wiUing to let him travel where he liked. It was merely
Mr. Chang who twisted and misquoted the Lhasa Treaty
to exclude him.

CHINESE ILL-DISPOSITION 345

Later other evidence of Mr. Chang's antipathy came
to light. The Tibetan Jongpens at Gyantse informed
Captain O'Connor in January, 1907, that since his
arrival upon the scene their position had become very
difficult, for he had told them that in future the Chinese
were to act as intermediaries between the English and
Tibetans, and so before complying with any request of his
they would be obliged to ask the permission of Mr. Gow.
And on March 5 Captain O'Connor telegraphed that he
was now completely cut off from personal intercourse with
Tibetan officials, as Mr. Gow refused to let the Jongpens
see him.

In other directions also the change for the worse since
Mr. Chang's arrival was apparent. The Resident Yu-tai,
with whom I negotiated in 1904, was reported to have
been dismissed from office and imprisoned in fetters in
January, 1907. His Secretary was also degraded, and
a desire to sweep away all Chinese officials connected
with the improvement of our relations with the Tibetans
seemed to have inspired Mr. Chang's actions. A similar
resentment against Tibetan officials concerned with the
recent negotiations was also shown, two Councillors and
a General being degraded. These incidents affiarded, in
the opinion of the Government of India, indubitable proof
of Mr. Chang's determination to upset the status quo
and destroy the position secured to us by the Mission.
Mr. Chang's assumption seems to have been that virtual
recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was in-
volved in the signature of the latest Convention with
China.

So clear, indeed, had the intention of the Chinese to
work against us rather than with us been showing itself
that Sir Edward Grey, on February % 1907,* telegraphed
to Sir John Jordan that, while it was our desire to have
matters put right, not by separate action in Tibet, but
through the medium of the Chinese Government, he
should bring Mr, Chang's action to the attention of the
Chinese Government, and point out to them that the
recognition by China of the Lhasa Treaty was not con-

'' Blue-book, IV., p. 88.

346 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

sistent with the punishment of officials for being concerned
in its negotiation. Our Minister was further to state that
interference by Chinese officers with the freedom of the
deaUngs between the Tibetan Agent and the British Trade
Agent at Gyantse could not be permitted by His Majesty's
Government.

Again, on March 15,* he telegraphed that " the right
of direct communication between the British Agent and
local Tibetan authorities must be firmly insisted on," and
the Chinese Government must be " urged to send very clear
instructions in this sense to Chang."

Later, again, on June 27, Sir Edward Grey had
again to telegraph to our Minister to make further very
serious representations to the Chinese Government on the
subject. He was to draw their attention to the fact that
no friction existed between Captain O'Connor and the
Tibetans of the locality previous to the intervention of
Mr. Chang and Mr. Gow. We wanted nothing more
than freedom of trade, for our pohtical interests were
safeguarded by clauses in the Treaty, and we had no wish
to assert any political influence ourselves. We did not
even desire to foster trade. We wished, indeed, to reduce
the estabhshment at the marts, and, if things went on
quietly, native instead of British agents might be appointed
there. But Sir Edward Grey considered that China was
" trifling with her obligations in the matter of Tibet," and
he suggested that Mr. Gow should be entirely removed
from all employment in that country.

In consequence of these representations Mr. Gow was
withdrawn from Tibet, but only to be given a higher
appointment in a more popular part of the Chinese
Empire — the Directorship of Telegraphs at JNIukden in
Manchuria — and the attitude of the Chinese in Tibet has
not yet really changed. Perhaps the reason may be found
m the hint given by Sir John Jordan, who, when the
Grand Secretary told him that the Wai-wu-pu had
always been puzzled to know the causes of the friction
between Mr. Gow and the British Trade Agent, expressed
his conviction that they lay in the fact that someone from

* Blue-book, IV., p. 98.

BREACHES OF TREATY 347

Peking had been inspiring a policy in Tibetan affairs
which was hostile to the Treaty and to British interests.

In any case, whether the cause lay in Peking, or with
Mr. Chang, or with the Tibetans, the fact was clear that
the Treaty had not been carried out ; and the Government
of India thought it necessary to bring the matter formally
to the notice of the Secretary of State in a despatch dated
July 18, 1907. Considering what had taken place at
Gyantse, it was impossible to admit, they said, that the
Gyantse trade-mart had been effectively open during the
last few months. Our Agent had been cut off from inter-
course with the Tibetan authorities, and no adequate pro-
vision had been made for British traders having resort to
the mart. The agents whom the Lhasa Government had
nominated for the marts had not been allowed freedom of
communication with the British Trade Agent. And various
minor difficulties had arisen in connection with the open-
ing of the Gartok trade- mart. The Government of India,
therefore, suggested that the Chinese and Tibetan Govern-
ments should be formally reminded of these various
breaches of the Convention which had occurred, and
more particularly of the failure to open the marts, which
was a matter which struck at the root of the whole
Convention.

Mr. Morley thought* the situation at Gyantse con-
stituted undoubtedly a serious cause of complaint, but, in
view of the reply of the Chinese Government to the
representations recently made to them, he doubted the
expediency of making any further reference to the subject
at the moment. If, when the negotiations with Mr. Chang
regarding the Trade Regulations commenced, the attitude
of the Chinese and Tibetan representative should prove
obstructive, the question would arise whether the British
representative should not be authorized to warn them that
our evacuation of the Chumbi Valley depended on a
satisfactory settlement of the matters connected with the
trade-marts being arrived at, the Chinese and Tibetan
Governments being simultaneously warned to the same
effect.

* Blue-book, IV., p. 126.

348 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

So for the present ended any idea of direct re-
monstrance regarding breaches of the Treaty. But it
was not only locally at the trade -marts that the Chinese
were pursuing their policy of separating the Tibetans
from us. By an astute move they had already sought to
effect the same end through payment of the indemnity.
By the terms of the Treaty this was due from the
Tibetans. Though we might well have demanded the
indemnity from the Chinese, and many think that we
should have demanded part, at least, for it was to enforce
a Treaty which they had ashed us to make, which they
had assured us they could see observed, but of which,
from 1890 to 1904, they were never able to secure
fulfilment, that we went to Lhasa, we instead demanded it
from the Tibetans, and, on account of their poverty, we
reduced the amount payable from 75 to 25 lakhs of
rupees — from half a million sterling to £166,666. The
Chinese now said that they would pay this reduced
indemnity. In an Imperial Decree issued in November,
1905, it was ordered that the indemnity should, in view of
the poverty of the people, be paid by the Chinese Govern-
ment— that is, that the Chinese Government should pay
it over to us direct for, and on behalf of, Tibet.

In forwarding this information. Sir Ernest Satow
suggested that we should inform the Chinese Government
that we could not receive payment from them. He
believed that the Chinese Government were trying to
make themselves the intermediary of all communications
between India and Tibet, and it seemed to him reasonable
to conclude that this declaration of their intention to pay
the indemnity was intended to force the hand of the
Indian Government, and induce them to accept an
arrangement which the Chinese Government could after-
wards quote as a precedent in other matters.

Lord Lansdowne — these negotiations commenced while
the late Government were still in office — felt difficulty in
advising the India Office* as to how to deal with the matter.
It was on the one hand obvious that the indemnity was
required of the Tibetans partly as a punitive measure and

* Blue-book, IV., p. 29.

CHINESE PROPOSALS 349

partly in order that by the annual payment of the necessary
instalments they should formally recognize the binding
nature of the obligations entered into by them towards the
British Government. Should the annual instalments hence-
forth be paid by the Chinese Government, the punitive effect
of the indemnity would disappear, for it did not seem to Lord
Lansdowne at all probable that the Chinese Government
would be able or willing to recover from the Tibetan
Government the sums paid on this account, and past
experience had proved that it was not in the power of
China to insist effectively on the fulfilment of the other
stipulations of the Convention.

Lord Lansdowne felt no doubt that the proposal had
been made by the Chinese Government with the object of
re-establishing their theoretical rights to supremacy over
the Tibetan Government, and probably also with the
object of insuring that the non-payment of the instal-
ments at their due date should not stand in the w^ay of
the retirement of the British forces. Irrespectively of
these considerations, the refusal of the Chinese Govern-
ment to adhere to the Tibetan Agreement made it doubly
difficult for us to entertain the offer, and upon this ground
alone Lord Lansdowne considered that it should be
rejected. For acceptance would be tantamount to
admitting the intervention of China in relieving Tibet
from this portion of her obligations while avoiding all
responsibility for any other portion of the Convention.

Should the attitude of the Chinese Government
undergo a change in consequence of our refusal, and
should they intimate that they would adhere to the Agree-
ment, the situation would no doubt be altered, and might
be reconsidered by His Majesty's Government. Having
regard, however, to the complete inability shown by China
in the past to exercise effectual control over the Tibetan
authorities, it seemed to Lord Lansdowne that it would
be highly inadvisable to agree to any settlement which
might be regarded as an admission that responsibility for
the behaviour of the Tibetans would for the future rest
upon the Chinese Government.

This view of Lord Lansdowne's and Sir Ernest

350 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

Satow's, both very able and experienced diplomatists, was
justified by the event. It was here that the Chinese
began their series of efforts again to thrust themselves in
between us and the Tibetans, and prevent that direct
relationship between us which, through the futiUty of the
Chinese themselves, we had been compelled at so much
cost to estabhsh. If we had stood firm at the start on this
point, which was one on which we had a perfect right to
stand fast, much future trouble might have been saved.

The Government of India concurred in this view, and
thought that the annual payment by Tibetans in Tibet,
even though China should provide the money, would be
preferable from the point of view of local political effect,
to payment of a lump sum by China direct. The course,
therefore, which was preferred was, that a notification
should first be made by them to the Tibetans under
Article VI. of the Convention, to the effect that we
desired payment at Gyantse of the first instalment ; and
that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should then inform
the Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government
could not recognize the right of intervention on their part,
as they had not adhered to the Convention.

A notification was accordingly given to the Tibetan
Government that Rs. 100,000, the first instalment of the
indemnity, was due on January 1, 1906, and should be
paid at Gyantse. They replied in January, 1906, that the
revenue of Tibet was not great, and that the Chinese
Resident had stated that the payment of the indemnity
was to be the subject of discussion with China, in which
Tang at Calcutta was to act. Thus, said the Government
of India, as a result of the action of the Chinese, the
Treaty had been broken by the Tibetans, for no payment
of the indemnity had been made on the date fixed. They
proposed, therefore, to inform the Tibetan Government
that they held them responsible for the payment of the
indemnity under the terms of the Treaty.

Mr. Morley, who had succeeded Mr. Brodrick,
approved of the proposal, but added that this would not
preclude our accepting payment eventually from the
Chinese Government if agreement with them as to the

A CHINESE DEVICE 851

Tibet Convention should be arrived at ; and in a later
telegram he said that "direct payment by China could
not be refused by us after the Adhesion Convention had
been concluded."

The principle that the Chinese should pay instead of
the Tibetans was therefore practically conceded. But
another point arose. The Chinese had said they wished
to pay the amount of 25 lakhs of rupees (Rs. 25,00,000)
in three annual instalments, but by the Treaty the pay-
ment was to be paid in annual instalments of 1 lakh each.
The suggestion that the whole indemnity should be paid
in three instalments the Government of India thought a
Chinese device, having for its object the weakening of our
position in Tibet. The Treaty obligation was clear. And
the Indian Government preferred, as requested by the
Tibetans themselves at the time of signing the Treaty, to
receive animal payments of 1 lakh each at Gyantse, both
for political effect and because money was required for
recurring rent expenditure there.

Mr. Morley felt much hesitation in accepting the
views of the Government of India on this point. While
recognizing that certain advantages had been supposed by
some to arise from the political point of view in maintain-
ing our hold over the Tibetans for the full period of
twenty-live years, he was of opinion that such advantages
would be altogether outweighed by our relief from the
necessity of enforcing a direct annual tribute for so long a
period.

Shortly after, on April 27, the Chinese signed the
Convention which has been described at the beginning of
tliis Chapter, and the Chinese Government were informed
that we agreed to accept the offer to pay the whole of the
indemnity in three instalments, and that the first in-
stalment would be accepted from the Sha-p^ either by
cheque, handed to the British Commercial Agent at
Gyantse, or by cheque to the Government of India,
drawn on the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

The Chinese had made good their first point, and
we had receded from yet another stage which we had
reached in 1904. Their next point had now to be made —

352 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

to get us to accept payment in India instead of in Tibet.
The Tibetan Sha-pe being in Calcutta at the time, we did
not raise any difficulty about accepting payment of the
first instalment there. But when the question of the
payment of the second instalment arose, the Government
of India pointed out that under the Treaty it should be
paid at such place as the British Government might
indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British districts of
Darjiling or Jalpaiguri. Permission had been given to
pay the first instalment at Calcutta, as the Tibetan
Councillor happened to be there at the time, but the
Government of India wished that the second instalment
should be handed over by a Tibetan official to our Trade
Agent at Gyantse. But the Secretary of State telegraphed
that it would be in accordance with the present policy of
His Majesty's Government to acquiesce in the wish of the
Chinese Government, and payment by telegraphic transfer
was agreed to. The third instalment was also received in
Calcutta. So the Chinese obtained their second point also.

The third point which they tried to make in their
policy of excluding the Tibetans, was to get us to receive
the indemnity direct from them instead of from the Tibetans.
They suggested that they should pay the second instalment
" by telegraphic transfer without the intervention of the
Tibetans." But the Government of India recommended
that deviation from the procedure laid down in the Treaty
should not be permitted, as their proposal seemed to
them a further indication of the Chinese desire to exclude
the Tibetans from relations with us.

His Majesty's Government, however, considered that
the formaUty of payment through a Tibetan representative
was " a comparatively immaterial point," and that if China
was to make further pretensions we should not be pre-
judiced by the concession.

Later on, however, as the Chinese had been obstructive
in other matters, and the second instalment had not yet
been paid, both Mr. Morley and Sir Edward Grey
9,dopted the proposal of the Government of India that
payment to the Trade Agent through a Tibetan official at
Gyantse should be required, and arrangements recently

PAYMENT OF INDEMNITY 353

conceded by His Majesty's Government for payment
direct by the Chinese should be cancelled. But this was
not eventually insisted on, and payments were received by
the Government of India through the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank.

In regard to the third instalment, Mr. Chang proposed,
on December 27, 1907, that he should hand it over in the
form of a cheque to the Indian Government. But the
latter again stood out for receiving it from a Tibetan.
It was due only to a misunderstanding that payment in
the previous year had been accepted direct before orders
on the subject had arrived. As regards this proposal of
the Chinese, Mr. Morley, though he doubted the advantage
of raising the point, saw no objection, as the Tsarong
Sha-p^ was then in Calcutta, to payment being made by
the Tibetan Government through him to the Government
of India.

But this method of payment Mr. Chang refused, and
wrote to Sir Louis Dane : " I regret to say that I am
unable to meet your wishes that Tsarong Sha-p^ should
himself tender payment. I have received very explicit
instructions from my Government on this subject, that
the third instalment of the indemnity (Rs. 8,33,333 : 5 : 4)
is to be handed over in the form of a cheque only by
myself." When the matter arose in discussion at a
meeting on January 10, Mr. Chang intimated that he
based his objection to the proposal on the fact that direct
dealings between us and the Tibetan authorities would be
involved in it. It was no longer possible, the Government
of India thought, to doubt Chang's firm determination
that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, to the exclusion of
all local autonomy, should be indicated, and that direct
communication of all kinds between our officials and
Tibetans should be prevented. It appeared that Mr.
Chang was being supported in this attitude by the
Chinese Government, and that it was doubtful if we could
expect, without further guarantee, loyal fulfilment of the
Lhasa Convention as interpreted by His Majesty's
Government. Chinese claims might exist which con-
travened our distinct rights under the I^hasa Convention,

354 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

as recognized in the Anglo-Russian arrangement regarding
Tibet, and confirmed by the Peking Convention. The
Indian Government greatly feared the reproduction in an
aggravated form of the position of affairs before 1903 if
Chinese contentions were admitted.

Mr. Morley proposed to Sir Edward Grey that a
representation should be made to the Chinese Government
of the serious consequences that would ensue if payment
of a third instalment of the indemnity was not made in
accordance with the Treaty ; and the latter telegraphed to
our Minister at Peking to inform the Chinese Govern-
ment that the transfer of authority in the Chumbi Valley,
much as it was desired by His Majesty's Government,
would be unavoidably delayed unless payment was made
in accordance with the provision of the Lhasa Convention.
The result was that within a week a cheque, signed by
Mr. Chang, was delivered by the Tsarong Sha-p^, who
paid a formal visit to Sir Louis Dane, accompanied by two
Tibetan officers.

The Chinese did not altogether gain their third point,
but it is to be noted that the cheque was signed by Mr.
Chang, and that the Tibetan official was not much more
than a messenger carrying it over to the Foreign Office.

All these proceedings have an air of triviahty, but
that in Asiatic eyes they were of importance we may
infer from the insistence of the Chinese. If they really
were trivial they might have handed the money to the
Tibetans, and saved themselves the worry with us.

Connected with this question of the payment of the
indemnity was the question of the evacuation of the
Chumbi Valley, to effect which was the most important
object of Chinese policy. By the original Treaty we had
the right to occupy it till seventy-five annual instalments
of the indemnity had been paid, but by the declaration
affixed to the ratification of the Treaty we undertook that
the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley should cease
after due payment of three annual instalments, provided
that the trade-marts, as stipulated in Article II., should

CHINA AND CHUMBI VALLEY 355

have been eiFectively opened for three years, as provided
in Article VI. ; and that in the meantime the Tibetans
should have faithfully complied with the terms of the
said Convention in all other respects. On December 23,
1907, the Chinese Government addressed a note to our
Minister, stating that as the final instalment was ready for
payment on January 1, 1908, we should " withdraw on
the above date the British troops in temporary occupation
of the Chumbi Valley."

The Indian Government pointed out* that the Chinese
ignored the condition that evacuation was contingent on the
Tibetans faithfully complying with the Treaty in every
respect. Instances tending to show that this condition,
and the condition that the trade-marts should be effectively
opened had not been fulfilled, had already been reported to
the Secretary of State. The fact that the Tibetan authorities
had recently failed to provide accommodation, except at
extortionate rent, for Indian traders supplied evidence of
this. The Tibetans also imposed unauthorized restrictions
on trade by accustomed routes across the northern frontier
of Sikkim, and on traders going from the United Provinces
to marts in Western Tibet. The fact that, in spite of the
maintenance of the telegraph service being provided for in
Article III. of the Peking Convention, there had been
serious recrudescence of interruptions to it since Mr.
Chang's visit to Tibet, further illustrated the attitude of
the Tibetans. There had also been obstruction to postal
communication with Gartok. It could not, then, be said
that marts had been effectively opened since Mr. Chang's
visit, whatever might have been the case before.

We should presumably have been entitled to claim,
under the letter of the Treaty, that, until the trade-marts
had been effectively opened for three years, and until the
terms of the Convention had in the meantime been com-
plied with in all other respects, the vaUey should be
retained by us. It was not the desire of the Government
of India to suggest rigid enforcement of the Convention
in this respect. They bore in mind, however, the decision
of His Majesty's Government that if, after commencement

* Blue-book, IV., p. 136.

356 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

of the negotiations for the Trade Regulations, the attitude
of the Chinese and Tibetan representatives proved
obstructive, the question of warning the Chinese and
Tibetan representatives that our evacuation would depend
on matters connected with trade-marts being satisfactorily
settled, should be considered.

It was shown by the history of the negotiations that,
in regard to important points at issue, the Chinese had
been, and still were, most obstructive. Sir John Jordan's
requests regarding points which he was pressing had not
yet been acceded to by the Wai-wu Pu ; while, in a letter
to Sir Louis Dane, which had just been received, Mr. Chang
refused to yield other contested points, and forwarded
further draft regulations. The transfer of the administra-
tion of the valley should, therefore, the Indian Govern-
ment submitted, be deferred until some guarantee that
the marts would be effectively opened, and that they
would remain so, was afforded us by the new Trade
Regulations. The chief lever which we possessed for
securing China's real comphance with the terms of the
Lhasa Convention would be lost if the transfer was per-
mitted before the signature of the Regulations. The
possibihty, in the event of non-fulfilment of conditions, of
temporary postponement of evacuation was apparently con-
templated by the annexure to the Anglo-Russian arrange-
ment concerning Tibet. And the sincerity of our inten-
tion to leave the valley would perhaps be sufficiently
guaranteed by the fact that discussion of the Trade
Regulations was in progress, and that their settlement was
to be followed by evacuation.

Mr. Morley, in reviewing these contentions of the
Indian Government, said that it must be remembered
that when the Government of India, in July, 1907, raised
the question of the failure of the Tibetans to fulfil the
conditions on which evacuation was to take place, it was
decided by His Majesty's Government that it was " not
necessary at present formally to remind the Chinese and
Tibetan Governments of such breaches of the Lhasa
Convention as have occurred." Nor had the incidents
since reported by the Government of India been con-

OBJECTIONS TO EVACUATION 357

sidered of sufficient importance to justify a warning either
to Tibet or China that there had been a failure to comply
with the conditions on which our evacuation of Chumbi
depended. The fact that we kept silence at the time that
these incidents occurred rendered it impossible, in Mr.
Morley's opinion, to revive them now without exposing
ourselves to a charge of bad faith.

There remained the argument that the evacuation of
Chumbi would deprive us of our only practical means of
bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to
expedite a satisfactory settlement of the negotiations now
in progress for the revision of the Tibetan Trade Regula-
tions. But though it might be inconvenient to be deprived
of this weapon, it appeared to Mr. Morley that, since by
our own action we were precluded, for the reasons stated
above, from alleging that there had been breaches of the
Lhasa Convention of such a nature as to necessitate our
retention of Chumbi, it would be an unjustifiable exten-
sion of the interpretation to be placed on the conditions
laid down in that Convention to maintain, as we should
have in effect to do, that the marts cannot be regarded as
eiFectively open till the revised Trade Regulations have
been satisfactorily settled. The Lhasa Convention clearly
contemplates the marts being conducted under the old
Regulations, which in form were sufficiently comprehen-
sive until the new ones were introduced. It contained
no stipulation, as it well might have done, that a revision
of the Regulations satisfactory to ourselves was essential
before the marts at Gyantse and elsewhere could be held
to have been effectively opened.

The possibility had also to be borne in mind, given the
peculiarities of Chinese diplomacy, that the continued
occupation of Chumbi might have no other effect than to
increase the obstinacy of the Chinese Government in the
matter of the revision of the Regulations. In that case,
as time went on, our position would have become increas-
ingly difficult, and if our occupation was seriously pro-
tracted, as might not improbably have been the result of
delaying evacuation, the whole policy of His Majesty's
Government in Asia would to a certain degree be stultified.

358 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

A comparison of the British and Chinese drafts of the
proposed Regulations showed that the points at real issue
in the Regulations were not only those of political status
involved in the wording of the preamble, but practical
commercial questions of great complexity and inherent
difficulty, such as that, for instance, to which the Govern-
ment of India drew special attention, of the teyms under
which Indian tea was to be admitted into Tibet. It could
not seriously be contended that our occupation was to
continue till terms as to tea, satisfactory to the Indian
trade, had been accepted by Tibet and China. On the
other hand, no line could be logically and defensibly
drawn between those matters in the Trade Regulations
which were, and those which were not, essential points in
the consideration of the question whether the trade-marts
had been effectively opened.

The conclusion at which Mr. Morley had arrived was
that, on an impartial interpretation of the Lhasa Conven-
tion, by the light of the events of the last three years,
there were not sufficient grounds to justify a refusal to
withdraw from Chumbi, and that, for reasons of policy and
expediency, it was desirable that our occupation should ter-
minate at once. Whatever difficulties might be in store for
us from Chinese obstructiveness, Mr. Morley was of opinion
that our power of coping with them would be diininished,
not increased, if we placed ourselves in what would be an
essentially false position by declining to withdraw from
the Chumbi Valley, in accordance with our pledges and
declared intentions.

Sir Edward Grey concurred in the views expressed by
the Secretary of State for India in regard to the evacua-
tion of the Chumbi Valley ; but he considered that it
would be well to point out to the Chinese Government
that His Majesty's Government would expect, in return
for evacuation, that their wishes would be met in regard to
the Trade Regxilations then under discussion at Calcutta,
and that conciliatory instructions would be sent to Chang
with a view to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations.
He had accordingly sent to His Majesty's Minister at
Peking a telegram in the above sense.

CHUMBI EVACUATED 359

The final instalment of the indemnity having been
paid, orders for the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley were
issued on January 27, 1908.

Thus we deliberately abandoned the sole guarantee for
the fulfilment of the Treaty. For years prior to the
conclusion of the Lhasa Treaty we had had practical
experience that Chinese engagements regarding Tibet
were useless. Since the signature of the Lhasa Treaty
we had three years' evidence that the Chinese were trying
to evade its execution. Its provisions had not been ful-
filled, and have not yet been carried out, six years after
it was signed. Extreme moderation had been shown ;
concession after concession had been made. With a
broad-mindedness in which some might suspect indifference
we had given way point after point. In spite of all this,
the Chinese were not observing the Treaty. And yet
we gave up tRe one and only material guarantee for its
fulfilment.

Now, at least, when we had withdrawn from Chumbi,
and when we had been complacent in so many respects,
we might fairly have expected that a change of tone would
have come over Chinese pohcy. But, as we have on many
other occasions experienced, the Chinese are not always
most reasonable when we are most accommodating. And
from the time we evacuated the Chumbi Valley they
commenced a great forward movement in Tibet, which
has resulted in the practical extinction of the Tibetan
Government, and necessitated our despatching a much
larger number of troops than we had in Chumbi to Gnatong,
an inhospitable spot over 12,000 feet above sea-level, where
they still have a 15,000-feet pass between them and
Chumbi, and can, in consequence, exert only one-quarter
of the moral effect they had in Chumbi itself

But before this movement actually commenced, the
Chinese had concluded some Trade Regulations with us ;
again at the instance of the Chinese Government, who seem
to have a shrewd suspicion that these various agreements
bind us to a far greater extent than they confer benefit on us.

360 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

On April 7, 1907, the Chinese Government had notified our
Minister at Peking that if the Government of India would
appoint a special representative, Mr. Chang would proceed
to Calcutta to negotiate the new Trade Regulations with
him. Sir John Jordan, in accordance with instructions
he had received, pointed out that under Article III. of
the Lhasa Convention it was the Tibetan Government
who should appoint a delegate to negotiate a revision of
the Trade Regulations. We were, however, willing not
to insist on negotiating these Trade Regulations exclusively
with delegates of the Tibetan Government. But before
the negotiations began a Tibetan delegate should be
appointed by the Tibetan Government, with full power to
negotiate and sign on behalf of the Tibetan Government
in such a manner as to bind that Government to the
settlement arrived at. This delegate should then be
associated with Mr. Chang and proceed together with
him to Simla, to negotiate there with a special representa-
tive of the Government of India,

The Chinese Government replied on May 21, sug-
gesting that Tibet should depute a Tibetan and India an
Indian Government official to negotiate, and that the
actions of the Tibetan representative would be subject
to the approval of Mr. Chang, and those of the Indian
representative to that of the Viceroy of India. This
was a thoroughly Chinese device to put India on a par
with Tibet and Mr. Chang on a par with the Viceroy.
What reply it met with is not on record, but on July 18
the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy that he
should address to the Tibetan Government a friendly and
uncontroversial letter, notifying them of the negotiations
to be held at Simla, and requesting that their delegate
might be suppHed with proper credentials. In carrying
out these instructions the Viceroy telegraphed that he had
also told the British Trade Agent to give a copy of the
communication to Mr. Chang, and that the Foreign
Secretary had written a friendly letter to Mr. Chang
announcing that he. Sir Louis Dane, had been appointed
British delegate.

The Regulations were eventually signed at Calcutta

TRADE REGULATIONS REVISED 361

on April 20, 1908, by Mr. Wilton (who had taken Sir
Louis Dane's place), Mr. Chang, and the Tsarong Sha-p^.
The questions relating to extradition, the levy of Customs
duties, the export of tea from India into Tibet, and the
appointment of Chinese Trade Agents, with Consular
privileges, were reserved for future consideration.

By these new Regulations it was laid down that the
old Regulatiohs of 1893 should remain in force, in so
far as they were not inconsistent with the new Regula-
tions. The boundaries of the Gyantse mart were fixed.
British subjects were allowed to lease land at the marts
for the building of houses and godowns ; the administra-
tion at the marts was to remain with the Tibetan officers,
under the Chinese officers' supervision and directions ; the
Trade Agents and Frontier Officers were to hold personal
intercourse and correspondence one with another, and the
Chinese authorities were not to prevent the British Trade
Agents holding personal intercourse and correspondence
with the Tibetan officers and people ; and British subjects
were to be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever
they pleased and to buy goods from whomsoever they
pleased. China engaged to affijrd effective poUce protec-
tion at the marts and along the routes, and on due fulfil-
ment of arrangements for this, Great Britain undertook
to withdraw the Trade Agents' guards at the marts and to
station no troops in Tibet, so as to remove all cause for
suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. In a
letter accompanying the Regulations Mr. Wilton wrote
to the Chinese and Tibetan delegates that the strength of
the armed guards at Gyantse and Yatung would not
exceed fifty and twenty-five respectively, and the desira-
bility of reducing these numbers even before their actual
withdrawal would be carefully considered from time to
time, as occasion might offer.

These Regulations would have been of value if they
had been observed, but even in 1910 the Indian Govern-
ment reported that the Chinese did not aUow the Tibetans
to deal directly with our Agents, and once they were con-
cluded the Chinese seem to have been more engrossed
with the great forward movement which, I have stated,

362 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

they commenced as soon as we had evacuated Chumbi,
than in carrying out their part of the agreement.

The first indication of this significant change of Chinese
pohcy was the appointment of Chao Erh-feng, the Acting
Viceroy of Szechuan, as Resident in Tibet, in the spring
of 1908. It was unusual, said Sir John Jordan in report-
ing this, to select an official of his standing and record
for this position. The appointment was aU the more
significant because his brother, Chao Erh-hsun, who suc-
ceeded Chang Chih-tung as Viceroy at Hankow in the
previous September, was suddenly transferred to the less
important post of Viceroy of Szechuan at the same time
as Chao Erh-feng was sent to Tibet.

A Memorial of the Board of Finance, approved by an
Imperial Rescript of March 19, which was published in
the Chinese press on March 31, threw some light on these
appointments and the intentions of the Chinese Govern-
ment. Chao Erh-feng was apparently expected to perform
in Tibet functions similar to those of the Marquis Ito in
Korea, and especially to extend the control of the Chinese
Government over the Tibetan Administration. The
appointment of Chao Erh-hsun as Viceroy was intended
to strengthen his brother's hands and insure harmony of
action.

The Memorial of the Board of Finance stated that
Tibet acted as a rampart for the province of Szechuan, and,
in view of its extent and the backward civilization of the
natives, plans for such important measures as the training
of troops, the promotion of education, the development of
agriculture, mining and industries, the improvement of
means of communication, the increase in the number of
ofl[icials, and the reform of the Government, should be pre-
pared without delay, so that the administration of the
country might gradually be put on a better basis. Chao
Erh-feng had been appointed to the post of Imperial Resi-
dent in Tibet, and, as a mark of the importance of his
office, exceptionally high rank had been conferred upon
him.

Chao Erh-feng was directed to investigate the local
conditions in concert with Lien Yu, to prepare com-

SIGNIFICANT CHINESE APPOINTMENT 363

prehensive schemes for all the measures to be undertaken
in Tibet, and to draft Regulations. The officials should
receive liberal salaries, and be generously rewarded for
meritorious service. They should all be permitted to bring
their families with them, and would be required to hold
their appointments for long periods. To meet the
necessary expenditure, the Board of Finance was to
provide a sum of from 400,000 to 500,000 taels every year
in order to aid in this important undertaking, and the
Viceroy of Szechuan was to give his assistance when
required, even beyond the limits of his own jurisdiction.

Sir John Jordan, as events have proved, was amply
justified in drawing attention to the significance of this
appointment of Chao Erh-feng. He was a man of both
ability and energy, but also of severity. His dealings with
the semi-independent States of Eastern Tibet will be
related in the following Chapter. Here it is important to
emphasize the facts that he was turning these States one
after another into districts directly administered by Chinese
officials, and that he was making a special set against
Lamaism* — regulating the numbers who might become
priests, curtailing the donations to monasteries, increasing
the taxes they had to pay, prohibiting the construction of
temples except by Chinese officials, and declaring the
inefficacy of the Lama's prayers — excellent reforms in
many ways, but when carried out with the severity with
which Chao was introducing them in Eastern Tibet, inevit-
ably calculated to arouse anger and suspicion at Lhasa.

Following the appointment of this high-handed Viceroy
bearing a special mandate to " reform " the Government of
Tibet appeared anti-British articles in a Lhasa newspaper,!
published by the Chinese officials and circulated through^
out Tibet. The Tibetans were exhorted not to be afraid
of Chao and his soldiers ; they were not intended to do
harm to Tibetans, but " to other people." The Tibetans
were to remember how they felt ashamed when the foreign
soldiers arrived in Lhasa, and oppressed them with much
tyranny. Chinese and Tibetans must all strengthen them-
selves on this account ; otherwise their common religion

* See especially p. 373. t Blue-book, IV., p. 178.

364 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

would be destroyed in a hundred, or perhaps a thousand,
years. In the west the " foreign frontier " was very close.
In that direction, also, was Nepal. The Tibetans were
therefore to make friends quickly with the Nepalese, and
"become as one to resist the foreigners." In Tibet were
" some wicked, aggressive foreigners," with whom inter-
course had to be maintained, and for this purpose English
schools would be opened. Then, again, in the south was
Bhutan, and " Tibet and Bhutan were as inseparable as
the cheek from the teeth." It would be even more advan-
tageous to make friends with Bhutan than with Nepal.
If at any future time the Bhutanese wanted help, the
Chinese Resident would give it. " Bhutan is like a wall of
Tibet. The Emperor thinks that the Gurkhas, Bhutanese,
and Tibetans should live like three men in one house."

The next Chinese move was the Imperial Decree
issued in November, 1908, to which more detailed allusion
will be made later,* ostensibly conferring an additional
honour on the Dalai Lama, in reality containing, as Sir
John Jordan put it, " the first unequivocal declaration on
the part of China that she regarded Tibet as within her
sovereignty " — sovereignty, be it noted, not suzerainty.

Then, a year later, came the announcement by the
Chinese Government to our Minister, that " Chao Erli-
feng was faced with a serious state of unrest on the
Tibetan marches — so much so that the Chinese Govern-
ment, having reason to fear complications with Tibet, and
desiring to strengthen their influence at Lhasa, were con-
templating the despatch of a body of troops to the
Tibetan capital."

By a remarkable coincidence, on the very day,
November 12, 1909, on which the Chinese Councillor
made this announcement to our Minister, the Dalai Lama,
from a monastery three marches outside Lhasa, despatched
a messenger to him, expressing the Dalai Lama's concern
to find, on his return to Tibet, that active measures were
being taken in the country by Chinese troops, and adding
his hope that the Minister would do what he could in the
matter.

* See p. 384.

CHINESE FORWARD MOVEMENTS 365

The events which led up to this will be set forth in
detail in the following Chapter. To make the consecutive
narrative of Chinese action complete, it will merely be
noted here that three months later the Chinese troops
arrived in Lhasa ; that on the day of their arrival ten
soldiers were sent to each of the Tibetan Ministers' houses ;
that the Dalai Lama thereupon fled to India ; that the
Chinese sent several hundred soldiers to " attend " and
" protect " him, but that he escaped across our frontier ;
that only a fortnight after he had left Lhasa he was
deposed by Imperial decree ; that the Chinese then took
the Government of Tibet into their hands, preventing the
sole remaining Minister from doing anything without the
Resident's consent, holding the ferry across the Brahma-
putra, and preventing anyone crossing the river without a
pass from the Resident, replacing Tibetan by Chinese
police, seizing rifles, closing the arsenal and mint ; and,
what more intimately concerns ourselves, and what was
immediately opposed to Treaty obligations, preventing
the Tibetans dealing directly with our Trade Agents.

AU this was done, moreover, with the object, as our
Minister was informed, of " tranquillizing the country," of
" protecting the trade-marts," and of " seeing that the
Tibetans conform to the Treaties."

Whether the Chinese forward movement extended
beyond Tibet to Nepal and Bhutan, there is no official
information. But Government evidently expected some
such action, for in January, 1910, they concluded a
Treaty with Bhutan, increasing the annual allowance
from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 100,000, and securing from the
Bhutanese an agreement that they would be guided by
the advice of the British Government in regard to their
external relations. And on Lord Morley's suggestion, the
Chinese Government was informed in February of this year
that we could not prevent Nepal from taking such steps to
protect her interests as she might think necessary under
the circumstances ; while in April we went a step farther,
and gave a clear intimation to China* that we could not
allow administrative changes in Tibet to aifect or prejudice

* Blue-book, IV., p. 215.

366 NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA

the integrity either of Nepal or of Sikkim and Bhutan,
and that we were prepared, if necessary, to protect the
interests and rights of these three States. It was also
impressed upon the Chinese Government that it was
inadvisable to locate troops upon, or in, the neighbourhood
of the frontiers of India and the adjoining States in such
numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements
on the part of the Government of India and the rulers of
the States concerned.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS SINCE 1904

Immediately following the conclusion of the Treaty at
Lhasa, the attitude of the Tibetans was friendly enough.
The Ti Rimpoche wrote to the Government of India
expressing the gratitude of the Tibetans for the reduction
of the indemnity from 75 to 25 lakhs of rupees, and
for the promise to restore the Chumbi Valley after three
years if the provisions of the Treaty were duly observed.
" The two parties have now commenced friendly relations,"
wrote the Regent, " and we hope that for the future they
wiU be firmly established, and that the Viceroy wiU
vouchsafe his aid in making this friendship last for a very
long time to the benefit of the Tibetans."

The Yutok Sha-pd, one of the councillors who had
negotiated the Treaty at Lhasa, was appointed a kind of
Special Commissioner to Gyantse to arrange about the
opening of the trade-mart, and in a speech he made
during a visit to Captain O'Connor he said that the
Tibetans were quite satisfied with the arrangements
regarding the trade-marts, and that they all hoped that
the newly cemented friendship would be of long duration,
and that a flourishing trade would spring up.

The National Assembly also wrote a letter to Captain
O'Connor saying that they were rejoiced in heart, and gave
thanks.

Some exception was taken by the Tibetans to our
building a house in Chumbi, and to the maintenance of
the telegraph-line, both of which had been erected during
the course of the Mission. But on the whole the inter-
course was friendly, and these written and personal com-
munications showed that the Tibetans had entirely

367

368 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

reversed their former attitude of positively refusing all
direct intercourse with us.

On the opposite side of Tibet, in that part not directly
under the Lhasa Government, but inhabited by people of
the Tibetan race and of the Lamaist religion, matters
were, however, very diiferent, and in the spring of 1905
serious troubles, including the massacre of both Chinese
officials and Europeans, occurred.

Around Batang for years past the Tibetans had been
very turbulent. In February, 1905, according to Chinese
accounts, a Chinese official was forcibly robbed near
Batang, and the Chinese Amban, Feng, sent a hundred
Tibetans belonging to a regiment in Chinese employ
to arrest the robbers. Thereupon great crowds from
the surrounding country assembled in the neighbour-
hood of Batang, declaring that Feng had no right to
establish his permanent residence there. Communication
by water was cut off, and on April 2 the people, " in
collusion with the Lama brigands of the Ting-lin monas-
teries, surrounded Batang." The Roman Catholic Mission
Chapel was burned, and subsequently Peres Mussot and
Souh^ were murdered here, and four others at Litang.
The Chinese general was shot in the main hall of the
Yamen, and Feng only escaped through a back gate. He
was, however, followed up and surrounded in a house to
which he had fled. He tried to escape from this also
with seventy- three men, but of these only three escaped,
and all the rest, including the Amban Feng himself, were
killed.

A French priest of the Tibetan Mission, when inform-
ing Mr. Litton, our Consul at Teng-yueh, that the revolt
appeared to be spreading to all the large lamaseries in
North- West Yunan, thus analyzed the cause of the
disorders.

For some two years past the Szechuan Government
had been endeavouring to bring Batang and the adjacent
country under the ordinary jurisdiction of the Chinese
officials, which was violently resented by the Lamas.

TROUBLE IN EASTERN TIBET 369

The new Amban, or Assistant Amban, who was
murdered, had been delaying his journey at Batang for
some months, and his followers had been guilty of pillag-
ing the Tibetans.

The considerable party which was still attached to the
deposed Grand Lama had been active in intrigues against
the Chinese officials, who, it was argued, had been proved
by recent events quite incapable of safeguarding the
privileges of the Lamaist body, and incompetent to exer-
cise the rights of suzerain over Tibet— that is to say, the
Lamas had realized the utter feebleness of the Chinese
Government.

Before the outbreak at Batang the probably false
rumour was spread about that the deposed Grand Lama
had " descended from Heaven," had arrived in Tachien-lu,
and was about to return to Lhasa.

It was said that secret orders had been issued by the
great lamaseries at Lhasa to Batang and other places for
the murder of all Chinese and Europeans near the Tibetan
frontier.

The Lamas about Litang had a further feud with the
Chinese officials, who in the previous year seized the kenpu,
or chief steward, of their lamasery and chopped off his head.

It may be noted that on March 30 — that is, four days
before the attack on Feng took place — Consul-General
Campbell had written to our Minister sa3dng that Feng
was headstrong, and that it was evident that his plans
must create serious disturbances unless the Chinese
garrisons in East Tibet were strengthened.

Later, on May 12, Consul-General Goffe wrote from
Chengtu that a Chinese official at Batang stated that the
local tribes had no intention of rebelling against the
Chinese Government, and that Feng had brought his
death upon himself by his harsh and unpopular measures.
The local chiefs also sent a petition to the Chinese
Viceroy of Szechuan complaining of the various unpopular
changes introduced by Feng, which had incensed the
people beyond measure. They repudiated any intention
of throwing off their allegiance to China, but they warned
the Viceroy that any despatch of troops to Litang and

370 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

Batang would exasperate the people and provoke a general
rebellion.

The Chinese official view of these transactions is given
in a joint memorial from the General and the Viceroy to
the Throne. The memorial stated that Feng recognized
that unless the power of the Lamas, who had absolute
control of the tribesmen, was reduced, there was certain
to be serious opposition to the measures of reform he
proposed to introduce. He accordingly requested that
the old law limiting the number of priests should be put
in force, and he further proposed that for a space of twenty
years no one should be allowed to enter the priesthood.
The Lamas resented this, and spread reports that Feng's
troops wore foreign dress and were drilled in the foreign
fashion. They also represented that the changes he wished
to introduce were solely in the interests of foreigners.
His protection of the missionaries was adduced as a
further proof of his partiality towards foreigners.

The Tibetan frontier continued in a disturbed condition.
The great lamaseries of North- Western Yunan rose against
the Chinese, and on August 3 Consul Litton reported
from Teng-yueh that the rebellion was the work of the
exiled Dalai Lama's partisans. He said it was easy to
raise disorders, particularly on account of the ill-judged
attempt of the Szechuan authorities to force their juris-
diction on the Batang people. Mr. Forrest, a botanist
who was travelHng in the district at the time, wrote to
Mr. Litton that, so far as the Chinese military were
concerned, the whole affair had now become a mere
squeezing and looting expedition. The disorderly char-
acter of the Chinese troops and the corruption of their
officers constituted, he said, a serious danger, because the
whole country might be raised thereby.

With more information before him, Mr. Litton wrote,
on August 12, that the reason why the great lamaseries
which in the previous May, when there were no Chinese
troops at Atentse, had refused to join the Batang m-
surgents had now risen against the Chinese was to be
sought in the violence and extortion of the Chinese
Prefect. He had been at Atentse since the end of May

CHINESE ACTION 371

with some 400 or 500 troops, who had been looting every-
where, which was hardly surprising when, according to a
French priest living in the district, he received neither men
nor money from his Government in spite of his warnings
of the growing seriousness of the situation. Mr. Litton
observed, further, that this was the third serious rebellion
which had occurred in Yunan during the three years of
Viceroy Ting's tenure of office, and that none of these
rebellions would have occurred if the most ordinary
efficiency and honesty had been exercised. Viceroy Ting's
government, he said, was a calamity to his own people and
a nuisance to his neighbours.

Only three days after he wrote this he received a report
that Mr. Forrest, together with Peres Dubernard and
Bourdonn^, had been murdered.

The Chinese, in face of these occurrences, now took
strong measures to put down the insurrection. Chao Erh-
Feng, then Director of the Railway Bureau, and now
Resident for Tibet, was ordered in April, 1905, to proceed
with 1,000 foreign-drilled troops, and 2,000 more which
he could raise on the way, to Tachien-lu. Some diffi-
culty was experienced in collecting together the neces-
sary troops, but in August it was reported that the
Tibetans had suffisred a reverse near the Batang frontier,
and that the Chinese Commander was then at Batang
itself. Later information showed that, in consequence of
Chao's severity and breach of faith, a serious revolt had
again broken out in Batang, that Chao's position was
critical, and reinforcements were being hurriedly de-
spatched from Chengtu in response to an urgent demand
for them which he had addressed to the Viceroy. But
he eventually established his position there, and, as will
be related below, converted it from a self-ruling State into
a Chinese district.

In January^ 1906, Chao set oiF with some 2,000 foreign-
drilled troops, equipped with rifles of German pattern and
four field-guns, for Hsiang Cheng, a lamasery at one time
the home of over 2,000 Lamas. It is situated about a
week's journey south-east of Batang on a high plateau
surrounded by mountains, and the territory under its

372 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

sway had so far been prohibited to Chinese, any who did
enter being skinned ahve. In the winter of 1905 a small
Chinese official with twenty soldiers had come to this
stronghold with a summons to the Abbot to swear his
allegiance to China, but the Lamas had treated him with
contumely.

Chao now bombarded the monastery, but the walls were
20 feet high and 4 feet thick, and at the four corners stood
high square towers pierced with loopholes for rifle-fire,
and against this the bombardment was ineiFective. The
country people harassed the besiegers from the surrounding
hills, and the Chinese were unable to make an entrance
tiU June 19, and then only by a ruse. The garrison, by
deaths, sickness, and desertion, had been reduced to 1,000
men. The Abbot himself had, in despair, committed suicide.
But Chao got some friendly Tibetans to say they had come
as a relief, and induce the garrison to open the gates. The
ruse was successful. The Lamas streamed out of the back
gate, but only to find themselves surrounded by Chinese,
who slaughtered them almost to a man.

For excessive severity in connection with this siege
and in other places, and for extensive looting of the
lamasery, Chao was impeached by a censor. He never-
theless succeeded in establishing Chinese authority, and,
before the year was closed, in converting Batang into a
Chinese province, laying down for its governance regula-
tions* which are particularly worthy of note.

The head T'u Ssu (chief) and the assistant T'u Ssu
having been beheaded, the office of T'u Ssu was abolished
for ever. Both the Chinese and the tribesmen of Batang
were henceforth to be subjects of the Emperor of China,
and subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese officials ; and
the district of Batang, together with the Chinese and
tribesmen resident therein, were to be under the adminis-
tration of Chinese officials. The people were forbidden
to style themselves subjects of the Lamas or of the T'u
Ssu. And being subjects of the Emperor, every man was
to sha,ve his head and wear the queue. Headmen of
villages were to be elected for triennial periods by the

* Blue-book, IV., p. 98.

BREAKING LAMAS' POWERS 373

villagers themselves, and were to be removable by the
villagers if they acted unjustly. Under each district official
(presumably a Chinaman) were to be three Chinese and
three Tibetans, to be jointly responsible for the collection
of the land tax and the hearing of suits, and all six of
them were to know both the Chinese and Tibetan
languages. The land tax (payable in cash), according to
the fertility of the land, was to be 40, 30, or 20 per cent,
of the total yield, which is considerably higher than the
land tax in British India. Officials in future were to pay
for their transport — a very wise and necessary provision.
Highway robbery was to be punishable with death, whether
anyone was killed or not. The gross ignorance of the
tribesmen having led to the murder of Feng and the
French priests, a Government school would be established
which all boys from the ages of five or six would have to
attend. The barbarous methods of burial practised by the
tribesmen were to be abolished. Habits of cleanliness were
inculcated. Adult men and women were urged to wear
trousers in the interests of morality, and children were to
be compelled to wear them. Each family was to take a
surname. Slavery was to be abolished. The people were
warned against smoking opium. The streets were to be
properly scavenged, urinals erected, and cemeteries were
to be made in low-lying places, and not on high ground.

Thus in every detail did Chao determine to make
Batang a component part of China. But the most signifi-
cant portion of the regulation is that relating to the Lamas.

The Ting Ling Monastery had been razed to the ground.
Orthodox temples would be constructed by officials, but
no other places of worship would be allowed, and no Lamas
would be permitted to reside even in these. Those Lamas
who took no part in the late disturbances might continue
to reside in the country villages, and such of them as
wished would be permitted to quit their habit. What
those Lamas who did take part in the disturbances might
do is not mentioned. The number of Lamas in each
temple was not to exceed 300, and a register was to be
kept of the names and ages of the Lamas of each temple.

Temple lands were to pay land taxes like other land,

374 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

though previously this had not been done. On the other
hand, the custom of making annual donations in kind to the
Lamas was to be abolished. So that the Lamas, while
they had to pay more, were to receive less. The Lamas were
not to interfere in the administration of the districts by the
Chinese local authorities. And as a final thrust at the
priest|y power, it was pointed out to the people of Batang
how ineffectual the prayers recited by the Lamas really
were, for they had not been able to save the Dalai Lama,
himself a living Buddha, from being defeated by foreign
troops and forced to fly for his life.

No one, after reading this, will wonder that the Dalai
Lama again fled from Lhasa when he heard that this very
same Chao, who had since absorbed still other parts of
Eastern Tibet, was advancing on Lhasa with a Chinese
army.

The introduction of as large a Chinese element as
possible into the district was, Chao Erh-Feng informed
our Consul-General at Chengtu a year later, what he was
anxious to bring about. He desired, by the above out-
lined means, and by the inviting of Chinamen of the
farming class to settle in Batang, to check the Lamas.

Batang being reduced, Chao turned his attention to
Derge, the largest State in Eastern Tibet, and also the
most favourable to the Chinese. For four years there had
been strife, of the type to which we are so accustomed on the
Indian frontier, between two brothers. The unsuccessful
appealed to Chao. Chao seized the chance ; supported
him with 500 Chinese and 500 Tibetan soldiers ; drove the
other brother out ; established his proteg^ on the throne,
and constructed a road from Derge to Batang. Eventually
he reports to the Emperor that the Chief is a man of
no ability, and had made repeated requests to him to be
allowed to hand over the whole of his territory to China.
He had also handed over his seal of office, saying that the
strife between him and his brother had caused indes-
cribable suffering to the people. Chao pointed out to the
Emperor that the situation of Derge was important
strategically, and that with it under proper control the
Chinese would be able to strengthen Central Tibet, and at

CHINESE ANNEXATIONS 875

the same time screen the frontier of Szeehuan. If the
Chinese Government insisted on the Chief carrying on
the succession, there would be no end to the sufferings of
the inhabitants, and other States would get drawn into the
disturbances. He therefore recommended that China
should take measures to guard against such eventualities.

It is not difficult to read between the lines of this
report. The Reform Council, in a memorial on this pro-
posal that " the native State of Derge should be allowed to
adopt our civilization and come under our direct rule," said
that it was laid down in the Imperial institutes that native
Chiefs who did not govern properly, must be denounced
and punished either by the substitution of other Chiefs or by
their territoiy reverting to China. The present conditions
on the frontier were not the same as before, and the
Chinese must take proper measures to keep their boundaries
secure, and to put an end to tribal feuds. Derge was of
great strategical importance to Szeehuan and Tibet.
The people were extremely anxious to come under Chinese
jurisdiction. Chao's proposals should therefore be acceded
to, and " the entire State of Derge be brought under
Chinese rule." The Chief was to be allowed the here-
ditary title of captain, and to wear a button of the second
class and the peacock feather, and allowed about £500 a
year from the revenue of his own State. Whatever he
had got out of Chao by his appeal, certainly Chao had
taken a good deal out of him.

Chao's next move was to Chiamdo, which, according
to a traveller* who was there in 1909, was not a part of
Lhasa territory, but had a Government on the Lhasa
principle, with an incarnated Lama as ruler and three
chief Lamas as his Ministers, all residing within an
enormous monastery. The whole population was said to
amount to 84,000 families, say about 420,000 people.
Chiamdo is the most important place between Ta-chien-lu
and Lhasa, and though the State sends tribute every six
years to Peking, it only did so because it received much
more valuable presents in return, and as a fact, the Chinese

* Blue-book, IV., p. 185. It is not clear whether this was Mr. Toller
or someone else.

376 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

residents in Chiamdo had to serve the Lamasery. At the
end of last year there was a great deal of unrest, this
traveller reported, among the Tibetans in this and other
parts of Tibet owing to the appointment of Chao, whom
they feared and hated, and everywhere they were pre-
paring and drilling soldiers, and in some places had
already declared their independence, and refused to give
transport to Chinese officials travelling.

Chao, however, early in 1910 was entirely successful
in his operations, and occupied Chiamdo, Draya, and
Kiangka without suffering any casualties.

Such were the relations between the Chinese and
Tibetans in those parts not directly under the Lhasa
Government. That they must have profoundly affected
the inhabitants of Tibet proper must be very evident, and
what the effect was I will relate after I first traced the
relations between the Tibetans and ourselves at this time
and followed the adventures of the Dalai Lama himself.

Returning, then, to the relations between oursehes
and the Tibetans on the other side of Tibet, we find
representations being made by both parties as to what
each considered breaches of the Treaty by the other. The
Tibetans objected to our administering Chumbi during
our occupation, and we objected to their reconstruction of
the fortifications of Gyantse Jong.

The Government of India replied to the Tibetans that
the action taken by us in the Chumbi VaUey called for
no explanation or defence, as it was in strict accordance
with the terms of the Treaty. As we subsequently
gave up the Valley, the point is not of any importance.

On the other hand, by levying trade dues at Phari, by
the stoppage of free trade via Khamba Jong, by the
stoppage of the letters of the British Trade Agent at
Gartok, and by their failure to pull down defence walls
on the road between Gyantse and Lhasa, Captain
O'Connor considered* that the Tibetans had clearly con-
travened the provisions of the Treaty.

* Blue-book, IV., p. 41.

MOVEMENTS OF DALAI LAMA 877

This change of attitude the Government of India
attributed to fear on the part of the Lhasa authorities lest
the Dalai Lama should on his return punish them for
complaisance to our demands ; and also to expectations
that the negotiations which the Chinese Commissioner
was at the time conducting in Calcutta might result in a
material modification of the Convention in favour of
Tibet.

Any real change there might have been at this time
was, anyhow, only at Lhasa itself, for the Tashi Lama from
Shigatse, spiritually an equal of the Dalai, visited India in
the winter of 1905-06, was received by H.R.H. the Prince
of Wales and Lord Minto, travelled to all the Buddhist
shrines, saw some great manoeuvres under Lord Kitchener,
and returned to Tibet impressed with the cordiality of his
reception.

As to the Dalai Lama himself, after fleeing from
Lhasa on our approach in August of 1904, he made his
way to Urga, in the North of Mongolia, where there is
another incarnate Lama of great spiritual influence. But
the two incarnations do not appear to have hit it off very
well, and the Dalai Lama's presence is reported to have
nearly ruined the other both in revenue and in reputa-
tion. They had a disagreement as to the division of fees,
and the Dalai Lama accordingly left Urga in September,
1905, for Sining, on the borders of Tibet.

Early in the following year we hear of him sending
the indispensable Dorjieff" to St. Petersburg with a
message and gifts for the Czar. Of this the Russian
Director of the Asiatic Department informed our Am-
bassador, stating that His Majesty had granted DorjiefF
an audience, and had accepted the gifts, which consisted
of an image of Buddha, a very interesting copy of Bud-
dhistical liturgy, and a piece of stuff; The message was
to the effect that the Lama had the utmost respect and
devotion for the " Great White Czar," and that he looked
to His Majesty for protection from the dangers which
threatened his life if he returned to Lhasa, as was his
intention and duty. The answer returned to him was of
a friendly character, consisting of an expression of His

378 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

Majesty's thanks for his message and of his interest in his
welfare. The Russian Minister said that he wished the
Ambassador should hear exactly what had occurred, as the
Press would probably make out that the audience had a
political character.

The Czar also sent the Dalai Lama a complimentary
telegram, in regard to which our Ambassador spoke
to Count LamsdorfF in April, 1906. The Russian
Chancellor informed Mr. Spring-Rice that the policy of
his Government with regard to Tibet was the same as
that of His Majesty's Government — namely, that of non-
intervention. They wished the Dalai Lama to return as
soon as possible to Lhasa, as they considered his continued
presence in Mongolia undesirable, but he had fears for the
safety of his person on his return, and had asked for a
promise of protection. The telegram had been sent in
place of this promise, and was designed to reassure, not
only the Dalai Lama himself, but also the Emperor's
Buddhist subjects, with regard to whom the Russian
Government would find themselves in a very embarrassing
position should any mishap befall the Lama. The inten-
tion of the Russian Government, Count LamsdorfF in-
formed our Ambassador, was to keep us fully informed in
order to avoid all misunderstanding.

Here it may be fconvenient to interpolate an account
of the agreement which was come to in the following year
between the Russians and ourselves in regard to Tibet.
By the Convention of August 31, 1907, generally known
as the Anglo-Russian Agreement, the suzerain right of
China in Tibet was recognized, but, " considering the
fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical
position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the
status quo in the external relations of Tibet," the follow-
ing arrangement was made. Both parties engaged " to
respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain
from all interference in its internal administration." They,
secondly, engaged " not to enter into negotiations with
Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese

ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 379

Government." This engagement was not, however, to
" exclude the direct relations between British Commercial
Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in
Article V. of the Convention between Great Britain and
Tibet of September 7, 1904, and confirmed by the Con-
vention between Great Britain and China of April 27,
1906 ;" nor was it to " modify the engagements entered
into by Great Britain and China in Article I. of the said
Convention of 1906." It was to be clearly understood that
Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, might
enter into direct relations on strictly rehgious matters
with the Dalai Lama, and the other representatives of
Buddhism in Tibet ; the Governments of Great Britain
and Russia engaging as far as they were concerned not
to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the
present arrangement. Thirdly, the two Governments
engaged not to send representatives to Lhasa ; and they
further agreed neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for
themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways,
roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet ;
and no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or
in cash, were to be pledged or assigned to Great Britain
or Russia, or to any of their subjects.

On this agreement I would here make only this remark
— that it embodied yet one more concession to Russia of
what we had obtained at Lhasa three years before. By
the Lhasa Treaty the Tibetans engaged not to cede terri-
tory, admit foreign representatives, grant concessions for
railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, " with-
out the previous consent of the British Government " ; and
in the event of concessions for railways, mines, etc., being
granted, " similar or equivalent concessions " were to be
granted to the British Government — that is to say, we
were not precluded from ourselves acquiring any of
these concessions if, at any time, we should want them ;
but the Russians were precluded from obtaining them
until our consent had been given. This was the position
under the Lhasa Treaty. , Under the Anglo -Russian
Agreement we have bound ourselves not to try to get any
of these concessions. Out of deference to Russia, we had

380 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

already given up the right we had acquired to send a
British officer to Lhasa, and the right to occupy the
Chumbi Valley, and we now gave up the right to exclude
Russians from concessions in Tibet if we so desired, and
engaged not to obtain any concessions ourselves. I am not
here contending that, from grounds of general policy, this
deference to Russia may not have had some countervailing
advantages. AU I am concerned to show is that, in regard
to Tibet, we gave up in the Anglo- Russian Agreement yet
another of the results we had obtained at Lhasa in 1904.

Annexed to the Agreement was a re-affirmation of the
declaration we had made that the occupation of the Chumbi
Valley should cease after the payment of three annual
instalments of the indemnity, provided that the trade-
marts had been effectively opened for three years, and
that in the meantime the Tibetans had faithfully complied
in all respects with the terms of the Treaty. But to this
affirmation was added a most important supplementary
statement. "It is clearly understood^' it said, " that if
the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces
has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time antici-
pated in the above declaration, the British and Russian
Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views
on this subject."

Before we evacuated the Chumbi Valley the Indian
Government represented* that the trade-marts had not
been eiFectively opened since Mr. Chang's appointment to
Tibet, whatever might have been the case before, and that
in other respects the terms of the Treaty had not been
faithfully complied with ; and they referred to this annexure
to the Anglo-Russian Agreement as contemplating the
possibility of a temporary postponement of evacuation.
But no advantage was taken of the annexure, and the
only material guarantee we had for the observation of the
Treaty was given up.

To return to the Dalai Lama. Throughout the year
1906 he seems to have wandered about the borders of

* Blue-book, IV., p. 136.

THE DALAI LAMA 881

Tibet in the Kansu Province of China, either in the
vicinity of Sining or of Kanchow ; but in the spring of 1908
he began making towards Peking. In March he was at
Tai-yuan-fu, where he put up in a specially made encamp-
ment outside the town ; then he marched to Wu-tai-shan,
a holy place in North Shansi, the huge following which
accompanied him preying upon the country like a swarm
of locusts, and tending to create a general feeling of dis-
satisfaction.

From Wu-tai-shan he sent a messenger and a letter to
our Minister at Peking. The letter was merely compli-
mentary, and was similar to what the Dalai Lama had
addressed to the other foreign representatives in Peking.
The messenger said the intention of the Dalai Lama was
to return to Tibet in response to the repeated petitions of
the Lama Church. Sir John Jordan told his visitor that he
could not say how His Majesty's Government would view
his intended returottto I^hasa. During his absence relations
between India and Tibet had improved, and the rupture
of friendly relations in 1904 had been the outcome of
misunderstanding, which had arisen under the Dalai
Lama's administration. The messenger explained that
this had been due to the fact that the Dalai Lama's
subordinates had persistently kept him in the dark as
to the true circumstances in State affairs ; but the
Dalai Lama now knew the facts, and was sincerely
desirous, on his return, to maintain friendship with the
Government of India, whose frontiers were those of
Tibet.

Mr. R. F. Johnston, of the Colonial Service, District
Officer at Wei-hai-wei, and the author of the most remark-
able of recent books of travel, *' From Peking to Manda-
lay," paid the Dalai Lama a private visit in July, and
reported that he was treated in a dignified and friendly
manner. The Dalai Lama told him that he wished his
relations with the British to be friendly, and that " he
looked forward to meeting British officials from India
when he returned to Tibet." Mr. Johnston said he
appeared to treat his Chinese guard with contempt, and
that there was bad feeUng between the Chinese and

382 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

Tibetan soldiers, while the Chinese officials complained
that they were ignored by the Lama.

The Dalai Lama informed another visitor that he had
received several pressing invitations to go to Peking, and
on July 19 an Imperial Decree was issued, summoning
him to the capital. He arrived at Peking by rail on Sep-
tember 28, 1908. The reception at the station was not
specially remarkable. He was borne in his own chair to
an improvised reception-hall, where representatives of the
Wai-wu-pu (Board of Dependencies), and the Imperial
Household awaited him ; he was then escorted to the
Huang Ssu (Yellow Temple), outside the north wall of
the city. It had been buUt by the Emperor Shun-chih
especially for the reception of the Dalai Lama who came
to thei Chinese Court in 1653 to pay homage to the new
Manchu dynasty. He had been the first Chief Pontiff of
Tibet to visit Peking, and the present Dalai Lama was
only the second.

An emissary from the Dalai Lama came to Sir John
Jordan two days later, with a message of greeting. The
Minister acknowledged this, and gathered that the Dalai
Lama would be pleased to see him. Sir John Jordan
was not, however, prepared to visit the Dalai Lama till
he had been received in audience by the Emperor, and
about this there was some difficulty. The Chinese
Goverriment did not find the Pontiff an altogether tract-
able personage to manage. In the rules for his recep-
tion it had been laid down that "the Dalai Lama would
respectfully greet the Emperor, and kotow to thank his
Majesty for the Imperial gifts." Kotowing is kneeling
and bowing down till the forehead touches the ground.
The Dalai Lama was prepared to kneel, but not to touch
the ground with his forehead. This might be called " a
puerile question of etiquette." But etiquette means a
great deal in Asia, and the audience had to be put off
eight days, till this point and the question of the inter-
change of presents had been satisfactorily arranged. The
Dalai Lama was to offer forty-seven different kinds of
presents, but was to kneel and not kotow ; it was likewise
laid down that when being entfertained at a banquet by the

BRITISH MINISTER VISITS LAMA 383

Emperor, he was to kneel on the Emperor's entrance and
departure.

Though the Russian and British Ministers worked in
consultation with one another in regard to visits to the
Dalai Lama, and agreed to communicate their intentions
informally to the Wai-wu-pu, the Chinese evidently did
not care to encourage these visits. The foreign Ministers
were informed that the Dalai Lama would receive the
members of their staffs on any day except Sunday,
between the hours of twelve and three, and that the intro-
duction would take place through the two Chinese officials
in attendance, one of whom was Chang Yin-t'ang, the
negotiator of the recent Anglo-Chinese Convention, and
the same official who had done so much in Tibet to stop
direct intercourse with us. This was obviously intended
to reduce intercourse with the Dalai Lama to the level of
commonplace Western functions, and to deprive him of
any further opportunity of ventilating his grievances to
the representatives of the foreign Powers. That the
Chinese should thus assert their claim to control the
external relations of Tibet was, perhaps, reasonable
enough, but our Minister thought it was open to doubt
whether their methods would, in the long-run, further
their interests in that dependency. Some Chinese were
already beginning to doubt whether the PontiiF's experi-
ence at Peking was likely to make him an active partisan
of Chinese policy on his return to Tibet.

Sir John Jordan visited the Dalai Lama on October 20,
at the Yellow Temple. On arrival he was received by
two Chinese officials, one of whom was the afore-men-
tioned Mr. Chang. After a considerable delay in the
waiting-room — whether due to Mr. Chang or to the Dalai
Lama is not mentioned — he was conducted to the
reception-hall, where he found the Dalai Lama seated
cross-legged on a yellow satin cushion, placed on an altar-
like table, about 4 feet high, which stood in a recess or
alcove draped in yellow satin. The Dalai Lama in
appearance was of the normal Tibetan type, thirty-five
years old, slightly pock-marked, with swarthy complexion,
a small black moustache, prominent and large dark brown

384 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

eyes, and good white teeth. His hands worked nervously,
and his head had not been shaved for ten days.

A few remarks were interchanged regarding the
chmatic superiority of North China over Tibet, and the
Dalai Lama's journey from Wu-tai-shan to Peking, part of
which was performed by train, and then the Dalai Lama
made reference to the proximity of India to Tibet. Some
time ago, he said, events had occurred which were not of
his creating ; they belonged to the past, and it was his
sincere desire that peace and amity should exist between
the two neighbouring countries. He desired the Minister
to report these words to the King-Emperor. The message
was not in the first instance clearly interpreted by the
attendant Lama, but that this was the Dalai Lama's
meaning appeared from what followed. Sir John said in
reply that the desire for peace and amity was fully
reciprocated by his country; and, on this being interpreted,
the Dalai Lama returned to his point, repeated the lan-
guage he had previously used, and asked that it should be
reported to the King-Emperor. The Minister then added
that he would not omit to carry out this request. A
pause ensued, and then the Dalai Lama said that if the
Minister had nothing further that he wished to discuss, he
would bid him God-speed, and, in doing so, presented him
with a pound or two of " longevity " jujubes. The recep-
tion lasted about eight minutes. The whole proceedings
were carried out with perfect dignity.

Under the outward aspect of honouring the Dalai
Lama, the Chinese now by Imperial Decree emphatically
stated his subordinate position. " The Dalai Lama," said
the Decree, " already, by the Imperial commands of former
times, bears the title of the Great, Good, Self-existent
Buddha of Heaven. We now expressly confer upon him
the addition to his title of the Loyally Submissive Vice-
gerent, the Great, Good, Self - existent Buddha of
Heaven." As Sir John Jordan observed, the additional
attributes did not leave much doubt as to the role which
the Pontiff was expected to play in the future. He was,
above all else, to be the loyally submissive Vicegerent of
the Chinese Emperor, and his dependence on ihe Imperial

LAMA LEAVES PEKING 385

favour was to be further accentuated by the grant to him
of a small personal allowance, also provided for in the
Decree.

The Decree laid down, too, that when he arrived in
Tibet, he was " to carefully obey the laws and ordinances
of the sovereign State," and in all matters he was to
" follow the established law of reporting to the Imperial
Resident in Tibet." This, said our Minister, was the first
unequivocal declaration on the part of China that she
regarded Tibet as vdthin her sovereignty, though in a con-
versation between Prince Chang and Sir Ernest Satow
the former had held that both land and people were
subject to China.

In preparing his expression of thanks for the honours
conferred upon him, the Dalai Lama sought to improve
his position by proposing that he should be able to
memorialize the Throne direct, instead of through the
Resident, but the Board of Dependencies refused to allow
him to do so.

The Dalai Lama left Peking on December 21 to pro-
ceed to Lhasa by way of Tung-kuan, Si-ngan, Lanchou,
and Kumbun — that is, by the northern route, and not
through Szechuan, as the Chinese Residents always travel.
The day before his departure he sent two of his Coun-
cillors to Sir John Jordan to pay a visit of farewell on his
behalf. In addition to some presents of incense and other
articles for the Minister, they brought a " hata " (scarf),
which they specially begged should be transmitted to His
Majesty the King-Emperor, with a message of respectful
greetings from His Holiness. The Councillors said that
the Dalai Lama's visit to Peking had been a useful educa-
tive influence to himself and his advisers, and had resulted,
they hoped, in the resumption of the time-honoured rela-
tions with China. It had also enabled them to ascertain
the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to
Tibet, and, after the assurances our Minister had given
them, they now went back thoroughly convinced that so
long as they faithfully carried out the terms of the recent
Convention, they could look forward with confidence to
the maintenance of friendly relations with His Majesty's

386 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

Indian Government. This they considered one of the
most valuable results of their journey. The Dalai Lama
had originally intended, they explained, to leave two or
three of his Councillors to represent his interests here, but
this proposal had for the time being been abandoned in
deference to the views of the Chinese Government.

So the Pontiff disappears into space again, and for a
year nothing is heard of him till a report comes from our
agent in Tibet in October, 1909, that he had arrived at
Nagchuka, a fortnight's march from Lhasa. He had by
this time evidently heard of the proceedings of Chao
(Chao Erh-feng) in suppressing Lamaism and destroying
the powers of the Lamas in Eastern Tibet, for he now
sends telegrams to the British Agent at Gyantse, to be
despatched from there to " Great Britain and all the
Ministers of Europe." These reached Gyantse on
December 7, 1909. The first of them said that though
the Chinese and the Tibetans were the same, yet nowadays
the Chinese officer, named Tao (? Chao) and the Amban
Len, who resides at Lhasa, were plotting together against
the Tibetans, and had not sent true copies of Tibetan pro-
tests to the Emperor, but had altered them to suit their
own evil purposes. They had brought many troops into
Tibet, and wished to abolish the Tibetans' religion ; the
Dalai Lama asked, therefore, that " all the other countries
should intervene and kindly withdraw the Chinese troops."
The second telegram, to be sent after some days if no
reply were received to the first, said that in Tibet, in the
case of several Chinese officers, "big worms were eating
and secretly injuring small worms." The third telegram
was to the Wai-wu-pu, and contained the same expression,
and added : " We have acted frankly, and now they steal
our heart."

The Dalai Lama also at this time sent a messenger by
Calcutta to Peking with a letter to the British Minister,
dated November 7, from the Tacheng Temple, three days'
march outside Lhasa. This messenger reached Peking on
February 7. The letter gave expression to the Lama's
desire that friendly relations with India might be main-
tained, and begged that the bearer's message might be

LAMA'S ARRIVAL IN LHASA 387

listened to by the Minister. This message, which was
dehvered on February 21, was to the effect that, having
arrived in Lhasa territory, the Dalai Lama was concerned
to find that active measures were being taken in the
country by Chinese troops, and hoped that anything our
Minister could do would be done. This messenger,
though he had denied that he was the bearer of any other
letters, as a matter of fact also delivered similar letters to
the Japanese, French, and Russian Ministers, and the
Russian Minister informed Mr. Max Miiller, our Charg^
d' Affaires, that the letter to him was couched in more
definite terms than that addressed to Sir John Jordan,
and asked directly for Russian help against the aggression
of the Chinese.

The point to note about these proceedings is that
before the Dalai Lama had even reached Ijhasa, he was
seriously concerned at the anti-Lamaist proceedings of
Chao in Eastern Tibet, and very suspicious of Chinese in-
tentions in regard to his own rule in Tibet.

He appears to have actually reached Lhasa on Christ-
mas Day, 1909, and shortly after sent a Lama to the
Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, whom he had met at Peking,
with a message to thank the Government of India for the
very generous treatment they extended to the Tibetan
Government and people during the stay of the British
Mission in Lhasa, and for withdrawing from the country
after signing the Treaty. The Sikkim Maharaj Kumar
understood from this message that the Dalai Lama wished
to open friendly relations direct with the Government of
India.

The situation in Lhasa on the Lama's arrival was
most critical. The Tibetans were alarmed and enraged
at the excesses which had been committed by the Chinese
troops in Eastern Tibet, especially in the destruction of a
large monastery near Li'tang, in retaliation for the murder
of a Chinese Amban ; and the Tibetans had a story that
when they destroyed the monastery the Chinese soldiers
used the sacred Buddhist books for making soles to their
boots.

An official was sent by the Dalai Lama and Council to

388 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

our Trade Agent to represent the situation to him. He
reached Gyantse on January 31 of this year, and said that
the Chinese troops were still at Chiamdo, but as Tibetan
troops were massed at only half a day's march from that
place there was not the least doubt that there would be
bloodshed if the Chinese persisted in coming to Lhasa.

At Lhasa itself the Tibetans had continually requested
the Chinese Resident to arrange that these Chinese
troops should not be brought to Lhasa, but he refused to
take any action. After the return of the Dalai Lama to
Lhasa, the representatives of Nepal and Bhutan, together
with some of the leading merchants and Mohammedan
head-men in Lhasa, again approached the Chinese Resident
as well as the Dalai Lama, with a request that he should
settle the dispute as to whether or not these troops should
be allowed in Lhasa. In the meanwhile the Tibetans had
sent a considerable force to face the Chinese troops, which,
as previously stated, had arrived under Chao-Erh-Feng
at Chiamdo, a place tributary to, but not directly ruled
by, China. The Tibetan force was meant to intimidate
the Chinese, but, Uke the poor troops at Guru, had orders
not to fight.

The account subsequently given by the Tibetan
Minister of what next happened was that on February 9
the Assistant Resident, Wen, had an interview with the
Dalai Lama in the Potala. The Nepalese representative
and Tibetan traders were also present. A promise was
then given by Wen not to bring more than 1,000 Chinese
troops to be stationed at Gyantse, Phari, Chumbi, and
Khamba Jong. Wen further promised that there should
be no bringing to Lhasa of fresh troops, by which I sup-
pose he meant that the garrison of Lhasa itself should not
be increased. And he undertook to give them a promise
to the same effect in writing.

Tibetans are proverbially hazy in their accounts of
what was actually said or done on particular occasions, and
the Chinese Government afterwards denied that Wen could
possibly have given any such promise. But the Ministers did
show Mr. Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim, a letter which
they asserted they had received from Wen. Wen wrote :

CHINESE TROOPS IN LHASA 389

" I had a personal interview on February 9, 1910, at the
Potala, with His Hohness the Dalai Lama, in regard to
the orders sent from Szechuan about sending 1,000 Chinese
troops to Lhasa. ..." He then agreed that the distribu-
tion of the troops to guard the frontier would be considered
on their arrival at Lhasa ; the Lamas would riot be
harmed or their monasteries destroyed, and there would
be no diminution in the Dalai Lama's spiritual power.
Wen further stated in this letter that the Dalai Lama had
agreed that the Chinese troops would have no resistance
offered to them ; that the Tibetan troops then assembled
would be dismissed to their homes ; that the Dalai Lama
would thank the Emperor, through the Resident, for the
great kindness shown him ; and that great respect should,
as usual, be paid by the Dalai Lama to the Chinese
Resident.

This letter was written on February 10, and on the
same day the Dalai Lama replied that orders for the with-
drawal of the Tibetan troops and for the carriage of the
Resident's mails had been issued. The report to the
Emperor of his arrival in Lhasa was also forwarded. But
the Dalai Lama drew the Resident's attention to the fact
that while he had stated that there would be no diminu-
tion of his spiritual power, he had made no mention of his
temporal power.

From this correspondence, taken with other actions of
the Chinese, it was reasonably evident that the Chinese
meant to take the temporal power from the Dalai Lama.
But the point whether the Resident actually promised that
more than 1,000 Chinese troops should not be brought to
Lhasa is not clear. Anyhow, there is no mention of any
more than 1,000, and no intimation that more than 1,000
were coming, or request that they might be allowed to.
In India British troops are not sent into a Native State
without at least an intimation, and when the Resident had
made no mention of more than 1,000 being sent, the
Tibetan Government had some justification for complaining
when more than 1,000 arrived.

For this is what now happened. The Chinese, to the
number of 2,000, advanced from Chiamdo, where, on

390 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

January 20, a small fight took place between the Chinese
and Tibetans; eight Chinese and fifteen Tibetans being
killed, and eighteen of the latter being captured, all of
whom were at once beheaded. The Tibetan troops then
withdrew, and on February 12 forty Chinese mounted
infantry and 200 infantry arrived suddenly in Lhasa, while
1,000 more were only two marches behind. A crowd of
unarmed Tibetans went to look at the new arrivals and the
Chinese fired into the midst, killing two Tibetan poHcemen,
and wounding a high Tibetan official and an old woman.

This is the Tibetan version of what happened. The
Chinese asserted that, although the Resident had gone
to meet the Dalai Lama, yet the latter had refused to
see the Resident again to discuss matters amicably ; had
prevented the Resident and his escort from obtaining the
usual supplies, and by refusing transport had endeavoured
to cut off communication with China. Bodies of Tibetans
had impeded the march of the troops from the first, and
finally the supplies collected for the Chinese troops had been
burnt, although it had been carefully explained to the Dalai
Lama that the troops were coming as police, and to
protect trade-marts, and that no alteration whatever in the
internal administration or interference with the Church was
in contemplation. The right to station troops in Tibet
had always rested with China, and the object of sending the
recent reinforcements was merely to secure observance of
Treaty rights, to protect the trade-routes and to maintain
peace and order.

Such was the account given by the President of the
Wai-wu-pu to our Minister at Peking. But the Dalai
Lama, remembering what had happened just recently in
Eastern Tibet under Chao Erh-feng, who was now himself
at Chiamdo, was not so confident as to what these
additional troops were meant for. When the new arrivals
entered Lhasa on February 12, three of his chief Ministers
were with him in the Potala, and during the meeting
news came that the Chinese had despatched ten soldiers
to the house of each Minister to arrest him. Upon
hearing this, and that more than the 1,000 Chinese
troops had entered Lhasa territory, the Dalai Lama and

FLIGHT OF DALAI LAMA 391

his Ministers decided to fly, and they left Lhasa that same
night.

The Dalai himself gave these to Mr. BeU as his reasons
for flying. He said that the promise of the Emperor of
China that he would retain his former power and position in
Tibet had been broken since his return to Lhasa. The
Chinese police already in Lhasa and the forty mounted
infantry had fired upon inoffensive Tibetans, and he fled
because he feared he would be made a prisoner in the
Potala, and that he would be deprived of all temporal power.

He left Lhasa with the Minister and Councillors, who
were afraid to return to their houses, at midnight on
February 12. Accompanying him were about 200 soldiers
and various officials and attendants. The next day they
reached the ferry over the Brahmaputra River at Chaksam,
where he left the soldiers to check any Chinese who
might come in pursuit, while he himself crossed the river
and proceeded to Nagartse which he reached on the 15th
— very rapid travelling.

The Chinese did pursue him, which is a point to note,
as tending to increase the suspicion that they really had
meant to make a prisoner of him. A fight took place
at Chaksam, in which several Chinese — one report says
sixty — were killed, but after which the Tibetans dispersed.
And, according to the Dalai Lama, 400 Chinese troops were
sent by the direct road from Lhasa to Phari, and another
party of 300 along the road to Gyantse, while rewards
were promised to anyone who might effect his capture or
might capture or kill his Ministers. Some of the Chinese
letters oiFering these rewards fell into his hands.

The Dalai Lama himself had meanwhile pressed
rapidly on. On the 16th he crossed the Karo-la, the
scene of Colonel Brander's fight, and reached Ralung.
Nor was reached on the 17th, Dochen on the 18th, and
Phari on the 19th. Here lots were cast as to whether he
should proceed vih Bhutan, Khamba Jong, or Gnatong.
The lot fell on the last route, and, reinforced by about
100 men of the Chumbi Valley, he was escorted as far as
Yatung on the 20th. With still further reinforcements
and with fresh supplies he was escorted up to the Sikkim

392 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

frontier on the 21st, and that same day reached Gnatong,
on the British side.

With the British Trade Agent at Yatung he left a
message saying that it was his intention to go to India to
consult the British Government. He had appointed a
Regent and Acting Minister at Lhasa, but he and the
Ministers who accompanied him had their seals with them.
He looked to the British for protection, and trusted that
the relations between the British Government and Tibet
would be that of a father to his children.

The Viceroy sent instructions to the authorities at
Darjiling to show him every courtesy on his arrival there,^
about the 27th, but to treat his visit as private. The
effect of the flight of the Lama and his Ministers, not only
in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, but also on Indian opinion,
would, Lord Minto said, be profound, for in all these
countries he was regarded with veneration and awe. He
thought it of the first importance, therefore, to treat the
Dalai Lama with high consideration.

At Darjihng, on March 3, Mr. Bell, the Pohtical
Officer in Sikkim, had an interview with him. The Lama
rose from his seat to receive Mr. Bell, and shook hands with
him. He asked him to telegraph and thank the Viceroy
for the arrangements for the comfort of himself and his
party. Then, when he had dismissed his attendants and
given an account of his flight and his reasons for leaving
Lhasa, he told Mr. Bell that when Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutan
agent, had presented him with Lord Curzon's letter, before
the time of the Mission, he would not receive it, since he
had agreed with the Chinese to conduct his foreign affairs
through Chinese intermediaries only. In like manner,
when I had written to him in the course of the Tibet
Mission, the Chinese refused to let him send a reply.
Now the Chinese had broken their promises, as already
related, and he had come to India for the purpose of asking
the help of the British against the Chinese. He stated
that unless the British Government intervened, China
would occupy Tibet and oppress it, would destroy the
Buddhist religion there and the Tibetan Government, and
would govern the country by Chinese officials. Eventually,

CHINESE ACTIVITY 393

he added, her power would be extended to India : there
were already 2,000 Chinese troops in Lhasa and its
neighbourhood, others were following, and it was not for
Tibet alone that so large a number of troops were
required.

This statement of the Dalai Lama's was borne out by
information received from Gyantse, which said that 2,000
Chinese troops from Chiamdo had arrived at Lhasa in
February, and that the Tsarong Sha-pd (the General who
had met Mr. White and me at Khamba Jong, and who
afterwards, raised to the position of Councillor, was one
of those who negotiated the Treaty) was the only high
Tibetan official left in Lhasa, and had to obtain the
Resident's permission for all his acts. The Gyantse
report added that the chief opponent of the Tibetans was
the Resident Len, who, according to the common talk of
Lhasa, desired to take the entire administration into his
own hands, and was very suspicious of British influence
in Tibet. The Tibetans believed that the first thing he
would do if the Ministers returned would be to cut their
heads off and force the Dalai Lama to give him the
power. Chinese soldiers had been posted on each side
of the Brahmaputra at Chaksam to prevent any Tibetan
crossing without a pass signed by the Resident.

Later information received from the Ministers showed
that whereas the normal Chinese garrison of Lhasa and
surrounding country was only 500, there were now alto-
gether 3,400 Chinese soldiers there — viz., 2,400 in Lhasa ;
500 at Gyamda, ten days' journey east of Lhasa ; and 500
at Lharigo, fourteen days' march north-east of Lhasa.
The Ministers also stated that the intention of dismissing
the Ministers who accompanied the Dalai Lama to India
had been announced by Amban Len. The Dalai Lama's
palace near Lhasa, known as Norbaling, was stated to
have been taken possession of by Chinese soldiers, who
were endeavouring to construct barracks capable of hold-
ing 1,000 Chinese troops at Lhasa.

Besides this, the Minister reported that Chinese police
were being posted throughout the country bj'^ the Amban,
and where Tibetan police existed they were being dis-

394 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

missed. The Amban had removed thirty good rifles from
the Tibetan armoury, had closed the Tibetan arsenal and
Tibetan mint, and proposed the confiscation of all rifles
throughout the country in the possession of Tibetans.
The Regent had been forbidden by him to perform his
religious duties, the Amban saying another Lama would
be chosen for this purpose. The Amban had broken open
the sealed doors of the Dalai Lama's palace at Norbaling,
near Lhasa, was taking steps to deprive the Ministers
who accompanied Dalai Lama to Darjiling of their ap-
pointments, and had posted soldiers in most of their
houses.

From DarjiUng the Dalai Lama proceeded to Calcutta,
where, on March 14, after an exchange of formal visits, he
had a private interview with the Viceroy. He expressed
his reliance on the British Government and his gratitude
for their hospitality. The difficulties between Tibet and
Britain in 1888 and 1903 had been caused by China. The
promises of the Emperor and Dowager Empress had been
disregarded by the Amban, who had clearly shown that
he would leave the Tibetans no power. He appealed to
us to secure the observance of the right which the Tibetans
had of dealing direct with the British. But he further
desired the withdrawal of Chinese influence, so that his
position might be that of the fifth Dalai Lama who had
conducted negotiations, as the ruler of a friendly State,
with the Emperor. There should also be withdrawal of
Chinese troops. The Treaties of 1890 and 1906, to which
they were not parties, could not be recognized by the
Tibetans. He was cut off^ from communication with the
Regent whom he had left at Lhasa, although he and his
Ministers were the Government of Tibet, and had the seals
of office. All travellers were stopped and searched by
the Chinese, and, unless sent secretly, no official letters
got through. He had received some private letters. He
would not return to Lhasa unless this matter was settled
satisfactorily. What his eventual destination would be
he could not say ; he wished to return to DarjUing for the
present. After the violation of the promises which the
Dowager Empress gave him, he would not trust the

TIBETANS ASK BRITISH AID 395

Peking Government's written assurance. Intrigue on his
part against the Chinese he denied. The Amban was
altogether hostile, and a hostile policy had been adopted
by the Chinese. He repeated his statement that the
Chinese had designs on Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. So
far as Tibet was concerned, there was no need for the
large force of 2,700 troops which, according to his infor-
mation, the Chinese had in and round Lhasa. The Lama
also gave his account of his relations with DorjiefF, who,
he said, was a purely spiritual adviser, and of the treat-
ment of the letter from Lord Curzon. He inquired, at
the conclusion of the interview, how his appeal was
answered. In reply Lord Minto said that at present he
could give no reply at all, but that he was very glad
to make his acquaintance, to extend hospitality, and
to hear his views, which would be placed before His
Majesty's Government. The Dalai Lama again thanked
Lord Minto warmly for his hospitality and took his
leave.

On the return of the Dalai Lama and his Ministers to
Darjiling further representations were made by the latter
to Mr. Bell. They said that the only offence of them-
selves and the Tibetan people was the struggle to maintain
the freedom of their country, and they asked* that a
British officer might be sent to Lhasa or Gyantse to
inquire into Chinese conduct, and that " an alliance under
which each party should help the other on the same terms
as the arrangement which they said exists between the
Government of India and Nepal might be concluded by
the Government of India with Tibet."

A few days later, on April 18, they requested f that
the aggression of the Chinese might be stopped while
discussion between the British and Chinese Governments
was in progress, and that permission to communicate
with their deputies at Lhasa might be given to the
Tibetan Government in Darjiling. Failing this, they
requested the despatch to Lhasa of British officers with
soldiers to inquire into and discuss the present condition
of affairs with the Chinese.

* Blue-book, IV., p. 215. t Ibid., p. 217.

396 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

Was there ever a more tragic reversal of an old
position ? Warren Hastings, Bogle, Turner, Lord
Curzon, and we in 1904, aU trying to induce the Tibetans
to be ordinarily civil ! And now the Grand Lama and
his entire Government come to us, come to beg us to
uphold their right of communicating direct with us, and
to send British officers — and not merely officers, but
soldiers — to Lhasa, and to form an alliance. In all
history there can hardly be a case of a more dramatic
turning of the tables. Yet, when all we had been striving
after for a century and a half was now being pressed upon
us, we informed the Dalai Lama we were precluded from
interfering. When the Tibetans did not want us we
fought our way to Lhasa to insist upon their having us ;
when they did want us, and had come all the way from
Lhasa to get us, we turned them the most frigid of
shoulders.

The reason for this attitude was said to be* that the
Anglo-Tibetan and Anglo-Chinese Convention specially
precluded us from interfering in the internal administration
of the country. But if the Tibetan Government them-
selves wished a change, there was no reason why the first
objection should hold ; and if the latter was the obstacle, it
is inconceivable why we ourselves should have made it,
and thus in yet one other way tied our own hands. It
was because the Chinese had so grossly mismanaged
Tibetan affairs that the Indian Goa ernment had to under-
take two expeditions on the Tibetan frontier. And we
must have taken some unfortunate step if, when the
Chinese were again mismanaging Tibet, we were pre-
cluded by an engagement with them from taking what
action we liked to keep this frontier quiet.

We were, however, not altogether inactive. On
January 31, 1910, the Government of India, when they
had first heard through the official sent by the Dalai Lama
to our agent at Gyantse that the Chinese were advancing
into Tibet, had suggested f that a representation should
be made at Peking pointing out that disorder on our
frontier could not be viewed by us with indifference,

* Blue-book, IV., p. 218. t I^id., p. 188.

BRITISH PROTESTS TO CHINA 397

resulting as it possibly might in the status quo being
entirely changed, and in conditions being set up wholly
inconsistent with the spirit of our agreements with Tibet
and China, agreements by which the continuance of a
Tibetan Government was recognized. The Chinese Govern-
ment might also be told, they considered, that we should
be compelled in self-defence to strengthen our escorts at
Yatung and Gyantse if unsettlement of the country
continued, though assurance might at the same time be
given to both China and Russia that the maintenance of
the status quo under the Treaties and Trade Regulations
was all that we desired.

There was nine days' delay — perhaps due to the
General Election — in considering this telegram in the
India Office, and during those fateful days events were
advancing apace at Lhasa. But on February 9, the day
when the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Associate Resi-
dent were consulting together in the Potala, Lord Morley
informed* Sir Edward Grey that he would be glad if he
would see fit to address the Chinese Government in the
sense suggested by the Indian Government.

Sir Edward Grey fully appreciated! the serious com-
plications which might arise upon the Indian frontier as
the result of an attempt on the part of the Chinese to
deprive the Tibetans of their local autonomy, but before
deciding on the course to be adopted he thought it de-
sirable to ascertain the views of Sir John Jordan, who was
accordingly telegraphed to in this sense on February 11,
the day before the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa.

Sir John Jordan, one of the best Ministers we have
had in Peking, had unfortunately to leave Peking at this
time, and since the reply of the Charg^ d' Affaires, Mr.
Max Mtlller, was received the situation had so altered
that the terms in which the Chinese were to be addressed
had to be reconsidered. It was true, said Lord Morley,
in addressing the Foreign Office, that, in view both of our
Treaty relations with China and Russia and of the history
of our past policy in regard to Tibet, the position of
Great Britain is somewhat delicate, and that it is

* Blue-book, IV., p. 189. + Ibid.

398 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

difficult for us to make an effective protest. But he
was strongly of opinion that it should be pointed out
emphatically to the Chinese Government (1) that Great
Britain, while disclaiming any desire to interfere in the
internal administration of Tibet, cannot be indifferent to
disturbances of the peace in a country which is both our
neighbour and is on intimate terms with other neighbour-
ing States upon our frontier, and especially with Nepal,
whom we could not prevent from taking such steps to
protect her interests as she might think necessary in the
circumstances ; (2) that, in view of our Treaty relations
with both Tibet and China, His Majesty's Government
had the right to expect that the Chinese Government
would at least have tendered friendly explanations before
embarking on a policy which, in the absence of such
explanations, could not but appear intended to subvert
the political conditions set up by the Anglo-Tibetan Con-
vention and confirmed by the Anglo- Chinese Convention ;
and (3) that His Majesty's Government must claim that,
whatever the intentions of the Chinese Government might
be as regards the future of Tibet, an effective Tibetan
Government should be maintained, with whom we could,
when necessary, treat in the manner provided by those two
Conventions.

Sir Edward Grey concurred in Lord Morley's views,
and directed Mr. Max Miiller on February 23 to make a
representation to the Chinese Government in the above
sense. In reply to this, Liang-tun-yen, the President of
the Wai-wu-pu, informed Mr. Max Miiller on February 25
that the force despatched to Lhasa consisted of not
more than 2,000 men, under a Brigadier, but not under
Chao Erh Feng, who was apparently still at Chiamdo.
He wished to assure the British Government that the
Chinese intentions were merely to enable the country to
be policed and more effective control than formerly to be
exercised, particularly in regard to Tibet's obligations to
neighbouring States. The Chinese desired no modification
of the status quo, and no alteration in any way of internal
administration. It had not been their intention that the
Dalai Lama should be deprived of his power, and repeated

DALAI LAMA DEPOSED 399

messages to that effect had been sent him. His title had
already been taken from him in 1904, and subsequently
restored to him. He would now be punished personally
by deposition and by a new Dalai Lama being appointed ;
but unless unforeseen circumstances rendered such a
course necessary, no further aggressive action in Tibet was
contemplated.

On returning home from his interview Mr. Max M uller
found a note from the Chinese Government communi-
cating the terms of an Imperial Edict issued that morning
deposing the Dalai, Lama and giving instructions for the
election of a successor. This note said that "the Dalai
Lama had flown from Tibetan territory in the night of
February 12 ; he [the Resident at Lhasa] knew not whither,
but that officers had been sent in all directions to follow
him up, attend upon him, and protect him."

The Imperial Decree said that the Dalai Lama had
been the recipient of Imperial favour and abounding kind-
ness, but that since he assumed control of the administra-
tion he had been proud, extravagant, lewd, and slothful
beyond parallel, and vice and perversity such as his had
never before been witnessed. Moreover, he had been
violent and disorderly, had dared to disobey the Imperial
commands, had oppressed the Tibetans, and precipitated
hostilities. In July, 1904, he had fled during the disorders,
and was denounced by the Imperial Resident in Tibet as
of uncertain reputation, and a Decree was issued depriving
him temporarily of his title. When he came to Peking
he was received in audience, given an addition to his title,
and presented with numerous gifts. Every indulgence
was shown to him in order to manifest the Emperor's
compassion. The past was forgiven in the hope of a better
future, and the Emperor's intention was generous in the
extreme. The present entry of Szechuan troops into
Tibet was specially for the preservation of order and the
protection of the trade-marts, and the Tibetans should
not have beein suspicious because of it ; but the aforesaid
Dalai, after his return to Tibet, spread reports and became
rebellious, defamed the Resident, and stopped supplies to
Chinese officers. Numerous efforts were made to bring

400 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

him to reason, but he would not Ksten ; and when Lien-yii
telegraphed that, on the arrival of the Szechuan troops
in Lhasa, the Dalai Lama, without reporting his intention,
had fled during the night of February 12, and that his
whereabouts were unknown, the Emperor commanded the
Resident to take steps to bring him back and make satis-
factory arrangements for him. The aforesaid Dalai Lama
had been guUty of treachery over and over again, and had
placed himself outside the pale of the Imperial bounty.
To his superiors he had shown ingratitude, and he had
failed to respond to the expectations of the people below
him. He was not a fit head of the saints.

He was, therefore, to be deprived of the title of Dalai
Lama as a punishment, and to be treated as an ordinary
person, and the Resident in Tibet was to at once institute
a search for a number of male children bearing miraculous
signs, to inscribe their names on tablets, and, according to
precedent, place them in the golden urn, from which one
should be drawn as the true re-embodiment of the previous
generations of Dalai Lamas.

In a written communication to the British Minister,
dated February 27, the Chinese confirmed their verbal reply.
They were sending troops "to tranquillize the country and
protect the trade-marts." The troops which were entering
Tibet were " in no way different from a police force," and
were to protect the trade-marts and "see that the Tibetans
conformed to the treaties." " But the Dalai Lama does
nothing but run away on one pretext or another," continued
the note "and must really be considered to have renounced
his position voluntarily." But "under no circumstances
would the dismissal or retention of a Dalai Lama be used
to alter the political situation in any way."

In a further interview which Mr. Max MiiUer had with
the Chinese Grand Councillor, Natung, on March 5, the
Chinese position was again stated. He showed, by sketch-
ing his career, how impossible it was to place any con-
fidence in the Dalai Lama. Ever since the Lama assumed
direction of affairs in 1895 he had been a constant source
of trouble to China, and our expedition in 1904 was the
result of his intrigues and wild disregard of Treaty

REASONS FOR DEPOSITION 401

obligations. On that occasion he had fled from Tibet
without permission, but all along he had been treated with
consideration, and his insubordination borne with, by the
Chinese Government ; the latter had, however, been com-
pelled to depose him and appoint another, owing to his
proceedings since his return to Lhasa territory and his
flight from Lhasa without just cause. On Mr. Max
MiiUer asking for definite instances of insubordinate con-
duct, Natung said that although, on the Lama's arrival,
the Amban had gone to meet him, yet the former, during
the fifty days he was in Lhasa, had refused to see the
Amban again to discuss matters amicably ; had prevented
the Amban and his escort from obtaining the usual
supplies, and by refusing transport according to regula-
tions had endeavoured to cut communications with China.
Bodies of Tibetans had impeded the march of the troops
from the first, and finally the supplies collected for the
Chinese troops were burnt, although it had been carefully
explained to the Dalai Lama that the troops were coming
as police and to protect trade-marts, and that no altera-
tion whatever in the internal administration or inter-
ference with the Church was in contemplation. On
Mr. Max MiiUer telling Natung of the incidents reported
to have occurred in Lhasa at the time of the flight of the
Dalai Lama, he said that no such information had reached
the Chinese Government ; he would not assert that no
incidents had accompanied the entry of the Chinese troops,
but, seeing that the strictest orders to the contrary had
been given to the troops, he could not credit statements as
to the unprovoked attacks on Tibetans. It was not true,
moreover, that there had been any diminution of position
or power of the Dalai Lama, and he could not believe that
a promise that only 1,000 troops would come to Lhasa
had been made by the Amban ; without the Chinese
Government's authorization, which had not been given,
such a promise could not be made.

Natung emphatically stated that newspaper reports as
to the proposal by the Viceroy and Cliao Erh-feng for
conversion of Tibet into a province of China were without
a shadow of foundation. His Excellency said that the

402 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

Chinese Government entertained no thoughts of such a
course, which would be a contravention of the treaty
stipulations between England and China. Mr. Max Miiller
was reminded by Natung that blame was formerly imputed
to the Chinese Government because they did not enforce
observation of Treaty engagements on the part of the
Tibetans, and that the signature of the Trade Regulations
of 1908 by a Tibetan delegate had been insisted on by His
Majesty's Government, because they thought that Regula-
tions would otherwise not be conformed to by Tibetans.
He stated, as regards troops in Tibet, that none of Chao
Erh-feng's force had entered Lhasa territory, that force
being still in Derge and Chiamdo. The 2,000 men sent to
Lhasa were a separate body of troops from Szechuan, and,
beyond the Amban's normal escort and the guard at the
post-stations, these were the only additional troops in the
country. The right to station troops in Tibet had always
rested with China, and the object of sending the recent
reinforcements was merely to secure observance of Treaty
obligations, to protect the trade-marts, and to maintain
peace and order. The person of the Dalai Lama himself,
he assured the Minister repeatedly, was alone affected
by the steps which the Chinese Government had taken.
Precedents for removing Lamas were numerous ; in 1710,
owing to misconduct, the sixth Dalai Lama had been
removed. No action would be taken which would disturb
the Lama Church or the existing administrative system
in Tibet. It was absurd to suppose that the Chinese
Government would interfere with Lamaism, as there were
Lamaist functionaries at the Peking Court, and millions
of Lamaists among the Mongol subjects of China. With
regard to the charges that monasteries had been burnt,
one only had been destroyed by Chao Erh-feng, more than
a year previously, because a Chinese Amban had been
ambushed and killed, together with thirty of his escort, by
the Lamas.

On the receipt of the Chinese reply, Lord Morley
telegraphed to the Viceroy for the views of the Govern-
ment of India ; but at the same time he impressed on
them that they should bear in mind that it was essential

INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS 403

that a strictly non-committal attitude on aU points at issue
between China and Tibet should be observed.

The Viceroy replied on March 12* that it appeared
that all power at Lhasa had been taken by the Chinese
into their own hands. The only high official left could
not act without consulting the Chinese Resident. Reports
from Trade Agents stated that the Chinese did not allow
the Tibetans to deal with them direct. Various reports
as to Chinese aggressive and oppressive action were in the
possession of Government, but their authentication was
difficult. It appeared to be the case, however, that there
was no longer any Tibetan authority in existence, and it
was impossible to reconcile with established facts the state-
ments of the Chinese that the power and position of the
Dalai Lama had not diminished, and that no alterations
in internal administration were contemplated. Copies of
the correspondence that had passed between the Dalai
Lama and the Assistant Minister at Lhasa had been given
to Mr. Bell. This correspondence, in the genuineness of
which there was every reason to beheve, showed (1) that
the intention was that the Dalai Lama's temporal power
should be taken from him ; and (2) that the despatch of
only 1,000 troops was contemplated. Lama Buddhists and
Tibetans would not recognize that the Dalai Lama had
been deposed spiritually, and the latter would, therefore, be
a source of trouble to the Chinese. There was no reason
why the Dalai Lama should have our support, but
confidence would be restored on the frontier by his
restoration, and it would be proof of a desire to maintain
the status quo. The Suzerainty of China was denied by
Tibetan Ministers in conversation with Mr. Bell, but if
China wished to be friendly it might stiU be possible to
bring about a modus vivendi.

The Viceroy suggested that in any case our own
interests must be protected. There was unsettlement in
our frontier States. Rumours of location of a garrison
at Yatung and the number of troops in Tibet constituted,
in the opinion of the military authorities, a menace to
the peace of our border. The reform, not the abolition,

* Blue-book, IV., p. 205.

404 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

of the Tibetan Government was contemplated in the
edict of March 9, 1908. The Trade Regulations of 1908
had been violated in the following respects: Adminis-
tration and policing of trade-marts had, inconsistently with
Article III., been taken over by Chinese, and direct
dealings between our Agents and Tibetans had been pre-
vented. The Tibetan Government was recognized by the
Convention of 1904, which was recognized by Article I. of
the Convention of 1906. A large slice of Tibetan territory
had been lopped off by the Chinese, who had forcibly
occupied and dispossessed the Tibetans of Chiamdo, of
Troya, and of Tsa Kalho — provinces of Eastern Tibet. It
seemed necessary in any case, therefore, that the Chinese
Government should be required to give definite assurances
on the following points : (1) The limitation of the Chinese
garrison in Tibet to a number adequate for maintenance
of order internally. (2) The maintenance of a real
Tibetan Government. (3) The policing of the trade-
marts by Tibetans under Chinese officers, if necessary.
(4) The appointment at Lhasa of an Amban less hostile to
British interests. (5) The issue of instructions to Chinese
local officers to co-operate with British Trade Agents and
not to hinder our officers and the Tibetans from dealing
direct with one another. It might be advisable that at this
stage the Chinese Government should be informed that the
British Government must reserve the right to retain and
increase the escorts at Yatung and Gyantse, if necessary, in
view of the change in the status quo, unfriendliness of local
Chinese officers, and disturbed state of Tibet. Individual
Chinese might get out of hand, though it was improbable
that our agencies would be attacked by the Chinese.

Lord Morley, in forwarding these views of the Indian
Government to the Foreign Office, observed that it
appeared that the Chinese Government was deliberately
making its suzerainty over Tibet effective, and that the
result of its proceedings would be the substitution of a
strong internal administration for the feeble rule of the
Dalai Lama. It was necessary, therefore, to consider
how this change would affi^ct, in the first place, British-
Indian relations, commercial and political, with Tibet ;

LORD MORLEY'S VIEWS 405

and, secondly, the relations of the three States of Nepal,
Sikkim, and Bhutan, lying outside the administrative
border of British India, but under British control or pro-
tection, with the Government of India and with their
neighbour in Tibet. As to the first of these questions, it
seemed to be sufficient at this stage to take note of the
assurance of the Chinese Government that it would fulfil
aU treaty obligations affecting Tibet, and to inform it
that His Majesty's Government would expect that pend-
ing negotiations and representations on the subjects of
tariff. Trade Agents, monopolies, tea trade, and so forth,
would not be prejudiced by delay or by any change of
administration. The second question was, however, one
of greater urgency and importance, because delay might
create mistrust in the States concerned, and even en-
courage China to raise claims which would hereafter lead
to trouble. It seemed to be advisable that a clear intima-
tion should at once be made to China that the British
Government could not allow any administrative changes
in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal or
the rights of a State so closely alhed to the Government of
India. Sikkim had long been under British protection.
By a recent Treaty the foreign affairs of Bhutan were
under the control of the British Government. The com-
munication, therefore, which it was proposed to make to
the Chinese Government relative to Nepal might weU
cover the other two States on the borders of British India.
While, then, it was suggested that the Chinese Govern-
ment should be informed that the British Government
expected the Treaty obligations of Tibet and China in
respect to Tibet to be scrupulously maintained, and,
moreover, were prepared to protect the integrity and
rights of their allies, the States of Nepal, Sikkim, and
Bhutan, the Secretary of State for India proposed to
instruct the Viceroy to check any action on their part
which was not authorized by the Government of India.

Should China fail in performing her Treaty obligations
in Tibet after the receipt of the intimation, the breach of
agreement could form the subject of precise protest and
negotiation. But in the meantime it was undoubtedly

406 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIBETANS

desirable to press the Chinese Government to send strict
orders to their local officials to co-operate with our own
officers in a friendly manner, since without such friendly
relations (of which there had recently been a marked
absence), friction between the two Governments was
certain to arise. It might also be well, thought Lord
Morley, to impress upon the Chinese the inadvisability of
locating troops upon or in the neighbourhood of the
frontiers of India and the adjoining States in such numbers
as would necessitate corresponding movements on the part
of the Government of India and the rulers of the States
concerned. The Tibetans, though ignorant, were peace-
able people, and it was unlikely that a very large Chinese
force would be necessary for such simple police arrange-
ments as were contemplated by Article 12 of the Trade
Regulations.

Adopting these proposals. Sir Edward Grey tele-
graphed to Mr. Max Miiller on April 8, to make a repre-
sentation to the Chinese Government in their sense.

All we know further than this is that two battalions
of infantry, four guns, and some sappers have been sent by
us to the Sikkim frontier, to be ready, if necessary, to
proceed into Tibet to protect the Trade Agents. And so
the story ends much as when it began, except that whUe
formerly it was the Tibetans who were supposed to be the
most impenetrable and unsociable, it is now the Chinese
who are presenting the real obstacles to any reasonable
intercourse between India and Tibet.

CHAPTER XXIV

SOME CONCLUSIONS

The close of the long narrative of our efforts since 1773
to effect the single object of harmonizing our relations
with Tibet having now been reached, it may be useful to
draw here some practical conclusions from our past
experience which may be a help for future action. And
first I would make some observations on the agency
through which our intentions have been carried into effect.

On several occasions in the course of this narrative I
have referred to the relations of local officers with their
Provincial Governments, of these Local Governments with
the Supreme Government in India, and of the Indian
Government with the Imperial Government in England.
Since the days of Warren Hastings there has been a marked
tendency towards centralization. More and more control
has been exercised by London over Simla, by Simla over
the Provincial Governments, by them, again, over their
local officials. This tendency has been accentuated in the
last few years. It has never been more pronounced than
at the present time. And if the conduct of Tibetan affairs
since 1873 may be taken as an example — as I think it may
— there is not much evidence that it is producing satis-
factory results.

It has been said, indeed, that if ever we lose India it
will be in London. I am not of those who think we ever
shall lose India, for I have much too great a faitli in the
common sense and spirit of my countrymen. Nor do I say
that we are worse than other peoples in " trusting the
man on the spot." I think we are very much better. It
requires a really big people to give their representatives
rope ; and a big people we are, and in the main the

407

408 SOME CONCLUSIONS

British nation has supported its Viceroys, Governors and
their Agents better than any other nation have sup-
ported theirs, or we should not be in India now.

But of late the discretion and responsibility of the
Government of India have been most seriously diminished.
Secretaries of State, partly of their own initiative, and
partly because active bands of faddists exert a dispro-
portionately great influence upon them, while the more
sensible members of the House of Commons, on account of
their silence, exercise a disproportionately small influence,
have interfered more and more in even the details of
Indian administration. The system is no longer one of
selecting the best available men, and then supporting
them, on the assumption that in the unusual conditions
under which we govern India, they will rule it better
than anyone can from England. The system is now
becoming one of directing the Government from England
on lines which an ignorant British electorate is most
likely to approve. The result is a general weakening all
down the line. No one feels responsibility. And the
British elector, who has been held up to the EngUshman
in India as the man who ultimately controls his actions,
and who should, therefore, have the responsibility, simply
shrugs his shoulders and asks what India has to do with
liim.

And while British administrators in India thus have
less and less confidence placed in them, they on their part
have little cause to be placing increasing confidence in their
controllers and rulers. Those who control Indian affairs
from London have, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred,
never been in India. They are as a rule personally un-
acquainted with Indian conditions. And the Cabinet is
not composed of men with a wide and long experience of
Imperial affairs ; of Indian and Colonial, as well as English,
questions ; and of European and Asiatic diplomacy. It may
occasionally include an ex- Viceroy of India, but it never
includes a Colonial statesman, or an ex-Colonial Governor,
or an ex-Ambassador, much less an Anglo-Indian adminis-
trator. It is almost exclusively composed of men with
purely English Parliamentary experience, and a Minister is

DEFECTS IN OUR SYSTEM 409

put in control of India who has not even seen it from the
Avindow of a railway-carriage, or probably spoken to a
single Indian or Anglo-Indian in his life. Even when
there does happen to be available a politician who has
visited India and specially studied it, who, being a peer,
has naturally some sympathy with the aristocratic inclina-
tion of Indian methods of rule, and who, being a Liberal,
might be expected to infuse into any too aristocratic
methods a sufficiency of the English democratic spirit, he
is put (like Lord Crewe) to control Colonial affairs, while
another politician who is noted for his specially demo-
cratic inclinations, and whose knowledge of India is
purely literary, is put to control India. Such methods
may in practice produce very fair results, just as the
House of Lords does, on the whole, work remarkably
well. But better methods would produce better results.
By the present system the confidence of administrators
can never be secured, and for that reason alone it stands
in need of revision. The composition and action of the
House of Lords are now subject to criticism, because peers,
not being elected, are supposed to be out of touch with
the feeling of the people. But, after all, the peers do live
in Great Britain, they do know the country and the
people and the conditions to a very great extent ; and
if, knowing aU this, they do not yet possess the confidence
of the people, how much less can it be expected that
Englishmen in India could have any real confidence in
the present method of governing India from England ?
If the composition and methods of the House of Lords
need revision, how much more do the composition and
methods of the Imperial Cabinet need reform ?

Again, agents in India can hardly help feeling that
under the existing system less attention is paid to their
matured views than to the opinions of inexperienced
British electors. Not only is it that the latter are near,
while the former are distant, but also that the latter can
, turn the' London controllers of Indian affairs out of office,
while the former have to run the risk of being turned out
themselves. It stands to reason that the Indian Secretary
must be looking more to the will and wishes of the electors

410 SOME CONCLUSIONS

who put him where he is, and who may remove him, than
to the advice of the agents in India whom he controls, and
that he will be more influenced by the English agitator
than by the Anglo-Indian subordinate. Indian adminis-
trators may say that a particular course is necessitated by
local conditions. The Secretary of State will say that the
man in the street in England will not understand or give
his approval, and the Indian administrator will go by the
board without appeal. An English Member of Parlia-
ment, holding strong views on an Indian question contrary
to those held by the Secretary of State, may, by express-
ing them with sufficient force, help to remove a Secretary
of State for India from office, or at least make him abandon
or modify his policy. An Anglo-Indian administrator, if
he holds views in opposition to those of the Secretary of
State, will not damage the latter, but he may ruin his own
career, as Sir Bampfylde Fuller ruined his, though events
have shown his views to have been right. Under such
conditions, Englishmen in India cannot be expected to
have confidence in the present plan of ruling India directly
from England.

One very natural result of this system is a resort to
half-measures — deporting seditious agitators, and letting
them out again a few months afterwards ; allowing an
agent in Tibet, but not at the capital, only halfway to it,
where he runs every bit as much risk and has one-tenth
part of the practical effect.

Secretaries of State lecture the Indian Government
about the " wider view," the " larger Imperial interests,"
and so on ; but administrators in India have a suspicion
that, however broad the views of a Secretary of State may
be, they are probably not much longer than the distance
which separates him from the next General Election. In
any case, whether or no he is looking — as indeed he ought,
under the theory of our Constitution, to be looking — to the
next General Election, he cannot be expected to have the
same length of view as the Indian Government ; for he is,
after all, a bird of passage, in the India Office for a few
years and then not heard of there again. And as to the larger
Imperial interests, most British administrators are aware of

SUGGESTED REMEDIES 411

them, for they have been about the world more than
British politicians. They are well enough aware that
Indian considerations must be weighed in the balance with
other Imperial considerations, and that in the last resort it
is the British statesman who must decide. But what they
doubt is whether the full weight of the Indian considera-
tions is ever put into the Imperial scale. Since 1873
every sort of consideration has been given more weight
than the Indian in these Tibetan affairs, and the con-
sequence is that they still drag on in as unsatisfactory
a state now as they were thirty-seven years ago.

These are some defects of the present system, but
there is little use in criticizing if no remedy is suggested
for the supposed evil. The main remedy I would, with
all deference, suggest is that the Parliamentary control,
which must always exist, should be exercised, less by
means of meddlesome and mischievous questions, and
more by means of full debates, in which, on Indian affairs,
both Houses always show great sense and dignity and
restraint. Such debates, critical though they may be of
the work of British administrators, assist, encourage, and
educate rather than hamper them, and do not tend to
impair that responsibility which should be theirs if India
is to be well governed. They put faddists in their proper
place, and let rounded common sense and wide experience
in large affairs have their due influence. The British
public probably do not expect any more than this of their
Parliamentary representatives. In all likelihood they
would be quite willing to allow a greater freedom to their
representatives in India, and have no desire for their Par-
liamentary representatives, by incessant bombardment on
trifling points, to be putting such pressure on the Secretary *
of State as to encourage any natural inclination he may
already have to increased interference in the details of
Indian administration.

If this be really the wish of the British people, then
a much ampler latitude might be allowed to the Viceroy,
Lieutenant-Governors, and high Frontier Officers, and a

412 SOME CONCLUSIONS

greater deference be shown to their views. If agents
abuse this latitude, then they can be censured, as I was
censured, or punished in any way that is necessary. And
if the present men are not good enough to be entrusted with
responsibiUty, then means might be taken for sending out
better. Competitive examinations are not the only or
the best means of obtaining rulers for India. And there
is no reason why India should not be provided with just
as good men as go to Whitehall or Westminster. But
never can it be seriously believed that it is the wish of the
British people that the principle of trusting the man on
the spot be abandoned, or the sense of responsibility in
their agents damped down.

For the good working of this principle, which I would
here again remark is much more fully carried out by the
British Government, with all its imperfection of constitu-
tion, than by any other Governrhent in the world, there
must, however, be much more intimate relationship than
there is at present between these men and their principals
in England. The men in India and the politicians in
England must be better known to each other, and have
more confidence in one another. And it is upon this
point that I would make a few suggestions of a practical
nature.

Politicians who aspire to control the affairs of our most
complex Empire might, like our Royal Family, make an
effort at some periods of their lives to become personally
acquainted with the local conditions of the more im-
portant parts of the Empire. Communication is rapid
and easy nowadays, and a week in a railway-train through
India would be better than not seeing India at all. If
you have seen a man for a couple of minutes you under-
stand him, and, above all, take an interest in his actions,
more than if you had never even seen him. And if it is
impossible for all Secretaries of State to have visited
India before they come to the India Office, there does not
seem any inseparable impediment to a Secretary of State
visiting India during his term of office. There are many
and great objections, I know, but these surely cannot be
more numerous or more serious than are the objections to

PERSONEL INTERCOURSE 413

the present system. Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South
Africa benefited him and the Dominion, and the precedent
would be well worth consideration.

But if this is quite out of the question, the correspond-
ing idea of the Viceroy visiting England at least once in
his five years' term of service should not be so utterly im-
practicable. A swift cruiser would take him home or out
again in twelve days very easily, and the rest and the advan-
tages of personal conference would be of inestimable value.
The Agent-General in Cairo comes home every year.

More practicable and feasible, and probably more useful,
than either of these suggestions is that the India Office,
instead of being manned half by officials who have never
been to India and half by officials who will never go there
again, might be completely manned by officials who haA^e
both been to India and who will return there— men of the
Indian Service in active employ. At present it consists of
officials of the Home Civil Service and of retired Indian
officials. What is wanted is an ebb and flow — a strong,
fresh current running to and fro from England to India.
It is bad to keep men out in India too long at a time, and
it is bad to have a Secretary of State who knows nothing
about India surrounded by men who have either never
seen it or who have left it for good, A Secretary of State
would, moreover, if the India Office were fiUed with men
of the active Indian Service, have a better acquaintance
than he niow has with the personnel of the Indian Services ;
while, on their side, the latter would experience an infiltra-
tion of men who were acquainted with English conditions,
and of the especial difficulties and influences which beset
Secretaries of State in London.

Another direction in which improvement is possible is
in politicians in England making more effort to see men
serving in India who are home on leave. Lord Morley
has done far more in this direction than any other Secre-
tary of State, and his courtesy in this respect has been
much appreciated. His is a good precedent for other
Secretaries of State to follow and develop ; and if English
politicians could regard men of the Civil Service in India
as something more than clerks it would be well. A Lieu-

414 SOME CONCLUSIONS

tenant -Governor who had successfully ruled a great
province in India told me he was convinced they looked
upon him as a clerk, because they were always so " damned
polite " to him.

Especially at the present time, too, men who are
actually holding high positions in India should be taken
notice of and brought forward when they come to England.
The old East India Company used to take great pains in
this respect, realizhig the importance of their agents being
known among the best men in England, and haying the
opportunity of gaining their confidence, and realizing, too,
that for the efficient discharge of their duties in India they
should be armed with the prestige which high public recog-
nition in England gives. This will be a specially impor-
tant point in the time to come. From one cause and
another, the Service in India has been losing its prestige,
and this when, as at no previous time, it requires all the
prestige that is its rightful due. The abandonment of
Lord Curzon in his controversy with Lord Kitchener, and
of Sir Bampfylde Fuller in his efforts to suppress sedition
in Eastern Bengal at its rise, have been severe blows to
the Viceroyalty and Lieutenant-Governorships, which have
to be amended.

Lastly, there is scope for much fuller personal inter-
course between local officers and superiors in India itself
and between India and England. Facility of communica-
tion is not taken sufficient advantage of in this way.
To refer again to this case of Tibet. During all that time
occupied in the correspondence leading up to the Mission
an Indian official, thoroughly well posted in the local con-
ditions and with the views of the Government of India
upon them, might have been sent to Peking, St. Peters-
burg, and London, to put the Indian and local view before
our Ambassadors and the Home Government, to be
informed in return of the Chinese and Russian and
Imperial views, and to be the bearer of the final decision
thereon of the Imperial Government, which he could
explain with much greater effectiveness than is achieved
by letters and telegrams. An advantage, additional to the
better settlement of the actual question in hand, would be

OUR POLICY IN TIBET 415

that the Indian oflficial so employed would be gaining some
all-round experience, which would be of value on future
occasions.

By all these means that personal, intimate contact
will be increased which alone can beget mutual confi-
dence. At present men in India feel that they are
regarded with suspicion by English politicians, as if they
were guilty till they could prove themselves innocent.
No strong inspiration comes from England to them.
They have to carry on the greatest Imperial work that
any country has ever undertaken, chilled by distant
critics who know them not. These are conditions which
obviously call for improvement, and perhaps these sugges-
tions would go some way to this end, and render it more
possible for English politicians to place that trust in the
men on the spot, which is the bed-rock principle on which
England should carry on the government of her great
Dependency.

All this, however, is a matter of machinery, I have
touched on it first because it is, in my opinion, through
the machinery being of a defective type that the object of
our policy in Tibet has not been attained. It is now time
to examine the results of our efforts there since 1773.

The net result is that at last we find the Tibetans
anxious to be on neighbourly terms, and, indeed, to form
an alliance with us, but that the action of the Russians
on the one hand and of the Chinese on the other, together
with lukewarmness in England, stands in the way of our
being as intimate with the Tibetans as they now wish us
to be. It has proved in the result that the Tibetans are
not really the sechisive people we had believed. By
nature they are sociable and hospitable and given to
trade. They are jealous about their reUgion, but as long
as that is not touched they are ready enough for political
relationship, for social intercourse, and for commercial
transactions. The present obstacle to neighbourly inter-
course is the suspicion of the Chinese. There is some
reason to think that from the first they have instilled into

416 SOME CONCLUSIONS

the Tibetans the idea of keeping themselves secluded.
Anyhow, now they are quite evidently keeping us apart.
And any means we had of preventing the Chinese
insinuating themselves between us and the Tibetans
have been taken from us through the jealousy of the
Russians. Owing to this, we are not now in Chumbi and
we have not an agent at Lhasa. The Chinese fear we
may absorb Tibet and press them in Szechuan, and the
Russians fear a predominant influence with the Dalai
Lama might be used by us detrimentally to their Buddhist
subjects present and to be. Both, therefore, stand in the
way of that close relationship with the Tibetans which is
now desired even more by them than by us.

This in brief is the situation at which we have arrived,
and in drawing conclusions as to any future action we
must first make our minds clear as to what we want in
Tibet.

Many say that we do not want anything at all. They
argue that the Tibetans live at the back of a stupendous
range of snowy mountains, and we had much better leave
them alone. Some go so far as to say that it was actually
wicked of us forcibly to enter Tibet in 1904. The Mission
was styled in the House of Commons " an ignoble little
raid," and even the then leader of the Opposition, after its
successful conclusion, said that it had " lowered our
prestige." Before, then, I proceed to examine what we
actually do want I will deal with this question as to
whether we really want anything at all, and whether
there was anything inherently wicked in the I^hasa
Mission of 1904.

This idea of the immorality of in any way coercing a
people like the Tibetans is, I beheve, largely based on the
assumption lying unconsciously at the back of people's
minds that Tibet is as distant and as much separated from
India as it is from England, that it is some remote and
inaccessible country into which no one but meddlesome
adventurers should want to enter. And they think that
for us to go out of our way deliberately to interfere with
a people who only wanted to be left alone was sheer
wanton wickedness, and nothing else — except, perhaps,

NECESSITY FOR INTERCOURSE 417

inane folly and wastefulness of human life and good
money. This view proceeds, I am convinced, from the
quite intelligible lack of appreciation by those in England
of the actual conditions prevailing on the spot. For the
men who act on the confines of the Empire in this
supposedly evil way are, after all, kith and kin with
themselves. They were laorn and bred in England, and
are probably not more naturally wicked than an ordinary
Member of ParUament.

Now, I have shown that, however remote Tibet is
from England, it is not remote from India, but, on the
contrary, adjoins and marches with India for 1,000 miles.
And if Russia, whose border nowhere comes within hun-
dreds of miles, can yet take such a practical interest in
the country as to protest time after time at each little
move we make in relation to the Tibetans, surely there is
some probability that we also have a necessity for interest-
ing ourselves in it ? If the Russians as well as ourselves
take practical interest in Tibet, and feel it necessary to
have some fairly sharp diplomatic correspondence about
it, the probability is that any action we take is not merely
inspired by inquisitiveness, idle curiosity, or love of
adventure, but that animating this interest must be some
real practical necessity.

What that necessity is must, I think, be evident to
those who have read the previous pages. Though it is
the fact that Tibet is divided from India by the lofty
Himalayas, it is also the fact that there is connection and
intercourse between the inhabitants of the two countries.
Tibet is not isolated like an oceanic island. The inhabi-
tants of India and the inhabitants of Tibet have always
had relation and intercourse with one another. And it is
the necessity for regularizing and harmonizing the inter-
course, and for putting it on a business-like footing, that
has been the cause of our interest in the country.

Let me bring the point a little nearer home. Sup-
posing there were in the far Highlands of Scotland a
people who had drawn their religion from England, who
always looked with veneration upon and made pilgrim-
ages to the sacred cities of Canterbury and York ; who

41S SOME CONCLUSIONS

were accustomed to come and trade in Perthshire, and
occasionally in Glasgow and Dundee ; who pastured their
flocks and herds along the Grampians ; and who inter-
married with the people in the Lowlands; and, supposing
that this people said they wanted to keep to themselves
in their own country in the far Highlands, and not admit
anyone from outside, we would say that we could sympa-
thize and understand such a wish, though it certainly
seemed somewhat one-sided, considering they had all the
advantage of coming into the Lowlands of Scotland and
into England whenever they liked. For the benefit of
these Lowlanders and Englishmen we might send some
emissaries to the Highlanders, as Hastings sent Bogle
and Turner to the Tibetans to try by amicable methods
to get them to admit our traders, to the reciprocal advan-
tage of both. But if they resented them strongly, we
should probably say to ourselves that as long as they did
not worry us we would not worry them, and would leave
them in their isolation in the Highlands.

But if they did worry us, would not the whole situa-
tion be changed? If 10,000 of them came down one
day and built a fort in the Perth Hills and refused to
move, would not that change our ideas as to leaving
them alone ? And if, in addition, after they had refused
to receive a letter from us, they sent an emissary with
letters to the German Emperor and his Chancellor,
would not that yet further change our ideas as to respect-
ing their seclusion? The Chancellor might explain that
the letter to him was merely to inquire after his health,
and that the business with the German Emperor was of a
"purely religious nature"; but we should, all the same, think
it was about time to be bestirring ourselves to come to
some practical understanding with these inhabitants of the
Highlands. We should say to them : " We do not in the
least mind your keeping yourselves absolutely to your-
selves, though we think it inhospitable and unneighbourly ;
but now you have begun to worry us and to have com-
munications with our rivals, we must come to a clear
understanding with you."

But supposing we found it impossible to discover any-

MORALITY OF INTERVENTION 419

one to make an understanding with, and that the emissary
we had sent to them, at the first place inside their border,
accompanied with a just sufficiently large escort to protect
him in venturing into these wild regions, could find no one
to communicate with, and had his letters returned, would
the proper thing then have been to bring him back home,
and say that as we could do nothing further except
by using force — and the use of force was wicked — we
must give up the whole business, not mind how many
letters were written to the German Emperor, and whether
the Highlanders did exclude our traders, and occupy our
pasture-lands, and throw down our boundary pillars ? We
might say that the game was not worth the candle, that
the coming to an understanding was not worth all the
expense and trouble of sending our emissary by force into
the very heart of the Highlands. But can it really be
contended that there would be anything unjustifiable,
wicked, or immoral in increasing our emissary's escort and
sending him still farther into the Highlands, with orders
that, by the use of force, if necessary, he must proceed till
he could find someone of authority sufficient for us to
make a lasting understanding with him, so that this
intercourse with our neighbours might for the future be
properly regulated, and any risk of their entering into
undesirable connection with possible rivals be removed ?

There surely would be nothing wicked in that. Yet
that is precisely similar to what we in India did in Tibet,
and for which we were accused of lowering British
prestige.

Allowing, however, that the proceedings were strictly
in order as far as their moraUty went, it might still be
contended that by using force we should defeat our ends
— we should make enemies when we wanted to make
friends. This argument was, indeed, used in Parhament.
" You cannot make friends by force," it was said. And
nothing would seem more obvious to the ordinary Briton,
who had never left his island. But, contrary to expecta-
tions, we not only can make friends by force, but we
actually did. The Tibetans were more friendly with us
after we had fought our way to Lhasa than they were

420 SOME CONCLUSIONS

before, and, still more extraordinary, while they invaded
our territory when we countermanded the Macaulay
Mission, they came and sought our alliance after we had
sent a Mission to Lhasa by force. When we had really
got to close quarters with the Tibetans at Lhasa itself,
when they had seen that their preconceived ideas about us
were false ; that, with all our power, we had moderation ;
that, fighters though we Avere, we yet treated their leading
men with poUteness and respect — with far greater respect,
indeed, than they received from their fellow-Asiatic
suzerain ; that we interfered in no way with their religion ;
that their traders could do an excellent business with us,
and their peasantry got fine prices for their produce and
plenty of employment as well, they entirely reversed their
attitude towards us, and, if I had held up my little finger,
would have gladly come under our protection.

This being the case, I hope the idea that it was either
wicked or needless to send a Mission to Lhasa will be no
longer entertained, and that it will be recognized that in
practice it is impossible to leave the Tibetans alone, how-
ever much we might like to. If, then, relationship of some
kind has to subsist between India and Tibet, what we
clearly want is that that relationship should be as har-
monious as possible. We want to buy the Tibetans'
wool, and to sell them our tea and cotton goods. And,
apart from questions of trade, we want to feel sure that
there is no inimical influence growing up in Tibet which
might cause disturbance on our frontier. That is the
sum total of our wants. The trade is not of much value
in itself, but, such as it is, is worth having. We have
no interest in annexing Tibet, and we have definitely
declared against either annexation or protectorate ; but
we most certainly do want quiet there and the removal
of any influence which would cause disquiet. Disorder
begets disorder. When Lhasa is unsteady Nepal and
Bhutan are restless. What we want, then, is orderliness
in Tibet and some means of preventing disorder from ever
arising.

Before the Lhasa Mission, Russian influence — not
necessarily exerted with deliberate intention by the Russian

CHINESE ATTITUDE 421

Government, but existent nevertheless — was the disturb-
ing factor ; now it is Chinese influence, exerted beyond its
legitimate limits and with imprudent harshne'ss. Eitherof
these causes results in a feeling of uneasiness, restlessness,
and nervousness along our north-eastern frontier, and
necessitates our assembling troops and making diplomatic
protests, and might require us to permanently increase
our garrison on this frontier. That is the practical point
we have to meet.

Inimical Kussian influence we have no longer any
cause to fear. Not only has Russia assured us that she
has no intention or desire to interfere politically in Tibet,
but the whole set of her policy is now towards Eastern
Europe rather than towards India, So altered, indeed, is
the situation that in future years I should say that there
would be an increasing likelihood of her acting with us
rather than thwarting us in Tibet, and I believe the day
will come when British and Russian Consuls wiU be sittiag
together in Lhasa, as in Kashgar, Mukden, and dozens of
other places in the Chinese Empire.

There remains the need of preventing Chinese influence
being exercised in such a fashion as to cause disorder.
Chinese influence in Tibet, as long as it is neighbourly to
us and not irritating to the Tibetans, we have no cause to
mind ; it is, indeed, what for years we tried to believe
existed. So we never questioned China's suzerainty over
Tibet, and in any dealings with the Tibetans their suze-
rainty always has been and would be recognized. It is of
many hundred years' standing, and as long as it is not
used tnimically to us, or in such a tactless way as to
cause disorder on our frontiers, we may be very well satis-
fied that it exists. The Chinese are good neighbours, and
in the sense of any invasion of India by way of Tibet,
we have no need to fear a Yellow Peril. We have
nothing to complain of, therefore, if the Chinese were
established as effective suzerains in Tibet, able to pre-
serve order there, and co-operating with us in a friendly
manner. A reference to the account of our negotiations
at Lhasa will show that throughout I worked with the
Chinese Resident, and never directly with the Tibetans,

422 SOME CONCLUSIONS

to the exclusion of the Chinese, and when I suspected
an inclination of the Tibetans thus to exclude them, I
addressed both Chinese and Tibetans together. Further,
on leaving Lhasa I presented the Resident with the eight
or ten repeating-rifles I had among my articles for pres-
entation, and I gave no rifles to the Tibetans. My
estimate of the situation was that any influence we had
should be exerted to sustain the authority and position
of the Resident. Our presence in Chumbi would give us
the means of exercising physical pressure more readily
than the Chinese ever could ; the presence of the Chinese
I at Lhasa itself would enable them to exert personal and
moral pressure more readily than we could. By working
together we could keep the Tibetans in order. They are
/'exceedingly childish and foolish, besides being excessively
obstinate in practical affairs. And if we and the Chinese
jworked together, as the Amban and I had done at Lhasa
in 1904, we should, I thought, be able to preserve har-
monious relations between all three of us — Tibetans,
Chinese, and British alike.

But when Chinese action is such as to create unrest
instead of preserving order, when it upsets aU the border
people and necessitates our assembling troops to keep the
frontier steady, then we have a need to intervene. And
this has been the nature of Chinese action lately. Except
the Afghans, I have not known any people quite so tactless
and provocative as the Chinese in dealing with a subject
race. Their haughtiness and the hatred they inspired were
remarked on a century ago by Manning. Long years of
slackness, indifference, and supercilious disdain of the
people, for whom no attempt is made to do anything, are
every now and then broken by some sudden and violent
effort. Chao Erh-feng's methods have formed the subject
of an impeachment by his own countrymen, and apart
from the question whether he used treachery or beheaded
prisoners, his regulations to the Tibetans of Batang to
adopt the queue and to wear trousers, the measures he
ordered for the breaking down of Lamaism, and his annexa-
tion of Derge,were all calculated to rouse the whole Lamaist
world. No one is more fully aware than myself that the

OUR ATTITUDE TO CHINA 423

priestly power required to be broken, for it had become
a curse and drag to the people. What I doubt is whether
the Chinese have gone the right way about it. To me it
seems they are more likely to have roused rumblings
among the Tibetans and Mongolians for many years to
come rather than have secured peace. Our own victories
had reduced the Tibetans of Tibet proper to order. The
recalcitrant Dalai Lama had been obliged to fly, and the
Chinese were masters of the situation ; and, especially
after we had withdrawn from Chumbi, they had nothing
to fear from us. That, even with these advantages, they
should have pursued this active pohcy in Tibet, driven the
Dalai Lama from Lhasa, turned the suzerainty into
sovereignty, and practically transformed Tibet from a
native State into a Chinese province, indicates to me that
they are wanting in pohtical sagacity, however much
diplomatic acumen they may possess, and that their action
is much more likely to cause disorder than order on our
frontier.

The problem reduces itself to this, then — that we have
to find some means of preventing Chinese action causing
disorder. Now, though I disagree with our pohcy of the
last few years, I recognize that it does now give us a
strong position. We have been most accommodating to
the Chinese, and especially in regard to the evacuation of
the Chumbi Valley, when the conditions under which they
might claim evacuation had not been fulfilled. If we
erred, it was in the direction in which we always should
err — in the direction of conciliation and broad reasonable-
ness. We have, therefore, some ground to stand on. So
standing, we have to work back to the situation there was
at Lhasa in 1904, when Yutai was Resident, and before
Tang and Chang and Chao ever appeared upon the
scene.

It is conceivable that this present burst of the
Chinese will not last long. It is expensive, and the
Chinese cannot afford unnecessary expenditure. What
they want, we may conjecture, is, above everything, to
" save their face." The Tibetans had been flouting them
for years, and the Chinese wanted to kick them. They

424 SOME CONCLUSIONS

now have kicked them, and their faces are saved. What
we have to do is to make them realize that to proceed any
farther will obviously bring them to unpleasant contact
with us. It might conceivably drive us into going to
Lhasa again. We have been there once, and could go
there again. We ought, therefore, to be able to make
the Central Government see that their best chance of
quiet on their frontier — which is, after all, even more
essential to them than to us — is to send to Lhasa a
Resident of the Yutai type rather than of the Chang and
Chao description. As long as the Chinese showed them-
selves wilhng to co-operate with us, we have for a long
series of years shown ourselves ready to co-operate with
them, and we are just as interested in their faces being
properly saved as they are. And if they would send a
Resident with the general hint to " get on " with us, there
would be quiet in Tibet without their dignity being
interfered with. On our side, to insure smooth working,
we might send one or other of the officers on the frontier
to Peking or to Chengtu to talk matters over with our
representatives in China, find out where the shoe is
pinching, and acquire hints as to the methods of dealing
with the Chinese to avoid friction. Or a Consular officer
from China might visit our trade-marts and give the
Indian Government suggestions. Anyhow, ia these or
similar ways we might do what we can to remove any
unnecessary local causes of friction while we are press-
ing the Central Government for a more concUiatory
manner to be observed in the Chinese officials sent to
Tibet.

As regards the Tibetans, our difficulty wUl always be
to keep up direct relations with them without interfering
with the legitimate and desirable authority which the
Chinese should always possess. The Chinese forfeited
their right to be the sole medium of communication
with the Tibetans by their total inability to get them to
withdraw from Sikkim in 1886, and to induce them to
observe the Treaty which they asked us to make Avith

TIBETAN TITLE TO SUPPORT 425

them on behalf of the Tibetans in 1890 ; and we acquired
the right to deal directly with the Tibetans by the ex-
penditure we were put to in 1888 and in 1904.

These direct relations, within the assigned limits, we
should studiously maintain. The touch and contact may
be light, but it should never be allowed to drop, for we
have many instances of bad blood and estrangement
arising through dropping a people and letting them lapse
back into isolation once we have been forced into
relationship with them. The Tibetans want to preserve
what they themselves caU the right of direct relations
with us, and it is to our interest to preserve it.

How far the Tibetans are entitled to our support is a
more dehcate question. We who fought against them
would probably like to go farther in this direction than those
who have had no personal contact with them. We had
a square stand-up fight, and we made friends afterwards.
We should always, therefore, like to see a guiding and
protecting hand extended to them. And what especially
rankles with us is that, when we had knocked them over,
and while they were still down, the Chinese should have
proceeded to kick them. While the Tibetans were strong
the Chinese did nothing. Even after they were down
the Chinese did not touch them while we were about ;
only after we had left Chumbi did the kicking commence.
And I do not myself see why we should have regarded
the process so placidly.

One thing, however, we can stand up for is that
an effective Tibetan Government should still be main-
tained— a Government with whom we could, when
necessary, treat in the manner provided for in the Treaties
with the Tibetans and Chinese. This, on Lord Morley's
suggestion, was what Sir Edward Grey pressed on the
Chinese Government in February, 1910, reminding them,
at the same time, that the Lhasa Treaty made with
the Tibetans was confirmed by them, and that, in con-
sequence, we had a right to expect that the Tibetan
Government should be maintained. The Chinese Central
Government have themselves assured us that they have
no desire to interfere with local autonomy in Tibet, and

426 SOME CONCLUSIONS

for the preservation of order upon our frontier it is highly
desirable that we should see that these intentions are
carried out. As 1 have admitted, the Tibetans do require
being kept in control up to a certain limit. They have
been very recalcitrant, and must expect to be brought
to book. But when the Chinese go beyond merely keep-
ing order, when they drive the Dalai Lama from his
capital, depose him, seize his Government, garrison the
whole country, and direct the administration themselves,
then they simply cause a general discontent and uneasi-
ness upon our frontier, and, from the point of view of
expediency alone, we are then justified in intervening, as
we intervened in Egypt when the Turks tried to increase
their degree of suzerainty beyond its normal limits.

As to the method of intervention, my own view is
decidedly in favour of sending a British officer to Lhasa
itself. The Tibetans have actually asked for this to be
done, so there is no difficulty on that score, and it is
within the Chinese Empire, so the Chinese, if they wish to
be considered in any way a civilized Power, should have no
objection on their side. It is at Lhasa that a British officer
could most effisctively explain to the Chinese the limits
beyond which it is impossible for us to countenance their
proceeding, and it is there also that he could best impress
the Tibetans of the bounds within which alone we can have
relationship with them, or render them support. If such
an officer could find it feasible to visit Peking and
London before proceeding to Lhasa, he ought to be able
to put Tibetan affairs upon a footing adapted to all the
interests concerned. And as to risk, if we keep an officer
at Gyantse we might as well send one to I^hasa.

Whether this is done or no we ought, in my view, to
alter our whole attitude to the Tibetan question. Instead
of expecting to secure peace by shrinking from having
anything to do with the people, we should rather put our-
selves forward to acquire increased intimacy. We should
seek to secure quiet by the more effisctive and certain
method of deliberately making use of every means we have
of keeping up and increasing contact with the Tibetans.
We have given the one line three great trials, and it has

ADVANTAGES OF INTIMACY 427

failed. We have given the other hne three trials, and
on each occasion it has succeeded. All the forbearance
and patience which w^e showed in countermanding the
despatch of Macaulay's Mission, and in trusting to the
consideration of the Chinese and Tibetans, only led to
the Sikkim campaign. Similar forbearance after 1888
merely led to the armed Mission of 1904. And the desire
to have as little as possible to do with Tibet since 1904
has, after all, resulted in the reassembling of troops upon
our frontier and protests to Peking. I am not contend-
ing that no forbearance, moderation, and patience should
be shown. My own proceedings are good enough testi-
mony of my belief in the efficacy of these qualities. My
contention is that there must be moderation even in
moderation, and forbearance even in forbearing, and that
the obstinate determination to have nothing, or as little
as possible, to do with Tibet has brought on exactly
what we wanted to avoid. On the other hand, when
we have gone forward and made efforts to get in touch
with the Tibetans, to understand them and explain
ourselves to them, a more settled state has always
resulted. After Bogle's and Turner's Missions in the
eighteenth century, and after the Mission of 1904, there
was a perceptibly better feeling between us and the
Tibetans, all tending to that orderliness on our frontier
which is what we most desire. The closer contact and
more intimate touch, besides being the more humane
method, diminishes rather than increases the risk of
trouble. As a case in point, I consider that if we had
had a representative at Lhasa this year, or even if our
agent at Gyantse had been able to proceed to Lhasa, the
present trouble need not have arisen. Knowing what
British officers are by their personal influence able to
accomplish, I believe that if Major O'Connor, or Major
Gurdon, or Major Dew, or one or other of a dozen similar
officers who are to be found in India, had been at Lhasa
last winter, he would have been able to nip this trouble in
the bud. And this not by giving the Tibetans out-and-
out support against their legitimate suzerain, but by
telling them frankly what the limits were beyond which it

428 SOME CONCLUSIONS

was quite impossible for them to expect support from us,
the Russians, or anyone else ; and by similarly impressing
upon the Chinese that there is a point at which we should
be bound to protest if they attempted to go beyond it.
He would have been the friend of the Tibetans, and he
would have been the friend of the Chinese ; and as friends
of both he would have made them friends with one
another.

I am, then, for a forward policy in Tibet as elsewhere,
though by forward I do not mean an aggressive and
meddlesome policy. I mean rather one which looks
forward into the future, and shows both foresight and
forethought — a pohcy which is active, mobile, adaptive,
and initiative. I imply a policy which recognizes that
great civilized Powers cannot by any possibility per-
manently ignore and disregard semi-civilized peoples on
their borders, but must inevitably establish, and in time
regularize, intercourse with them, and should therefore
seize opportunities of humanizing that intercourse, and, by
promoting neighbourly association, minimize that risk of
war which isolation, aloofness, and estrangement, invariably
bring about. It is because we are islanders that we are
such inveterate upholders of isolation. But by so doing
we are working against the grain of the world, and must
indubitably suffer in the long-run.

If I might personify the spirit of such a forward
policy, I would choose the personality of the late King
Edward. As he drew England out of her " splendid
isolation," so, would I urge, should we be brought out of
our Indian isolation. And the means he employed in
Europe are equally applicable to Asia. At the bottom of
all would be the same broad, generous humanity, great-
heartedness, and wealth of sympathy ; there would be the
same tactful vigilance and the unceasing efforts to know
our neighbours and to give them opportunities of knowing
us. There would be the same staunch loyalty to friends,
and, above all, there would be that same courage and
initiative which prompted King Edward, in his first State

A FORWARD POLICY 429

visit to Paris, to go in among the French people, to
dispel the hostility which existed, and to win his way to
their hearts by the sheer grace of his personahty.

This is the forward policy I would urge for Tibet, as
for the frontier generally — far-seeing initiative to control
events, instead of the passivity which lets events control
us ; the use of personality in place of pen and paper ; and
the substitution of intimacy for isolation.

CHAPTER XXV

A FINAL REFLECTION

" That strange force which has so often driven the
English forward against their will appears to be in opera-
tion once more," wrote the Spectator in May, 1904 ; " it
is certain that neither the British Government nor the
British people wished to go to Lhasa."

This reiflection was criticized by other journals at the
time as savouring of hypocrisy. One paper said that
no mention was made of the Viceroy, and that it was
obvious that "the advance was a perfectly gratuitous
move on the part of Lord Curzon." Another leading
London paper attributed the whole movement to "the
designs of the little group of intriguing officials " ; it said
that "the raid was conceived and engineered as a part
of the forward policy which has always been the peril of
India and of the Empire," and added that it had been
" based upon the most trivial and factitious excuses ever
invented by designing bureaucrats."

This matter is worth going into. Bureaucrats, of
whom presumably I was one, are only too painfully
aware that they have not a tithe of the power which is
attributed to them. They certainly have not the means
of making the whole British Government and British
people act against their wUl. I sometimes wish they had.
To attribute to them such miraculous power is as shallow
as to believe that the Lamas exercise their hold over
Tibetans and Mongols only by trickery and chicanery.
Bureaucrats and priests must have something far more
powerful behind them than intrigues and trickery. The
question is. What is it ? What does impel us ? Is there

430

BUREAUCRATIC DESIGNS? 431

really, as the Spectator suggested, some strange force
driving us forward ? and if so, whither is it driving us ?

These questions are not applicable to the Tibetan
affair alone, but to the British Empire generally ; and not
only to the British Empire, but to the Russian Empire,
the Chinese Empire, the Japanese Empire ; to the French
in Tongking and Annam, Algeria and Tunis ; to the
Americans in the Philippines, the Germans in Asia Minor,
the Austrians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are of
fundamental importance, and go to the very root of things.
They are therefore worth examination by so practical a
people as ourselves.

In all these cases where one country advanced into
the territory of another the forward movement has been
attributed to the intrigues of bureaucrats or the crafty
designs of scheming politicians. If the Germans advance
to Paris, the action is attributed to the Machiavellian
designs of Bismarck ; if the Austrians openly declare what
is already the accomplished fact of their sovereignty over
Bosnia, Baron von Ahrenthal is believed to have deliber-
ately schemed some devilment ; if the French attempt to
assert a predominance in Morocco, Delcass^ is accused of
plotting against Germany ; if the British laboriously
straighten out the affairs of Egypt, Lord Cromer is said
to be designing to estabUsh a permanent occupation of
the country ; and if we advance to Lhasa, Lord Curzon
is accused of bureaucratic designs upon Tibet.

To take one very noteworthy case, the German
invasion of France in 1870. To this day the action is
ascribed to the deliberate designs of Prince Bismarck, and
the story of his alteration of the Ems telegram is regarded
as a proof positive of his set design heartlessly to make
war on France. Yet quite recently there has appeared in
the " Reminiscences of Carl Schurz," the American states-
man, who was originally a German subject and revo-
lutionist of 1848, the account of a very remarkable
interview* he had with Bismarck before the Franco
German War. In a tone quite serious, grave, and almos
solemn, Bismarck said to Schurz : " Do not believe that I

* " Reminiscences of Carl Schurz,'' vol. iii., p. 272.

432 A FINAL REFLECTION

love war. I have seen enough of war to abhor it. The
terrible scenes I have witnessed harass my mind. I shall
never consent to a war which is avoidable, much less seek
it. But this war with France will surely come. It wiU
be forced upon us by the French Emperor." The Ems
telegram was " edited," but no mere editing of a telegram
by a bureaucrat could by itself have produced a war, much
less a victorious war. We read that when King William
returned from Ems to Berlin, he was quite stupefied by
the outburst of popular enthusiasm which greeted him
from every side, and gradually came to see that it was in
truth a national war which the people needed and craved
for. What Bismarck did was simply to express and
personify the feelings of the people. And in a recent
work by a French writer a letter by Napoleon III. is men-
tioned, in which he admitted that the French Govern-
ment had been the aggressor in 1870.

So far as the British are concerned, it is an undeniable
fact that we have over and over again been forced forward
against our dehberate wish and intention. Our presence
in India is the best possible example. There could not
by any means have been a deliberate intention on the
part of the inhabitants of an island in the North Sea to
establish an Empire over 200,000,000 people at the other
end of the world, at a time when they could only be
reached by a six months' voyage round the Cape, and
when the islanders were engaged in a life-and-death
struggle with their powerful neighbours across the
Channel. " International considerations," the " wider pur-
view," the " interests of the Empire as a whole," should in
allconscience have prevented the English from establishing
their rule in India. And yet, in spite of all these con-
siderations, in spite of peremptory orders from England,
in spite of Governor after Governor being sent out to stop
any further aggressions, English rule did extend over
India. The British Government and the British people
never intended, never even wanted, to supplant the
Moghul Emperors. They tried their very best, from
motives of clean, sheer self-interest, to leave the Sikhs in
the Punjab alone, just as they are now trying desperately

SOMETHING BEHIND BUREAUCRACY 433

to leave the Afghans and frontier tribes alone. But yet
they supplanted the Moghuls at Delhi and annexed the
Punjab.

It is absurd to put all this down to scheming bureau-
crats. There must have been something bigger than
bureaucrats behind it all. And in the case of Tibet,
though the advance to Lhasa was undoubtedly due to a
very large extent to Lord Curzon's strenuous advocacy,
and without that would not have taken place for some
years later, yet it is a clear absurdity to suppose that his
words alone, or his words, supported only by the opinion of
Mr. White, myself, and a few other bureaucrats, would
have been able to prevail against the deliberate wish and
intention of the Cabinet in England, then faced by an
opposition which the subsequent General Election showed
had the great bulk of public opinion behind it. Lord
Curzon is a man of great force and abUity, and a most
strenuous advocate of any cause he takes up, but even he
could not make a British Cabinet reverse their opinion
unless he had some strong compelling force behind
him.

Or, again, take the case of Lord Morley and Sir
Edward Grey in this matter of Tibet, No one could have
desired less than they did to intervene in Tibet. They
had come into office supported by an enormous majority
in the country — a majority which had had the very
question of Tibet before them. They had to fear nothing
from opposition in Parliament or in the country. They
had shown themselves most amenable and compliant to
Chinese wishes and Chinese methods. We had a right to
say that the Tibetans should pay the indemnity, but we
forebore to press this point, as the Chinese undertook to
pay it on their behalf. We had a right to occupy the
Chumbi Valley till the trade-marts had been effi2ctively
opened for three years. The trade - marts were not
effectively opened — our Agent reported, indeed, that they
were effectively closed — but again we did not want
to press the point, and the Chumbi VaUey, our sole
material guarantee for the observance of the Treaty, was
evacuated. We also engaged in a definite Treaty " not

434 A FINAL REFLECTION

to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the adminis-
tration of Tibet." Even travellers such as Sven Hedin
we refused to allow across our border into Tibet. Every-
thing we could do to avoid interference and irritation
we did. And every sign of intriguing official had dis-
appeared from India. Lord Curzon had left, Mr. White
and I had retired. Captain O'Connor was in Persia, and
there was a new Foreign Secretary. Yet just as many
troops as accompanied the Mission at the start were moved
to the frontier ready to advance into Tibet at any time.
If men like Lord Morley and Sir Edward Grey so act,
may it not be inferred that bureaucrats also are carried
along against their will by some strange force ?

To attribute these forward movements merely to the
designs of bureaucrats is, then, to take but a shallow view.
Single men of great force and ability and httle knots of
men can do a great deal, but to accomplish anything big
they must have a solid backing of some kind behind them.
They may, as it were, accentuate an impulse and carry it
forward a stage or two farther than without them it would
have gone. But unless they have this propulsion from
behind they can accomplish nothing. That great men
are not only the creators, but the creatures, of their
time is now a truism. Born at any other period than
the French Revolution, Napoleon might have been no
greater than Lord Roberts or Lord Kitchener. Born
in the Revolution, Cecil Rhodes might have been a
Napoleon.

The overwhelming probability is that there is some
strange force working in the affairs of men, and when
British Governments and the British people are driven
along against their will it is more reasonable to attribute
this phenomenon, not to the designs and intrigues of a
few officials, but to some inward compulsion from the
very core of things. The paragraph in the Spectator
must have been either written or inspired by Mr. Mere-
dith Townsend, then its co-editor and author of "Asia
and Europe," a man who had lived in India, who had
made a life -long study of Asiatic poUtics, and who
honestly did not like the idea of advancing to Lhasa.

THE INHERENT IMPULSE 435

When such a man wrote of the action of a strange force
the matter is worth close examination.

Intrinsically, there is nothing improbable or uimatural
in the idea. Individually, we all feel ourselves at times
in the possession of some unknown power. We are often
carried along by an irresistible impulse in spite of ourselves.
Each of us must at some time or other in his life have felt
that within him which will not let him rest, but impels to
expression. Everyone must have experienced deep within
him a great source of power which ever and anon comes
welling up in forceful spiritual fountains. Some inner
necessity compels us onward — longings, dreams, aspira-
tions, greater than can ever be satisfied coming surging up
from the inmost depths of our beings.

This internal force which probably most of us indi-
vidually feel to be within ourselves we also feel must be
working in others around us. And we have the further
feeling that we are not each of us separate and isolated
geysers, but are connected together and impelled by some
common interior, hidden, urge and impulse. Each of
us is a living centre of action, but we aU draw from some
one original source and spring of being. Deep in the
heart of things, inherent in the very life itself, we feel
there is an indwelling eternal energy or vital impulse
—the " life-force " of Bernard Shaw ; the " potent, felt,
interior command " of Whitman ; the " ^lan vital " of
Bergson ; the " impulse from the distance of our deepest,
best existence " of Matthew Arnold ; surging ever upward
and outward, and straining to express itself through our
personalities.

To many of the deepest thinkers this is of all things
the most real — to some it is the only thing that is real.
The solid mountains may be merely an aspect or appear-
ance of the true reality behind. But to many this " great
world-force, energizing through Nature " ; this " creative
and urging principle of the world " ; this unseen cosmic
impulse ; this indwelling spirit pervading every human
being, and ever striving to unfold itself; this pulse and
motive, "the fibre and the breath," is the one certainty,
the one genuine reality.

436 A FINAL REFLECTION

We may, then, very safely assume that there actually
is a strange force driving us on. The highest intelligence
affirms that it is so, and intuition, a stiU higher guide,
confirms the view. The practical question is : What is
the direction in which it is driving us ?

It has been expressed in various ways — as harmony, as
freedom, as the union of all with all, as unity in multi-
phcity and multiphcity in unity. The direction in which
this impulse is believed to press is towards fuller in-
dividualization and completer association. Each is driven
to express his own individuaUty more completely, but he
equally feels impelled to associate others more closely
with him. There is a tendency towards the balancing
between individualization and association, till the indi-
viduals become more and more free and perfect individuals,
but only as they become more and more closely united in
harmonious association. And, according to McTaggart,
the closer the unity of the whole, the greater will be the
individuality of the parts, and at the same time the more
developed the individuality the closer the unity ; the
impulse may be towards greater differentiation, but it is
not to separation or opposition, and our harmony with
our fellow-beings will always be more fundamentally real
than our opposition to them. Towards isolation, un-
sociability, or dissociation, there are no signs of the im-
pulse tending. It seems to be all in the opposite direction.

And perhaps it is here that we may find the true
reason why, as the Spectator observed, we Enghsh have
so often been driven forward against our own will. It is
when we have found ourselves in contact with disorder
or repugnance to association that we have been so often
compelled to intervene. We find by practical experi-
ence that the affairs of the world will not work while
there is disorder about. We find that except on ocean
islands there can in practice be no such thing as real
isolation. And experience proves to us ia the everyday
working of human affairs that in one way or another
order has to be preserved. It was the existence of dis-
order that drew us into both India and Egypt, and it
is fear of disorder recurring if we leave that keeps us

DISORDER COMPELS INTERVENTION 437

there. It was the anticipation of disorder which Russian
influence might cause which drew us into Tibet in 1904.
It is a similar anticipation of the disorder which Chinese
action may bring about that is causing even the pacific
Lord Morley to sanction the assembly of troops on the
Tibet frontier in 1910. In none of these cases have we
ever really wanted to intervene. We have intended, and
we have publicly and solemnly declared our intention, not
to intervene, or, if we have to intervene, to withdraw
immediately. But yet the impulse comes. Somehow we
have to intervene ; somehow we have to stay. And not
only we find this, but other great nations find the same.
Practical statesmen find nothing so disturbing to their
wishes and intentions as contact with a weak, unorderly
people. They try for years to disregard their existence,
but in the end, from one cause or another, they find they
have to intervene to establish order and set up regular
relations — they are, in fact, driven to establish eventual
harmony, even if it may be by the use of force at the
moment.

Yet all the time they feel that there is a delicate mean
to be observed in these matters. If they think only of
order and nothing of individualization they will find those
among whom they are preserving order impelled against
them. This balancing of order and freedom, of associa-
tion and individualization, is always the difficult task. It
is our trouble now in India, though it may be parenthetic-
ally noted that in isolated and secluded Tibet there is far
less freedom for the individual than in Bengal under our
alien rule, and that there is less freedom in a native State
than in a British province in India, for we try in India
as in Egypt to give the individual all the play we can
within the limits of order.

That there is a strange force driving us on, and that
it is impelling us in the direction of freedom with union,
or of the one through the other, is, then, a reasonable
assumption to make. And if this is so, we are not merely
drifting along on a mere tendency — we are being driven

438 A FINAL REFLECTION

onward by a forceful impulse. If, then, we find that the
direction in which we are thus being impelled is towards
what is, in itself, obviously good and desirable, should we
not be wiser, instead of standing stubbornly athwart the
impulse, to throw our whole selves in with it, to immerse
ourselves in it, to let it permeate us through and through,
and to utilize our intellects to give this general impetus
practical, definite effect ?

Instead of fostering isolation, acquiescing in seclusion,
and encouraging unneighbourliness in Tibet, in Afghanis-
tan, and all along our frontier, would it not be better
to work whole-heartedly with the great World-Impulse
towards more and more intimate union combined with
ever-increasing freedom ? Independence, indeed, we may
respect, but surely not isolation. To individuality we
may allow the fullest play, but hardly to unsociality.

Further, recognizing that forceful impulses mean flux
and movement, and that therefore we can never expect
finality, should we not place less and less faith in settle-
ments and treaties, and repose increasing trust in personal
contact, flexible and adaptable, ever ready for change in
details, but ever deepening and tightening the essential
attachment of man for man ? It is through personalities
that individuality is brought out, association fostered, and
harmony attained. It is through living human beings
that suspicions are dispelled, jealousies melted, prejudices
dissolved, and peoples united. The Tibet Treaty was
good ; would not an agent at Lhasa have been better ?

APPENDIX

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING
TO SIKKIM AND TIBET.

AVhereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely
desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good under-
standing which now exist between their respective Empires ; and whereas recent
occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is
desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with
the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty
the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject
and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, His Excellency the
Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G.,
G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial
Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor.

Who having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and
finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention
in eight Articles :

Article I. — The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the
mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its
affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into
other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan
frontier and follows the above-mentioned waterparting to the point where it
meets Nepal territory.

II. — It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over the
Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the
internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through
and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the
State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or
informal, with any other country.

III. — The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of
China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I., and to
prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

IV. — ^The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the
Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a, view to a mutually
satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

V. — The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved
for further examination and future adjustment.

VI. — The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement
the method in which official communications between the British authorities in
India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII. — Two Joint-Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification
of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the

439

440 APPENDIX

other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and
discuss the questions which by the last three preceding Articles have been
reserved.

VIII.— The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be
exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

REGULATIONS REGARDING TRADE, COMiVIUNICATION, AND
PASTURAGE TO BE APPENDED TO THE SIKKIM-TIBET CONVENTION

OF 1890.

I. — A trade-mart shall be established at Yatung, on the Tibetan side of the
frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from
the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers
to reside at Yatung to watch tlie conditions of British trade at that mart.

II. — British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to
and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung, and to rent houses
and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods. The
Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes
shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence
shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India
under Regulation I. to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to
sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in
kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their
business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexatious
restrictions. Sucli British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their
persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and
Yatung, where rest-houses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British
subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.
III. — Import and export trade in the following Articles —

arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or
narcotic drugs,
may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only
on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to
impose.

IV. — Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in Regulation
III., entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or
vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five
years commencing from the date of the opening of Yatung to trade, but after the
expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariflf may be mutually agreed upon
and enforced.

Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at
which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be
engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

V. — All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or from
Tibet, must be reported at the Customs Station there for examination, and the
report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the
goods.

VI. — In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or
Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal
conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer.
The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where
there is a divergence of views the law of the country to which the defendant
belongs shall guide.

VII.— Despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial
Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the
Chinese frontier officer, who will forward them by special courier.

APPENDIX 441

Despatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tihet to the Government
of India will be handed over by the Chinese frontier officer to the Political Officer
for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

VIII. — Despatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be treated
with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the
officers of each Government.

IX.— After the expiration of one year from the date of the openingj of Yatung,
such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such
Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the
general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such
Regulations.

General Articles.

I. — In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sikkim and
the Chinese frontier officer, each official shall report the matter to his immediate
superior, who iu turn, if a settlement is not arrived at between them, shall refer
such matter to their respective Governments for disposal.

II. — After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations
shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these
Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both
sides for this purpose, who shall be empowered to decide on and adopt such
amendments and extensions as experience shall prove to be desirable.

III. — It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be appointed
by the British and Chinese Governments under the 7th Article of the Sikkim-
Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the final settlement of the
questions reserved under Articles 4, S, and 6 of the said Convention ; and the
Commissioners thus appointed having met and discussed the questions referred
to, namely : Trade, Communication and Pasturage, have been further appointed
to sign the agreement in nine Regulations and three General Articles now
arrived at, and to declare that the said nine Reg^ations and the three General
Articles form part of the Convention itself.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TIBET, SIGNED AT
LHASA ON THE 7th SEPTEMBER, 1904.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of
the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1 893, and
as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements ; and
whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations
of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British
Government and the Government of Tibet ; and whereas it is desirable to restore
peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and diffi-
culties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention
with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel
F. E. Younghusband, CLE., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His
Britannic Majesty's (Jovernment and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-
Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council,
of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical
and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

I. — The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Con-
vention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as
defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars
accordingly.

II. — ^The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade-marts, to
which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse
and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

442 APPENDIX

The Regulations applicable to the trade-mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-
Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter
be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Govern-
ments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade-marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan
Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes,
and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade-marts under similar
conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.— The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved
for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint
fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British
Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. — The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other
than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. — The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and
Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to
the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at
each of the other trade-marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan
Agent, who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British
trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to
the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be
responsible for the due delivery of such communications, and for the transmission
of replies.

VI. — As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in
the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty
obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Com-
missioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay
a sum of pounds five hundred thousand — equivalent to rupees seventy -five lakhs —
to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may
from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British
districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees
one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginningfrom the 1st January, 1906.

VII. — As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for
the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade-marts specified in Articles II.,
III., IV., and v., the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi
Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade-marts have been
effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII. — The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and
remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication
between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX. — The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of
the British Government, —

(a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged

or otherwise given for occupationj to any Foreign Power ;
(6) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs ;

to Tibet ;

(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights,

shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any
Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being
granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the
British Government ;

(e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or

assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign
Power.

APPENDIX 443

X. — lu witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed
thereunto the seals of their arras.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa this 7th day of September in the year of our
Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date,
the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

Declaration Signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-
General OP India, and Appended to the Ratified Convention of
7th September, 1904.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having ratified
the Convention which was concluded at Lhasa on 7th September, 1904, by Colonel
Younghusband, CLE., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, on
behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government ; and by Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the
Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three
monasteries Sera, Dre-pung and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials
of the National Assembly, on behalf of the Government of Tibet, is pleased to
direct as an act of grace that the sum of money which the Tibetan Government
have bound themselves under the terms of Article VI. of the said Convention to
pay to His Majesty's Government as an indemnity for the expenses incurred by
the latter in connection with the despatch of armed forces to Lhasa, be reduced
from Rs. 75,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000 ; and to declare that the British occupation
of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instal-
ments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article, provided, however, that
the trade-marts as stipulated in Article II. of the Convention shall have been
effectively opened for three years as provided in Article VI. of the Convention ;
and that, in the meantime, the Tibetans shall have faithfully complied with the
terms of the said Convention in all other respects.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA, DATED
27th APRIL, 1906. (RECEIVED IN LONDON, 18th JUNE, 1906.)

{Batifications exchanged at London, July 23, 1006.)

Whereas His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the
Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations
of friendship and good understanding which now exist between tlieir respective
Empires ;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognize the validity of or to carry into
full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of the 17tb March, 1890,
and Regulations of the 6th December, 1893, place the British Government under
the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said
Convention and Regulations ;

And whereas a Convention of ten Articles was signed at Lhasa on the 7th Sep-
tember, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy
and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on the 11th November,
1904, a Declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain
conditions being appended thereto ;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of Cliina have resolved
to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have for this purpose named
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Sir Ernest Mason Satow,
Knight Grand Cross'of the Most Distinguished Order, St. Michael and St. George,
His said Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His
Majesty the Emperor of China ; and His Majesty the Emperor of China ; His

444 APPENDIX

Excellency Tong Shao-yij His said Majesty's High Commissioner and Plenipo-
tentiary, and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs ;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, and
finding them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the
following Convention in six Articles :

Article I. — The Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by Great
Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in Knglish and Chinese are attached to the
present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification
stated in the Declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting
Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the
due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

Article II. — The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex
Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Govern-
ment of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere
with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

Article III. — The concessions which are mentioned in Article IX. (rf) of the
Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are
denied to any State or to the subject of any State other than China, but it
has been arranged with China that at the trade-marts specified in Article II. of
the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph
lines connecting with India.

Article IV. — The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and
Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and
annex thereto, remain in full force.

Article V. — The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have
been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being
any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

Article VI. — This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both
countries, and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months
after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, 1907.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle
by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States
on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to
prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard
to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective
Plenipotentiaries, to wit :

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right
Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias ;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court
Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good
and due form, have agreed on the following :

Arrangement concerning Tibet.

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights
of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her
geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo
in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following Arrangement :

APPENDIX 445

Article I. — The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the terri-
torial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal
administration.

Akticle II. — In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of
China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations
with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This
engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial
Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in Article V. of the Convention
between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the
Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906 ; nor does it
modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article^, of
the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of
Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the
Dalai Lama, and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet ; the Govern-
ments of Great Britain and Russia engage as far as they are concerned, not to
allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Arrangement.

Article III. — The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not
to send Representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV. — The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor
to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions for railways,
roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

Article V. — The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of
Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain
or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Annex to the Arrangement between Great Britain and Russia

CONCERNING TiBET.

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy
and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention
of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley
by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the
indemnity of 2,600,000 rupees, provided that the trade- marts mentioned in
Article II. of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and
that in the meantime the Tibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all
respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood
that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any
reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration,
the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of
views on this subject.

INDEX

Agents, or local officers, best method
for instructing, 8-12 ; their position
now, 407

Ampthill, Lord, and Major Young-
husband, 332

Anglo- Russian agreement, 378

Arundel, Sir Arundel, 332

Ayi-la Pass, 331

Bailey, Lieutenant, 176, 330

Batang, Tibetan attack on Boman
Catholics at, 47 ; revolt against the
Chinese at, 368 et seq.

Behar Eaja, the, his capture, 4, 13

Bell, Mr., the political officer in Sik-
kim, 388 ; interview with the Dalai
Lama, 392

Benckendorff, Count, the Eussian
Ambassador, on Bussian interest in
Tibet, 80 et seq.; on the British
advance to Tibet, 144, 253

Bengal trade with Tibet, 22, 42 et seq.,
103

Bethune, Captain, at Khamba Jong,
125 ; in the Chumbi Valley, 157 ; his
death at Gyantse, 189, 191

Beynon, Major, 203

Bhutauese, the, aggression of, 5 et
seq. ; Mission to, 26 ; their attitude
towards the Lhasa Mission, 169, 170,
172; friendly support of, 206, 267,
336, 364

Bismarck, Prince, 431

Blanford, Mr., 43

Bliss, Captain, wounded at the storm-
ing of Gryantse Jong, 210

Bogle, Mr. : his mission to Lhasa, 4 et
seq. J- his character, 8, 9; Warren
Hastings' instruction to, 9, 10 ;
journey through Bhutan, 12 ; inter-
view with Tashi Lama and Lhasa
deputies, 13 et seq.; result of the
Mission, 24-26, 427 ; his death, 26

Bourdillon, Sir James, Acting Lieu-
tenant-Governor of Darjiling, 102

Bower, Mr., explorer of Northern
Tibet, 40

Brahmaputra (Sanpo) Biver, survey of,
40, 234, 328, 329, 330

Brander, Colonel : in command of the
Mission escort at Tangu, 109 ; recon-
naissance to the Karo-la, 185 ; attack
on the Mission at Gyantse, 187 et
seq., 225

Bretherton, Major, D.S.O., supply and
transport officer : appreciation of,
99, 333 ; preparing for the advance,
112, 151, 153; drowned, 237

Brodriok, Eight Hon. St. John (Lord
Midleton), Secretary of State for
India, 189, 337-341, 350

Buddhism, 166 ; birthplace of Buddha,
240; in Lhasa, 309; the Tibetan
religion, 315 et seq.

Burmese Convention, 77, 296

Burney, Lieutenant, at the storming of
Gyantse Jong, 218

Butterflies in Sikkim Valley, 105

Calcutta, Bogle's death at, 26 ; the
Dalai Lama's visit to, 394

CampbeU-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 286

Campbell, Colonel, at the storming of
the Gyantse Jong, 217, 218

Campbell, Lieutenant, and the Chinese
High Commissioner, 343

Candler, Edmund, Daily Mail corres-
pondent, wounded by the Tibetans,
178

Cavagnari, Sir Louis, his murder at
Kabul, 77, 236

Chaksam, occupation of, 234 ; fight
between the Chinese and Tibetans
at, 391

Chamberlain, Eight Hon. Joseph, 418

Chandra Shamsher Jang, Maharaja,
Prime Minister of Nepal, 134; his
advice to the Tibetans, 135, 186

Chang, Mr., Chinese High Commis-
sioner of Tibet : his diplomatic

447

448

INDEX

insistence and military activity in
Tibet, 342 et seq., 353, 356; signs
the Trade Eegulations, 361 ; the
Dalai Lama visits Peking^ 383, 385

Chao, Colonel, the Chinese delegate,
142, 154

Chao Erh-feng, Chinese Eesident for
Tibet, 362 ; defeats the Tibetans at
Batang, 371 et seg.y goes to Chiamdo,
388 ; his conduct impeached, 422

Chao Erh-hsun, Viceroy at Hankow,
362

Chefu Convention, 46

Chiamdo, Chinese military force arrive
at, 375 ; agreement between the
Chinese and the Dalai Lama at,
388

Chigyab Kenpo (Lord Chamberlain),
235, 242

China : her position and influence in
Tibet, 18, 22, 28, 34, 39, 114, 321,
421 et seq. ; Tashi Lama's death
at Peking, 26; the Nepalese driven
back by, 30 ; her desire to keep
foreigners from Tibet, 43 et seq.;
Chefu Convention, 46 ; the Sikkim-
Tibet Convention with Great Britain,
50 et seq., 439-441 ; the boundary
difficulty, 58, 59 ; and Bussia, 72,
80 ; the Burmese! Convention, 77 ;
attitude towards the Lhasa Mission,
86 et seq.; protest against the
advance to Lhasa, 143, 144; and
the negotiations at Lhasa, 263 et
seq.; obstructive attitude after the
Tibetan Treaty was signed, 342 et
seq., 362 et seq. ; and the payment
of the Tibetan indemnity, 348 et
seq. ; and the evacuation of the
Chumbi Valley, 354 et seq.; Trade
Begulations, 359 et seq.; Tibet within
her sovereignty, not her suzerainty,
364; puts down Tibetan revolt at
Batang, 368 et seq. ; reduces Derge
and Chiamdo, 374 et seq. ; the
Dalai Lama visits Peking, 384 ;
Tibetans' fear of, 387 et seq. ; Chinese
troops in Lhasa, 388 et seq.j deposi-
tion of the Dalai Lama, 899 et seq.j
convention with Great Britain, 443,
444

Ching, Prince, describes the Tibetan
character, 139

Chisul, 235

Chumalhari Mountain, 116, 160, 161

Chumbi Valley, 133, 139 ; the march
through, 155 et seq.; on the reten-

tion of, 256 et seq., 295 ; evacuation
of, 354
Churchill, Lord Randolph, 47
Conventions : Chefu, 46 ; between
Great Britain and China, 50, 439,
443 ; between Great Britain and
Tibet, 441 ; between Great Britain
and Eussia, 444
Cooper, Colonel, attack on Tibetan

position, 224
Craster, Captain, death of, 210
Cromer, Earl of, on the result of the

Mission, 325
Curzon, Viscount, Viceroy of India
his instructions to Major Young
husband, 11, 96, 97, 124, 142
attempts to communicate with the
Tibetans, 66, 72 ; and Nepal, 134
interview with Major Younghusband
on his return, 332, 333; newspaper
criticisms, 430, 433

Dalai Lama, the, 5, 48 ; his dealings
with Eussia, 67, 74, 820, 377, 378 ;
refusal to negotiate, 139, 140, 184 ;
204 ; desires a peaceful settlement,
211 ; objects to Mission going to
Lhasa, 238; gives present of silk,
241 ; flight from Lhasa on the
Mission's approach, 268, 269, 279,
281, 877; journeys to Peking, 380
et seq. ; interview with Sir John
Jordan, 383, 384 ; returns to Lhasa,
385, 887 ; Chinese excesses, 386 et
seq.; appeal to the British, 386,
395 ; thanks Lidian Government for
their generous treatment, 387 ; flight
from the Chinese at Lhasa, 391 ;
interview with Mr. Bell at Darjiling,
392 ; arrival at Calcutta, and inter-
view with the Viceroy, 394 ; returns
to Darjiling, 395; deposed by the
Chinese, 399 et seq.

Dane, Sir Louis, Foreign Secretary,
100, 328, 382; appointed British
delegate, 360

Darjiling, 47 ; scenery and description
of, 100-103 ; the Dalai Lama's flight
to, 392

Deb Judhur, the Bhutanese Chief,
his aggressive conduct, 13

Derge, Chinese reduction of, 874

Dharm, Eaja of Bhutan, friendship
for England, 183, 205

Diaya, Chinese occupation of, 376

Donchuk-la, frontier pillar at, 59

Dongste, 183

INDEX

449

Dorjieff, Envoy Extraordinary from the
Dalai Lama of Tibet to the Czar of
Russia, 67, 68; his influence with
the Dalai Lama, 154, 165, 269, 320,
377

Dover, Mr., the Sikkim engineer,
116

Dunlop, Major Wallace, wounded at
Tuna, 178

Durand, Sir Mortimer, Foreign Secre-
tary, 40

Easton, Lieutenant, 192

Edward VII., King : Major Young-
husband's audience with, 333 ; his
personality, 428

Elles, Sir Edmond, 151

Elliott, Sir Charles, Lieutenant-Gover-
nor of Bengal, and the frontier
question, 60, 64, 94, 103

Everest, Mount, 117

Feng, Chinese Aroban, his murder by
the Tibetans, 368-370

" Flag, the Viceroy's," 334

Forbes, Major, Cecil Rhodes' instruc-
tions to, 10

Forrest, Mr., botanist, 370

Franklin, Dr., 196

Eraser, Sir Andrew, 332

Frontier, difficulties as to demarcation
of, 51 et seq.

Puller, Major, in command of the
mountain battery, 208, 219, 225

Fuller, Sir Bamfylde, and the sedition
in Eastern Bengal, 410, 414

Gantok, the capital of Sikkim, 60, 61,

64, 106
Garrett, Mr., 152
Garstin, Lieutenant, killed at Gyantse,

194
Gartok, new mart at, 329, 330
Gesub Rimpoche, the Regent, at Lhasa,

18, 19, 23; and Turner's Mission,

27, 29
Giagong, assertion of British rights at,

71, 110
Giri, 111
Gnatong, Tibetan attack on, 48, 49 ;

Mission force assembled at, 153 ;

description of, 359
Goffe, Consul-General, 869
Gow, Mr., Chinese Sub-Prefect at

Gyantse, 343 et seq. ; his withdrawal,

346

Grant, Lieutenant, the storming of
Gyantse Jong, 219

Grey, Sir Edward, and the Chinese
influence against the British, 344 et
seq. ; on payment of indemnity, 352
et seq. , 433 ; and Chinese sovereignty
over Tibet, 397, 398, 425

Gurdon, Lieutenant, the storming of
Gyantse Jong, 218

Gurkha, Raja of Nepal, aggressiveness
of, 19, 21, 25

Gurkhas, the, their gallantry at
Gyantse, 187 et seq., 210, 219 ; turn
the Tibetan position, 224, 225 ; 1792
invasion of, 322 ; their excellent
behaviour at Lhasa, 327

Gyantse, Manning at, 34 ; proposal
for an Agent at, 87, 140 ; the
Mission's arrival at, 180 et seq.;
description of, 182 ; attack on the
Mission at, 187-190; Ta Lama and
Tongsa Penlop arrive at, 211 et seq. ;
the storming of Gyantse Jong, 216
et seq. ; return journey from Lhasa
to, 328

Hadow, Lieutenant, 161

Hamilton, Dr., his mission to Bhutan,

26
Hamilton, Lord George, 139
Hastings, Warren, Governor-General

of India : his policy with the

Bhutanese and Tibetans, 5 et seq.,

93, 141 ; Tashi Lama's letter to, 5, 6 ;

instructions to Bogle on his Mission

to Bhutan, 9, 10 ; sends Missions to

Bhutan and Tibet, 26 et seq. ; sad

ending to his work, 31
Hayden, Mr., the geologist, 123, 156,

172, 183, 337
Hedin, Sven, the Swedish traveller, 40 ;

expulsion from Tibet, 344, 434
Himalaya Mountains, 100, 104, 105 ;

Mission cross the, 160, 161
Ho Kuang-Hsi, Mr., Chinese delegate,

71; at Yatung, 90; at Giri, 111;

arrives at Khamba Jongpen, 113 ;

interview with White, 113, 114 ;

interview with Major Younghusband,

117, 121 ; reoaUed, 131
Hodgson, Captain, crosses the Karo-

la Pass, 186
Holdich, Sir Thomas, 41
Hooker, Sir Joseph, the botanist, 43,

.105
Humphreys, Captain, wounded at the

storming of the Gyantse Jong, 210
29

450

INDEX

Ibbetson, Sir DenzU, 332

Iggulden, Major, Chief Staff Officer,
151 ; at Lhasa, 807

India, the G-Qvernment of, 1, 2 ; the
aggression of the Bhutanese, 4, 5 ;
Bogle's Mission to Tibet and its
result, 8-25 ; trade with Tibet, 16,
22, 23, 53, 54, 86 ; reason for cessa-
tion of intercourse with Tibet, 30, 31 ;
Manning's visit to Lhasa, 33 et seq_. ;
Bengal's efforts to trade with Tibet,
42 et seq. ; Tibetan aggressiveness,
47, 49 ; the Convention with China
and its result, 50 et seq. ; the frontier
difficulty, 58 et seq. ; securing the
treaty rights, 66 et seq.; negotia-
tions with Russia, 79 et seq.; Home
Government's views as to Tibet, 84 ;
Mission to Tibet sanctioned, 85 et
seq.j start of the Mission, 99 ;
journey from Simla to Khamba Jong,
100 et seq. ; help from the Nepalese
Government, 132, 133 ; advance to
Gyantse sanctioned, 139-141 ; pro-
tests by China and Eussia, 144-148 ;
journey from Darjiling to Chumbi,
149 161 ; the fight near Tuna, 173-
179 ; at Gyantse, 182 et seq. ; the
advance to Lhasa, 223-250 ; terms
of negotiations of the treaty, 251 et
seq. ; the treaty concluded, 289-306 ;
the return of the Mission, 325-334 ;
the results, 335-341 ; negotiations
with China, 342-366, 397 et seq.j the
attitude of the Tibetans, 367-406 ;
on centralization and the responsi-
bihty of the Government in, 407-415

Insect life in the Himalayas, 105

James, Sir Evan, 75

James, Mr., 152

Jelap-la Pass, 47, 49 ; erection and
destruction of a boundary pillar, 58,
59 ; Mission cross, 154

Jit Bahadur, Captain, his help in the
negotiations, 267 et seq.

Johnston, E. P. (From Pehing to Man-
dalaii), visits the Dalai Lama, 381

Jo Khting Temple, 316

Jones, Captain, death from malaria, 4

Jordan, Sir John, Ambassador at
Peking, 345 ; on Chinese hostility
to the treaty, 346, 347 ; negotiations
with China, 360, 363 ; interviews
with the Dalai Lama, 383, 384;
leaves Peking, 397

Journal de Saint Petersbourg, 67

Kala Tso, 197

Kamba-la Mountain, 234

Kangma, massing of Tibetan troops
near, 186, 209 ; the Mission's first
fortified post, 196

Kangra-la Pass, 116

Karo-la Pass, Tibetan attack on the
Mission at, 185 et seq.

Kashmir compared with Tibet, 323

Kawaguchi, the Japanese traveller,
307 ; Three Years in Tibet, 311

Kazi, Ugyen, Bhutanese Agent in Dar-
jiling, 66, 67

Kelly, Colonel, 149

Keimion, Captain, 67

Khamba Jongpen and the frontier
incident, 71, 110 ; refuses to send
supplies, 112 ; brings presents from
the Lhasa delegates, 113

Khamba Jong, proposal to negotiate
at, 86, 88, 91, 110, 130; arrival of
Mission at, 112, 116 et seq. ; with-
drawal of Mission from, 150, 151

Kiangka, Chinese occupation of, 376

Kinchinjunga Mountain, 102, 116

Kitchener, Lord, 96, 332

Kuoh Behar, Tibetans' attack on, 4;
position of, 13

Lamas, the, at Lhasa, 15 et seq., 37,
309 et seq. See also Dalai, Tashi,
Ta

Lamsdorff, Count, and Russia's atti-
tude towards Tibet, 68, 202, 378

Landon, Mr. Pereival : Lhasa, 182 n.,
190, 234

Lansdowne, Marquess of, and the Con-
vention with China, 51 ; and the
reported agreement between Bussia
and China, 73 ; and Eussia on the
Tibet question, 79 et seq., 85, 144,
145, 201, 253, 255, 395 ; the object
of the Mission, 141 ; and the Chinese
Government, 143 ; and the Tibetan
indemnity, 348, 349

Le Mesurier, Captain, Political Officer,
171

Len, Amban, 393

Lengtu, Tibetan occupation of, 47, 48

Lepchas, the, 106, 107

Lewis, Mr., death of, 172

Lhasa, Bogle's visit to, 15 et seq. ;
Manning's visit to, 37, 38; with-
drawal of Mission to, 47 ; the Chinese
Eesident at, 50 ; delegates from, 111,
122, 129 ; Mission's arrival at, 250 ;
the negotiations, 263 et seq.; flight

INDEX

451

of Dalai Lama from, 268, 279, 291,

390 ; the treaty concluded, 289 et

seq. ; iilipressions at, 307 et seq. ;

Convention of 1904 confirmed, 342 ;

China sends more troops to, 390

et seq.
Lhi-ding Depon, 168
Li, Major, 159
Liang-tun-yen, President of the Wai-

wu-pu, 398
Litton, Mr. Consul, and the Tibetans,

370
Lye, Major, wounded at Gryantse, 208

Ma, General, 216

Macaulay, Colman, Secretary of the
Bengal Government, 46 ; secures
Chinese permit for Mission to Lhasa,
47, 103 ; his death, 47

Macdonald, Brigadier - General, com-
mander of the Mission military force,
140 ; arranging for the advance, 151 ;
Darjiling to Chumbi, 152 et seq. ; at
Phari, 159 ; at Tuna, 160, 173 ; dif-
ficulty of communication, 169 ; fight
with the Tibetans, 177, 178; retires
to Chumbi, 185, 192, 203 ; marches
for Gyantse, 208, 209 ; durbar,
214 ; storming of Gyantse Jong, 216
et seq., 228 ; the advance to Lhasa,
223 et seq. ; occupation of Chaksam,
234 ; arrival at Lhasa, 250 ; as to
time for Mission to return, 289 ; the
treaty concluded, 303 ; his apprecia-
tive speech, 307 ; the return from
Lhasa, 325 et seq.

Maogregor, Sir Charles, 77

Macpherson, Mr., 102, 332

Magniac, Vernon, 203, 318, 330

Manning, Dr. : his career, 33 ; his visit
to Tibet, 33 et seq. ; at Gyantsej 35 ;
arrives at Lhasa, 37-40 ; interview
with the Grand Lama, 37

Marindin, Mr., the Commissioner of
Darjiling, 102, 169

Markham, Sir Clements : Mission of
Bogle, 5, 8, 9, 13, 16, 23, 26; and
Colman Macaulay, 47

Mesaager Offidel, Bussian newspaper,
69

Mezhow Mishnies, 44

Minto, Earl of, Governor-General of
India, and Manning, 33; and the
Tashi Lama, 377 ; on the flight of
the Dalai Lama, 392

Missions to -Tibet, account of. See
Bogle, Turner, and Younghusband

Mitter, Mr., 303

Mongolia and Russia, 74, 75 ; character
of the Mongols, 313

Moorcroft, Mr., explorer of Western
Tibet, 40

Morley, Mr. (afterwards Viscount),
Secretary of State for India, on the
situation at Gyantse, 347 ; on the
payment of the Tibetan indemnity,
350, 352 ; and the evacuation of the
Chumbi Valley, 356, 358 ; and China,
865, 397, 398, 402, 425; an appre-
ciation of, 413, 433

Muller, Max, 897, 398 ; his interviews
with Chinese Councillor Natung,
400, 401

Murray, Major, 8th Gurkhas, at
Gyantse, 187, 188, 196 ; storming of
the Gyantse Jong, 217

Nagartse, Mission arrives at, 225
Nathu-la Pass, 331

National Assembly, the. See Tibetans
Natung, Chinese Grand Councillor,

and Max Miiller, 400
Nepalese, the, invade Tibet, 21, 22, 30 ;

defeat by the Chinese, 30 ; and India,

84 ; assistance to the British Mission,

132 et seq., 170, 206, 268 et seq.;

and China, 864
Ngpak-pas, the, or miracle-workers,

316
Niani, monastery of, 209
Nolan, Mr., Commissioner of Darjiling,

62, 166
Norbaling, the Dalai Lama's palace,

393
Novae Vrem/ya, Bussian newspaper, 68

O'Connor, Captain, artillery officer and
Tibetan scholar, 97 ; and the Jongpen
of Khamba Jong, 110 ; interview
with the Lhasa delegates, 113 ;
Tibetan friendliness to, 137, 172
241, 328, 367; arranging for the
Mission's advance, 151, 153 ; on the
attitude of the Lhasa monks, 159,
166; interview with the Tibetan
leaders, 162, 163, 178; visits Dongste
Monastery, 183 ; Tibetan attack on
Gyantse, 187 ; bravery at storming
of Palla, 194, 195, 283 ; occupation
of the Nagartse Jong, 228 ; release
of prisoners, 307 ; at Lhasa, 309 ;
warm reception by the Tashi Lama,
380 ; and the Chinese, 345 ; and the
treaty provisions, 376

452

INDEX

O'Conor, Sir Nicholas, Minister at

Peking, 55
Odessa Novosti, Eussian newspaper,

67
Orleans, Prince Henri de, 40
Ottley, Captain, attacks the Tibetans,

190 ; appreciation of, 193

Palkhor Choide Monastery, 182

Palla, village of, storming of, 194

Parr, Captain, Customs Commissioner
at Yatung, 90, 112, 153, 155

Parsons, General, Inspector - General
of Artillery, 216

Paul, A. W., negotiated Trade Begula-
tions of 1893, 51, 108

Pearson, Captain, at Gyantse, 196

Peking, Tashi Lama's death at, 26

From Peking to MoMdala/y, by B. F.
Johnston, 381

Peterson, Major, and the storming of
Palla, 194

Phari, Bogle's reception at, 12 ; Man-
ning's visit to, 38 ; as a possible trade
mart, 52, 86 , duty on goods at, 54,
55 ; Mission's arrival at, 157 ; Lhasa
representatives at, 159 ; Tongsa Pen-
lop at, 203

Pimus excelsus growing in the Teesta
Valley, 105

Potala Palace, the, at Lhasa, descrip-
tion of, 37, 250, 265 ; treaty signed
at, 801

Prain, Colonel, now Director of the
Botanical Gardens, 128

Bangpur, annual fair at, 26
Eavenshaw, Colonel, British Besident

in Nepal, 134, 206
Bawling, Captain, explorer of Western

Tibet, 208 ; the return journey from

Lhasa, 829, 881
Bayleigh, Lord, on the colouring of

water, 238
Beid, Colonel, at Gyantse, 208
Ehodes, Cecil, his instructions to his

agents, 10
Bhubarb, gigantic (Bheum nobile), in

Sikkim, 109
Einohengong as a trade-mart, 270
Eoman Cathohcs, treatment of, by the

Tibetans, 47, 868
Bong Valley, 186
Eoosevelt, Mr. Theodore, 193
Bosebery, Earl of, on the Mission, 286
Bow, Major, at Phari, 158, 159; a

successful engagement, 189

Eussia : her influence in Tibet, 22, 29,
320, 377,421 ; the Tibetan envoy to
67, 72, 165 ; and China, 73 ; protest
against the advance into Tibet, 144
negotiations with the Indian Govern
ment, 79 et seq., 201, 202, 255, 295
Anglo-Bussian agreement, 878, 444

Byder, Captain, Survey Of&oer : a
difficult march, 156 ; visits the
Dongste Monastery, 183 ; the return
from Lhasa, 328, 329; reward for
survey work, 380

Salisbury, Marquess of, on the Tibet
question, 66

Sanpo. See Brahmaputra

Sarat Chandra Das, the Bengali tra-
veller, explores Tibet, 40, 807, 319

Satow, Sir Ernest, British Minister at
Peking : Bussia's agreement with
China, 73 ; and China on the Tibetan
question, 138, 189, 208, 256, 385 ;
and the Tibetan indemnity, 848,
350

Sawyer, Captain, interview with Tibetan
leaders at Guru, 163, 164

8chii/rz, Beminisoences of Carl, 431

Sera Monastery, 312

Shahzad Mir, 97

Sheng, the Chinese Besident, 51

Sheppard, Captain : appreciation of his
woyk, 192 ; his bravery, 194, 218

Shigatse, Tashi Lama's reception of
Bogle at, 13 ; Turner's reception at,
27 ; sacked by the Nepalese, 80 ; the
Abbot of, 137

Sikkim, the Convention between Great
Britain and China as to, 50, 51, 439-
441 ; StTcTcim wnd Bhutan, by Mr.
White, 106, 107 ; vegetation of, 109;
Tibetans' claim to, 244

Spectator, The,onthe Mission to Lhasa,
480, 434

Spencer, Herbert, on the Lepchas, 107

Stewart, Colonel J. M., 203

Sutlej, survey of the, 330

Szechuan, 362, 368

Ta Lama, the, afterwards Tsarong
Sha-pe, at Shigatse, 210 ; his inter-
views with Major Younghusband on
the Tibetan question, 211, 225 et
seq., 238 et seq., 249,250, 282 et seq.j
his disgrace, 267 ; and the indemnity,
353, 354; and the Trade Eegulationg,
361 ; his position at Lhasa, 393

Tang, Mr., 342

INDEX

453

Tang-la, 331

Tangru, 109

Tashi Lama, the, and the Bhutanese
aggression, 5 ; letter to Warren Hast-
ings, 5, 6 ; interview with Bogle, 13
et seq. ; character, 15, 316 ; journey
to Peking and death, 26 ; reincarna-
tion of, 27, 28 ; sends delegates to
Major Younghusband, 123, 125 ; his
reception of Captain O'Connor, 330 ;
and Sven Hedin, 344 ; visits India,
377

Tashi Lumpo Monastery, the Abbot of
the, interview with Major Youngs
husband, 125-129

Tea trade with Tibet, 52

Teesta Elver, 104, 105

Tibetans, the (see also Younghusband,
Major) : reasons for Indian interfer-
ence, 1 et seq. ; position, 2 ; religion,
3, 240, 315, et seg. ; Bogle's Mission,
4-26; seizure of KuohBehar, 4; trade
with India, 16, 22 ; Chinese influence,
18, 22, 28, 34, 39, 88, 114 ; Turner's
Mission, 26, 31 ; Nepalese invasion,
30 ; communication ceases, 31, 42 ;
Manning's visit to Lhasa, 33-41 ;
fresh efforts to trade with, 42 et seq.;
withdrawal of Mission to, 47 ; ag-
gressiveness of, 47, 49 ; Sikkim-Tibet
Convention between Great Britain
and China, 50, 439-441; difficulties
of fixing frontier with India, 51, 71,
72 ; remove frontier pillar, 59 ; their
view of the Treaty, 62, 63, 71 ; send
envoy to Eussia, 67 et seq.; negotia-
tions with Eussia, 79 et seq.; British
Government's views, 84-88; Major
Younghusband's Mission to Lhasa,
86 et seq.; their treatment of India,
92 ; protest against the advance of
the Mission, 111 et seq., 125 et seq.,
153-156, 164-168, 174 ; advice of the
Nepalese to, 185, 136 ; shed the first
blood, 177, 178; attack the Mission
at Gyantse, 187-190 ; the Karo-la
fight, 190; the storming of Palla,
194, 195 ; further discussions at
Phari and Gyantse, 203-206,209-216;
the storming of the Gyantse Jong,
216 et seq.; power of the National
Assembly, 235, 236, 240, 244, 245,
268 et seq., 282 ; and Sikkim, 244 ;
the terms of the Treaty, 251-262,
441-443 ; the negotiations, 263-288 ;
the Treaty concluded, 289-300 ; sig-
nature of Treaty in the Potala, 801-

306; impressions at Lhasa of, 307-
321 ; social habits, 818 ; attitude of
the Chinese to, 321-323, 362-366;
Mission returns from Lhasa, 325 et
seq.; results of the Mission, 335-
841, 415 et seq.; payment of in-
demnity, 848-354; British evacua-
tion of the Chumbi Valley, 354-359 ;
Trade Eegulations, 360, 361, 440;
attitude since 1904 of, 367 et seq.;
difficulty of direct relations with,
424 et seq.

Ti-mi-fu, the, 37

Ting Ling Monastery, 373

Ti Eimpoche, the Eegent of Tibet :
negotiations with the Mission, 268 et
seq.; his character, 310, 325; and
the indemnity, 367

Tongsa Penlop, Maharaja of Bhutan:
interviews with Major Younghus-
band, 203, 204 ; his character, 204 ;
negotiations at Gyantse, 209 et seq.;
negotiations with the Mission at
Lhasa, 263 et seq.; places Bhutan
under British Protectorate, 336

Townley, Mr., British Charg6 d' Affaires
at Peking, the Chinese and the Tibetan
question, 88, 129, 130

Townsend, Meredith, Asia and Europe,
434

Trade between Tibet and India, 16, 22,
28, 52, 86 et seq.; new regulations,
360, 361, 440

Trimpuk Jongpen, the, arrives at
Phari, 169 ; interview with Major
Younghusband at Tuna, 170, 204

Tsamdang Gorge, fight at, 180

Tsarong Sha-p6. See Ta Lama

Tse-chen Monastery, 209

Tuna, Mission at, 160, 162 et seq.;
General Macdonald brings more
troops to, 173

Tung-yig-Chembo, the Chief Secretary :
interviews with Major Younghus-
band, 211, 225 et seq.; his bad influ-
ence, 241

Turner, Captain Samuel, 5 ; Mission to
Tibet, 26 et seq., 427; appreciation
of his work, 30

T'u Ssu office abolished, 372

Victoria, Queen, and the Tibetans, 319

Waddell, Colonel, Chief Medical Officer
and archsBologist : his knowledge of
Lamaism, 240, 309 ; collects Tibetan
manuscripts, 337

454

INDEX

Wade, Sir T., British Ministfer at
Peking, 77

Walker, Lieutenant, his bravery at
Gyantse, 194, 195

Walsh, Mr., Deputy Commissioner at
Darjiling, 102; appointed Assistant
Commissioner, 152 ; at Gyantse, 204 ;
and the occupation of the Ohumbi
Valley, 256 ; his good work, 309 ;
return to India, 331

Walton, Captain, ornithologist, 123,
172, 183 ; at Gyantse, 187 ; his natural
history collections, 337

Wen, Chinese Assistant Besident at
Lhasa, interview with the Dalai
Lama, 388, 389

White, Claude, Political Ofi&oer in Sik-
kim, visits the mart at Yatung, 53 ;
Tibetan disregard of the Treaty, 54
et seq.j the frontier difficulties, 58-
60 ; withdrawal to Gantok, 61, 62 ;
sent to Giagong to reassert British
rights, 70 et seq., 120; appointed
Joint Commissioner, 87, 88 ; Mission
to Tibet starts, 97 ; Sikhwn omd
Bhutam, 106; obstruction by the
Tibetans, 110, 111 ; arrives at Khamba
Jong, 112 ; interview with the Lhasa
officials, 113, 114 ; as to advancing to
Lhasa during the winter, 149 ;
friendly reception by the Bhutanese,
172, 204, 267, 336 ; and the indem-
nity, 282 ; at Lhasa, 309; the return
of the Mission, 328, 329, 331

Wilton, Mr. . China Consular service,
124 ; at Gyantse, 187 ; return of the
Mission, 328-831 ; and the Trade
Begulations, 361

Witte, M., and the Tibetan envoys, 69
Wood, Lieutenant, Survey Officer, 829
Wu-tai-shen, 381

Yamdok Tso Lake, its beauty, 232
Yatung, trade-mart at, 52, 53, 63, 86
Younghusband, Major, Besident at
Indore, appointed Commissioner,
87, 90 ; his career and experiences
in India, 95, 97 ; the Viceroy's in-
structions, 96 ; arrangements for the
Mission, 97-99 ; leaves Simla, 99 ;
journey to Darjiling, 100-102; leaves
Darjiling, 108; journey to Tangu,
104109; White's interview with the
Jongpen of Khamba Jong at Gia-
gong, 110-115 ; journey to Khamba
Jong, 116 ; interviews with the
Chinese and Tibetan delegates, 117

et seq., 131 ; interview with the Abbot
of the Tashi Lumpo Monastery, 125-
129 ; help from the Nepalese, 132,
133 ; Tibetan dilatoriness and signs
of war, 137 ; returns to Simla to
confer with the Indian Government,
138 et seq.; advance decided on,
140, 146 ; Chinese and Eussian pro-
tests, 143-146, 201-203 ; journey
through the Teesta Valley, 152 ; Mis-
sion assembled at Gnatong, 153 ; on
the Jelap-la Pass, 154, 155 ; Tibetan
obstruction, 155 ; arrival at Phari,
157, 159 ; interviews with Lhasa
monks and their demeanour, 159 ;
crossing the Himalayas, 160, 161 ;
at Tuna, 161 et seq. ; critical inter-
views with Lhasa officials, 162 et
seq. ; the Bhutanese become allies,
170-172 ; advance continued, 173 ; a
last palaver, 174 ; first bloodshed,
176-179; fight at the Tsamdang
Gorge, 180 ; arrival at Gyantse, 182 ;
demeanour of the inhabitants, 182 ;
Tibetan attack on the Mission at
Gyantse, 187, 188 ; result of Colonel
Brander's fight at the Karo-la,5189,
190, 191 ; Indian Government sanc-
tion the advance to Lhasa, 191, 221;
occupation of Palla village, 194, 195 ;
Tibetan attack on Kangma fortified
post, 196; returns to Chumbi for
consultation, 196-203 ; interview with
the Tongsa Penlop at Phari, 203-
207 ; returns to Gyantse, 208, 209 ;
Tibetan opposition, 209 ; receives the
Ta Lama and other delegates, 211-
216 ; the storming and capture of
Gyantse Jong, 217-220; proclamation
issued, 222 ; the fight at Karo-la
Pass, 223, 224 ; arrival at Nagartse,
225 ; a deputation of the Ta Lama
and other delegates, 225-232 ; cross-
ing of the Kamba-la Pass, 234 ;
occupation of Chaksam, 234 ; letter
from the National Assembly, 235;
drowning , accident, 237 ; another
interview with Ta Lama and other
Tibetan delegates, 238-250; arrival
at Lhasa, 251 et seq. ; terms of the
Treaty, 252-262, 441-443 ; the nego-
tiations, 263 et seq. ; description and
impressions of Lhasa, 265, 807 et
seq.; the Treaty concluded, 289 et
seq.; Treaty signed in the Potala,
801-806 ; the attitude of the Chinese
to the Tibetans, 821-324 ; the return

INDEX

455

from Lhasa, 325 et seq.; and Lord
Ourzon, 832, 333 ; interview with King
Edward, 333 ; the Viceroy's Flag,
384; results of the Mission, 335-341,
415 et seq. ; negotiations with China,
342 et seq. ; the indemnity question,
351 et seq. ; evacuation of the
Chumbi Valley, 354 et seq. ; the
Chinese forward movement, 362-366 ;
on the attitude of the Tibetans since
1904j 367 et seq. ; on centralization

and- defects of present system, 407-
415 ; a final reflection, 430 et seq.

Yu-Tai, Imperial Resident in Tibet,
88 ; his character, 263 ; interview
with Major Younghusband, 263 et
seq. ; Chinese instructions to, 342 ;
dismissal from office, 345

Yutok Sha-p^ : interviews with Major
Younghusband, 225 et seq., 268 et
seq., 282 et seq.; and the trade-marts
367

-THE END

BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PEINTEKS, GUILDFORD

AFGHANISTAN-—

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "India and Tibet; a history of the relations which have subsisted between the two countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910; with a particular account of the mission to Lhasa of 1904"

See other formats